AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1939-194 5 SERIES TW O NAV Y VOLUME I ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY, 1939-1942
AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1939-194 5 SERIES I (ARMY ) I. To Benghazi . By Gavin Long.* II. Greece, Crete and Syria. By Gavin Long.* III. Tobruk and El Alamein . By Barton Maughan . IV. The Japanese Thrust . By Lionel Wigmore.* V. South-West Pacific Area—First Year . By Dudley McCarthy . VI. The New Guinea Offensives . By David Dexter. VII. The Final Campaigns . By Gavin Long. SERIES 2 (NAVY ) I. Royal Australian Navy, 1939-42 . II. Royal Australian Navy, 1942-45 .
By G. Hermon Gill. * By G . Hermon Gill.
SERIES 3 (AIR ) I. Royal Australian Air Force, 1939-42 . By Douglas Gillison. II. Air War Against Japan 1943-45 . By George Odgers .* III. Air War Against Germany and Italy, 1939-43 . By John Herington.* IV. Air Power Over Europe, 1944-45 . By John Herington . SERIES 4 (CIVIL ) I. The Government and the People, 1939-41 . By Paul Hasluck.* II. The Government and the People, 1942-45 . By Paul Hasluck . III. War Economy, 1939-42. By S. J. Butlin . * IV. War Economy, 1942-45 . By S. J . Butlin . V. The Role of Science and Industry . By D . P . Mellor. SERIES 5 (MEDICAL ) I. Clinical Problems of War. By Allan S . Walker. * II. Middle East and Far East. By Allan S. Walker.* III. The Island Campaigns . By Allan S. Walker . * IV. Medical Services of R .A .N . and R.A .A .F. By Allan S . Walker . * Published.
The writers of these volumes have been given full access to official documents , but they and the general editor are alone responsible for the statements and opinion s which the volumes contain.
ROYAL AUSTRALIA N NAV Y 1939-194 2 by
G. HERMON GIL L
CANBERR A AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
First published in 1957
WHOLLY SET UP, PRINTED AND BOUND IN AUSTRALIA B Y THE GRIFFIN PRESS, ADELAIDE. REGISTERED AT THE G.P .O . ADELAIDE FOR TRANSMISSION THROUGH THE POST AS A BOOK .
CONTENT S Page
Preface .
xi
Chronology
xvii
Chapter
1 BETWEEN THE WARS
1
2 THE EVE OF WAR
45
3 AUSTRALIA STATION TO JUNE 1940 .
65
4
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS TO JUNE 1940 .
13 0
5
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
142
6 AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST, JUNE DECEMBER 1940 . 24 7 • 7 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN 28 5 ▪ 8 GREECE . 29 9 9 CRETE
•
10 THE MIDDLE EAST
•
11 MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF 1941 12 AUSTRALIA STATION 1941 13 WAR IN THE FAR EAST 14 SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA 15 ABDA AND ANZAC
• ▪
•
17 PRELUDE TO VICTORY
363 39 0 41 0
4 • 46 . 48 4 •
16 DEFEAT IN ABDA
33 6
•
51 3 57 3 62 5
APPENDIXES : 1 List of Ships in the R .A.N . in 1920 . 2 3
Flag Officers commanding Australian Squadron fro m 1919 to 1945 . ▪ Abbreviations
INDEX .
65 0 65 1 65 3 65 5
V
ILLUSTRATION S Page
The First H .M .A .S's Australia, Sydney and Melbourne 46 The Second H .M .A .S . Australia 46 H .M .A .S. Hobart . 47 47 H .M.A .S. Adelaide . Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, R.N. 78 Rear-Admiral J . G . Crace, R.N. . 78 Crew of a 4-inch Gun at H.M.A .S . Rushcutter 78 H .M .S . Ramillies in Fremantle Harbour 79 Convoy "US .3" in Fremantle Harbour 79 Italian Motor Vessel Romolo 14 2 Survivors from Romolo being taken on board Manoora 14 2 Italian Submarine Uebi Scebeli 14 2 H .M .A .S . Sydney in Alexandria Harbour . 14 3 Italian Cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni 14 3 Captain J. A . Collins, R .A .N. 17 4 Members of Sydney's Crew looking through Shell-hole 17 4 Lieut-Commander R . Rhoades, R .A .N ., with Captain H . M . L . Waller, R.A.N. . 17 5 Captain H . L. Howden, R.A .N . . 17 5 Temporary Pier and Tug Queen at Berbera 20 6 H .M.A .S. Stuart with Mediterranean Fleet 206 Italian Destroyer Artigliere 20 7 German Raider Pinguin . 20 7 Floating Enemy Mine off Australian Coast . 23 8 Federal Steam Navigation Company's Steamer Cambridge . 23 8 Survivors from Cambridge picked up by H.M .A .S. Orara . 23 9 Survivors from Port Brisbane on Board H.M .A.S . Canberra . 23 9 Minesweeper H .M .A .S . Goorangai . 27 0 British Phosphate Commission's Steamer Trienza 27 0 German Raider Komet . 27 1 German Raiders at Emirau Island . 27 1 Survivors from Nauru Island in Steamship Nellore 302 Damage by German Raiders' Gunfire at Nauru 302 German Air Attack on H .M .S . Illustrious and H .M .A .S . Perth 303 H .M .A.S. Perth on Patrol off Crete 303 Mediterranean Battle Fleet at Sea . 31 8 H.M .A .S . Perth, H .M .S . Ajax and H .M .S. Orion 31 8 H.M.A .S . Voyager, off Suda Bay . 31 8 The Cruisers at Matapan, 28th March 1941 . 31 9 Captain Sir Philip Bowyer-Smyth, R .N ., with Officers on Bridge of Perth . 31 9 31 9 Captain H. B . Farncomb, R.A .N . . 319 Captain H . A. Showers, R.A .N . . Vi
Pag e
H .M .A.S. Nizam entering Alexandria Harbour Norwegian Tanker Ketty Brovig German Motor Vessel Coburg . H.M .A.S. Yarra in Persian Gulf H .M .A.S. Waterhen Georgic and Glenearn aground in Suez Bay . . Crew of H .M.A .S . Hobart bathing in Bitter Lake . Boat's Crew from H .M .A .S . Perth, in Alexandria Harbour Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham inspecting H .M .A .S. Hobart's Communications Division . Manning Anti-aircraft Gun, H.M .A .S. Perth . Water Polo, from an Australian Destroyer . H.M .A.S. Kanimbla alongside Italian Oiler Bronte . H.M.S. Barham blowing up, 25th November 1941 . German Mine on Deck of H .M .A .S . Uki Launching of H.M .A .S. Arunta Scene in Galley of H .M .A .S. Sydney Scene in Engine Room of a Cruiser . Launching a "Walrus" from Catapult . Naval Auxiliary Patrol . Members of the Australian Naval Board 1941 . . . New Entries marching at H .M .A .S . Rushcutter H.M.A.S. Sydney leading Convoy "US .12a" . H.M .A .S. Bungaree—Minelayer—in Sydney Harbour . Captain J . Burnett, R .A .N . . Survivors from Kormoran German Raider Kormoran • Dutch Merchant Ship Straat Malakka . Japanese Battleship Yamato . . Wounded from U.S .S . Marblehead at Tjilatjap . . Motor Schooner Lakatoi . . Norah Moller on fire in Banka Strait . Admiral Thomas C. Hart, United States Navy . Vice-Admiral Conrad Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy . Japanese Bombing in Gaspar Strait . Boom Working Vessel, Darwin . H .M .A .S. Vendetta in tow of H .M .A .S. Ping Wo . H .M .A.S . Perth . Darwin 19th February 1942 . Transport Zealandia on Fire . Darwin 19th February 1942 . Railway Jetty during Raid . . Darwin . Oil Tanks on Fire . H .M .A.S . Nizam alongside H .M .A .S . Manoora Netherlands East Indies Cruiser Java . vii
31 9 366 366 367 367 39 8 398 39 8 39 8 39 9 39 9 39 9 39 9 43 0 43 0 43 1 43 1 446 446 446 446
447 447 44 7 447 46 2 46 2 46 3 463 494
494 495 49 5 49 5 55 8 55 8 55 9 55 9 59 0 59 0 59 1 591
MAP S Page
Western Pacific after Allotment of Mandates, 191 9 Oceans of the World and Trade Routes, 193 9 Limits of the Australia Station, 1939 German Merchant Ships in Netherlands East Indies Manoora's Search for Romolo Area of Activities of H .M .A.S. Perth, September 1939-February 1940 Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea
• • • • • •
Strategic Situation in Mediterranean, June 1940 Battle of Calabria—the Decisive Phase . Cape Spada Action—Track Chart of H .M .A.S . Sydney Area of Activities of H.M.A.S . Hobart, August 1940 Area of Activities of H .M .A.S. Australia in Dakar Operation . The Aegean Sea Operations in Eastern Mediterranean, November 1940 . Activities of German Raider Orion, June-September 1940 Area of Activities of H .M .A .S. Adelaide, September 1940 German Surface Raiders in Indian Ocean, 1939-1940 Nauru, Raider Attacks . Egypt-Cyrenaican Coastline The "Lustre" Convoys to Greece, March-April 1941 The Battle of Matapan, 28th-29th March 1941 . Night Action at Matapan—H .M .A .S. Stuart's Track Chart Withdrawal from Greece . The Battle of Crete . Withdrawal from Crete , Activities of German Raiders in Indian Ocean, January-May 1941 The Red Sea—Defeat of Italy, January-March 1941 . Area of Operations of H .M .A .S. Parramatta at Fall of Massawa Area of Operations of H .M.A.S . Yarra at Iraq Area of Naval Operations in Syrian Campaign Area of Operations of H .M .A .S's Kanimbla and Yarra The Tobruk Ferry . Northern Screen Coastwatcher Stations, December 1941 The A .I.F. Convoys The Sydney-Kormoran Action The Japanese Attacks, 8th December 1941 Australia—Reinforcement of North and Islands ABDA and Anzac Areas . Reinforcement of ABDA . Japanese Attacks on Rabaul . Japanese Progress in the Western Pacific
• • • • • • •
3 46 52 106 120 13 1 148 16 1 17 8 18 9 20 2 21 6 23 2 23 8 26 1 26 5 27 2 27 8
29 1 304 • 31 1 • . 31 4 328 347 35 8 369 37 2 •
37 3 37 7
.
37 9 38 6 39 1
• •
42 3 43 5 45 5 485 51 2
520 526 • 543 . 557
Page
Exodus from ABDA . 57 6 Japanese Raid on Darwin 59 1 Four Phases of the Java Sea Battle .604- 5 Battle of Bantam Bay 62 0 Situation, Java Area, 28th February-1st March 1942 62 3 Retreat to Australia—Approximate Positions of H.M .A . Ships, 4th March 1942 63 0 Indian Ocean, Movements, early March 1942 63 5 The Far Eastern Scene, beginning of March 1942 . 63 9
lx
PREFAC E HE naval volume of the Official
History of
Australia in the War of
T 1914-18 was concerned with the activities and achievements of a n
infant navy . This volume and its successor are concerned with the activitie s and achievements of the same navy, but one grown from infancy t o youth and well on the way to maturity. The infant navy of the earlie r war was conceived from a union of ideas . From the earliest days of British settlement in Australia, its people have been reminded at interval s of their dependence upon sea communications, and of the importance t o them of sea power . On the morning of the 24th January 1788, within a few hours of the arrival at Botany Bay of Captain Phillips' First Flee t bringing with it Australia's original settlers, there was considerable alarm in the ships at the appearance of two strange vessels in the offing standin g in for the land . It was thought that they were hostile Dutch frigates sen t to dispute the British landings . Actually they were the French ships of La Perouse. Relations were friendly, and there was no trouble . It was , however, the first of a series of alarms which impressed the Australia n mind, and which to an extent influenced the development of the Australia n defence policy on the lines it followed up to the outbreak of the secon d world war . The victory of Trafalgar in 1805 secured British control of the sea and ushered in the long period of the Pax Britannica . During the first hal f of the nineteenth century no threat to Australia appeared . Daily the su n rose over peaceful Pacific waters, and often gilded the masts and spar s of ships of the British East Indian squadron, lying in Port Jackson . Australia then formed part of the East Indian station, whose flag office r controlled the movements of these ships . In times of peace they offere d comforting assurance of protection . But the Australian authorities kne w that in time of war they would probably sail off over the encircling horizo n to duties elsewhere, leaving the Australian coast, in appearance at any rate, undefended . In 1859 (by which time ripples from the distant Crimea had broken on Australian shores, producing a mild scare which constrained Ne w South Wales and Victoria each to acquire a small armed ship for local defence) the Australia station was constituted as a separate Imperia l naval command independent of the East Indian station . The position , however, remained unchanged regarding the ships there based . They formed an Imperial squadron whose duty was not only to provide for th e defence of the Colonies, but, in time of war, to escort treasure ship s sailing for England, accompanying them as far as either the Cape of Goo d Hope or the Horn, both a long way from Australia . The urge grew for Australian-controlled ships for local defence, in addition to thos e of the Royal Navy. There was a natural clash of views between the Imperial and Colonia l governments on this question . The Imperial authorities correctly premised xi
that because the seas are one the fleet should be one . They held that the successful conduct of war at sea demanded one central control o f naval forces, and that the best contribution by the colonies would b e a subsidy. The Australian authorities, while accepting the premise an d being willing and eager to contribute their share towards the defenc e of sea communications and to their own local defence, understandabl y wished to have some say in that defence and in the dispositions of th e forces to which they contributed . Fortunately there was give and take on both sides, though each had its die-hards . The Australians saw the wisdom in the Imperial argument ; the British government and the Admiralty were sympathetic towards Australian aspirations . A continuin g and progressive compromise, speeded by the march of events and th e increasing threat from growing rivals to Britain ' s naval supremacy, provided the solution . During the colonial period the way was paved fo r Australia's naval development by the Governments of New South Wales , Victoria, Queensland and South Australia (in part impelled by war alarm s overseas) establishing their own small naval forces for local defence , under the immediate wing of the Imperial squadron and the overall protection of the far distant British battle fleet . With Australian federation in 1901, and the establishment of a Commonwealth Governmen t responsible for Australian defence, the substitution of ships and men fo r a subsidy, and of an Australian squadron for the Imperial squadron o n the Australia station, became possible. Thus the infant Australian navy of the first world war was conceived , from a union of British and Australian ideas fused by a compromis e which produced a practical plan . In 1909, after ideas and proposals ha d been exchanged for some years, the Admiralty suggested that Australi a should acquire a self-contained fleet unit, owned by Australia and con trolled and administered by the Australian Government through the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board . Its composition should be such that , while manageable (within the Australian budget) in time of peace, an d capable of effective independent operation as a balanced force in time o f war, it could also be used as a component part or, divided, as component parts, of other forces under Admiralty control . The fleet unit, acquired by Australia in the years immediately preceding the first world war, consisted of one battle-cruiser, three light cruisers, six destroyers and tw o submarines, with the necessary auxiliaries . The original intention wa s that this fleet unit should be one of three forming an "Eastern" or "Pacific " fleet of the British Empire ; but events overtook plans (as was to happe n again in the period of which this volume tells) and only the Australia n unit materialised . There is interest in the parallel between this Britis h "Fleet unit" conception of 1909, a self-contained fast striking force buil t around a battle cruiser, and that of the American "Task force" of 1941 , built around an aircraft carrier . xii
There were four main essentials to the success of the fleet unit conception . To meet natural Australian ambitions, its ships had to be owne d and controlled by Australia, and manned as far as possible by Australia n officers and seamen . Because its main value at all times would be it s constant and instant readiness to cooperate with the Royal Navy, eithe r as a separate squadron or as a component part or parts of other forces , its regulations had to resemble the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, and the standard of training, discipline and general efficienc y in ships, officers, and men, had to be maintained on an equality with that of the Royal Navy . As a corollary, it was most desirable that, s o far as was possible, there should be joint training with H .M . Ships . An d finally, there must be a readiness on the part of the Australian Government and people to transfer strategic and tactical control of the squadro n or of units thereof to the Admiralty in time of war . These essentials were met . Because of lack of training it was no t possible at the outset to man the ships entirely with Australians, an d throughout the first world war the proportions were approximately 8 0 per cent R .A .N . and 20 per cent R .N . officers and men . Training centre s were, however, established in Australia on the British model, a naval college for embryo officers and a training ship (later establishment) fo r ratings, and the gap was virtually closed in the years between the wars . In its governing regulations, its methods and standards of training, discipline, and general conduct, the R .A .N . has adhered closely to the R.N . pattern ; and the desired standard of equality with the older navy has a t all times been maintained . Joint training in peace time was not easy t o arrange, but whenever opportunity offered, with the visit of a Britis h squadron to Australian waters, combined exercises were carried out ; an d a program of cruiser exchange, though interrupted by economic difficulties, gave valuable results . There was also a continuous interchange of officers, petty officers, and men, which is of great benefit to both navies . As to unified control in time of war, Australia accepted in principl e the theory that the indivisibility of the seas demanded, as far as possible , an undivided naval control . The basis of the naval defence of Australi a remained fundamentally unchanged from the days of earliest settlement local responsibility for the Australia station (first as part of the Eas t Indian station) and ultimate dependence on the integrity of world wid e sea communications . The instrument guaranteeing this integrity was th e power radiating from the British battle fleet outwards through th e squadrons and ships of the various naval stations, of which the Australi a station was one . Australia recognised that it might be necessary in war t o concentrate power by reinforcing one station at the expense of others and , to meet that contingency, agreed in both world wars (though not withou t occasional rightful criticism) to transfer control of the squadron, or o f individual ships, to the Admiralty . It is again of interest that this recogni-
tion of a vital principle and readiness to act according to it was an exampl e in unity of naval command followed (after some expensive fumbling ) by the Allies during the second world war . It was a concomitant of victory. Australian acceptance of the theory of the indivisibility of the seas, an d the consequent need for unified control of naval forces, has greatl y widened the scope of this history . Australian ships formed part of Britis h (and later of Allied) naval forces in widely separated areas . Their movements and activities were determined by a variety of influences in bot h the political and military fields, and emanating from Australian, British , Allied, and enemy sources . Because of this it has been necessary largely to sketch in the pattern of the whole war, politically, economically, geographically and militarily, on a world background ; and against this t o trace the Australian naval story in as great detail as practicable . Only s o could any attempt be made to preserve a just proportion in depicting th e part of the Australian navy in relation to the whole . To discuss an d determine the influence of sea power on the progress and outcome of th e war; the way that power was wielded by the respective participants ; and the contribution made by Australia through the Royal Australian Navy , is the object of this work . All available sources of information have been drawn upon withou t restraint, and the author has been given generous assistance in all quarter s where it was sought . Sources include records of the Australian Wa r Cabinet and Advisory War Council, and of the Admiralty and the Australian Naval Board ; reports of commanders-in-chief and of commandin g officers of individual ships ; the war diaries and letters of proceedings o f ships and establishments ; personal notes and written or verbal account s of experiences ; and Allied and enemy documents . Recourse has also been made to published works, reference to which is, in each instance, recorded in footnotes . The author has been untrammelled by censorship, and give n complete freedom in comment and the expression of opinion, for whic h he alone is responsible . This book has been written for the general reader rather than for the naval expert, so that technicalities, excepting those widely and readil y understood, have been avoided as far as possible ; and sometimes terms running counter to professional practice have been used . For example, courses and bearings have been given in compass points instead of i n degrees . Reference is made above to the assistance received in general . In particular, the author is indebted to a number of individuals who hav e given him much of their time and thought, and much encouragement . It is not possible to over-estimate his indebtedness to Mr Gavin Long , the General Editor of the series of histories of which this is a part . H e has been a never-failing inspiration ; a most forbearing editor, offering sympathetic understanding of problems, stimulating comment, and wise xiv
advice . Of Mr Long's efficient and ever-helpful staff, Mr John Balfou r has been a painstaking assistant, notably in putting the many necessar y final touches to the typescript to make it ready for the printer, and i n preparing biographical footnotes . Mr Hugh Groser has added greatly to the value of the book with his excellent charts ; and Miss Mary Gilchrist has smoothed the path with many thoughtful secretarial attentions . In the field of research, valuable help was received from Mr H . H . Ellmers and his staff in the records section of the Admiralty ; from Commander Geoffrey Rawson, who for some months acted in Londo n as a personal link with the Admiralty ; and from Mr J . M . Luke, officerin-charge of Naval Historical Records, Navy Office, Melbourne, an d members of his staff, especially Mr J . K . Ware and Mr L . G . Norman . A most necessary contribution was made by Mr L . I. Parker, whos e arduous task was the preparation of the index . Much encouraging help , by precept and example, was received from fellow authors of the histories . Most valuable comments and suggestions have been given by thos e upon whose forbearance, knowledge and experience, the author has draw n as readers of his draft chapters . A careful reading and checking agains t records was done by Mr Luke and his staff at Navy Office . All the chapters were read by members of the Historical Staff at the Admiralty, who checked them for factual accuracy in matters concerning ships and operations of the Royal Navy, with extremely useful results . The late Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin read Chapters 1 to 11 inclusive, and his penetratin g comment was of the greatest help. His death terminated a kindly servic e and robbed the author of a wise mentor and esteemed friend . All th e chapters have been read with diligent scrutiny by Commander R . B . M . Long, R .A .N. (Retd), who most kindly broke into his too-limited leisur e to study them, and whose sage counsel has been of inestimable benefit . A number of others generously read small portions which they were peculiarly qualified to discuss . Finally, the author is indebted beyond measur e to his wife, who uncomplainingly listened to his reading of the developin g volume in and out of season, and who always encouraged him wit h pertinent criticism and thoughtful suggestions . The author himself had some years sea experience as an apprentic e and deck officer in the British Merchant Service . The 1914-18 war years , spent wholly at sea, made him familiar with many of the scenes of thi s history, in particular the Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Persian Gulf , the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the Australia station, under war conditions—even though they lacked the intensity of the conditions in the war with which this history deals . He settled on shore in Australia i n the nineteen-twenties, and joined the Royal Australian Naval Voluntee r Reserve while practising as a journalist, and as a writer largely o n nautical matters . He was mobilised when war broke out in 1939, an d spent most of the war in the Naval Intelligence Division, where his work , xv
though mainly in Navy Office, Melbourne, took him all over Australia , to New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and finally, on historical research , to naval headquarters at Colombo, Alexandria, the Admiralty, and th e United States of America . G .H .G. Middle Park, Melbourne, 25th March 1957 .
xvi
CHRONOLOG Y Events described in this volume are printed in italic s
1921 13 Dec
1922 6 Feb 1930 22 Ap r 1935 18 Ju n 1936 25 Mar
1938 29 Sep 1939 22 May 1 Sep 3 Sep 1940
9 Jan 10 May 10 Jun 12 Jun 22 Jun 19 Jul
27 Sep Oct-Nov 11-12 Nov 1941 28 Mar Mar-Apr 22 Apr 25-27 Apr 1 Jun 8 Jun 22 Jun
Four Power Treaty signed between British Common wealth, U.S.A ., France and Japan. (AngloJapanese Alliance ended ) Washington Naval Treaty signed between Britis h Commonwealth, U .S .A ., Japan, France and Italy London Naval Treaty signed between Washingto n Treaty Powers Anglo-German Naval Agreement signe d Second London Naval Treaty concluded betwee n British Commonwealth, U .S .A ., France. (Japan and Italy failed to adhere ) Munich Agreement signed between Britain, Germany , France and Italy "Pact of Steel" (Axis) between Italy and German y Germans invade Poland Britain and France declare war on Germany . R . G . Menzies broadcasts that Australia is at wa r First A .I .F . contingent embarks Mr Churchill becomes Prime Minister of U .K . Italy declares war H .M .A .S. "Manoora" intercepts Italian ship "Romolo" France signs armistice terms with German y H .M .A .S. "Sydney " sinks Italian cruiser "Bartolomeo Colleoni " Tripartite Pact : Germany, Italy and Japan German raider "Pinguin" lays mines off Australia Battle of Taranto Battle of Cape Matapan 6th Australian Division arrives in Greec e Embarkation of troops from Greece begins Australian and New Zealand units from Greece arriv e in Crete Embarkation from Crete completed Allied invasion of Syria opens Germans invade Russi a xvi i
7 Oct 19 Nov 7-8 Dec 8 Dec 10 Dec 1942 16 Jan 23 Jan 15 Feb 19 Feb 27 Feb 17 Mar
Mr Curtin becomes Prime Minister of Australi a H .M .A .S. "Sydney " sunk in action with German raide r Japanese attack Malaya and Pearl Harbou r Australia at war with Japan 5 p .m. H .M .S . "Prince of Wales " and H.M.S. "Repulse" sunk Formation of Combined Chiefs of Staff Committe e Japanese force attacks Rabaul Singapore surrendered to Japanese force s First Japanese air raid on Darwin Battle of Java Sea General MacArthur arrives in Australi a
xviii
CHAPTER
1
BETWEEN THE WAR S 1919 and 1939 profound economic and geographic change s B ETWEEN affected both the Australian nation and its navy ; Australia's development, accelerated by war, was continued in a post-war world beset b y problems which imposed increased and widened responsibilities . As early as the Imperial Conference of 1911, the implications of th e birth and growing strength of naval forces in the Dominions had bee n stressed by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. He said that , if the action of fighting forces in different parts of the Empire were deter mined by divergent views about foreign policy, the Empire would no t consent to share the resulting liability, the risks of which it could no t gauge ; and that " the creation of separate fleets has made it essential tha t the foreign policy of the Empire should be a common policy " . One of th e first fruits of this conclusion was that the Dominion Ministers were consulted at this Conference before the renewal for ten years of the AngloJapanese Alliance, the original treaty having been entered into in 190 2 and the renewal effected in 1905 without previous concurrence by th e Dominions . After the 1914-18 war came recognition of equality of status as between all the partners of the British Commonwealth . Speaking of the Dominions at the 1921 Imperial Conference, the British Prime Minister, Mr Lloy d George, said : "They have attained full national status, and they now stan d beside the United Kingdom as equal partners in the dignities and responsibilities of the British Commonwealth ." This new status, with the late r recognition that it was for the parliaments of the several parts of th e Empire upon the recommendations of their respective governments t o decide the nature and extent of any warlike action which should be taken by them,' was to exercise an influence in Australia's naval policy. On the economic side large war debts had been incurred, and a prunin g of defence expenditure was considered necessary to economic recovery , especially in Britain . There was a demand that governments spend mone y on improving social conditions rather than on armaments . It was accepte d that the defence of the Empire depended on the British Navy . But although , at the end of the war in 1918, Britain occupied a greater pre-eminence over European powers than at any previous time and her navy ranke d ahead of those of the United States and Japan, she was no longer in the strong position she had hitherto employed . With the end of the war in sight, British capital ship construction ha d ceased except that Britain went on building the big battle cruiser Hood.2 This was to have been one of four, but work on the other three was 1 Resolution No . 2, Imperial Conference, 1923 . HMS Hood, battle cruiser (1920), 42,100 tons, eight 15-in and twelve 5 .5-in guns, 31 kts ; sunk by German battleship Bismarck, Denmark Strait, 24 May 1941 .
2
BETWEEN
THE WARS
1916-24
stopped in October 1918, the contracts later being cancelled . Immediate post-war estimates made no provision for building warships, and not unti l 1921 were tenders for four capital ships invited . Both the United States and Japan, on the contrary, had considerabl e building programs in hand, started in 1916 and making good progress . The new American and Japanese capital ships were to mount 16-inch guns , whereas Hood was the only post-Jutland ship in the British fleet, wher e the heaviest gun mounted was the 15-inch . By 1924 Britain would posses s only fourteen first-class battleships, totalling 336,350 tons to the twenty one of 722,000 tons under the American flag, while Japan would hav e eight of 252,000 tons ; Britain would have four battle cruisers with th e heaviest guns, of 121,000 tons, to the six of the United States of 261,00 0 tons ; the Japanese would possibly have six completed in 1924 and had , moreover, decided soon to lay down eight capital ships . Anxiety about the decline of British naval power was reflected i n Australia, a reflection sharpened by the fact that it was obvious that th e centre of naval strategy now lay in the Pacific, and there were indications that the Pacific might be the scene of the next world war, a naval race having developed between the United States and Japan, eac h of whose fleets had carried out large-scale manoeuvres in Pacific waters . With the United States, Australia, in common with the rest of the Britis h Empire, was on terms of the closest international friendship . With Japan , Britain had a Treaty of Alliance to which Australia was a partner . Some friction had; however, arisen between Australia and Japan on the questio n of the White Australia policy . Moreover, the two countries were no w much closer neighbours than before as a result of the allocation unde r mandate of the former German colonies, Japan having been granted thos e islands north of the equator, while Australia had those to the south . As was stated during the course of debate on the Peace Treaty in the Hous e of Representatives on 17th September 1919, "Australia has taken its frontiers northward to Rabaul, but the frontier of Japan has been brought southward 3,000 miles to the equator, until their front door and our bac k door almost adjoin" . At this stage the Commonwealth Government was basing its nava l policy on the advice contained in the Henderson 3 "Recommendations " of 1911 . The consideration that this policy might require reviewing in th e light of war experience and the post-war situation led to the Government's inviting the Admiralty to send out a naval authority to survey and repor t on the whole question of naval defence . Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe 4 was selected, and arrived in Australia in May 1919, remaining thre e months before returning to England by way of New Zealand and Canada . The results of his survey were embodied in his "Report on the Nava l Mission to the Commonwealth " , which was submitted to the Governor General in August 1919, and in which great stress was laid upon th e *Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, GCB ; RN . B . Worth, Kent, Eng, 20 Nov 1846. Died 12 Jul 1932 . *Admiral of Fleet Earl Jellicoe, GCB, OM, GCVO ; RN . Comd Grand Fleet, 1914-16 ; Ch of Nava l Staff, 1917 ; Governor-General of New Zealand, 1920-24 . B . 5 Dec 1859. Died 20 Nov 1935 .
1919
THE
3
JELLICOE REPORT
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It had been made so in 1935 and 1936 . Then Britain's weakness in the Mediterranean had led to her receiving no practical support durin g the Abyssinian war, and she had been the only country to move a shi p or a man as a deterrent to Italy . But, though active support was not forth coming then, the movement of those ships and men revived the hopes o f weaker Mediterranean countries for the future . It was an echo down three
1940
BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS
149
centuries of "your fleets meeting here" being of admiration to "foreign kingdoms into which reports fly to them daily" . And it was shortly afterwards that the British Government resolved any doubts as to its intentions by stating unequivocally Britain ' s decision to remain in th e Mediterranean in strength ; and that the building up of that strength began . II I For the first ten days after Italy entered the war in June 1940, th e Mediterranean picture was not an unfavourable one for Britain and France . The coastline, except for that of Italy and her possessions—th e Dodecanese, Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica—were Allied or neutral . Allie d responsibility for the defence of the sea was shared mainly on a geographical basis, the French being responsible for the western basin, the Britis h for the eastern . At Gibraltar a British patrol force of one aircraft carrier , Argus, and two cruisers and nine destroyers of the North Atlantic command, kept watch over the Straits . In the western basin the French Flee t comprised the battleships Bretagne and Provence ; the battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg ; four 8-inch gun cruisers of the Algerie clas s and six 6-inch gun ships of the Marseillaise class ; twenty-seven destroyers , including six large vessels of the Tigre and Le Fantasque classes, which were in effect light cruisers ; and thirty-two submarines . The main force , including the four capital ships, was based on Mers el Kebir, with lighte r concentrations at Algiers, Bizerta, and Toulon . There was also a French force under Admiral Godfroy in the Eastern Mediterranean, consisting o f the battleship Lorraine, the 8-inch gun cruisers Suffren, Duquesne, and Tourville, the 6-inch gun cruiser Duguay-Trouin ; the destroyers L e Fortune, Forbin, and Basque ; and seven submarines . The British Mediterranean Fleet consisted of the battleships Warspite—wearing the flag o f the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Cunningham—Ramillies, Roya l Sovereign, and Malaya ; nine cruisers, including Gloucester, Liverpool, Orion, Neptune, and Sydney of the 7th Cruiser Squadron; and the "C " class vessels of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron which was under the comman d of Rear-Admiral Renouf ;4 the aircraft carrier Eagle ; the monitor Terror ; twenty-six destroyers, four of which were detached to the East Indie s Station ; twelve submarines ; and various auxiliary vessels . 5 The main fleet was based on Alexandria, only light forces being at Malta . Vice-Adm E. de F . Renouf, CB, CVO ; RN . Comd HMS Sheffield 1938-40, 3 Cruiser Sqn 1940-41 . B . 1888. e Bretagne, Provence and Lorraine, French battleships (1915-16), 22,189 tons, ten 13 .4-in an d fourteen 5.5-in guns, 20 kts ; Bretagne and Provence severely damaged at Oran by British shel l fire, 3 Jul 1940 ; Provence refitted at Toulon, but again heavily damaged 27 Nov 1942 . Dunkerque and Strasbourg, French battleships (1937-38), 26,500 tons, eight 13-in and sixtee n 5 .1-in guns, 29.5 kts ; ,severely damaged at Oran by British fire, 3 Jul 1940, and further heavily damaged, at Toulon, 27 Nov 1942 . Algerie, French cruiser (1934), 10,000 tons, eight 8-in guns, six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 31 kts; scuttled at Toulon, 27 Nov 1942 . Marseillaise, French cruiser (1937), 7,600 tons, nine 6-in guns, four 21 .7-in torp tubes, 31 kts . Tigre, French destroyer (1926), 2,126 tons, five 5 .1-in guns, six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 35 .5 kts . Le Fantasque, French destroyer (1934), 2,569 tons, five 5 .5-in guns, nine 21 .7-in torp tubes, 37 kts. Duquesne and Tourville, French cruisers (1928), 10,000 tons, eight 8-in guns, six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 33 kts . Duguay-Trouin, French cruiser (1926), 7,249 tons, eight 6.1-in guns, twelve 21 .7-in torp tubes, 33 kts, 4
150
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
1940
The Italian Fleet consisted at this time of six battleships, four of which , Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, Conte di Cavour, and Giulio Cesare, had bee n completed during the 1914-18 war, but had been reconstructed an d modernised—as had Warspite and Queen Elizabeth-class battleships of th e British Navy—and two of which, Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, laid dow n in 1934, were new vessels ; nineteen cruisers, including seven 8-inch gu n ships of the Bolzano, Zara, and Trento classes, and twelve 6-in gun vessels of the Emanuele Filiberto and Condottiere classes, all completed during the pre-war decade ; some fifty destroyers and at least 115 submarines ;s and small craft. The Italian Navy had no aircraft carriers, but could b e strongly supported in the air by the land-based aircraft of the Italian Ai r Force, reputed to number about 2,000 first line machines, with 400 t o 500 in reserve, operating from bases in Italy, North Africa, and the Dodecanese . In June 1940 the main Italian Fleet was based in Italy, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons ? at Taranto and Naples respectively ; with some cruisers at Palermo and destroyers and submarines at Trapani in Sicily , where also, at Augusta, were the two new battleships, carrying out exercise s before taking their place in the fleet . There were light forces at the Dodecanese Islands, and some destroyers and submarines based on Massaw a in the Red Sea . 8 The combined British and French fleets were thus numerically superio r to that of Italy in capital ships and about equal to it in cruisers . Allie d numerical inferiority lay in destroyers and submarines, in which categories they were outnumbered by more than one-third of their total . In genera l the Italians had the important advantage of greater speed in all classe s of surface vessels, and possessed vastly superior air power which could be used from bases ideally situated for attack and defence . Furthermore , Italy's commanding geographical position, by which the Mediterranea n Sea and the fleets of her enemies were divided, would, if exploited wit h energy and determination, have more than offset her discrepancy in capital ships . Le Fortune, Forbin and Basque, French destroyers (1927-29), 1,378 tons, four 5 .1-in guns , six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 33 kts . HMS Warspite, battleship (1915), 30.600 tons, eight 15-in and eight 6-in guns, 24 kts. HMS Royal Sovereign, battleship (1916), 29,150 tons, eight 15-in and twelve 6-in guns, 21 kts . f HMS Terror, monitor (1916), 7,200 tons, two 15-in guns, 12 kts ; sunk by enemy aircraft of Libyan coast 24 Feb 1941 . 6 0n 11 March 1940 Mussolini told Ribbentrop that 120 Italian submarines would be ready th e following May . Ciano Diplomatic Papers (1949) . 7 In the composition of the Italian Fleet a squadron consisted of two or more divisioni, each o f which contained two or three large warships—battleships or cruisers—to which might be adde d one or more squadriglia, each of which consisted of four or more ships of the same type — destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, etc . 6 Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio, Italian battleships (1915-16 ; reconstructed 1937-40), 23,622 tons , ten 12 .6-in and twelve 5.3-in guns, 27 kts . Conte di Cavour and Giulio Cesare, Italian battleships (1913-15 ; reconstructed 1933-37), 23,62 2 tons, ten 12 .6-in and twelve 4.7-in guns, 27 kts ; Conte di Cavour torpedoed by naval aircraft at Taranto, 11 Nov 1940, and badly damaged . Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, Italian battleships (1940), 35,000 tons, nine 15-in and twelve 6-i n guns, 30 kts ; Littorio was in August 1943 renamed Italia ; she was torpedoed (for the thir d time in her career) on 9 Sep 1943, but reached Malta. Bolzano, Zara and Trento, Italian cruisers (1929-33), 10,000 tons, eight 8-in guns, eight 21-i n torp tubes, 32-36 kts ; Zara sunk off Cape Matapan, 29 Mar 1941 ; Bolzano and Trento damage d by British submarines 1942 . E . Filiberto Duca d'Aosta, Italian cruiser (1935), 7,283 tons, eight 6-in guns, six 21-in tor p tubes, 36.5 kts. Condottiere, Italian cruiser (1931-33), 5,000 tons, eight 6-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 37 kts .
1940
THE ITALIAN NAVY
15 1
There were, however, other factors the existence of which, suspecte d outside Italy at the time, was confirmed from Italian sources after th e war : the battle efficiency of the Italian Fleet was weakened by th e country's Mediterranean environment, and by traits inherent in th e Italian character and that of the Fascist regime . It was Fascist policy to build a large navy to impress the world and deter possible enemies . The ships, to a large extent, suffered in design from the "Mediterranean " tradition, being built for speed in comparatively calm waters, lackin g adequate protective armour, and having far too much space devoted t o luxurious quarters for officers ; the bridges of even destroyers and corvette s were covered and built-in for shelter from the elements . There was lac k of encouragement of engineering and scientific development which ha d its effect—the Italian Navy, for example, fought throughout the war with out radar. And the feeling existed that Britain, even if her power in th e Mediterranean was inferior, had enormous reserves upon which to draw , in the lack of which Italy was fighting a defensive war. The Italians wer e particularly hampered in operations by shortage of fuel oil, for lack o f which the big ships, in the later stages of the war, were at times immobilised . For various reasons there was little real fighting spirit or enthusiasm among officers and men of the fleet. Although there was a small bu t powerful core of Fascist minded officers in key places—ambitious me n whose political leanings had gained them recognition and promotio n (Mussolini held the portfolio of Navy Minister)—Fascism had infiltrate d far less into the navy than into any other walk of Italian life, and mos t senior officers from the rank of lieut-commander upwards were staunc h Monarchists, little tainted with Fascism, but torn between a hatred o f Germany and a fear of Communism . The Italian naval officer's feelings towards Britain had, in most instances, been friendly until the Abyssinian crisis . He remembered Britain's aid an d sympathy in the period of the Risorgimento, and the fact that the tw o countries had never been at war ; and he felt that the ties of friendship were strengthened by the "brotherhood of the sea" . But Britain's attitude in the Abyssinian period was incomprehensible to the Italian mind, an d her subsequent inactivity in the face of Germany's provocative action s culminating in the annexation of Austria, caused Italians to feel that they were being driven into German arms, and bitterness grew against Britain . Yet the Italian Navy did not feel that war with Britain was justified ; and when it finally came, many officers believed that their only hope la y in defeat, since they had few illusions about Germany . Discipline in the navy, though superficially strict, suffered from th e characteristics of officers and ratings . The majority of the permanent officers came from the centre and north of Italy, from such towns as Genoa , Leghorn, Venice, Trieste, Florence, Milan, Rome, Turin, and surrounding regions. Among the ratings, the greatest proportion were southerner s —recruited from fishermen, boat-builders, sponge divers and other se a trades predominating in southern Italy—and added to this gulf between
152
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
1939-40
local sympathies was that between the living conditions on board ship , where the luxury of accommodation, furnishings, and food and wine o f the officers contrasted strongly with the lot of the ratings . The officer's manner with subordinates was brusque, and he had little consideration for their welfare ; and punishments of ratings for minor infringements were severely and freely given. The team spirit, never strong among the individualistic Italians, was thus further weakened, and discipline tended t o break down in a crisis . Naval administration was bad, and there was incompetency in organisation which induced cynical apathy among the seagoing forces . Trainin g was sketchy, and never intensive during the war, exercises being cancelle d when the weather was bad and seas were heavy . The movements of al l ships were controlled directly by the Ministry of Marine in Rome, an d commanding officers afloat were seldom allowed to use their own discretion . In actual war operations not only strategy, but tactics, were veste d in the Ministry, where was only the haziest appreciation of what wa s happening at sea, and where the fear of losses was a determining factor . Consequently occasions arose when a commanding officer in superior strength and favourable circumstances was ordered from Rome to retire . Confidence was sapped by lack of faith in reports of Italian naval successes ; reports which were fruits of a general tendency to exaggerate , of which the Italians were aware but which they themselves did nothin g to correct . Finally, the modern Italian Navy—though Fascist training traced Italy's achievements on the seas back to the Roman Empire 's nava l victories, commemorated in the existing fleet in the name of the battleshi p Caio Duilio, as the later victory of Lepanto was in that of her sister shi p Andrea Doria—was not founded until 1861 . There was no long unbroke n line of tradition to inspire confidence and pride . The British Mediterranean Fleet was in an entirely different position . Many of those now manning the ships had seen arduous service in various parts of the world during the 1914-18 war and the intervening years ; an d nine months actual experience and training in the existing conflict lay immediately behind them . The Mediterranean Station, where ships i n peacetime remained in full commission for two-and-a-half years with few changes in their crews, had long been recognised as an ideal training ground . A regular routine had been followed : spring cruises in the wester n basin ; the Central Mediterranean in the summer ; the Aegean and Easter n Mediterranean in the autumn and winter . During the decade leading up to the outbreak of war in 1939 training, especially in night-fighting, ha d increased in efficiency . Previously night-fighting had been looked upon a s something to be avoided, but a change in British naval opinion occurre d in 1929, as a result of a combined memorandum from the Commandersin-Chief of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets urging upon the Admiralty the great advantages of fighting at night in certain circumstances . Writing later of his period as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, fro m 1930 to 1932, Lord Chatfield, who had contributed to this memorandum when Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, recalled that : "A large part of my
1914-39
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM
15 3
time in the Mediterranean was consequently occupied in developing ou r night-fighting efficiency . . . . Never again was it to be possible for an enem y fleet to escape destruction under cover of darkness . On the contrary , night-fighting was to be our great opportunity in another war . We woul d surprise the enemy by our efficiency ."9 Chatfield's second-in-comman d at this time, and his successor as Commander-in-Chief, was Admira l Fisher, with whom those night-fighting exercises were initiated and b y whom they were continued . Fisher's time as Commander-in-Chief, from 1932 to 1937, included the period of the Abyssinian crisis, when th e fleet was on a war footing ; while during the term of his successor, Admira l Pound, l the Spanish Civil War, with its piratical submarine attacks o n merchant ships in the Mediterranean, kept the fleet operating under nearwar conditions . The fleet, therefore, although but lately reconstituted after the dispersa l of its units to other stations during the few quiet months in the Mediterranean preceding the growing Italian threat, was at a high pitch o f efficiency . Most of its officers and men had been trained under three outstanding Commanders-in-Chief in a sea made familiar to them by constan t exercises under all conditions of weather by day and night, so that the y knew the Ionian, the Aegean, and the Levant, far better than did thei r new adversaries . And they were now under a Commander-in-Chief wh o had spent the greatest proportion of his time afloat in the Mediterranean , in the war of 1914-18 and the near-war years from 1934 on . Much of Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham' s service in the first world war was in the Mediterranean as commanding officer of the 890-to n destroyer Scorpion—a ship he commanded for the record period of seve n years, and in which he won distinction at Gallipoli . With his promotio n to captain he commanded destroyer flotillas from 1922 to 1924, and h e had big ship experience in command as captain of H .M .S. Rodney throughout 1930 . In 1934 he was appointed Rear-Admiral Commandin g Destroyers, Mediterranean Fleet . "I see a lot of RA(D) who lies close to us," wrote Fisher, then C-in-C, "and he is a great trump ." Two years later, promoted to vice-admiral, he was commanding the battle-cruise r squadron as second-in-command to Admiral Pound . In June 1939, after seven months at the Admiralty, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief , Mediterranean, when Pound became First Sea Lord. Cunningham was known throughout the fleet as "A .B .C ." . He was o f middle height, with alert eyes, a high broad head, aggressive ears an d jaw, but a humorous mouth . He was intolerant of inefficiency and coul d be uncompromising in speech and approach . As a young destroyer office r he had shown the dash and initiative which were to remain with him an d which, allied to later experience in higher command, were to set the pac e of his direction of the naval war in the Mediterranean . But his enthusiasm Chatfield, The Navy and Defence (1942), p. 240 . 'Admiral of Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, GCB, OM, GCVO . (Comd HMS Colossus at Jutland. ) Director Plans Div, Admiralty 1922-25 ; Second Sea Lord and Ch of Naval Personnel 1932-35 ; C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet 1936-39 ; First Sea Lord and Ch of Naval Staff 1939-43. B . 29 Aug 1877. Died 21 Oct 1943 .
154
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
Jun e
and drive, salted with a puckish humour, were infectious, and inspire d devotion in the fleet, while his humanity earned him the respect alik e of his own men and of the enemy . 2 As his second-in-command, and Vice-Admiral Commanding Ligh t Forces, Cunningham had Admiral Tovey, also a destroyer officer, who fo r the twelve months preceding his appointment in June 1940, had been Rear-Admiral Commanding Destroyers, Mediterranean Fleet . He had commanded the destroyer Onslow at Jutland, when, in a disabled condition, he attacked the German battle cruiser Der.07inger. The greatest part of his time afloat had been spent in destroyers, but, like Cunning ham, he had experience of both operational and administrative directio n ashore, and had big ship experience in command as captain of Rodne y from 1932 to 1934 . A quick thinker, a proved fighter and seaman, he had charm of personality, and a humanity matching that of his Commander-in-Chief . The confidence existing between the two leaders was shared with th e Admiralty—by whom a large measure of freedom of action was lef t to the Commander-in-Chief—and extended throughout the command , where it was fully reciprocated ; so that, in character and spirit, the Mediter ranean Fleet had what the Italian Navy lacked—ships built as efficien t fighting units for service in all seas and all weathers ; officers and me n imbued with a team spirit and with mutual esteem founded on experience ; hard training which had brought them to a high degree of efficiency ; a long and unbroken tradition of a kind to induce confidence ; and resolut e and aggressive leadership unhampered by outside interference . IV Darkness, descending upon Egypt's Mediterranean littoral on th e evening of the 10th June 1940, concealed a coastline in most parts fringe d by dangerous off-shore reefs and shoals, but having few outstandin g topographical features in the eastern half of its 510 miles . From th e Palestinian border at Rafa, the advancing shadows obscured a low, sand y coastal fringe, broken after 100 miles by Port Said and the straight ribbo n of the Canal fading southwards into the desert . They travelled on acros s the 130 miles of Nile delta to Alexandria . They hid the coastal plain , with its occasional cliffs backed by lagoons and salt marshes and th e 2
At Christmas 1940 Cunningham wrote to a friend : "The war progresses slowly out here bu t everything that has happened has proved how right Sir William [Fisher] was in 1935-1936 durin g the Abyssinian time. Many a time when confronted with a difficult situation I cast my min de back and ask myself what he would have done, and the answer always comes the same—to tak the bold and direct course—and it pays ." Admiral W . James, Admiral Sir William Fisher (1943) , p . 157 . An incident indicative of Cunningham 's character occurred in Alexandria when, as a motor-boa t from one of the Australian destroyers was leaving "No . 6 Gate ", a man in plain clothes aske d the coxswain if he could drop him at Warspite as he passed . The coxswain, who thought he was the flagship's canteen manager, agreed, but said clutch trouble prevented his going aster n and the passenger would have to jump for it passing the Warspite's gangway, as he wouldn't stop the engine for him . The passenger said he would jump all right, and duly did so, at th e battleship 's midship gangway . It was not until the coxswain got back to his own ship, wher e was a signal from the C-in-C to the C .O . thanking him for the lift, that he realised who h e had put on board the flagship . As was subsequently learned, Cunningham was regarded in the Italian Navy as the outstandin g naval figure of the war, and his humanity, manifested on a number of occasions, and particularl y after Matapan, produced a deep Impression . The general Italian naval sentiment was that at se a the British and Italian navies fought each other cleanly and without rancour .
June
ALEXANDRIA
15 5
low scarps of the Libyan plateau, which stretches 130 miles beyon d Alexandria to the small harbour of Mersa Matruh . They swept on a further 100 miles to Salum, where a sheltered bay provides anchorag e with good holding ground for large ships, and where the escarpment, her e some 600 feet high, comes down to the shore, and the coastline rises i n precipitous 300-foot cliffs which continue on to the nearby frontier o f Cyrenaica at Marsa Ramla . Eight miles beyond the frontier was the first Italian coastal stronghold, Bardia, with a small harbour enclosed in high , steep cliffs, whose skyline forms a distinct "V" seen from seaward . Tobruk, the main Italian port and naval base on this section of the coast, lay 60 miles farther west, a well sheltered and defended harbour wit h good depths, and accommodation for large ships . The port of Derna, suit able for only small ships within a sheltering breakwater, lay 80 mile s beyond Tobruk ; and Benghazi, Cyrenaica's principal port, was anothe r 160 miles on, around the coastal bulge on the eastern shores of th e extensive Gulf of Sidra . The ports were linked by a road which in man y places was in clear view from the sea . Alexandria, the largest port and—by virtue of the floating dock—the only capital ship base in the Eastern Mediterranean, far exceeded all the others in size and facilities . Situated at the north-east end of a bay protected by a rock and shoal-studded bank, its Western Harbour, an artificia l haven made by a breakwater, provided ample accommodation for th e fleet in its outer basin, an area some two miles long and averaging a mil e in width, with depths of 56 to 58 feet . Anti-submarine defences had bee n laid by the net vessel Protector .3 The Eastern Harbour, a picturesqu e semi-circular bight one and a quarter miles in diameter on the site of th e ancient port, fringed by a promenade on the landward side and separated from the Western Harbour by a low promontory, was no longer used . Four passages—the Marabout Pass, Boghaz Pass, Corvette Pass, and Grea t Pass—led through the shoals to the Western Harbour . The Great Pass , about a mile and a half in length, was the main channel and the only one used at night. Boghaz Pass was second in importance and could b e used by deep draught ships in calm weather, and the Boghaz Patrol — known to the sailors as "Bughouse Patrol" —was a regular duty of th e Australian destroyers based on the port . Alexandria's most conspicuou s landmark from the sea was the tall column of Ras el Tin lighthouse . On the evening of the 10th June, most of the ships of the fleet wer e in the Western Harbour. At 4 .30 p .m . Ciano had told the British an d French ambassadors in Rome that from the 11th June Italy would consider herself at war ; but news of this declaration did not reach the flee t until two and a half hours later . The event had, however, been anticipated, and on this day the ships' companies had been closed up to first degre e anti-aircraft readiness at dawn and dusk. With the news of the declaration the fleet went to two hours' notice for steam, and a projected refit o f Ramillies was abandoned. Sydney, and the Australian destroyers excep t Vendetta refitting in Malta, and Waterhen at sea with seven other destroys HMS Protector, netlayer (1936), 2,900 tons, two 4-in guns, 20 kts.
156
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
May-Jun e
ers under Captain (D) 2 in Hyperion on an anti-submarine patrol to the westward, were in harbour . Dinner was in progress in Sydney's wardroo m when, about 8 p .m ., the mess president tapped for silence and broke th e news that an Italian ultimatum declared a state of war against the Allie s as from midnight that night . The news "came like the proverbial bomb into our midst", 4 with, for some at any rate, the expectation of a heav y air raid the following morning . A few days earlier, on the 23rd May, Admiral Cunningham had tol d the Admiralty that in the event of war his initial object would be to secur e control of communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean , and cut off enemy supplies to the Dodecanese . This objective did not envisage cutting Italian communications with Libya, and Cunningham explained this by the paucity of his light forces and lack of aircraft, th e fact that military offensives against Libya were not then contemplated , and that it was important to support Turkey and to deal with Italian nava l forces based on the Dodecanese . He did not, however, intend to neglect the Central Mediterranean, but would carry out sweeps in that area . This statement was not acceptable to Mr Churchill—by this time Prim e Minister—who on the 28th May told the Chiefs of Staff Committee : If France is still our ally after an Italian declaration of war, it would appea r extremely desirable that the combined Fleets, acting from opposite ends of th e Mediterranean, should pursue an active offensive against Italy . It is important tha t at the outset collision should take place both with the Italian Navy and Air Force , in order that we can see what their quality really is, and whether it has change d at all since the last war . The purely defensive strategy contemplated by Commanderin-Chief Mediterranean ought not to be accepted . Unless it is found that the fighting qualities of the Italians are high, it will be much better that the Fleet at Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks than that it should remain in a posture s o markedly defensive . Risks must be run at this juncture in all theatres . 5
Cunningham's initial objective could hardly be said to constitute "purely defensive strategy " . Control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegea n could not be secured, nor the enemy's communications with the Dodecanes e severed, by the fleet remaining in Alexandria "in a posture so markedly defensive" . The Commander-in-Chief's intention to penetrate the Centra l Mediterranean had been made clear, and with the Italian lines of communication with Africa intersecting the vital British east-west routes, any such penetration would make a major clash inevitable . Churchill's criticism appears to have been hasty and ill-founded . Within an hour of the outbreak of war, the bulk of Cunningham' s force was slipping for sea "to secure control of communications in th e Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean " . Sydney, with the 7th Cruise r Squadron, sailed at 1 a .m . on the 11th, and dawn found Alexandri a Harbour practically empty and the fleet under Cunningham in Warspite, with Malaya, Eagle, the five cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and screening destroyers including Stuart, Vampire, and Voyager, sweeping t o the westward, while the French cruiser squadron headed north for th e • W. H. Ross, Stormy Petrel (1945), p . 106. 5 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol 1I (1949), pp . 111-12.
10-14 June
A MEDITERRANEAN SWEEP
15 7
Aegean . The Australian destroyers did not remain long with the battl e fleet on this occasion . They were detached for Alexandria at 8 .15 p .m . on the 11th—being relieved on the screen by the more modern ships o f the 2nd Flotilla—and entered harbour at 11 o'clock the following morning . For four days the battle fleet, with the cruisers well in the van and th e battleships in support, searched the two areas without sighting any enem y ships or aircraft, although the westward sweep took the 7th Cruiser Squadron almost to the Gulf of Taranto . Sydney steamed over 2,000 miles in f the operation, during which the squadron carried out reconnaissance of Benghazi on the 12th and the Ionian islands on the 13th, rendezvousin g with the Commander-in-Chief at noon each day. Sydney's sole excitement was a fruitless depth-charge attack on a reported submarine in the after noon of the 13th, as she was sweeping south-eastward and along the African coast on the return to Alexandria . Liverpool and Gloucester were the only ships to come into action with the enemy . Detached to attack any sea forces at Tobruk, they shelled a flotilla of minesweepers off th e harbour, sinking one and drawing heavy fire from shore batteries . This episode was watched with interest by a British patrol of Hussars wh o had penetrated a hundred miles inside the enemy lines, and were on th e beach near by . The fleet returned to Alexandria late on the 14th, Sydney entering the harbour and securing at 7 o 'clock . For many of those who had not been in action before, this sweep wa s a period of nervous tension culminating in an anti-climax . As one office r in Sydney put it : I had pictured the Mediterranean alive with enemy submarines lurking in wai t for us at every turn, and I accordingly expected all kinds of "fireworks", but a t the end of those four days, when nothing at all had happened, I felt quite "flat" , and rather like the little boy who went to the circus to see the ferocious man-eatin g lion and found that it was only an overgrown cat anyway.
There were submarines about, however, and during this period an d the following days the ships of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla had a busy time with them . The first ship of the flotilla to gain submarine contact was Diamond, who on the 10th June unsuccessfully attacked a submarin e off Malta . On the 11th Decoy, on patrol off Alexandria, reported that sh e had attacked a submarine . In the early hours of the following mornin g the Italians drew first blood when a submarine torpedoed and san k Calypso6 of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, off Crete . Caledon, 7 and Dainty of the 10th Flotilla, were in company with her at the time, and brough t the survivors to Alexandria, where they arrived on the 13th . Meantim e a number of minefields had been discovered off Alexandria, denotin g the presence of minelaying submarines in the vicinity . Stuart, Vampire , Voyager and Waterhen proceeded on patrol from Alexandria in the late afternoon of the 12th, and- at 7 .40 p .m . Stuart, searching independently to seaward, sighted a moored mine on the surface, seventeen miles from Ras el Tin lighthouse . While examining it she detected by echoes numerou s HMS Calypso, cruiser (1917), 4,180 tons, five 6-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 29 kts ; sun k south of Crete, 12 Jun 1940 . 7 HMS Caledon, cruiser (1917), 4,180 tons, five 6-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 29 kts . 6
158
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
12-13 June
others below the surface . Waller reported his find, and buoyed the positio n of the floating mine—which was in about 200 fathoms of water—an d throughout the night carried out a stealthy search of the area, seekin g further mines and the submarine laying them . Within two hours he ha d found a second minefield six miles from the first, and a further thre e miles on he found himself "surrounded by mine echoes", from which h e extricated Stuart with some difficulty in the darkness . For the rest o f the night he patrolled the vicinity, returning to his first buoyed mine a t daylight on the 13th . He was trying to sink it by rifle fire when, in th e clear water, a moored mine was sighted below the surface, almost along side Stuart amidships . There were some tense moments on board whil e Waller carefully manoeuvred with his engines and finally drew clear a s Abingdon and Bagshot8 of the 2nd Minesweeping Flotilla, appeared t o clear a channel for Caledon and Dainty, arriving from Crete . Stuart escorted Caledon and Dainty through the minefields, and then led th e sweepers to the fields, when "they immediately began to bring up an d explode mines in the sweeps". After a brief return to harbour to discuss the situation with the Rear Admiral 1st Battle Squadron and Rear-Admiral Alexandria, Waller re organised his destroyer patrols in view of the known mine position, while himself searching a hitherto unexplored area in Stuart . He was thus engaged shortly after dark on the 13th when a gun flash was sighted t o seaward. Waller closed the flash at full speed "to be ready to join in" , having first ordered Vampire, who had raced up enthused with simila r ideas, to resume his patrol . At 7 .53 p.m . Voyager, the source of the gun flash, reported a submarine 17 miles to seaward, and Dainty and Decoy, on the outer anti-submarine patrol, were ordered to close her and hunt . Stuart reached Voyager at 8 .35, and Waller found himself in the centr e of yet another minefield, which he reported and buoyed while warnin g the other ships of the flotilla to keep clear of him . In the meantime Morrow, in Voyager, reported that he had delivered three depth-charges on th e submarine which had been seen to surface on its side, that there had bee n muffled explosions from the enemy, which had been engaged with gu n fire, and that it had finally disappeared beneath the surface . Waller sen t Voyager and Decoy to warn ships of the new danger area, while he spen t two hours "in getting myself out of the minefield". Before Stuart wa s clear, Voyager—nearly out of depth charges—reported re-establishin g contact with the submarine on the bottom ; but by the time Waller reached her contact had been lost, and could not be regained . There followed a shouted discussion between the two ships by megaphone across the dar k waters, after which, as Waller put it, "we decided the submarine wa s sunk, and went about our several duties" . At the time this was assumed to be a submarine scalp to the Australia n destroyers, but in the final reckoning the claim of destruction was no t allowed, it being considered that the submarine, although damaged, 'HMS's Abingdon and Bagshot, minesweepers (1918-19), 710 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts.
10-14 June
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND LIBYA
15 9
escaped . 9 Her identity was not conclusively established, but she is though t to have been the Italian Foca l—a minelaying submarine—or one of her class, which was later learned to have been in the approaches to Alexandria at the time . According to a later Italian statement, Foca wa s destroyed on the 23rd October 1940, presumably by a mine of unestablished origin. The "several duties" of Stuart and Voyager included further attacks on a submarine before the night was over . At 1 .30 a .m. on the 14th June Voyager reported expending the remainder of her depth charges on anothe r contact, which was confirmed later by Stuart, who also attacked with depth charges, as did Decoy . No direct evidence of destruction was avail able in the darkness, but daylight disclosed a large oil patch extendin g over a two-mile strip in the vicinity of Stuart's attack . Again the destruction of the submarine was not credited in the final analysis . But the work done by the flotilla in discovering, and determining th e position and extent of the minefields, was invaluable . Throughout the 14th , all the available ships of the flotilla searched out an approved channel for the main fleet returning in the afternoon from its four days ' sweep ; and the Italian expenditure of effort and mines in an endeavour to block the approaches to the base and to cause ship casualties, went for nothing . V When Italy entered the war, the British staff in the Middle East estimated that enemy troops in Libya totalled over 215,000 . For some weeks after the outbreak the Italians made no attempt to cross the frontier, and on shore, as at sea, the initiative was taken by the British, a small detachment crossing the frontier on the night of the 11th-12th June in the firs t of a series of harrying operations . The foremost British defended positions were at Mersa Matruh—the railhead—and the frontier force therefore operated at a distance of at least 120 miles from its point of supply an d administration . The Italians were better placed with the port of Bardia , believed to be strongly held and the chief supply base for their force s on the frontier, only six miles or so within the Libyan border . To help the army in its harrying operations, it was decided to carry out a nava l bombardment of Bardia to destroy military objectives . The Italians were believed to have six or eight 6-inch guns or 8-inch guns on the cliffs north and south of the harbour, and a number of mobile howitzers and som e long-range anti-aircraft guns . Considerable enemy air forces, and som e cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were at Tobruk, some seventy miles to the west . Plans were made for a pre-arranged area shoot by the ships participatin g in the bombardment, the targets to be covered by a heavy neutralising fire . In addition to the bombarding forces, five destroyers carried out an White Paper : (1946) . 3
German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War. Comd 6843
Foca, Italian submarine (1938), 1,109 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 16 kts ; destroye d 23 Oct 1940.
160
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
20-21 Jun e
anti-submarine sweep along the coast as far as Tobruk, while two Frenc h cruisers and three destroyers cruised off Tobruk in support, and sub marines patrolled off Derna and Benghazi . The bombardment force, consisting of Orion—wearing the flag of Vice Admiral Tovey—Neptune and Sydney of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the French battleship Lorraine, and the destroyers Stuart, Decoy, Dainty, and Hasty,2 sailed from Alexandria at 11 .30 a .m . on the 20th June, and arrived off Bardia a few minutes before sunrise the following morning . Tovey had decided to make the last twenty miles or so of his approach in the daw n light, and to attack while the sun was still low enough to dazzle th e Italian gunners ; and the lighthouse on Point Bluff, the south cliff, wa s the only object clearly discernible through the haze when the force close d the coast on a south-westerly course, the large ships spaced a mile apar t on a line of bearing in the order Orion, Lorraine, Neptune, Sydney, with two destroyers on the outer bow of each wing ship . Orion opened fire o n Point Bluff at about 13,500 yards at 5 .48 a .m . and was followed by th e other ships firing on their allotted targets . Course was altered to the southeastward shortly after fire was opened, and the bombardment continue d for twenty-two minutes, when the force withdrew to the north-eastward . Sydney fired at one target throughout, a camp in the centre of her area . She started a fire there, and apparently caused losses among troops see n to leave the camp during the shoot . Stuart and Decoy concentrated o n barracks and wireless masts in the left half of the town, at a range o f about 12,000 yards . Waller commented later that in opening fire at thi s range he had in view merely the moral effect on his guns' crews an d ship's company generally, and "the effective neutralising fire produced , assuming 4 .7-inch shells capable of doing material damage ashore, wa s therefore in the nature of a pleasant surprise " . According to members o f Stuart's ship's company, months later when Bardia had fallen to the Britis h forces, fragments of 4 .7-inch shell of the type Stuart had fired were found in her target area . The Italians made no reply to the fire, and the squadron could se e no coast defence guns in position . Each of the large ships had a spottin g aircraft aloft, and a few ineffectual rounds fired at these from anti-aircraf t guns was the only opposition encountered. The sole casualty suffered b y the bombarding force was that of Sydney's amphibian aircraft, which, as Tovey put it in his remarks on the operation, was "shot up by friendl y fighters", of the Royal Air Force . Although the aircraft was badly damaged , the pilot, Flight Lieutenant Price, 3 R .A .A .F., managed to fly it to Mers a Matruh, where it broke up on landing, but with no injury to pilot o r observer . 4 HMS Hasty, destroyer (1936), 1,340 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; sunk by German submarine, E Mediterranean, 15 Jun 1942. s W Cdr T. McB . Price, DFC, 172. Comd 20 Sqn 1941-42, 14 Sqn 1943 . Accountant; of Adelaide; b . Adelaide 14 Nov 1914 . The British were not alone in making errors in aircraft recognition . Just a week later Air Marsha l Balbo, the Governor-General of Libya and Commander of the Italian Army in North Africa, was killed. Ciano recorded in his diary : "Balbo is dead . A tragic mistake has brought his end. The A/A battery at Tobruk fired on his 'plane, mistaking it for an English 'plane, and brought it to the ground."
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162
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940 21-22Iun e
In all, the three cruisers and the four destroyers expended 400 round s of 6-inch and 154 of 4 .7-inch shells respectively, and Lorraine fired 5 3 rounds of 13 .4-inch and 37 of 5 .5-inch . From what could be seen from th e ships and judged subsequently from air photographs, the bombardmen t destroyed some ammunition and other storehouses, blew up an ammunitio n dump, and damaged or set fire to barracks and buildings in and nea r the town . Cunningham described it as "a useful minor operation, in whic h the damage caused fully justified the ammunition expended" . The force returned to Alexandria at 10 .40 p .m . on the day of the bombardment. Possibly as a reprisal, the Italians delivered their first air raid on the port early the following morning. Some bombs exploded no t far from Sydney's berth, but no damage was suffered by any ships . VI The first bombardment of Bardia was the last operation against th e Italians in which Admiral Godfroy's French squadron took part . On the 22nd June the French Government signed an armistice with Germany, and the naval situation in the Mediterranean underwent a drastic change . Hitherto the Anglo-French Fleets had dominated the sea, and consider able stretches of European and African coastline, with major fleet bases , had been important factors in that domination . Now in one stroke the greatest proportion of the French Navy was eliminated or might be use d against Britain . Clause Eight of the armistice terms provided that : The French Fleet, except that part of it left free for the safeguard of Frenc h interests in the Colonial Empire, shall be collected in ports to be specified , demobilised, and disarmed under German or Italian control . The German Government solemnly declare that they have no intention of using for their own purpose during the war the French Fleet stationed in ports under German control, excep t those units necessary for coast supervision and minesweeping . Except for that part (to be determined) of the Fleet destined for the protection of colonial interests, al l ships outside French territorial waters must be recalled to France .
This meant that the ships had to be handed over as fighting units, an d as such would be at enemy disposition . The French metropolitan an d African coastlines and harbours—with those of Syria—were now denie d to the British Fleet . The scales had thus dipped suddenly and heavily in Italy's favour . It was a situation in which the suggestion that the flee t should be withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean was again brough t forward at the Admiralty . It was argued that Alexandria was an unsatisfactory base which probably would be exposed to increasingly sever e attack from German as well as Italian aircraft ; and that the increase d German surface raider activity resulting from the enemy's use of Frenc h Atlantic ports would likely demand the use of battleships (which coul d only be found from the Mediterranean Fleet) for convoy escort purposes . The suggestion was, however, strongly opposed by the British Prim e Minister and by Admiral Cunningham, and nothing more was heard of it . Its acceptance would, in Cunningham's opinion, "have been a major disaster, nothing less" .
22-30 June
FORCE
" H"
163
In the Eastern Mediterranean the major units of Admiral Godfroy's force were in Alexandria, whence permission to sail was refused by Cunningham—at which refusal Godfroy appeared thankful . In the Western Mediterranean the French defection left the sea entirely unprotected . O n the 25th June the Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic, Admiral North, 5 pointed out to the Admiralty that there were now no forces betwee n Gibraltar and the Italian Fleet base . Three days later the Admiralty repaire d this situation by constituting a detached squadron—Force "H"—under the command of Vice-Admiral Somerville, 6 to be based on Gibraltar. This force consisted of the capital ships Hood, Resolution and Valiant ; the aircraft carrier Ark Royal ; the cruiser Arethusa ; and the destroyers Faulknor, Foxhound, Fearless, Escapade, Forester, Foresight and Escort . ? Its tasks were to prevent units of the Italian Fleet from breaking out of th e Mediterranean, and to carry out offensive operations against the Italia n Fleet and Italian coasts . Somerville hoisted his flag in Hood at Gibralta r on the 30th of the month. VII Admiral Cunningham was thus deprived of the services of the Frenc h force at a time when an important operation in the Eastern Mediterranean imposed a severe strain on his resources . This operation—MA.3—wa s designed to protect simultaneous movements of a slow convoy from th e Aegean, and a fast convoy and a slow from Malta, to Egyptian ports . It resulted in the first surface clash with the Italian Navy, and include d Australian ships . Timing of the movements was planned so that the three convoys would be in the vicinity of 35 degrees north, 22 degrees east position "K " , almost due south of Cape Matapan in Greece, and a little more tha n halfway from Alexandria to Malta—on the 30th June . Here a strong supporting force comprising Royal Sovereign (wearing the flag of Rear Admiral Pridham-Wippell, 8 Rear-Admiral 1st Battle Squadron), Ramillies, Eagle, and seven destroyers would be in position . General cover of th e Malta convoys, which were to have a close escort of destroyers, was t o 5 Admiral Sir Dudley North, GCVO, CB, CSI, CMG ; RN . (HMS New Zealand 1914-16 .) Comd North Atlantic Stn 1939-40; Flag Oft i/c Great Yarmouth 1942-45 . Of Netherbury, Dorset, Eng ; b. 25 Nov 1881 . 5Admiral of Fleet Sir James Somerville, GCB, GBE, DSO ; RN . (Served Dardanelles 1915-16. ) C-in-C East Indies 1938-39 ; OC Force "H" 1940-42 ; C-in-C Eastern Fleet 1942-44; Head of Admiralty Delegation to USA 1944-45 . Of Somerset, Eng ; b . 1882 . Died 19 Mar 1949. 7 HMS Resolution, battleship (1916), 29,150 tons, eight 15-in and twelve 6-in guns, 21 kts ; seriously damaged by French submarine, 25 Sep 1940 . HMS Valiant, battleship (1916), 31,100 tons, eight 15-in and eight 6-in guns, 24 kts . HMS Arethusa, cruiser (1935), 5,220 tons, six 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 .25 kts. HMS Faulknor, destroyer (1935), 1,460 tons, five 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 .75 kts. HMS Foxhound, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts. HMS Fearless, destroyer (1935), 1,375 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk in air attack on convoy, Mediterranean, 23 Jul 1941 . HMS Escapade, destroyer (1934), 1,375 tons, four 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts . HMS Forester, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts. HMS Foresight, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk in Central Mediterranean, 13 Aug 1942 . HMS Escort, destroyer (1934), 1,375 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk by German submarine in W Mediterranean, 11 Jul 1940. *Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell, KCB, CVO ; RN . (1914-18 : In HMS ' s Audacious ana Warspite, and in comd destroyers at Gallipoli, Adriatic and Palestine coast .) Second-in-comd Mediterranean Fleet 1940; Flag Officer Cdg Dover 1942-45 . B . 12 Aug 1885 . Died 2 Apr 1952.
164
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940 26-28 June
be provided by the 7th Cruiser Squadron . In close escort of the Aegean convoy were to be Capetown9 (flag of Rear-Admiral Renouf) and Caledon of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, and four destroyers, Garland, Nubian , Mohawk, and Vampire.'° In addition to these main dispositions, destroyer s would be submarine hunting as circumstances required, and air reconnaissance of the Ionian Sea would be carried out by Sunderland flying boats of No . 201 Group, R .A .F., operating from Malta . At 6 p .m . on the 26th June, Caledon, Garland and Vampire sailed from Alexandria and joined Capetown, Nubian and Mohawk at sea the following day on passage to the Dardanelles . At eleven the following morning, Tovey , in general charge of the operation and flying his flag in Orion, left Alexandria with the 7th Cruiser Squadron and shaped course for positio n "K" . The Aegean force picked up its convoy of eleven ships on the 28th , and began the southern voyage to Egypt. Early that afternoon, when the 7th Cruiser Squadron was in th e vicinity of position "K", Tovey received a signal from flying-boat L .580 6 reporting three Italian destroyers in a position 30 miles south-west of th e island of Zante, which lay some 150 miles just to the west of north o f him . The signal did not state the destroyers' course, and Tovey, thinkin g they might be steering south-east for the Kithera Channel between Greec e and Crete, altered course to the north to intercept them . That was a t ten minutes past four . Half an hour later the destroyers were again reported, this time by flying-boat L .5803, in a position 35 miles west of Orion and steering south . Tovey immediately altered course to south-west , increased speed to 25 knots, and formed the squadron on a line of bearin g 180 degrees in open order, with the 2nd Division—Gloucester and Liverpool—stationed five miles 180 degrees from the 1st . Orion's position a t 5 o'clock was approximately 60 miles west-south-west of Cape Matapan . For an hour and a half the squadron sped swiftly over a glittering , slightly choppy sea, with a fresh wind broad on the starboard bow . At 6 .30 Liverpool, the southernmost ship, reported the enemy destroyers in sight bearing 235 degrees from Orion . Three minutes later she opened fire . The 1st Division increased to full speed and altered course to clos e the enemy, who was at this time on a converging course ; but at 6 .5 0 Gloucester reported the Italians—still invisible from Orion—to have altered course to west-south-west, speed 30 knots . Four minutes later Orion sighte d the destroyers—Espero, Zeffiro, and Ostro l , of the Turbine class—an d opened fire at one minute to seven at a range of 18,000 yards . The actio n was a chase in rapidly failing light with the enemy against the afterglow o f O HMS Capetown, anti-aircraft cruiser (1922), 4,200 tons, eight 4-in anti-aircraft guns, 29 kts . ,o HMS Garland, destroyer (1936), 1,335 tons, three 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; transferred to Polish Navy 1939 . HMS Nubian, destroyer (1938), 1,870 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 .5 kts . HMS Mohawk, destroyer (1938), 1,870 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36.5 kts ; torpedoed in action with Italian destroyers, Central Mediterranean, 16 Apr 1941 . r Espero, Italian destroyer (1928), 1,073 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk in Mediterranean, 28 Jun 1940 . Zeffiro, Italian destroyer (1928), 1,073 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk in Mediterranean, 9 Jul 1940. Ostro, Italian destroyer (1928), 1,092 tons, four 4.7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; destroyed by air torpedo in Bomba Bay, Cyrenaica, 22 Aug 1940 .
CRUISER SQUADRON
28 June
16 5
the sunset which, however, reported Tovey, "was not so effective as is frequently the case" . With the wind fine on the bow, the Italians made clever use of smoke, making ranging and spotting difficult for their pursuers . With the sighting from Orion, all ships came into action . The spacing of the two divisions of the 7th Cruiser Squadron placed the enemy unde r fire from each quarter, while he directed his fire on Liverpool and Gloucester to port and Orion to starboard . At five minutes past seven Neptune reported that the enemy had fired torpedoes, and course wa s altered for three minutes to comb the "spread" . By 7 .20 the range wa s down to 14,000 yards, and the 1st Division altered course 50 degree s to starboard to open "A" arcs . 2 Shortly after this Espero was seen to be hit, and at 8 o'clock she was disabled and stopped . For about ten minute s the chase of the other two destroyers continued, but then Tovey broke off the engagement, as light was failing and ammunition was running short . The squadron then shaped course for Malta, and Tovey detache d Sydney, to sink Espero, with discretion to stop and pick up survivors . Sydney accordingly headed for the destroyer, but when about 6,000 yard s distant, two shots from the enemy were observed to fall, 200 yards shor t but in line with the cruiser . Collins had no option but to open fire, and hits on the enemy were observed from four salvos, to which no reply wa s made, and Espero was seen to be on fire amidships and forward . At 8 .3 5 Sydney was stopped 2,000 yards astern of Espero, whose end was near . In the glare of flames men could be seen jumping overboard from her ; there was an explosion in the vicinity of the bridge ; and at twenty to nine she listed almost on to her beam ends, and sank in about 1,400 fathoms , in position 35 degrees 18 minutes north, 20 degrees 12 minutes east . Fro m the depths that swallowed her thudded a series of explosions, probabl y caused by the detonation of her depth charges . For nearly an hour and three quarters Sydney remained in the vicinity , with both cutters lowered, and Jacob's ladders, boatswain's chairs, an d heaving lines over the side to aid survivors . From the dark waters aroun d her, cries for help could be heard in all directions as the rescue work went on . Her position was one of considerable risk. Submarines were about, and the flames from Espero must have been visible for many miles . At nineteen minutes past ten, after having been warned by signal tha t dispatch was necessary, and having picked up all survivors in sight, she proceeded to rejoin the squadron . Before doing so, however, she slippe d a cutter with oars, sails, provisions, water and rifles, and burned a 10-inc h signalling projector on it as she steamed away, to enable any survivor s still in the water to make for it. The rescue work was hampered by the darkness and the fact tha t Sydney herself had to remain blacked out . But forty-seven Italians were taken from the water, of whom three died on the passage to Alexandri a where the remainder—three officers and forty-one ratings—were landed . From the prisoners it was learned that Espero and her consorts were o n a "To open
'A
'
"
arcs : to bring all main armament to bear.
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940 June-July 166 passage from Taranto to Libya with troops and stores when they wer e intercepted ; that Espero had about 225 of ship's complement and passengers on board ; and that her captain had been killed by the explosion i n the vicinity of the bridge . The survivors were well treated by Sydney' s people . As one of her officers later recalled : By the next morning it was a common sight to see our lads shepherding group s of survivors around the ship, looking after all their wants, giving them all th e cigarettes they could smoke and treating them to ice-cream and "goffers" (sof t drinks) from the canteen .
No damage save that resulting from the concussion of their own salvoe s was suffered by the ships of the squadron . In Sydney, when the action wa s joined , most messes had their tables set ready for the evening meal . The first salvo starte d the wrecking process and from then on until the end of the chase things went fro m bad to worse. With each salvo the ship shuddered violently and the air becam e filled with dust and fluff. Light bulbs began to burst with popping noises, showerin g us with tiny splinters, and from all around came the crashing of objects of al l shapes and sizes and the tinkling of falling glass . Every movable object—including a few we thought immovable–was shaken from its resting place during the action . What a din and what a mess . 3
Morning showed the muzzles of the guns stripped of paint, which hun g in long reddish-grey streamers almost to the deck . This action brought home a lesson, and emphasised a weakness in th e Mediterranean Fleet . To achieve the destruction of Espero the 7th Cruiser Squadron had indulged in what Admiral Cunningham described as th e excessive expenditure of nearly 5,000 rounds of 6-inch ammunition . I n eagerness to secure a decisive result in a race against night in this firs t surface action, no regard had been paid to the peacetime experience o f the low rate of hitting to be expected in the conditions of a chase in failin g light of small vessels dodging and making smoke, at ranges of betwee n 18,000 and 14,000 yards . "We have learnt our lesson, " said Cunningham in a subsequent signal to the Admiralty, to whom he had a few days earlie r remarked : "Assume it has not been overlooked that cruisers have not eve n an outfit of ammunition on board and reserves still some way off ." As it was, the expenditure of ammunition in this instance necessitated the retur n of the 2nd Division of the squadron to Port Said to replenish. Operatio n MA .3 had to be abandoned incomplete, and the sailing of the Malta convoys was postponed . The Aegean convoy, however, reached Alexandri a and Port Said on the 2nd and 3rd July respectively without loss, thoug h it had been subjected to high level bombing attacks by aircraft from th e Dodecanese Islands on the 29th and 30th June, and the 1st July . It wa s on this last day that Sydney and the ships of the 1st Division reache d Alexandria, having also undergone air attack without damage on th e return journey. As part of operation MA .3, ships of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla Wer e meanwhile engaged in activities resulting in the sinking of two Italia n • Ross, Stormy Petrel, p . 124.
27 June-1 July
DESTROYER FLOTILLA
16 7
submarines . At dawn on the 27th June Voyager sailed from Alexandri a with her flotilla companions Dainty, Decoy, and Defender, and Ilex 4 of the 2nd Flotilla . At sunset Alexandria lay 200 miles astern of them, an d at 6 .28, when about 100 miles south-east of Crete, a surfaced submarine —which shortly submerged—was sighted on the horizon . The destroyer s quickly closed the position, and within a few minutes five depth-charg e attacks were made by Dainty, Decoy, Defender and Ilex . An oil trail was observed, and was followed by Dainty in the falling darkness, and after a hunt of ninety minutes the submarine was again reported on the surfac e at 2,500 yards . During the intervening period—as was subsequently learne d —the submarine, the Console Generale Liuzzi, had been badly shaken by the initial attacks . The first had put all lights out except in the contro l room, had shattered depth gauges, and blown the naphthalene tank fro m the bulkhead . The second had done further damage, including the entry of water into the after compartment, which had gassed the batteries . Thi s combination of mishaps made Liuzzi immobile when she surfaced, as ther e was insufficient battery power to start the engines, and no alternativ e naphthalene . As soon as she was again sighted, she came under gun fir e from Dainty and Defender, and very soon a white light was waved as a token of surrender. Cease fire was ordered, and Dainty closed the sub marine, whose officers and crew were in the conning tower ; and the wor k of removing them, and of picking up those who jumped overboard, began . The destroyers lowered boats—Voyager's whaler picked up thirteen survivors—and Dainty put her bows almost up to the submarine before the last two Italians could be persuaded to jump into the water . In all , it took three and a quarter hours to induce the more reluctant to leave the submarine after the surrender ; and she was then sunk by Dainty with depth charges . By dawn on the 29th the five destroyers were nearly 400 miles farthe r west, with Crete 160 miles due east of them, when another surfaced sub marine was sighted . She was the Uebi Scebeli, which dived and was attacked with depth charges by Ilex, Voyager, and Defender ; and, force d to the surface, was sunk by gun fire from Dainty at 8 .20 after survivors had been rescued . Five minutes later the destroyers proceeded for Alexandria, and entered the harbour in the evening of the 30th, Voyager securing at 7 .34 and landing her survivors . Information provided by the prisoners from Liuzzi and Uebi Scebeli indicated the presence of an Italian submarine patrol line between Cret e and the African coast, and on the 29th June Stuart and Hostiles sailed from Alexandria to hunt north of Derna . A submerged submarine wa s located during the morning of the 1st July, and the two destroyers carrie d out a series of depth charge attacks which—from the evidence of th e discharge of large quantities of air, and the fading of the echo, believe d as a result of the great depth to which the submarine sank—were at th e ' HMS
Ilex, destroyer (1937), 1,370 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts. 5 HMS Hostile, destroyer (1936), 1,340 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; mined and sunk off Cape Bon, in Mediterranean, 23 Aug 1940 .
168
R .A.N .
SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
June-July
time assumed to have destroyed her . But the claim was not allowed i n the final analysis . The two ships returned to Alexandria in the afternoo n of the 2nd July . In spite of poor asdic results in the warm waters of the Mediterranea n and Red Sea, the results of the anti-submarine warfare were promising . On the 28th June, Ciano recorded in his Diary that Admiral Cavagnari , the Italian Chief of Naval Staff, complains of the High Command . There is disorder, and no one assumes responsibility. The submarines we have lost number eight .
On the following day he could have added two more to the score . B y the end of June the Italian Navy had lost ten, of which six were in th e Mediterranean, two in the Red Sea, one in the Gulf of Aden, and on e in the Persian Gulf . G During the same period three British submarines , Grampus, Orpheus and Odin, 7 were lost in the Mediterranean, presumabl y victims to deep laid mines . VII I During the first week in July the British Government took bold and ruthless action to determine the question of the disposal of the French Fleet . Before the signing of the armistice, important units of the fleet had lef t France for Allied and French empire ports . A number, including the battleships Courbet and Paris, the large destroyers (contre torpilleurs) Leopar d and Le Triomphant, some destroyers and submarines—among them Surcouf —proceeded to England . In addition to the major vessels already in Nort h African ports, the battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart—the last name d non-operational, being without main armament—sailed to Dakar and Casablanca respectively . 8 The British Government determined that none of e Macalle, Italian submarine (1936), 615 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; wrecke d
on reef SE of Port Sudan, 14 Jun 1940 . Provana, Italian submarine (1938), 941 tons, two 3 .9-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; sunk by French Curieuse in W Mediterranean, 17 Jun 1940. Galileo Galilei, Italian submarine (1934), 880 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; captured by HM trawler Moonstone off Aden, 19 Jun 1940 . Diamante, Italian submarine (1933), 590 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; torpedoed and sunk by HM submarine Parthian NNW of Tobruk, 20 Jun 1940 . Evangelista Torricelli, Italian submarine (1934), 880 tons, two 3 .9-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; sunk by HMS's Kandahar and Kingston off Perim, 22 Jun 1940 . Galvani, Italian submarine (1938), 896 tons, one 4 .7-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; rammed and sunk by HMS Falmouth, Persian Gulf, 23 Jun 1940 . Console Generale Liuzzi, Italian submarine (1939), 1,031 tons ; sunk SE of Crete, 27 Jun 1940 . Argonauta, Italian submarine (1931), 590 tons, one 4-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; destroyed by Sunderland aircraft, Central Mediterranean, 28 Jun 1940. Uebi Scebeli, Italian submarine (1938), 613 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; sunk W of Crete, 29 Jun 1940. Rubino, Italian submarine (1933), 590 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; destroyed by Sunderland aircraft SW Corfu, 29 Jun 1940 . ', HMS Grampus (1937), submarine, 1,520 tons, one 4-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 15 .75 kts ; lost off Augusta, Sicily, 14 Jun 1940 . HMS Orpheus, submarine (1930), 1,475 tons, one 4-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 .5 kts ; lost between Malta and Alexandria, 27 Jun 1940 . HMS Odin, submarine (1929), 1,475 tons, one 4-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 .5 kts ; lost in Gulf of Taranto, 14 Jun 1940 . Courbet and Paris, French battleships (1913-14), 22,189 tons, twelve 12-in and twenty-two 5 .5-in guns, four 18-in torp tubes, 20 kts . Leopard, French destroyer (1927), 2,126 tons, five 5 .1-in guns, six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 35 .5 kts; wrecked near Benghazi, 27 May 1943 . Le Triomphant, French destroyer (1934), 2,569 tons, five 5 .5-in guns, nine 21 .7-in torp tubes, 37 kts . Richelieu and Jean Bart, French battleships (1940-43), 35,000 tons, eight 15-in and twenty 5-i n guns, over 30 kts.
3-4 July
DISPOSAL OF FRENCH FLEET
16 9
these ships should be permitted to return to France to fall into Germa n hands, and preventive action was taken on the 3rd July . The French vessels in the United Kingdom were boarded by superio r forces and occupied without resistance except in the case of Surcouf, where one British officer and one French officer were killed and others wounded . In the Mediterranean, Force "H" arrived off Oran at dawn on the 3rd , and throughout the day Admiral Somerville endeavoured to secure a n agreement that the French ships there and at Mers el Kebir would mee t one of four requirements : continue the fight with Britain against the enemy ; sail with reduced crews under British control to a British port ; sail to a French West Indian port to be demilitarised or perhaps entrusted to th e United States until the end of the war ; or scuttle in their present positio n within six hours . But the French Admiral, Gensoul, refused to meet an y of these requirements, and late in the afternoon Somerville—under definit e and urgent orders from the Admiralty—was forced to open fire, whil e bombers and torpedo bombers of the Fleet Air Arm also carried out attacks . The fleet bombardment lasted ten minutes . Together with th e air attacks it resulted in the sinking of the battleship Bretagne, the damaging and beaching of Dunkerque and Provence, and damage to other vessels . Strasbourg, and five destroyers, escaped and reached Toulon . In Alexandria the affair was fortunately settled without military actio n or bloodshed, though not without tension . Admiral Godfroy had bee n informed that his ships would not be permitted to sail, and had bee n invited to come to terms similar to those proposed to Gensoul at Oran . As at Oran, a decision was sought by the evening of the 3rd . Throughout that day the ships of the Mediterranean Fleet were at immediate notic e for steam and ready for action . The destroyers and smaller craft had bee n berthed alongside, to clear the line of fire if such were necessary . Boarding parties were told off and equipped, turrets manned, and guns loaded . At the last moment Admiral Godfroy called for a parley and negotiation s began, but on the morning of the 4th July the situation was still critical , and not until that afternoon was the matter finalised with Godfroy' s agreement to immobilise and demilitarise his ships . Yet the temper of some, at least, among the French in Alexandria, was shown by an inciden t on that morning. At 7 .30, when the tension was at its height and Britis h crews were standing by at first degree of readiness, there was an Italia n air raid on the port ; and a number of the French ships immediately opene d fire on the raiders . Sydney's war diary for the day sketches the situation in brief entries : 0720, first degree readiness . Situation with French very critical. 0745, engage d enemy aircraft . 0910, second degree readiness . 0945, air raid warning. 1000, first degree readiness . 1300, third degree readiness . 1800, reverted to harbour routine.
Protector, the only ship damaged, and that slightly by bomb splinter s and debris, acted up to her name in the Italian air raid . She was berthe d alongside at No . 39 Quay, with Stuart berthed outside her . At 8 o 'clock a stick of six bombs fell around both ships . One bomb exploded on the
170
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
June-July
roof of the quay shed, and one on the quay a few feet from Protector, with the remainder in the water close to Stuart . Her position outsid e Protector probably saved Stuart from damage . As it was, all she suffere d was a harmless bombardment of iron fragments from the coping of th e shed, with which she was fairly heavily covered . Away to the westward in the Atlantic Ocean, another Australian ship— Australia—was at this time concerned in the operations to deny the Frenc h ships to the enemy . When war broke out with Italy she was in Simonstown , after forming part of the escort of convoy US .3 to South Africa . During the remainder of June she covered the passage of the liner Ulysses (14,65 2 tons) from Capetown to Durban, and escorted Stratheden (23,722 tons ) back to Capetown whence she sailed on the 25th as escort to a fas t convoy—Stratheden, Orion (23,371 tons), and Reina del Pacifica (17,702 tons)—to Freetown, Sierra Leone . The convoy reached Freetown at 8 a .m . on the 3rd July, and here Australia met an old shipmate, the seaplan e carrier Albatross, now H .M . Ship, attached to the South Atlantic command . On the 23rd June Richelieu, which had for some days been shadowe d by H .M .S . Dorsetshire, had arrived at Dakar, where the British cruiser was keeping watch on her. Anglo-French relations at Dakar, hithert o friendly, had suddenly deteriorated, and at 11 .5 p .m . on the 3rd July , Australia was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic—Vice Admiral D'Oyly Lyon, 9 flying his flag in H .M .S . Edinburgh Castle s at Freetown—to sail immediately and rendezvous with Dorsetshire an d Hermes off Dakar at 5 a .m . on the 5th July . Australia weighed and saile d from Freetown within an hour and a half of receiving her orders . On the passage north in company with Hermes, a signal was receive d from D'Oyly Lyon that French submarines had been ordered to attac k British forces off Dakar, and that French submarines and aircraft ther e were to be attacked and destroyed on sight . Dorsetshire reported that she had sighted two submarines, and had sunk or damaged one . Australia and Hermes reached the rendezvous with Dorsetshire at ten past five in the morning of the 5th, and for the next two days patrolle d off Dakar, Hermes maintaining an air patrol over the harbour . On the 7th a signal from the Admiralty directed the Commanding Officer of Herme s —Captain Onslow2 —to take charge of the operation as an acting rear admiral, and to communicate to the French naval authorities at Dakar a message of similar import to those presented to Gensoul and Godfroy. A decision was to be requested within four hours of its receipt by the French . The sloop H .M.S . Milford, 3 which had joined the squadron from Freetow n shortly before noon on the 7th, was dispatched to Dakar with the messag e while the three remaining ships continued to patrol . The French, however, ', Admiral Sir George D'Oyly Lyon, KCB . (1914-18 : HMS Monarch and Grand Fleet .) C-in- C Africa Stn 1938-40, The Nore 1941-43 . B . 3 Oct 1883 . Died 20 Aug 1947 . 'HMS Edinburgh Castle, armed merchant cruiser (1910), 13,329 tons, Union Castle Mail SS Co . Ltd, 16 .5 kts . 2 Capt R . F . J. Onslow, MVO, DSC ; RN. (Comd coastal motor boats 1916-18 .) Comd HMS Coventry 1938-40, HMS Hermes 1940-42 . B . 29 Mar 1896 . Lost in sinking of Hermes 9 Apr 1942 . 2 HMS Milford, sloop (1933), 1,060 tons, six 4-in guns, 16 .5 kts .
7-28 July
DISPOSAL OF FRENCH FLEET
17 1
refused to permit Milford to enter harbour, and she rejoined the squadro n shortly before sunset . At 6 o'clock the message, in French, was transmitted in plain language through the Dakar wireless station, the time limi t for a decision being reduced to two hours . No reply was received, and it was decided to endeavour to crippl e Richelieu to prevent her leaving port . After sunset Milford towed one of Hermes' fast motor-boats towards Dakar . The boat was armed with depth charges, and its crew had their faces blackened . Although an accident put one of its engines out of action, the boat subsequently negotiated the boom defences of the harbour, and at 2 .45 a .m . on the 8th July dropped depth charges under Richelieu's stern . It then successfully evaded pursuit, and escaped from the harbour to the southward . A further attack on the French battleship was carried out at dawn on the 8th by si x torpedo bombers from Hermes . Air reconnaissance later disclosed Richelieu listing to port and down by the stern, while oil covered the water around her . It was subsequently learned that she had sustained no damage fro m the depth charge attack but had been struck by one of the torpedoes o n the starboard side . This caused severe damage in the compartment abaft the armoured bulkhead . The starboard inner propeller shaft was seriously distorted to a maximum of one metre from its centre line . It would hav e been impossible for the ship to have steamed at even three-quarters spee d until this propeller had been removed . At 6 a .m . on the 8th the British squadron concentrated 30 mile s north-west of Dakar and swept towards the port . But the only opposition encountered was from a single aircraft which passed over the squadro n and dropped a stick of bombs which fell harmlessly into the sea abou t 4 miles from Australia. During the day the Hermes ' motor-boat wa s recovered, and the ships resumed their patrols . On the 12th July th e Admiralty told naval commands that the British Government had decided to take no further action against French warships in French colonial o r North African ports . By this time Australia was on her way to the United Kingdom . At 6 .20 a.m . on the 9th she parted company with the Dakar force, and on the 11th overtook and joined the escort of her previous convoy—no w augmented by additional merchant ships . On the 16th July she anchored in the Clyde, and four days later reached Scapa Flow, where she joine d the 1st Cruiser Squadron . During the 27th and 28th of the month, in company with ships of the Home Fleet, she participated in a brief sorti e into the North Sea to a position 240 miles west-north-west of Skagerrak , the object being to intercept Gneisenau, which was reported to have sailed from Trondheim . Contact was not made, however, and at the end of th e month Australia was at Scapa Flow with the fleet. The elimination of the French Navy as an important factor almost at a singl e stroke by violent action (Churchill wrote later) produced a profound impression i n every country. . . . It was made plain that the British War Cabinet feared nothin g and would stop at nothing. That was true . 4 4 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol II, p . 211 .
172
R .A.N. SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
July
In Britain's existing situation, when many in the world counted he r already defeated, such a realisation was an inspiration to her well-wishers . But more important was that the stroke reduced the threat to that powe r at sea which was essential to her existence .' Admiral Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy and Minister of Marine in the Petai n Government, had given repeated assurances that the French Fleet shoul d never fall into German hands ; and, in the event, no French ship was eve r manned by the Germans or used against Britain by them during the war . When the Germans fully occupied France in 1942, the French ships a t Toulon were voluntarily destroyed "contrary"—as Darlan said at the tim e in a letter to Churchill—"to the wishes of the Laval Government " . But in the straits in which she found herself, Britain could not fail to tak e every precaution against the implications in clause 8 of the armistice terms , a fact which her victims in the French Navy would appear to have recognised . The action at Oran produced a natural bitterness in a section of th e French Navy, and strengthened within that navy generally the determination to defend French overseas possessions against the British as agains t any other aggressor . But the attitude of many in the French Navy was th e same as that of Admiral Godfroy at Alexandria in the long months in hi s flagship following his agreement with Cunningham . Of him the Britis h admiral wrote : The fate of France and the tragedy of Mers el Kebir were always in his mind ; but no success of the British Fleet passed without his letter of cordial congratulation, no loss without his letter of sympathy .6
IX The postponement of the sailing of the Malta convoys with the abandonment of operation MA .3, led to operation MA .5 a few days later. I t employed practically the whole strength of the fleet, and was a sweep int o the Central Mediterranean to cover the convoy movements ; while governing these movements was Cunningham's determination to seize any opportunity of bringing the enemy to action . The intention was for the fleet t o reach a position of cover east of Cape Passero—the south-eastern poin t of Sicily—on the afternoon of 9th July, when destroyers would be detached to Malta to escort the convoys, which would sail that night . The opportunity would also be taken to carry out operations against the Sicilian coast . The Malta convoys, MF .1 of three ships and thirteen knots, an d MS .1 of four ships and nine knots, were carrying evacuees and flee t stores from Malta to Alexandria . The fleet, less Ramillies and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, sailed fro m Alexandria on the night of 7th July in three groups : Force "A "—7t h 6 Earlier in her history Britain had not hesitated to take similar action when that power wa s similarly threatened . Writing of Admiralty investigations in 1907 into the possibilities of a "bol t from the blue" attack on the British Fleet, Admiral Fremantle said : "In all our investigations we could find two cases only of such hostilities being undertaken unless preceded either by a time of strained relations or a formal declaration of war . These were our two attacks on Denmark in 1801 and 1807 respectively . . both of which, though much criticised at home, were in m y opinion fully warranted by the strategical situations obtaining, and the successful execution o f which secured the desired results ." S . R. Fremantle, My Naval Career, 1880-1928 (1949), p. 126. 6 Cunningham, p. 255 .
7-8 July
BATTLE OF CALABRIA
17 3
Cruiser Squadron and Stuart, (D) 10, under the command of Admiral Tovey ; Force `B"—the Commander-in-Chief in Warspite, with the destroyers Nubian, (D) 14, Mohawk, Hero, Hereward, and Decoy ; Force "C"— Pridham-Wippell in Royal Sovereign, with Malaya and Eagle, and destroyers Hyperion, (D)2, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex, Imperial, Dainty, Defender , Juno, Janus, Vampire and Voyager . ? The three forces had cleared th e harbour by midnight on the 7th-8th July, and proceeded independentl y through separate set positions towards a rendezvous 120 miles east o f Cape Passero, and 150 from Malta . The Commander-in-Chief's mean line of advance was N .W . by W ., 20 knots . Arrangements had been made for flying-boat patrols by No . 201 Group , R .A .F ., from Malta ; and also for a diversionary operation by Force "H " from Gibraltar. This was to be an air attack on Cagliari in Sardinia , by aircraft from Ark Royal, and Force "H" left Gibraltar on the 8th July . Hasty made depth-charge attacks on two submarines shortly after leavin g Alexandria, and Imperial had to return to harbour with a burst steam pipe . Otherwise the fleet steamed through the night without incident ; but at 8 .7 a .m . on the 8th a report was received from the submarine Phoenix8 that three hours earlier she had attacked—apparently unsuccessfully—a n Italian force of two battleships and four destroyers about 180 miles eas t of Malta and some 500 to the westward of the fleet. The enemy ships were steering south . Suspecting that they might be covering an important convoy, Cunningham requested the Vice-Admiral, Malta, to arrange fo r a flying-boat to find and shadow them . Meanwhile the fleet maintained it s course and speed . Throughout the 8th the three groups of the fleet were subjected to heavy high-level bombing attacks by aircraft apparently from bases in th e Dodecanese . Most ships experienced near misses, but Force "A " was the only one to suffer damage and casualties . Early in the morning Stuart had been directed to take station ahead of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, whos e ships were then disposed in line abreast . The first indication of air attack was shortly after 10 o'clock, when three bombs exploded astern of Stuart. The attacking aircraft were so high as to be tiny shining specks agains t the blue sky. Further ineffectual attacks occurred during the day, th e majority being directed against Forces "B" and " C " , which were to the north-eastward of the cruiser squadron . The height of the attacking aircraft, and their appearance as glittering specks, led the 7th Cruiser Squadron t o open fire during the afternoon on the planet Venus . It was an indignit y the Goddess of Love, in her day-time manifestation in the sky, was ofte n 7 HMS Hero, destroyer (1936), 1,340 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts . HMS Hereward, destroyer (1936), 1,340 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; lost in action with enemy aircraft off Crete, 29 May 1941 . HMS Imperial, destroyer (1937), 1,370 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; lost in action with enemy aircraft off Crete, 29 May 1941 . HMS Juno, destroyer (1939), 1 .690 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; lost in action with enemy aircraft off Crete, 21 May 1941 . ' HMS Janus, destroyer (1939), 1,690 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk by aircraft off Anzio, W Italy, 23 Jan 1944 . 8 HMS Phoenix, submarine (1931), 1,475 tons, one 4-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 .5 kts ; lost off Sicily, 17 Jul 1940.
174
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
8-9 July
to undergo during the Mediterranean campaign . The last attack of th e day—it interrupted a game of Mah Jongg on the watch keepers' mess dec k of Stuart—was aimed at the cruiser squadron . One aircraft tracke d Gloucester from astern, and its stick of bombs crept along the cruiser' s wake in successive lofty plumes of water until the final bomb overtook it s target and scored a direct hit on the compass platform . The captain, si x officers, and eleven ratings were killed, and three officers and six rating s wounded . The damage to the bridge and director control tower necessitate d gun control and steering from aft ; and although Gloucester continued with the operation, she took no part in the subsequent action . Meanwhile, at 3 .10 p .m ., flying-boat L .5803—which a few days earlier had reported Espero and her consorts to the 7th Cruiser Squadron — reported two battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers about 90 mile s north of Benghazi. When sighted, this force was steering N .N .W ., but shortly after altered course to E .N.E . This sighting, coupled with th e impression, given by the intensive bombing attacks, that the Italians ha d a special reason for wishing to keep the fleet away from the Centra l Mediterranean, strengthened Cunningham's view that the Italian movements were covering an important convoy, and he decided temporaril y to abandon his own convoy covering operation, and to move the flee t at best speed towards Taranto, to get between the enemy and his base . The night of the 8th-9th passed without incident, and shortly befor e dawn Eagle flew off three aircraft to search to a depth of 60 miles to th e south-west. At 6 a .m . on the 9th, the fleet was concentrated 50 mile s due west of the south-west extremity of Greece and was disposed wit h the 7th Cruiser Squadron and Stuart in the van eight miles ahead o f Warspite and her screen, and the 1st Battle Squadron, Eagle, and their screening destroyers, eight miles in the rear of Warspite. The mean lin e of advance was altered to the southward—to W . by S .—speed 15 knots . It was of this period that an observer in Vampire later recorded hi s impressions . He was an Englishman, a passenger taking passage fro m Alexandria to Malta, and Commander Walsh had given him his cabin t o sleep in . He recalled : In the Royal Australian Navy things are slightly different to what they are in the Royal Navy . The Captain's servant was a very pally sort of cove, and he wok e me the following morning with a cup of tea and the remark : "I shouldn't lie aroun d all day if I was you . Get up on deck . You'll like it. There's going to be a battle ." "A battle!" I echoed stupidly . "What sort of battle? " "Just an ordinary bloody battle," he replied . "The sea's lousy with ships . Looks like all the Med . Fleet's here. " I went on deck as I was, in a pair of pyjama-trousers, with a cup of tea in m y hand . Remember it was mid-July in the Mediterranean . The morning was fresh and glorious, with a brilliant young sun still painting the new sky with the effulgenc e of his coming . The sea was sapphire, set with diamonds . The wake of Vampire' s passing was like coiled ropes of pearls. It was a morning for poesy . It was also a morning for something grimmer . The young Australian rating was right . The sea was lousy with ships . ° , F . Gerard, Malta Magnificent (1943), p. 35 .
Captain J . A . Collin s on Bridge of H .M .A .S . Sydney .
111111b'I
Members of Sydney's Crew looking throug h Shell-hole in Funnel . (R .:I . ..A' .
Hi .storicul .Section)
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
Lieut-Commander R . Rhoades with Captain H . M . L . Waller on Bridge of H .M .A .S . Vendetta .
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
Captain H . L. Howden on Bridge of H .M .A .S . Hobart .
9July
BATTLE OF CALABRIA
17 5
From now on, enemy reports from the flying-boats and from Eagle's reconnaissance aircraft, came in at frequent intervals, and enabled Cunningham to visualise the size and movements of the Italian forces wit h some clarity . At 8 a .m . the main enemy group of two battleships, fou r cruisers and ten destroyers bore 280 degrees from him distant about 14 5 miles, steering north at 15 knots . Another force of six cruisers and eight destroyers was stationed 80 degrees 20 miles from the main group . Cunningham altered his mean line of advance from W . by S . to N .W . by W . , and increased speed to 18 knots, to work to the northward of the enemy . At 11 .45 a.m . the enemy was believed to bear 295 degrees from Warspite , distant 90 miles, and a striking force of nine Swordfish aircraft was flow n off from Eagle to attack . But about this time the enemy battle fleet altere d course to the southward, and the striking force failed to find it . An attack was made, however, on a large number of ships sighted steering south , but no hits were observed . By 1 .30 p .m . it was clear to Cunningham tha t the enemy had turned southward to concentrate his forces, and this wa s confirmed by a flying-boat report a few minutes later of three battleship s and a large number of cruisers and destroyers in 37 degrees 58 minute s North 17 degrees 55 minutes East, steering S .W . and altering course to N .N .E ., speed 18 knots . The enemy, after concentrating, had turned north again, and the two fleets were rapidly closing . Cunningham stoo d on to the north-westward until 2 o'clock when, satisfied that he had cu t the Italians off from Taranto, he altered course to west to increase th e rate of closing . His speed of advance was limited by that of Royal Sovereign —about two knots less than Warspite's 242 . Warspite was acting as a battle cruiser to support the 7th Cruiser Squadron who, as the Commander-in-Chief later wrote in his dispatch, "being so few and lackin g in 8-inch ships, were very weak compared with the enemy ' s cruiser force " . Within half an hour of Cunningham ' s alteration towards the Italians , the centres of the opposing fleets were about 30 miles apart . The Mediterranean Fleet was disposed as at the morning concentration, with the 7t h Cruiser Squadron eight miles ahead of Warspite, and the Battle Squadron and Eagle ten miles astern of the Commander-in-Chief . The Italian Fleet, steering north at 15 knots, was disposed in four columns spaced about fiv e miles apart . The port wing column of five or six cruisers including some 8-inch Bolzano-class ships, the next of two or three cruisers ahead of th e two battleships Conte di Cavour and Giulio Cesare, the third of fou r cruisers, probably 8-inch gun ships, and the starboard wing column o f four 6-inch gun cruisers . A number of destroyers—probably three flotilla s —were in the van, while others screened the battleships . It was a brilliantly sunny afternoon, with few clouds in a blue sky . A moderate northerly wind raised a slight sea, and the atmosphere was bright , with visibility of 15 to 20 miles . One of Stuart's company recorded hi s impressions of the inspiring picture made by the fleet . In the perfect visibility, blue sea and cloudless sky, the cruisers on the wing, an d the destroyers in semi-circular formation screening in front of the battleships, made a picture no one who saw it can ever forget . . . . A few flags would flutter up to
176
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
9July
the flagship's yardarm and answering pendants to the yardarms of the other ships . Then, in unison, down would come the flagship's signal and the answering pendant s and over all helms would go together, and the fleet would alter course like so many well drilled soldiers, the destroyers leaning over with the sea creaming from thei r bows, the battleships, more ponderous, but not the less spectacular, moving mor e slowly around in their restricted circle to take up their new course.
Stuart, hitherto with the 7th Cruiser Squadron, was at 2 .35 ordered to join the screen of Royal Sovereign . Eagle, acting independently, wa s screened by Voyager and Vampire, and was joined by Gloucester, withdrawn from the cruiser squadron as unfit to engage in serious action b y reason of her bomb damage the previous day . At the time of sighting th e enemy, the 7th Cruiser Squadron therefore consisted of only four 6-inch gun ships . They were ten miles 260 degrees from Warspite, formed on a line of bearing 320 degrees, and steering west at 18 knots . Sydney sighted smoke broad on the port bow at 2 .45 and seven minute s later Neptune reported two vessels bearing S .W . by W . distant about 1 6 miles . In Sydney the first sighting of enemy ships, apparently five cruisers , was at one minute after 3 o 'clock . Seven minutes later, for the first tim e since the Napoleonic wars, the sighting of an enemy battle fleet in th e Mediterranean was signalled when Neptune reported the two Italian battle ships bearing W .S .W ., 15 miles . The 7th Cruiser Squadron hauled roun d to north, and at 3 .10 to north-east, to avoid getting too heavily engage d until Warspite was in a position to give support . The nearest enemy cruisers, in the third column, opened fire at 3 .14 at a range of 23,600 yards . At 3 .20 the 7th Cruiser Squadron was steering N .E . by N .—with "A" arcs open—at 25 knots, and two minutes later Neptune and Liverpoo l opened fire at a range of 22,100 yards, followed by Sydney whose target , a cruiser of the Zara class, was at a range of 23,000 yards . The speed of the squadron was increased to 28 knots . With the advantage of the sun behind him, the enemy's shooting was good for range in the initial stages, and the outnumbered British cruiser s came under heavy fire and were straddled several times, but neither sid e scored hits . Meanwhile the enemy advanced forces were sighted fro m Warspite, who opened fire in support of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, an d at 3 .25 released her destroyer screen, which formed single line ahead o n Nubian, worked round to the south-eastward, and proceeded towards the van on the disengaged side . Ten salvos were fired at the Italian cruiser s by Warspite, and at 3 .30 the enemy turned away making smoke, and fir e was checked . Malaya and Royal Sovereign, away astern, were striving to catch up and get into the fight, and at this stage Warspite turned through 360 degrees to enable them to overtake, and Tovey altered course to conform . Between 3 .33 and 3 .36 the flagship fired four salvos at each of tw o 6-inch gun cruisers of the enemy starboard wing column which were apparently trying to work to the eastward to get at Eagle, then about t o fly off a striking force . At 3 .51 Tovey, steering N .W . to close the enem y again, was three and a half miles ahead of Warspite, who was steering
9July
BATTLE OF CALABRIA
17 7
N .N .W . Malaya was in station on a bearing of 180 degrees from th e flagship . Royal Sovereign had gained, but could not achieve the spee d necessary to bring her into the action . By this time the Battle Squadron had also released its destroyer screen , and all the destroyers—which, with the exception of Vampire and Voyager, who were with Eagle, had been ordered at 3 .45 to join the 7th Cruiser Squadron—were concentrating in flotillas on the disengaged bow of th e battle fleet . Passing to the eastward of Warspite at 3 .54 some of them were narrowly missed by heavy shells from the enemy battleships, whic h had come into action against Warspite a minute earlier. This was the decisive five minutes of the action . The flagship, targe t of both enemy battleships and straddled but not hit, concentrated he r fire on the right hand enemy vessel—the Giulio Cesare . Malaya tried t o join in . She fired in all eight salvos at extreme range, but all fell short . Royal Sovereign, though her engines were driven to the limit, could no t keep pace with the tide of battle . At 4 o'clock Warspite straddled her target, and a hit at the base of the foremost funnel was observed. The effect was immediate . The enemy started to alter away and make smoke . Warspite altered course to the southward—to N .W.—in an endeavour to close , but at four minutes past four ceased fire, the targets being obscured. From now on destroyer activity predominated ; the enemy flotillas shielding the retirement of the Italian Fleet with smoke screens and torped o attacks, and the British counter-attacking . At five minutes past four—at which time Eagle's striking force attacked a Bolzano cruiser, and believe d it obtained at least one hit—enemy destroyers were seen from Warspite moving across to starboard from the Italian van, and two destroyer salvo s landed close to Stuart . By this time Senior Captain (D) in Nubian ha d re-formed the flotillas on course N . by W. in the order : 14th Flotilla , Nubian, Mohawk, Juno, Janus ; 2nd Flotilla, Hyperion, Hero, Hereward , Hostile, Hasty and Ilex, in single line ahead 25 knots, on bearing 14 0 degrees from Nubian ; 10th Flotilla, Stuart, Dainty, Defender and Decoy , in single line ahead 27 knots, on bearing 220 degrees from Nubian . At this stage the Italian destroyers fired torpedoes at long range, the track s of three or more passing close to the 14th Flotilla . At 4 .14 the British destroyers, then four miles east-north-east of Warspite and turning to the north-west, were ordered to counter-attack . They swung round to wes t and increased to 29 knots to close . Each flotilla manoeuvred as necessar y to clear the others, and keep their lines of fire open . It was Stuart's moment . With her battle ensign streaming from the foremast and the Australian flag at the main, the oldest destroyer in the action, she was in the va n when speed was increased to 30 knots at 4 .17, and was the first to ope n fire two minutes later ; her opening salvo, at a range of 12,600 yards , appearing to score a hit . The 2nd and 14th Flotillas opened fire shortly afterwards, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron also engaged the enemy destroyers . It was the closing phase of the action ; the Italian Fleet retiring behin d its concealing smoke screens, its destroyers dodging in and out of the
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14th DESTROYER FLOTILLA 1 Nubia n k Mohawk
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10th DESTROYER FLOTILLA Stuart Daint y Defende r
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2nd DESTROYER FLOTILL A Hyperio n Q Her o Herewar d Q Hostile Hast y Ilex
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Battle of Calabria—the Decisive Phase
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9-10 July
BATTLE OF CALABRIA
17 9
smoke and making half-hearted gun and torpedo attacks, and the Britis h forces firing spasmodically as targets appeared and disappeared . During this period, when the enemy destroyers were laying heavy smoke to cove r the retiring main forces, Sydney was one of the ships to bring effective fire to bear on a smoke-laying destroyer which suffered many severe hit s in the ten minutes or so in which she bore the brunt of the attack . By 4 .41 the Italian destroyer flotillas had followed the main forces int o the very effective smoke screens which concealed a large sector of the western horizon . The Commander-in-Chief considered it unwise, and playing the enemy's own game, to plunge blindly into this smoke, and cours e was altered to the northward and windward to get round it . The destroye r flotillas were clear of the smoke by 5 o 'clock, but by then the sea wa s clear of ships to the western horizon, and the enemy was out of sigh t from the fleet . The Italians were, however, observed from Warspite's aircraft in considerable confusion, making off at high speed to the south-west and west ward towards Port Augusta and the Strait of Messina . Not until an hou r had passed had they sorted themselves out and assumed formation . The y were attacked—but apparently not hit—by their own bombers at 5 .5 an d at 6 .57 . When last seen by Warspite's aircraft, at five minutes past seven , they were about ten miles off Cape Spartivento, steering south-west at 18 knots . With the conclusion of the gun action the Mediterranean Fleet came under heavy air bombardment from high flying bombers of the Italian Air Force . Eagle, Gloucester, and their two destroyers had been object s of attack much earlier, and were bombed at approximately fifteen-minute intervals from 3 p .m . for about five hours . The main fleet was left alone in the initial stages, but attention was paid to it from 4 .41 onwards, five attacks being made on Warspite between then and 7 .11 p .m ., while the 7th Cruiser Squadron and the destroyers were also bombed . There were numerous near misses but no hits, and the ships suffered no damage . In the Western Mediterranean Force "H" was also heavily bombed. Ark Royal was near-missed several times, and the risk to her caused Somerville to abandon the attack on Cagliari . At 10 .15 p .m . on the 9th , having fulfilled the object of creating a diversion during the Mediterranea n Fleet' s operation, Force "H" was withdrawn . During its return passage to Gibraltar, the destroyer Escort was torpedoed on the 11th July by a submarine, and sank later . For some time after clearing the Italian smoke, and in spite of th e enemy bombing, the Mediterranean Fleet held on to the westward, unti l the coast of Calabria was sighted, distant 25 miles, at 5 .35 p.m ., when course was altered to S .S.W . By 6 .30 it was clear that the Italians ha d no intention of resuming the fight and could not be intercepted, an d course was altered to S .S .E . to open the land, and an hour later there wa s a further change to the south-eastward . That night and the following day the fleet cruised south of Malta, and the destroyers were sent in by groups to fuel . Stuart, in the first group,
180
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
10-13 July
reached Malta with only fifteen tons remaining. Decoy, Vampire an d Voyager went in with the second group and reached Malta in the late afternoon of the 10th, during an air raid warning . Vampire's passenger found Grand Harbour the strangest place I'd ever seen. . . . The place was still . Save for the faint throb of our own engines and the distant hum of a lonely Gloster-Gladiator fighter high ove r Luca there was not a sound. Everyone had gone to ground. Valetta to our right and the Three Cities to our left were cities of the dead . . . . Nothing moved. On the still empty waters of the harbour and the creeks there was no life . The great walls, ramp s and bastions reared their massive stone in complete silence . The lofty Barracas wer e deserted, the ancient steps untrodden .l
By then Convoy MF.1 had gone. It had sailed, escorted by Diamond, Jervis, and Vendetta (now commanded by Lieut-Commander Rhoades 2 ) at 11 p .m . on the 9th, and was joined by Stuart and Gloucester as additional escort. MS .1 sailed on the 10th, escorted by Decoy, Vampire, and Voyager . Cover of both convoys was provided by the fleet on passage t o Alexandria . Again all forces, and the convoys, were targets for heav y air attacks . It was in one of these, an unseen attack on convoy MS .1 in the forenoon of the 11th, that occurred the first fatal casualty in an Australian ship in the war . Vampire was straddled by a salvo of bombs and Commissioned Gunner Endicott 3 was mortally wounded by splinters . Vampire closed Warspite—now screened by Nubian, Mohawk, Juno an d Janus—to find better accommodation for the wounded man, and he wa s transferred to Mohawk, where he died that night . Vampire remained on Warspite's screen, her place with the convoy being taken by Janus . 4 The remainder of the passage to Alexandria was made without damag e from repeated air attacks which continued until the ships closed th e Egyptian coast and came under fighter protection . Warspite, the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and screening destroyers, entered harbour at 6 a .m . on the 13th July, and convoy MF .1 three hours later . The Rear-Admiral, 3rd Cruiser 1 Gerard, p . 40 . s In March 1940 Lt-Cdr Cant, who had commissioned Vendetta from reserve, relinquished comman d to return to Australia to stand by the "corvettes" under construction . He was succeeded for a few weeks by Lt J . Smallwood, RN, and in Apr 1940 Rhoades assumed command . Vendetta ha d started a refit at Malta on the 11 Jun . While she was at Malta, from 11 Jun to 9 Jul, the islan d was bombed on nearly eighty occasions. Air raids made it necessary that only the most essentia l items of refitting were carried out, and a ventilating system which had been projected was no t completed . The ship's company was employed generally in dockyard defence, the torpedo part y being engaged in fitting charges for demolition of the dockyard should that be necessary . The Vice-Admiral, Malta, signalled to Waller regarding Vendetta's work at Malta : "The amount of good work of every description done by Lt .-Comm . Rhoades and the ship's company of Vendetta since war broke out with Italy has been beyond praise . They have turned their hand s to everything in true Australian fashion and produced astonishing results . I am proud of thes e units of my old squadron. Please repeat this signal to C-in-C when you are next in V/S touc h with him. " Capt R. Rhoades, DSC ; RAN . In Vampire at outbreak of war. Comd HMAS Vendetta 1940-41 , HMAS Quickmatch 1942-44, New Entry School, FND, 1944-45. Of Sydney; b. Double Bay, NSW, 8 Apr 1909 . ' Cd Gnr (T) J. H. Endicott, RN ; lent to RAN from 1 Jan 1938 . B . 12 May 1908. Died of wounds, 11 Jul 1940 . ' The lack of efficient anti-aircraft armament was a serious disability of the Australian destroyers at this period . Cdr Walsh commented on this incident : "The blast effect when straddled ble w everybody on the upper deck and bridge flat, some ratings finding themselves some yards fro m where they had been standing . The moral effect of the bombing was negligible until the straddl e occurred on July 11, after which there were signs of irritation at not being able to reply and a slight nervousness when the penetrating power of the splinters was observed. " Vampire was holed in several places in the superstructure, bridge, boats, and funnels, and had five holes in th e hull, including two under water.
8-14 July
PROTECTION OF CONVOYS
18 1
Squadron in Capetown, and Caledon, had previously sailed to meet convoy MS .1 ; and Ramillies with four destroyers—including Vendetta—left harbour on the morning of the 13th to give additional cover . Eagle and th e battle squadron reached Alexandria at 8 .15 on the morning of the 14t h July, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Ramillies, convoy MS .1 and escort, entered harbour twenty-four hours later . Operation MA .5 was successful in its objects of covering the Malt a convoys and of bringing the enemy to action . The meeting with the Italian Fleet, although "the meagre material results" were, as Cunningham late r wrote, "naturally very disappointing to me and all under my command" , was of considerable moral value . It showed the calibre of the fleet an d its Commander-in-Chief . Cunningham, although he believed that the Italia n Fleet ' s movements were covering those of an important convoy to Liby a (actually they were covering a convoy of five large ships, as was learned after the war), was also aware that there might be a deliberate attemp t to entice him into an engagement in Italian waters where the enemy woul d have superiority in surface forces, proximity to bases, and the suppor t of submarines and a powerful air force . He was aware that, as a resul t of the continued bombing attacks on the 8th July, his opponent shoul d have an accurate knowledge of his strength, whereas he himself had no t the same certainty regarding the Italian forces, only knowing that the y were superior in numbers and speed . He knew that the Italians coul d mount air attacks greatly in excess of those he could stage from Eagle, "this obsolescent aircraft carrier, with only 17 Swordfish embarked" ; and in the bomb on Gloucester on the 8th he had an example of what on e hit could do to make a valuable unit unfit to engage in serious action . He accepted the odds, and the possibility he envisaged of the enemy' s hope to draw him into an engagement under conditions in which those odd s could be exploited to the full . As he said : If these were, in fact, the enemy's intentions, he was not altogether disappointed , but the submarines, if there were any in the vicinity of the action, did not materialise , and fortunately for us, his air attacks failed to synchronise with the gun action .
The disparity in strength was considerable . The Mediterranean Fleet of three battleships, five cruisers, sixteen destroyers and an aircraft carrier , was opposed by two battleships, sixteen cruisers, and thirty-six destroyers . The British battleships mounted twenty-four 15-inch and thirty-two 6-inc h guns against the twenty 12 .6-inch and twenty-four 4 .7-inch guns of the two Italian vessels, but this favourable balance was offset by the fact tha t Malaya and Royal Sovereign could not get within range of the enemy . In numbers of 8-inch guns the Italian cruisers perhaps exceeded the forty eight 6-inch guns of the five British cruisers—twelve of which guns, i n Gloucester, were not used in the main action—while they had an eve n greater number of 6-inch guns in addition . In reputed speeds the Italian battleships had an advantage of two to three knots over Warspite an d Malaya, and five knots over Royal Sovereign ; and with the exception o f the four Zaras, the Italian cruisers were from two to four knots faster tha n the British . Ship for ship, the destroyers were practically equally matched
182
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
8-12 July
in speed and armament . The Italians had no aircraft carrier, but had great aerial superiority with shore-based bombers working from nearb y airfields . With Malta under frequent air attack, Cunningham was 70 0 miles from a dependable fleet base, but within easy distance of the Italia n Fleet were Taranto, Messina, Augusta, Syracuse, Palermo and Naples , offering shelter to damaged ships, and all submarine bases . The outcome lay in the difference in character of the opponents . The will to fight, present in the British fleet, was lacking in the Italian ; and, obsessed with the idea of their lack in building materials and resources , the Italians were reluctant to risk the loss of ships . The "disorder " in th e Italian High Command, of which Admiral Cavagnari had previously complained to Ciano, was evident in the lack of naval and air cooperation . On the day of the action there was no sign of Italian aircraft earlier tha n the bombing attacks on Eagle at 3 o'clock in the afternoon . Four days after the battle, Ciano recorded in his Diary : The real controversy in the matter of naval conflicts is not between us and th e British but between our aviation and our navy . Admiral Cavagnari maintains that our air action was completely lacking during the first phase of the encounter bu t that when it finally came it was directed against our own ships, which for six hour s withstood the bombardment of our airplanes. Other information also gives the li e to the glowing reports of our air force . I confess that I am incredulous too . Mussolini, on the other hand, is not . Today he said that within three days the Italia n Navy has annihilated fifty per cent of the British naval potential in the Mediterranean. Perhaps this is somewhat exaggerated .
This Italian weakness for optimistic exaggeration tended to lead them into grave misconceptions . The Rome News Bulletin of the 10th July gav e an account of damage inflicted on the British Fleet on the 8th : "several enemy ships being struck, some set on fire, and one sunk ." If such claim s were believed, and were not mere propaganda for civilian consumption , the sudden appearance of an undamaged fleet on the 9th may well hav e misled the Italian admiral as to its actual strength, and weighted th e indecision which was so often apparent in the Italian commanders i n the face of an enemy . In both gun and bomb attacks the Italians fought at long range . Cunningham, commenting on this, remarked on the difficulty of hitting with gun s at long range, and "the necessity of closing in, when this can be done, in order to get decisive results" . For that reason he thought Warspite's hit on one of the enemy battleships at 26,000 yards range might perhap s be described as a lucky one . Its tactical effect was to induce the enemy to turn awa y and break off the action, which was unfortunate, but strategically it probably ha s had an important effect on the Italian mentality .
Similarly, the bomb hit on Gloucester, at extreme range, could b e described as lucky . The difficulty of hitting in high-level bombing wa s shown by the meagre results achieved by large-scale attack during severa l hours . As an indication of that scale, Walsh estimated that a total of 1,35 0 bombs were aimed at ships screened by Vampire, and at Vampire, during the five days from the 8th to the 12th July, without one hit, although
3-15 July
ADMIRALTY POLICY IN MEDITERRANEAN
18 3
Vampire was straddled on the 11th . These operations showed, wrot e Cunningham on the 29th January 1941 (a date, it should be noted, befor e the close-range dive bomber had appeared in the Mediterranean in force ) that high level bombing, even on the heavy and accurate scale experienced, yield s few hits and that it is more alarming than dangerous . Finally, these operations and the action off Calabria produced throughout the fleet a determination to overcom e the air menace and not to let it interfere with our freedom of manoeuvre an d hence our control of the Mediterranean .
The moral value to the Mediterranean Fleet was reflected in London . There the Mediterranean naval situation had appeared so formidable following the collapse of France, that the Admiralty had contemplated th e abandonment of the Eastern Basin and concentration at Gibraltar . 5 This idea was opposed by Churchill and was rejected, and on the 3rd July a British Chiefs of Staff paper stressed the importance of the Middle Eas t as a war theatre, and recognised the possibility of a German attack o n Egypt, but expressed the view that, so long as the fleet could be retaine d in the Eastern Mediterranean, the existing British forces were enough t o deal with purely local attack. The effect of air attack on the fleet wa s being watched in London, and on the 12th July, while operation MA . 5 was still in progress, Admiral Pound told Churchill : We have gained experience of the air conditions in the Western Mediterranean , and as soon as the present operation on which the Eastern Fleet is employed i s completed we shall know pretty well what we are faced with in the Easter n Mediterranean . There is no doubt that both Force "H" and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet work under a grave disadvantage, inasmuch as it is not possible t o give them fighter protection as we do in the North Sea when ships are in the bombing area.
In the light of the knowledge gained, Admiralty policy regarding th e Mediterranean was carefully scrutinised, and no doubt the successful outcome of operation MA .5 influenced the decision—reiterated in a signal t o Cunningham on the 15th July—to maintain a strong force in the Easter n Mediterranean, charged with the task of destroying the enemy naval force s although these had a numerical preponderance . At the same time the Commander-in-Chief was invited to say what heavy ships he considere d necessary for the forces in both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean . He asked that Valiant and Barham should join him in the east—thu s enabling him to dispense with Royal Sovereign, a constant source of anxiety because of her poor deck protection and inferior speed—together with th e aircraft carrier Illustrious, 6 and two 8-inch gun cruisers ; and agreed that Hood, Ark Royal, and one or two "R" class battleships would suffice i n the west . With these forces he considered that the Mediterranean coul d be dominated and the eastern basin held indefinitely, provided that Malt a was adequately protected by fighters and that his resources at Alexandri a were built up . 6
Churchill, The Second World War, Vol II (1949), p. 390 . 6 HMS Barham, battleship (1915), 31,100 tons, eight 15-in and eight 6-in guns, 25 kts ; sunk by enemy submarine in E Mediterranean, 25 Nov 1941 . HMS Illustrious, aircraft carrier (1940), 23,000 tons, sixteen 4 .5-in guns, over 60 aircraft , 31 kts.
184
R .A .N. SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
13-19 July
X While these plans for reinforcement were formulating, the Italian s suffered another reverse in the Eastern Mediterranean in an action i n which Sydney played the leading role, following a brief spell in Alexandri a after her return from operation MA .5 on the 13th July . On the 14th and 15th of the month she was busy fuelling and ammunitioning ship . On th e 16th and 17th she was in the floating dock—and the resulting clean botto m was to be an asset in the next couple of days . In the afternoon of the 17th July two signals were sent by Tovey t o ships in Alexandria . One, to Commander Nicolson 7 in Hyperion, directe d him to take with him Ilex, Hero, and Hasty of his 2nd Flotilla, and sweep north of Crete from east to west . The object of the operation was th e destruction of Italian submarines . The second signal was to Captain Collins in Sydney, directing him to take Havock 8 under his command and proceed north of Crete east about, to support Nicolson's destroyer force, and als o to intercept Italian ships in the Gulf of Athens—this second objectiv e taking him considerably farther north than the destroyers . The two force s were to pass through Kaso Strait, east of Crete, within half an hour o f each other on the night of the 18th July, and to leave the Aegean by th e Antikithera Channel to the west of Crete the following day, the destroyer s to pass through this channel at 6 a .m . on the 19th—the selection of thi s hour proved to be of importance—some six hours ahead of Sydney, who would at that time be in the Gulf of Athens . As was learned after the war from Italian sources, at about the tim e the foregoing instructions were issued in Alexandria, Vice-Admiral Ferdinando Casardi, in command of a division of two cruisers of the Italia n Navy, received instructions to sail from Tripoli to Leros in the Dodecanes e Islands . He was flying his flag in Giovanni delle Bande Nere, 9 and had her sister ship Bartolomeo Colleoni 10—Captain Umberto Navaro—in company . His orders were to steer for a point thirty miles north of Derna , and thence proceed on a course of 12 degrees for the Antikithera Channel , through which he was to pass at 6 a .m . on the 19th July . The Italian cruisers left Tripoli at 9 p .m . on the 17th, and were of f Derna at 10 the following night, when they altered course to cross th e Mediterranean . At six next morning, steaming on a line of bearing an d zigzagging at 25 knots, they were in the southern entrance to the Antikithera Channel . Hyperion and her consorts passed the boom at Alexandria a few minute s after midnight on the 17th July, zigzagged at 16 knots across the Mediterranean, and passed through Kaso Strait at the appointed time . Throughou t the night of the 18th-19th they steamed westward along the norther n ' Capt H. St L. Nicolson, CBE, DSO ; RN . (King George V 1917-19 .) Comd HMS Hyperion
1938-40, HMS Ilex and Capt (D) 2 Destroyer Flotilla 1940-42 ; CSO to FOC Dover 1943-44; With British Pacific Fleet 1945 . B . 11 Apr 1899 . HMS Havock, destroyer (1937), 1,340 tons, four 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; grounded, total loss, off Tunisia, 6 Apr 1942 . 9 Glovannl delle Bande Here, Italian cruiser (1931), 5,069 tons, eight 6-in guns, four 21-in tor p tubes, 37 kts ; sunk by HM submarine Urge, 22-23 Mar 1942. 18 Bartolomeo Colleoni, Italian cruiser (1931), 5,069 tons, eight 6-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 37 kts; sunk NW of Crete, 19 Jul 1940 .
18-19 July
H .M .A .S . SYDNEY AND DESTROYERS
18 5
coast of Crete without incident, seeing only the bonfires of shepherds i n the mountains . Sunrise found them on a westerly course in the norther n entrance to the Antikithera Channel, hugging the Cretan side with th e nearest ship barely four miles from Cape Spada, the others spaced a t intervals of one and a half miles to the northward of her . Sydney, with Havock in company, sailed from Alexandria at 4 .30 a .m . on the 18th, and made a landfall off Crete at sunset that day . By 11 .4 5 p .m. she had cleared Kaso Strait, and zigzagged under a full moon on a mean course W .N .W ., speed of advance 18 knots . This course carried her to the northward of the destroyers, but not so far north as she might hav e been . During the passage from Alexandria, Collins had decided to concentrate on his first objective—the support of the destroyers—at th e expense of his second ; and to remain to the southward until 8 a .m. o n the 19th—by which time Nicolson' s division should have cleared th e Antikithera Channel—when he intended to make a short sweep northward s towards the Gulf of Athens . In the light of the early sun brightening th e high morning mist of a calm and cloudless day, Sydney, still steering west north-westerly, was some forty miles north of the destroyers—less tha n half the distance she would have been had Collins not decided to remain in their support. The Italian cruiser and British destroyer divisions sighted each othe r about 7 .20 a .m . on the 19th .' A sighting might have been made earlie r had either Sydney or the Italians catapulted aircraft . Sydney could not do so since her amphibian, lost after the bombardment of Bardia, had no t then been replaced . Admiral Casardi had aircraft, but did not catapul t them because he assumed that Egeomil—the Italian Headquarters a t Rhodes—would by that time have assured reconnaissance over the se a areas which he had to cross ; and because "the conditions of weathe r would not have permitted catapulting aircraft with any degree of safety " . 2 The opposing forces had opposing views of the weather conditions . Casardi experienced "strong wind from N .W ., sea very rough" . An observer in Hyperion enjoyed "an Aegean idyll of silver sea and sky, grey ships an d whispering bow waves " . Collins, forty miles away, found dawn usherin g in " a calm and cloudless day" . In Hyperion the ship's company had just been fallen out from dawn action stations, and the smell of breakfast bacon was floating up the bridg e voice pipes, when the starboard bridge lookout said : "Two cruisers on th e starboard bow, sir," adding "and they're Italian, too . " The Italian ship s bore W .S .W .—fine on the bow, for the destroyers were steering a little t o the southward of that—and were about ten miles off heading S .S .E . With alarm bells clanging the destroyers swung away to a north-easterly cours e 1 In the Italian report the times used are Zone minus one hour—an hour earlier than the British . Thus the Italian sighting of the destroyers is given as 0617/19, the destroyers ' sighting of the cruisers as 0722/19 . For the sake of clarity the British time is used here, the Italian bein g adjusted accordingly by the addition of one hour . Even so, there are occasional differences of three or four minutes in the two accounts . 2 It was stated after the action by a prisoner from Bartolomeo Colleoni that at about 5 a .m . an attempt was made to fly off an aircraft from that ship, but this was not done owing (he believed ) to a mechanical breakdown .
19 July R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940 186 under full rudder as battle ensigns were hoisted, an enemy report was made by wireless, and speed was increased to 30 knots . During the tur n away, Hyperion and Ilex, nearest the Italians, opened fire ; but their shells fell far short . In the leading Italian cruiser, Bande Nere, the destroyers, sighted o n the port bow, were assumed to be a screen searching ahead of heavie r ships . Casardi increased speed to 30 knots and turned his division to por t through 180 degrees to a northerly course, diverging from that of th e destroyers and thus opening the range . Bande Nere opened fire at 7 .27 a.m . on Hyperion and Ilex. 3 Beyond visual range, the course of this initial encounter was bein g followed with interest . Away to the north, Collins received Hyperion' s enemy report at 7 .33 a .m ., and immediately altered course towards . Three minutes later an amplifying signal from Hyperion gave him the destroyers ' position, course and speed, and Sydney and Havock swung farther to the southward to south by west and worked up to full speed, racing over th e smooth sea towards the nearest point of interception of the destroyers . Nicolson was not aware of Sydney's proximity, and, thinking her farthe r to the northward, anticipated no support in his unequal fight before 9 o' clock at the earliest . At this stage Collins—who had not been sighte d by aircraft since leaving Alexandria, and was anxious to conceal hi s presence from the Italians lest they broke off the engagement and double d back through the Antikithera Channel—kept wireless silence, so tha t Nicolson was left hopeful but in the dark . In Alexandria, Cunningham was also unaware of Sydney ' s position . O n receipt of Hyperion 's enemy report he signalled to Nicolson to join Sydney, and to Collins to support Nicolson ; but for the first hour the only pictur e he got was the partial one built up from Nicolson's brief reports of hi s course and speed . Collins had the fullest picture—of the Italian cruisers (though he di d not know what type, and whether 8-inch or 6-inch gun ships) and Nicol son's destroyers on roughly parallel north-easterly courses, and of Sydne y and Havock on a southerly course trending south-easterly as the situatio n developed ; with each force racing at 30 knots towards a point of intersection which they should reach in about an hour . His decision to keep it t o himself could not have been an easy one to make . He knew that Nicolso n would be concerned at his silence and was also aware of a risk that the y might miss each other, since Nicolson would think him to be much farthe r north than he was . But Hyperion's signals kept him informed of th e movements of the destroyers and of the enemy, and allowed him to adjus t his course accordingly . In the event, the surprise achieved was mos t valuable, and may well have led to the eventual outcome of the engagement . In the meantime, the brief approach period was well used in Sydney, and the ship's company had time for a hurried breakfast and to clean int o battle dress before being closed up to action stations . 8 Casardi' s account, in his official report to the Ministry of Marine, Rome, which says th ee destroyers did not reply until 7 .32, after Bande Nere's fifth salvo . A British account, on th other hand, says the destroyers opened fire first .
19 July
H .M .A.S . SYDNEY AND DESTROYERS
18 7
On board Bande Nere, Admiral Casardi had his own problems . He wa s concerned to manoeuvre so as to keep at the limit of the destroyers' gun range "and to avoid the chance of an effective torpedo attack", and thu s for the first twenty-five minutes or so he steered north or northerly, th e range opening as the destroyers were steering north-easterly . The Italia n anticipation of a torpedo attack caused them to see on e launched at 7 .43 a.m. at a range of about 20,000 yards with an inclination of abou t 75 degrees, the tracks of the torpedoes being observed far off and to starboard .
This must have been an optical illusion, as the destroyers fired n o torpedoes at this stage of the action, and, well outside the range of thei r own 4 .7-inch guns, could do nothing except dodge an d watch the fall of the Italian shot—an unpleasant pastime since the Italians frequentl y had the range, but were unaccountably out of line .
The Italian gunners were firing against the sun at long range, and i n those circumstances were experiencing that low rate of hitting to b e expected in the conditions of a chase in failing light of small vessels dodging and making smoke, which had been the lot of the 7th Cruiser Squadron chasing the destroyers some days earlier . But in this instance the rate was at zero ; a condition which could no doubt have been altere d had the cruisers, with their margin of speed of at least two knots over the destroyers, closed the range . This they made no attempt to do for som e time . Indeed when, shortly after a quarter to eight, Nicolson altered cours e to north in an endeavour to head the enemy in that direction, the Italian s —to his surprise—conformed for some minutes . It was about this time, according to an observer in Hyperion, that th e action hurtled past an old Greek freighte r rolling slowly through the calm water . . . . Her crew, alarmed at this most Olympian disturbance of the morning's peace, left her, stopped and pulled clear in their boat. The wash of the passing warships lapped her sides and distorted her reflection i n the mirror of the sea . The Greek sailors must have marvelled as they lay on thei r oars and watched, while the silence and calm of the Aegean was shivered by th e shriek and spray of shells being hurled across ten miles of sea.
Just before 8 o'clock Casardi made up his mind to press the attack, an d swung his division round to east . The range closed rapidly, but Nicolso n held on to the north-east to keep the action moving in the general directio n of Sydney, and the cruisers altered more to the north again, though keepin g on a converging course . The destroyers were, wrote Casardi : emitting smoke astern in an attempt to conceal their movements. From the beginning of their attack up to the moment when they drew out of sight the destroyers ha d scarcely been visible, either because of the mist or on account of the slanting ray s of the sun. As a consequence, favoured more by natural conditions than by their ow n artificial though rather ineffectual smoke-screen, the destroyers, still being pursue d by the cruisers, disappeared from view . From time to time they re-appeared very indistinctly and it was judged that they had again assumed a north-easterly course s o as to cross our bows . The control of our gun fire was rendered very difficult o n account of the bad conditions of visibility—particularly for the range-findersespecially when the destroyers were directly in line against the sun. It seemed tha t after the 12th salvo the leading destroyer, owing perhaps to having been hit, had
188
R.A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
19Ju[y
reduced speed and then turned away, falling somewhat astern of her sub-division . At 8 .27 a.m. I asked Egeomil, Rhodes, to intervene with bombing aircraft ; th e enemy destroyers had disappeared in smoke, and my attempts to re-engage the m with gun fire proved useless . Practically speaking, from 7 .48 to 8 .30, though continuing to chase the enemy at a speed of 32 knots, our fire was suspended .
Meanwhile Sydney and Havock, rushing down from the north, had altered course by successive changes to the eastward as the Italian pursuit of the destroyers moved in that direction across their front. At 8 .20 , Sydney was steering S .E. by E ., when her lookouts sighted volumes o f smoke on the southern horizon ; and six minutes later the Italian cruisers were sighted about two points before the starboard beam, distant 23,00 0 yards and steering easterly . Collins flashed off an enemy report by wire less, thus bringing Cunningham and Nicolson into the picture . And at 8 .2 9 Sydney opened fire on Bande Nere—the leader of the two cruisers—at a range of 20,000 yards . The relative positions of the three forces at that moment were at th e angles of a roughly equilateral triangle . The base, lying almost north an d south, was the line of bearing between Sydney and Bande Nere ; the two sides were the converging lines of advance of the opposing cruisers ; and at the apex was Nicolson's destroyer division, right ahead of Sydney— but still invisible from her—and steering north-east . Sydney's arrival was masked by a bank of haze which lay to the north ward . Casardi's first intimation was whe n at 8 .30 several salvos fell near the Bande Nere, coming from our port side wher e a thick bank of low fog could be seen. It was only possible to distinguish the flashe s of guns and not the hulls of the ships, nor their numbers .
To Nicolson, also, Sydney 's approach was heralded by her gun flashes . Hyperion's observer recorded : At 8 .29 bridge lookouts in the destroyers—who could still discern nothing to th e northward except the island of Milo, gradually taking shape over the haze—saw , on the port bow, the orange flashes of the Sydney's opening salvo—the most welcome sight in the world . She came rushing to the southward, on the port beam of the Italian, guns flashing, battle ensigns streaming, and such a smother of foam a t bow and stern that from the destroyers one seemed almost to hear the hightensioned scream of the machinery driving her across the water .
Collins was, as he later remarked, in the happy position of taking int o action a ship that had already experienced two successful encounters wit h the enemy . He was not at this stage, however, aware whether he was tackling 8-inch or 6-inch gun cruisers . Nor was the destroyer divisio n in sight, and he was watching for it with the idea of turning up clos e astern of it in support, having signalled his position, course and spee d to Nicolson at 8 .30 . The Italians opened fire at 8 .3 2 with gun fire from all their turrets but without being able to distinguish clearl y the enemy units, nor to get their range ; but being guided solely by the flashes fro m the enemies' guns .
Sydney found the Italian fire fairly accurate, their salvos starting shor t and then falling mostly over, though some straddles were obtained . Collins
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.091
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23'to Cape Spada Action—Track Chart of H .M .A .S . Sydney
190
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
19 July
held on to his south-easterly course to close the enemy and intercept th e destroyers, but Casardi, about the time of opening fire, turned away to th e south-eastward to a roughly parallel course . At 8 .35 Sydney scored her first hit on Bande Nere, a shell passing through the Italian's forward funnel and exploding on deck, where it killed four ratings and wounded fou r others. By now Collins had the measure of his opponents, having with som e relief identified them as Colleoni class cruisers, while he was even mor e pleased to observe the enemy making smoke , which indicated to me that even in the early stage he was giving consideration t o evasive tactics.
Meanwhile Nicolson, on sighting Sydney's gun flashes, had turned hi s destroyers through 180 degrees to a south-westerly course, anticipating an order to close and attack with torpedoes ; and at 8 .38 Hyperion was sighte d from Sydney fine on the port bow steering to cross, with Ilex, Hero, and Hasty in company . Havock was detached from Sydney to join them, and Collins directed Nicolson to attack . But by the time the signal was passed, Casardi had made a torpedo attack impracticable by turning 90 degrees to starboard to a south-westerly course . Collins followed him round, the course set by Nicolson enablin g Sydney to turn towards the enemy abreast of the destroyers . Thus, wrote Collins, by 8 .46 the position was that Sydney with destroyers practically in line abreast and in fairly close order was steering on a south-westerly course after the enemy at full speed.
This was, Casardi reported later, the crucial moment of the action . At 8 .46 it became possible to distinguish through the mist that the enemy's force was composed of two large units which were recognised as two cruisers, thoug h it was still not possible to obtain their range . During the course of the action it was possible to determine the cruisers as belonging to the Sydney or Gloucester class. My orders stated the object of the operation was to reach Leros. From the moment of meeting the enemy I considered that my task must be to engage him . In orde r to obtain the best tactical advantage arising from the speed of our cruisers I require d space to manoeuvre freely, that is without the restrictions imposed on us by the are a of combat . Therefore, from the first instant of combat with the enemy cruiser I had realised the necessity of drawing the enemy formation towards waters free from any land restrictions, for being composed of a greater number of vessels they coul d take advantage of the geographical configuration to prevent me disengaging from a critical position . Accordingly at 8 .46, the crucial moment of the action, rather than continue towards Leros in pursuit of the enemy, I turned sharply to starboar d to a track almost parallel to the enemy, bringing him into the largest sector of gu n fire. This manoeuvre, given the tactical situation of the moment, also gave me th e advantage of fighting from a position ahead and the chance to employ torpedoes . From 8.50 to 8 .52 in order to lessen the effect of the enemy's fire I turned to por t and at 8 .53 to starboard, once again bringing the enemy into the maximum sector of fire. Only at one minute past nine for the first time was there a chance o f obtaining a good range of the enemy ships, and Bande Nere and Colleoni recommenced firing with all turrets . During the period when, on account of the appearance of their cruisers, I had ceased chasing the destroyers, these latter were fre e to turn westward and join the larger units . As a result shortly after reopening the
19 July
SYDNEY-COLLEONI ACTION
19 1
battle, approximately at 9 .10 a.m., the Bande Nere and Colleoni found themselve s in action with six enemy vessels. The rolling caused by the heavy north-westerl y swell rendered gunlaying very difficult, nevertheless our fire was as intense and well directed as the enemies' . To escape their salvos which were very concentrated 1 made frequent small turns .
At the beginning of the chase of the Italian cruisers, range was 18,00 0 yards, and for a while it lengthened slightly . The Italian fire, though accurate, was of slow rate, which probably accounted for Sydney's no t being hit at this stage . Collins altered course as necessary to open "A " arcs and to conform to the evasive alterations of the enemy, and shifted target from ship to ship as one or other of the Italians became obscure d in smoke, and for half an hour or so the flight and pursuit tore noisily across the glittering sea, the Italian cruisers some ten miles ahead of thei r opponents . Bande Nere, about a mile ahead of Colleoni, was frequently obscured by smoke, so that the nearer ship increasingly became the target ; and at 8 .49 she came under the additional fire of the destroyers' 4 .7-inc h guns . The haze had now lifted, and the first of the day breeze whipped th e blue water into little waves whose spindrift pattered on the destroyers ' forecastles . The smaller ships were driving all out, but could not draw ahead of Sydney to attack with torpedoes, and the pursuers raced in line abreast, the orange flashes of gun fire stabbing from their forward turrets , bright colours of bunting streaming from their signal halliards, and whit e wakes foaming and trailing astern . At 8 .53 Casardi, under cover of a smoke screen, appeared from Sydney to alter towards in succession to starboard I sought to improve conditions by emitting for a few minutes a curtain o f artificial smoke, which resulted in the enemy's fire becoming irregular . After about four minutes I ceased to make smoke and turned decisively to starboard, followe d by the Colleoni
—and then steadied on a south-westerly course, with the British forc e conforming . From 9 .2 until she was again obscured by smoke Bande Nere was the target for Sydney's fire, but at 9 .8 target was shifted to Colleoni at a range of 18,500 yards. For seven minutes Sydney fired with he r forward turrets only, but at 9 .15 Collins altered course thirty degree s to starboard and opened "A" arcs, and very shortly Sydney's fire o n Colleoni appeared to be effective . The Italian ship lost speed, so that withi n four minutes the range had closed to 17,500 yards . Sydney now came under fairly accurate fire, and at 9 .21 suffered he r only hit in the action. An enemy shell exploded on the port side of th e forward funnel, about ten feet below the top, blew a hole three fee t square in the funnel casings, and did minor damage with splinters . Onl y one slight casualty—a splinter wound—resulted . But now Colleoni was far more severely hit . According to a prisoner's 4 statement after the action, she had first been hit in the forecastle, but th e 6 The prisoner was Engineer Lieutenant Gino Gallupini, who was in the engine room of th e Bartolomeo Colleont during the action . He was rescued from the water by Hyperion, and stated that with the damage resulting from the shell in the boiler room the crew of Colleoni "lost
192
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
19 July
decisive damage was caused about this time by one of Sydney's 6-inch shells which exploded in the boiler room, stopped the ship, and put th e power hoists for the turrets out of action . The range of the Colleoni no w closed rapidly, and she "became smothered in the large and smaller splashe s of cruiser and destroyer shells" . At 9 .25 she was observed from Sydne y to be stopped and apparently out of action in a position five miles W .S .W . of Cape Spada . Bande Nere, at this time well ahead of Colleoni, turne d towards her pursuers at 9 .21 . But it was apparently evident to Casardi that he could now do nothing to help the stricken ship, and without easing her helm Bande Nere completed the circle of her turn and continued on a south-westerly course . By 9 .26 she had rounded Agria Grabousa islan d at a distance of about one mile off shore, and cut down to the southwar d between the off-lying island of Pondikonisi and the west coast of Crete . At 9 .33 Collins directed Nicolson to torpedo Colleoni, and Sydney checked fire on her . The final range was 7,500 yards at 9 .38, at whic h time a heavy explosion was observed forward on the Italian, who was o n fire amidships . Superficially she appeared little damaged . The British shell s had penetrated her thin plating and burst inside, and internal fires coul d be seen through shell holes . Her four turrets appeared undamaged, an d were trained and laid on the starboard quarter . Hyperion's observe r recorded that : The Italian ensign still flew, just stirred in the breeze, from her peak, and aster n of her, in the water, floated the vast majority of her ship's company .
There was some doubt on Sydney's bridge as to whether she struck her colours at this time or they were shot away . Hyperion, Ilex and Havoc k stood by to pick up survivors and sink the crippled ship, and signallin g Nicolson to leave one destroyer to do that job and follow him with th e other two, Collins, with Hero and Hasty in company, continued the chas e of Bande Nere—some ten miles ahead—at 30 knots . Casardi had watched the destruction of Colleoni from the Admiral's bridge of his flagship. At 9 .24 the Colleoni, which up to that moment had maintained perfect statio n and kept up a rapid and effective fire, reported damage to her engines, I think fro m a hit received in a vital part of the motor machinery . Almost simultaneously sh e stopped . For a few minutes, still following their action course, the enemy warship s concentrated fire on her, except for one cruiser which continued to fire against th e Bande Nere. From the admiral's bridge I witnessed the last glorious moments of th e cruiser . For a few seconds she seemed to be surrounded by columns of water fro m the enemy's salvos . No one appeared on deck, all on board showed their extremel y heroic will to fight by their calm, implacable behaviour . The inequality of the fight was, however, sadly evident ; an explosion occurred in the bows due, probably , to the blowing up of the forward magazine . Immediately after, two very high heart and the ship stopped firing . After this the ship was repeatedly hit, notably at the bas e of the bridge which put the control out of action and also set fire to ammunition for the H/A guns. This fire spread and soon involved the whole bridge. There was no damage on deck abaf t the after funnel, but he saw numerous casualties and much damage in the forepart of the ship . The ship was abandoned soon after she was stopped, when a hit between the funnels starte d another fire . " According to another Italian account—that of Admiral Bernotti in La Guerre sin marl, p . 20 9 —a 6-inch shell exploded in the after boiler room, causing damage on deck and amidships and killing members of the crews at A/A and machine-guns and torpedo tubes .
19 July
H .M .A.S . SYDNEY AND DESTROYERS
19 3
columns of water alongside the dying ship showed that torpedoes from the enem y destroyers, now at last near their prey, had struck . A huge cloud of mixed black and white smoke, then the glorious warship—her upper deck almost level with th e water—heeled over to port and sank . Such was the epic end of the Royal cruise r Bartolomeo Colleoni.
When it was certain that she had been abandoned, Colleoni was torpedoed by Ilex and Hyperion, and sank at 9 .59 (it was to starboard tha t she rolled over, not to port), and the three destroyers remained to rescu e 545 Italians—51 of whom, including her commanding officer, Captai n Umberto Navaro, were seriously wounded—from the water . Sydney, with ammunition running short in her forward turrets and for this reason with holding her fire, was racing with Hero and Hasty after Bande Nere, an d at 9 .49 Collins again signalled Nicolson to hurry and join him in th e chase . Bande Nere kept up an intermittent fire from her after turrets bu t scored no hits, but Sydney, when she reopened fire with her forwar d turrets at 9 .58, made a second hit on the Italian cruiser, Casardi telling that a shell from her crossed the quarterdeck and entered "Zone 2" and exploded on the divisional bulk head between "Zones 1 and 2", killing four ratings and wounding 12 .
According to Casardi, Bande Nere had at this minute to shut off a boiler owing to defects in safety valves . Speed was reduced to 29 knot s "and range began to lessen " , though within a few minutes the ship wa s again making 32 knots . This lessening of range was not evident in Sydney ; and Hero, leading the chase, reported to Collins : "Regret I am not catchin g her . " Sydney found the range still opening, and the target and fall o f shot becoming indistinct, yet continued the chase in the hope of obtainin g a speed hit . But the Mediterranean haze, not noticeable north of Crete , combined with the enemy' s smoke in making spotting conditions impossible . At 10 .22 Sydney fired two salvos at 21,000 yards . Failure to observe th e fall of shot showed that Bande Nere had drawn beyond the maximu m range of splash visibility, and fire was finally checked . Sydney had by now only ten rounds of shell left in her forward turrets ; the enemy, practicall y out of sight at a range of eleven miles, was hauling away at an estimate d speed of 32 knots ; and at 10 .37 Collins, "with great reluctance " , abandoned the chase, having been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief t o return to Alexandria . In Warspite, Cunningham had been following the action through th e brief signals from the British ships, and must have felt both relief an d concern at Sydney's report made at 10 .5 a .m . : "One cruiser sunk . Ammunition practically finished . 5 Other cruiser course 200 degrees am following ." The possibility of there being stronger Italian forces in the vicinity was an immediate consideration when Nicolson's first enemy report was received, and during the forenoon of the 19th the fleet put to sea fro m Alexandria and steered to the north-west . Two of the Australian destroyer s were in this covering party, Stuart on Warspite's screen and Vendetta on 5
Sydney fired 956 rounds of 6-inch shell in this action, bringing her expenditure of ammunitio n from her main armament in action with the enemy during six weeks of war up to 2,200 rounds .
194
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
19-20 July
that of the battle squadron . The obvious concern of the enemy to evade in the early stages of the action had made Collins also consider the possibility of a desire to lead him on to stronger Italian forces near by ; and the behaviour of Bande Nere in holding a southerly course in the ope n sea when escape to the westward would have been easier, strengthene d this view ; which was further supported by a signal from Havock, receive d by Collins shortly after noon, saying that prisoners had stated that strong Italian forces were in the neighbourhood. But apparently no such forces were about. Casardi had intelligence o f the fleet leaving Alexandria, and was practising a deception in steerin g south while in sight of his pursuers . At 10 .22 Sydney had signalled t o Hero, "Drop back on me . We have been ordered to return to harbour . " Presumably in Bande Nere—where the conviction that the fifth British destroyer was a cruiser apparently persisted—Hero's falling back on Sydney was observed, for Casardi wrote of the final stages of the encounter : At about 10 .26, immediately after being straddled by one of our salvos, th e leading enemy cruiser turned sharply to starboard and ceased fire . Very soon the range increased to 21,000 yards when all the enemy vessels ceased fire and brok e contact . I think the enemy flagship had received a hit which caused her to stop, bu t it is certain that the Bande Nere continued to fire for some time after the enem y were silent . The other cruiser had desisted from continuing the chase alone afte r the Bande Nere, perhaps because she was only lightly built or had realised th e impossibility of engaging us with our higher speed . For about one hour I steere d towards Tobruk and when sure of being out of the enemy's sight I altered cours e for Benghazi to make sure of avoiding enemy naval forces, which had been reporte d leaving Alexandria.
In the event, the Mediterranean Fleet in its sweep to the north-westward found no enemy forces . Casardi's tactics led to the belief that Bande Nere was making for Tobruk. Six of Eagle's Swordfish torpedo bombers flew to Sidi Barran on the 19th, and made a moonlight attack on Tobru k in the early morning of the 20th . Bande Nere was not there, but a tanke r was torpedoed, and two other merchant ships probably damaged . Th e fleet returned to Alexandria at dawn on the 20th . Meanwhile the remainder of the 19th July provided Sydney and th e three prisoner-laden destroyers with further enemy action . On abandonin g the chase Sydney, with Hero and Hasty in company, set course for Alexandria, speed being reduced to 25 knots to allow Hyperion, Ilex and Havock to catch up . These ships had, however, been delayed in rescuin g Colleoni's survivors, and at three in the afternoon Sydney received signals from Havock saying that she had been bombed, and that damage to a boiler room had reduced her speed to 24 knots . Collins—who had though t the three destroyers were much closer astern than they were—with a n air attack in mind, detached Hero and Hasty to Alexandria, and himsel f altered course to support Havock . The possibility of submarine attack then caused him to order Hyperion and Ilex—who it was thought were between Sydney and Havock—to join him at sunset . Sydney experience d heavy bombing attacks shortly after turning back, a stick of bombs straddling her but without damage . At 4 .35 she met Havock, and two
20-22 July
H .M .A.S . SYDNEY
19 5
hours later they were joined by Hyperion and Ilex, just before the final and fruitless bombing attack of the day . With the damaged Havock in th e centre, Hyperion and Ilex forming an anti-submarine screen ahead, an d Sydney bringing up the rear, the force continued through the night at 2 0 knots without further incident, and reached Alexandria at 11 a .m . on the 20th. Sydney had a triumphal entry into harbour . Previous to her arrival Cunningham made a general signal to the fleet saying that she would b e in shortly and adding : "Give her a rousing cheer ." And the fleet did so . Her own destroyers started it off by hauling out of line in the channe l near the boom and cheering her as she passed them . Her berth lay at th e far end of the harbour, a distance of about two miles from the boom . Every ship in harbour had cleared lower deck, and as she passed dow n harbour they cheered her in turn. To one of Sydney's company it was "a continuous roar for about fifteen minutes . . . something I will never forget". The Australian destroyers—each flying seven Australian flag s for the occasion—gave her a tremendous welcome, and Waller, leading th e cheering in Stuart, gave an Australian flavour to his greeting with th e signal, "Whacko, Sydney" . It was a great Australian day in Alexandria . Coming so soon after the fleet action at Calabria, this second revers e had noticeable repercussions on Italian strategy . In a letter to the Admiralty two months later, the Commander-in-Chief said it was "significan t that, so far as is known, no Italian surface forces have returned into o r near the Aegean since this action was fought " . The credit (he wrote) for this successful and gallant action belongs mainly t o Captain J. A . Collins who by his quick appreciation of the situation, offensiv e spirit and resolute handling of HMAS Sydney, achieved a victory over a superio r force which has had important strategical effects . . . . Sydney's gunnery narrative is of great interest both technically and from the more general point of view . It shows the results obtainable by an efficient control team backed by good material , and it should be given the weight due to the experience of a ship which has ha d the unique opportunity of firing 2,200 main armament rounds in action in six weeks .
It was the presence of offensive spirit, resolution, and experience o n the British side, and their absence from the Italian, which determine d the course and result of this action . And once again the lack of operationa l coordination between the Italian navy and air force was evidenced i n Casardi's misplaced confidence that aerial reconnaissance had been carrie d out over the areas he was to cross . At the same time, neither the short comings of the air force nor the state of the weather would appear t o excuse his own failure to have ensured such reconnaissance with his ow n aircraft . Propaganda—always a double-edged weapon—from Italian and Germa n sources, gave colourful versions of the encounter in broadcasts and news paper stories in which the odds were represented as heavily against th e Italians, and in which, while the loss of one of their cruisers was admitte d by the Italians, that of a British cruiser was claimed . But in his Diary entry of the 22nd July—three days after the action—Ciano recorded of Mussolini :
196
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
June-July
Today he was depressed on account of the loss of the Colleoni, not so muc h because of the sinking itself as because he feels the Italians did not fight ver y brilliantly .
In one particular the action pointed a lesson to the British . The delay imposed upon Hyperion, Ilex and Havock by their stopping to rescue Colleoni's survivors may have contributed to the escape of Bande Nere . It did result in Sydney and the three destroyers (which were each over loaded with some hundreds of demoralised prisoners whose presenc e gravely lowered the ships' fighting efficiency) being heavily bombed, an d Havock badly damaged . It was an experience which brought home the unpalatable fact that, faced as they were by greater numbers, Britis h commanding officers could not afford to permit the escape of an enem y vessel or endanger the safety of their own by acts of mercy, but mus t harden their hearts in similar circumstances in the future . An order to this effect was issued to the fleet . XI In the clashes between British and Italian surface forces in the first tw o months of the war, the initiative established by Cunningham at the outse t was retained . But Italian aircraft dominated the air in both the Centra l and Eastern Mediterranean. The inability to use Malta as a base, eve n for light surface forces, because of the constant air attacks and weaknes s of the island ' s anti-aircraft defences, gave the Italians a considerabl e degree of freedom to run convoys between Italy and Libya . The navy ha d some Swordfish aircraft at Malta, but these were of insufficient rang e to intercept reported convoys, and distance placed a similar ban on surfac e forces from the Eastern Mediterranean . Italian aircraft carried out daily reconnaissances over Alexandria, so that the enemy was immediatel y acquainted with British fleet movements, and was able to time the passag e of fast convoys to Libya accordingly . In the Eastern Mediterranean, Italia n aircraft based on the Dodecanese persistently menaced naval operations , and made the passage of Aegean convoys extremely hazardous . On th e 17th July 1940 Air Marshal Longmore, 6 the Air Officer Commanding-in Chief, Middle East, reported that his slender resources prevented his takin g counter action ; and Admiral Cunningham told the Admiralty that in its absence, unless he could have suitable escort vessels with good anti-aircraf t armament, the hazards to Aegean convoys—and to the cruisers which ha d to be used to escort them—would be such as to offset their value . Cunningham was also embarrassed, as Nelson had been in the same area nearly 150 years earlier, by his lack of light forces, and his fleet operation s were limited by his having to use destroyers to escort slow convoys, "a function which was wasteful of such precious vessels" . The major operation entailed in the passage of Aegean convoys during the last days o f July, and the scale of air attack encountered, is an instance of the difficultie s of this period . The operation, extending over eight days, covered the whol e ° Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, GCB, DSO . AOC-in-C RAF in ME 1940-41 ; IG of RAF 1941 . B . St Leonard 's, NSW, 8 Oct 1885.
21-27Iuly
PROTECTION OF CONVOYS
19 7
of the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean between Cape Matapa n in Greece and the south-western corner of Asia Minor, and employe d practically the entire strength of the fleet . The operation started on the 21st July when Liverpool, flagship of th e 7th Cruiser Squadron, with Capetown, Diamond, and Stuart, escorting one ship, sailed from Alexandria . The following day they were joine d by Dainty and Defender with five ships from Port Said, and convoy AN. 2 was formed, and course set for the Aegean via Elafonisos Channel, betwee n the Greek mainland and Kithera Island . At midnight on the 23rd July, Orion, with Vampire and Vendetta, left Alexandria for Castellorizo Island, off the south-western point of Asi a Minor, and made a demonstration about ten miles off the island shortly before sunset on the 24th July as a diversion from the convoy movement . Vampire and Vendetta then proceeded to Port Said, where they arrive d at 11 .30 a .m . on the 25th . At about that time the ships of the convoy, which had entered th e Aegean, were scattered for their Greek ports, with the exception of tw o bound for the Dardanelles, which continued northwards with the escor t group . On the 26th Capetown, Stuart, and Defender, parted company t o await the formation of a southbound convoy in the Gulf of Athens . While waiting for this convoy, the cruiser and destroyers sought for a Greek ship , Ermioni (440 tons), known to be carrying petrol for the Dodecanes e Islands ; but they failed to find her . Vampire and Vendetta sailed from Port Said again at 10 a .m. on the 26th, to rendezvous with Orion for a further demonstration against Castellorizo . They were accompanied by the armed boarding vessels Fion a and Chakla to represent transports, and on the evening of the 27th the force proceeded as if to carry out landings on the island .' Neither demonstration provoked any action from the island's defences, although th e ships fired star shells on the 27th, nor was there any sign of enemy ai r activity . Meanwhile the fleet—three battleships, Eagle, Neptune, Sydney, an d ten destroyers—sailed from Alexandria to provide cover for the southbound convoy . Sydney had been in Alexandria since her return there fro m the action off Cape Spada . On the 21st July she had landed a funeral party for Italian seamen from Colleoni, and on the 24th Collins and a number of his officers attended the funeral of Captain Navaro, who had died of wounds he suffered in that ship . The following day Sydney wa s painted in camouflage colours, and on the 26th she embarked an aircraf t to replace that lost at Bardia . She left Alexandria in company with Neptune at 3 a .m . on the 27th, and the two ships joined the Commanderin-Chief at sea seven hours later . At 6 .20 in the evening of the 27th—at which time Capetown, Defender, and Stuart had assembled a convoy of four ships—AS.2—in the Aegea n and set course southwards for the Kithera Channel—the fleet was heavil y 7
HMS Ftona (1927), 2,190 tons; sunk by enemy aircraft off Sidi Barrani, 18 Apr 1941 . HMS Chakla (1914), 3,081 tons ; sunk by enemy aircraft in Tobruk Harbour, 29 Apr 1941.
198
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
27-30 July
bombed . In all, five attacks were made by enemy aircraft, and sixty-thre e bombs were dropped . In one of these attacks, just after seven in th e evening when, as a Sydney officer recorded : we were in the midst of our meal in the wardroom, suddenly, without warning, w e heard the hair-raising whistle of approaching bombs . Eating ceased at a stroke, ears were cocked, and then as one man we yelled "Bombs!" someone adding : "Yes , and they're going to fall bloody closer s
They did . A salvo of heavy bombs straddled Sydney, but fortunately did little harm, there being two minor splinter casualties, and the newlyembarked aircraft was made unserviceable by splinter damage . There wa s no other damage in the fleet . The following day the convoy and escort—which Liverpool, Dainty , and Diamond rejoined at daylight—passed through Kithera Channel int o the Mediterranean, and Neptune and Sydney, detached from the fleet, the n to the north-west of Crete, entered the Aegean through the Elafoniso s Channel, to endeavour to intercept the Ermioni. The two ships were heavily bombed from 7 .35 to 8 p .m . and were near missed ; Sydney suffered no damage, but Neptune's aircraft, badly riddled by splinters, had to be jettisoned as a fire hazard . Shortly before dusk, near the Thermia Channel a t the entrance to the Gulf of Athens, the cruisers intercepted Ermioni, and Sydney gave anti-submarine protection to Neptune while the British cruiser, having made sure that Ermioni had been abandoned by her crew, shelle d her, setting her on fire . With the lights of Athens faintly glimmering o n the horizon, the cruisers stood by as Ermioni exploded and disappeared , and at 9 .25 they proceeded . At two in the morning of the 29th, they passed through Kithera Channel southbound, and entered Alexandria a t noon the following day. During their Mediterranean passage on the 29th, both the fleet an d convoy were subjected to nine heavy bombing attacks between 7 .35 a.m . and 3 p .m . In Stuart it was estimated that some 200 bombs were aime d at the convoy and its escorts . There was, however, only one hit, whe n Liverpool was struck by a bomb which, penetrating two decks, failed t o explode . During the last attack one Italian bomber was shot down i n flames by a Gladiator fighter from Eagle, after which the fighter pilot , unable to find Eagle and running out of petrol, landed his aircraft on the sea just ahead of Stuart. The aircraft sank immediately, and Stuart's lifeboat was called away and picked up the pilot, a New Zealander, wh o insisted on his parachute being saved also "because it cost a lot of money" . Fleet, convoy, and escorts reached Alexandria and Port Said withou t further incident on the 30th July ; and summing up the operation th e Commander-in-Chief defined as his urgent needs fighter aircraft over the fleet ; radar ; and action against enemy airfields . He was to get som e relief in these directions before long, and a few aircraft for Malta's defence s were then in the Mediterranean on their way to the island in the aircraf t carrier Argus. Ross, Stormy Petrel, p. 182 .
July-Aug
EAST AFRICA
19 9
XI I In August 1940 the Italians began to move on land towards Britis h Somaliland at the southern end of the Red Sea . With the closing of th e Mediterranean to through traffic, the approaches to the Red Sea throug h the Gulf of Aden, the fifteen-mile-wide passage of the Strait of Bab-el Mandeb—the "Gate of Tears"—and the 1,200-mile stretch from th e Strait to Suez, became the main highway to the Middle East for convoy s from Great Britain as well as those from Australia and India, and it s security of first importance . An area of great heat and high humidity ; bordered by barren coasts of desert and lofty hog-back mountain ranges ; and beset with navigational hazards of off-lying reefs and false horizons ; it offered little but discomfort and hard work to those in the ships protecting it . South of Suez the two main British ports were at Port Suda n on the western coast of the Red Sea little more than half-way down, and at Aden, outside and some 100 miles east of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb . Three hundred and fifty miles north of the Strait, roughly half-way t o Port Sudan and also on the west coast of the Red Sea, lay the Italia n naval base of Massawa, well situated for the delivery of attacks on th e convoys which had to pass it . The Italians had strong land forces in East Africa ; at least 200,00 0 troops, and 200 aircraft . The naval base of Massawa was securely protected behind an extensive screen of off-lying islands and reefs, heavil y fortified, and with its entrances mined . Here were based, at the outbreak of war, seven modern destroyers and eight submarines, with smaller craft , under the command of Rear-Admiral Bonetti . From the Sudan frontie r one-third of the way up the Red Sea, to the border of Kenya, the Eas t African coastline was in Italian hands with the exception of 400 miles o f French and British Somaliland on the southern border of the Gulf of Aden . Before 1935 the Red Sea, in Admiralty dispositions, had formed par t of the Mediterranean Station ; but at the Abyssinian crisis it had bee n made an operational area of the East Indies Station, and had so remained . At this juncture this was a matter of concern to the British army and ai r commanders in North and East Africa, who had to deal with two nava l Commanders-in-Chief—Mediterranean and East Indies—regarding th e Red Sea ; but the position was not altered until October 1941 when th e Red Sea again came under the Mediterranean command . At the end of July 1940 there were about 430 British and Allie d merchant ships on the East Indies Station, many of them congregatin g towards the Red Sea approaches to the Middle East . The protection o f all this traffic on the wide ocean stretches and the focal points, couple d with the task of watching the Italian Somaliland coast, made heav y demands on the forces available, and there was some reinforcement fro m other areas at this period . Just before the outbreak of war the cruiser Leander, which had arrived at Alexandria on the 26th May after detaching from the escort of convoy US .3 ten days earlier, was allocated to the Red Sea Force, replacing Liverpool, which joined the 7th Cruiser Squadro n in the Mediterranean . Four of Cunningham's precious destroyers—
200
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
Mar-Au g
Khartoum, Kimberley, Kingston and Kandahar—were also sent south of Suez from the Mediterranean . Early in July the Commander-in-Chief , China, proposed to the Admiralty the release of the Australian-manne d merchant cruisers under his command for service elsewhere . This proposal was adopted, and Kanimbla was transferred to the East Indies Station, an d arrived at Colombo on the 9th August, to spend twelve months on patro l work in the Indian Ocean, and on convoy escort between Durban, Aden , India, and the Persian Gulf . The other two armed merchant cruiser s Moreton Bay and Arawa, were allocated to the South Atlantic Station . O n the 24th July, Cunningham offered to surrender to the East Indies Statio n the cruisers Capetown and Caledon, which were unsuited for the heavy scale of Mediterranean air attack because of their inadequate anti-aircraf t armament and lack of speed, and they left Alexandria for the India n Ocean on the 3rd and 10th August respectively . And on the 30th July , H .M .A .S . Parramatta arrived in Aden from Colombo. During the passage from Colombo, Parramatta was in company with H .M. submarine Regent, 9 with whom she formed a tactical unit to cop e with a surface raider suspected to be operating in the Indian Ocean . Suc h a ship—the Atlantis' which had sailed from Germany on the 11th Marc h and entered the Indian Ocean in May after laying mines off Cape Agulhas —was in fact operating on the station . On the 10th June she capture d the Norwegian ship Tirranna (7,230 tons), bound from Melbourne to Mombasa, and on the 11th and 13th July respectively sank the Britis h ships City of Bagdad (7,506 tons) and Kemmendine (7,769 tons) . But she was operating some hundreds of miles southward of the Parramatta and Regent, who made their voyage without incident . By the beginning of August 1940 the Red Sea Force, which was unde r the command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, based ashore a t Colombo, and administered by the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea (RearAdmiral Murray), based ashore in Aden, had been considerably expande d from its establishment with Liverpool and Hobart in April . By August, o r shortly afterwards, it consisted of the cruisers Hobart, Leander, Caledon and Carlisle ; the destroyers Kimberley, Kingston, and Kandahar; 2 th e sloops H .M . Ships Flamingo, Auckland, Shoreham and Grimsby ; H.M. Indian Ships Clive, Indus and Hindustan ; and H .M .A .S . Parramatta . 3 °HMS Regent, submarine (1930), 1,475 tons, one 4-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 .5 kts ; sunk in Strait of Otranto, 16 Apr 1943 . i Atlantis, German auxiliary cruiser (1937), 7,862 tons, six 5 .9-in guns, four torp tubes, 93 mines , 18 kts ; sunk by HMS Devonshire NW of Ascension I, 22 Nov 1941 . 2 Khartoum was lost to this force when she sank in Perim harbour on 23 June as the result o f internal explosion . (HMS Khartoum, destroyer (1939), 1,760 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, five 21-i n torp tubes, 36 kts. ) s HMS Carlisle, anti-aircraft cruiser (1918), 4,200 tons, eight 4-in AA guns, 29 kts . HMS Kimberley, destroyer (1939), 1,760 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts . HMS Kingston, destroyer (1939), 1,760 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk by aircraft at Malta, 11 Apr 1942. HMS Kandahar, destroyer (1939), 1,760 tons, six 4.7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; mined off Libyan coast 19 Dec and sunk by own forces 20 Dec 1941 . HMS Flamingo, sloop (1939), 1,250 tons, six 4-in guns, 19.25 kts . HMS Auckland, sloop (1938), 1,250 tons, six 4-in guns, 19 .25 kts ; sunk off Tobruk, 24 Tun 1941 . HMS Grimsby, sloop (1934), 990 tons, four 4-in guns, 16 .5 kts ; sunk off Tobruk, 25 May 1941 . HMIS Clive, sloop (1920), 1,748 tons, two 4-in guns, 14 .5 kts. HMIS Indus, sloop (1935), 1,190 tons, two 4-in guns, 16 .5 kts ; sunk by Jap aircraft at Akyab, 6 Apr 1942 . HMIS Hindustan, sloop (1930), 1,190 tons, two 4-in guns, 16 .5 kts .
Apr-Aug
THE RED SEA FORCE
20 1
Local forces based on Aden were two minesweepers, two small A .M .C's and two armed trawlers . Various ships joined the force from time to time—including Ceres and Colombo, which had been intended for th e Australia Station—and for a while the 8-inch gun cruisers Dorsetshire and Shropshire were on escort duty in the Red Sea . Up to August 1940 enemy naval opposition in the Red Sea and its southern approaches was very slight, and confined to submarine activity in which the Italians came off second best . Four of their eight submarines were accounted for by the end of June . Nothing was seen of their surfac e forces . Within an hour or two of the outbreak of war the Italian Ai r Force raided Aden, and attacks continued on that base, and were also carried out on convoys, but with little harmful result . The first air raid alarm at Aden was at 1 .57 a .m . on the 11th June , as Hobart left the harbour on a sweep into the Red Sea . In harbour again next day she experienced further raids ; in one by four aircraft on the 13t h one raider fell a victim to either her fire or that of Carlisle . On the 19th Hobart carried out an air raid on her own account, when shortly befor e dawn she flew off her amphibian "pusser's duck" which bombed an Italian wireless station on Centre Peak Island—in the middle of the Red Se a opposite Massawa—and did some damage to the station buildings . Throughout the rest of June Hobart patrolled and carried out sweeps in the southern Red Sea, and on the 30th in Aden embarked 687 officers an d men of a Punjabi battalion for British Somaliland . Before the formation of the Red Sea Force in April, it had bee n decided in principle that British Somaliland should be held . At that time the military forces there consisted of the 650 Somali troops of the Somaliland Camel Corps . Reinforcement began in May, when Hobart went t o Berbera to superintend the disembarkation from the troopship Karanja (9,891 tons) of a battalion of the 2nd King 's African Rifles . There were no further reinforcements until the end of June, and the general situatio n was altered by the collapse of France in that month . British military plan s had been based on close collaboration with strong forces in French Somali land ; but the collapse of the French colony followed that of France . Early in July, however, Colonel Chater, 4 commander of the troops in Somaliland, thought that the British position would not be untenable unde r certain conditions, one being that naval support was forthcoming on the coast west of Berbera ; and this was promised to the fullest possible extent. From the French Somaliland border in the north-west, the British coastline extended eastwards some 400 miles to the frontier of Italian Somaliland . Just inside the western boundary was the small port of Zeila . Some hundred miles farther east, and almost opposite Aden 150 miles distan t from it across the Gulf, lay Berbera, the seat of government, and a practically undeveloped port whose normal trade was catered for by dhow s and a small weekly steamer . With only two small piers devoid of liftin g 4 Maj-Gen A . R. Chater, CB, DSO, OBE . Comd defence of British Somaliland 1940 ; comd troop s
Cyprus 1940-41 ; Military Governor and comd troops British Somaliland 1941-43 ; Director of Combined Ops India and SE Asia 1944-45 . Regular soldier; of Camberley, Surrey, Eng; b . London, 7 Feb 1896 .
202
R .A.N .
SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
June-Aug
gear and capable only of accommodating lighters or ships ' boats at between half and full tide, the port was ill adapted for the rapid handling of troop s and equipment . The position was aggravated in the summer months by th e kharif, a strong south-west wind often reaching gale force, which blow s for approximately twelve hours every night from June to September , making boatwork hazardous if not impossible in the harbour. In these conditions, Hobart was called upon for considerable resource and plannin g in the weeks of reinforcement and withdrawal during July and Augus t 1940 . With her Punjabi troops on board, and escorting Chantala 5 carryin g the battalion's transport and heavy stores, Hobart sailed from Aden at 3 p .m . on the 30th June, and reached Berbera early next morning . Fo r 40° 7 Ma s
44°
•Adi Ugri
-
*Hodeida
52 ° .11
/
ADE N YEMEN / PROTECTORAT E
R 14°
48°
Z
4,
de r
Asset -, i
C~GN ~
O I
~
f —y b i0or a 10 _
\
Bulhar BRITIS H •Hargeiss Tug Argan Ga p
*Addis Ababa I 40°
v
SOMALILAND / \ I 4 v / F' ' ~. O
4 44°
48°
5
the following two weeks she escorted troopships between Aden and Berbera, and assisted with her boats in their disembarkation there . On the 31st July she again left Aden for Berbera escorting a ship whos e troops were landed in her boats . On the 3rd August General Legentilhomme, who had attempted t o fight on in French Somaliland, left there, and on the 4th arrived at Berber a on his way to Aden . That day the Italians invaded British Somaliland , the main attack being from Abyssinia across the mountains towards th e coastal plains and Berbera . The British defence line was at Tug Arga n Gap, forty miles or so inland from the port . Another Italian column invaded from French Somaliland, and captured Zeila on the 5th August . Hargeisa, on the line of advance of the main enemy column, fell on the 6t h 5
HMS Chantala, armed merchant cruiser (1920), 3,129 tons ; sunk by mine in Tobruk Harbour, 7 Dec 1941 .
3-14 Aug
H.M .A .S . HOBART
203
August, and by the 11th the Italians were pouring down the escarpmen t on to the British defence line . During this period Hobart was in Berbera or on the Somaliland coast . Between the 3rd and 5th August she swept to Guardafui, and carried ou t a reconnaissance of the coast west of Berbera to investigate the bes t position to hold up an enemy advance by coastal bombardment . Back in Berbera on the 5th, she found there Parramatta, who had arrived th e previous day and experienced her first bombing attack . Parramatta left on convoy duty on the 6th, but Hobart remained, her boats busy ferryin g native refugees to their embarkation ship, and disembarking the 2nd Blac k Watch, who had been brought from Aden in Chantala . Early in the morning of the 8th August, three enemy fighter aircraft raided the Berbera airfield, and, thinking they might be from Zeila an d could be caught on the ground refuelling, Captain Howden catapulte d Hobart's amphibian . At 5 .30 a .m . the aircraft, approaching Zeila from the sea " in a steady dive from eight thousand feet ", dropped its two bomb s from 800 feet, aiming at the Residency—believed to be the Italian headquarters—in lack of other targets . The bombs fell close enough to blo w in all the windows, after which the amphibian lumbered over the tow n at 250 feet and machine-gunned the Residency, motor-lorries, and enem y posts and troops . It landed on the harbour at Berbera at 7 a .m . with tw o bullet holes in the port main lower plane, but no other damage . Th e Italians hit back about three hours later, when two aircraft dropped eigh t bombs which fell in the harbour between Hobart, Auckland, and Amber.6 They came nearer in an attack at 10 .50 a .m ., when they straddled Hobart and Chakdina, 7 but in neither attack was there any damage . In the evening of the following day, in response to a request from military headquarters , Hobart landed a 3-pounder Hotchkiss saluting gun on an improvise d mounting made from a 40-gallon drum reinforced by iron plating, with a crew of three and sixty-four rounds of ammunition . By four o'clock in the morning of the 10th, the gun—with its three sailors 8 in military uniform—was in position at Tug Argan Gap where, said the Commanderin-Chief, Middle East, "their presence and conduct were of the utmost value to the morale of the garrison " . From the 11th to the 14th of the month Hobart was in Aden, but sh e arrived back in Berbera at 5 .26 p .m . on the 14th to conduct the withdrawal which was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, th e following day . It was evident (wrote Admiral Murray in his subsequent report) that wit h specialised knowledge of Berbera it was best to leave him to deal wit h details of evacuation on the spot, after providing him with as many ships and boat s etc. as could be. Captain H. L . Howden, OBE, RAN, was Senior Naval Officer , Berbera, throughout the critical time .
Hobart's
"HMS Amber, armed trawler (1934), 700 tons, one 4-in gun, 12 kts . 'HMS Chakdina, armed merchant cruiser (1914), 3,033 tons ; sunk by aircraft in E. Mediterranean, 5 Dec 1941 . 8 PO H . Jones, AB H . C. Sweeney and AB W . J. Hurren .
204
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS
JUNE-DECEMBER
1940 14-17 Aug
Ships which took part in the operation were the cruisers Hobart, Carlisle, and Ceres ; the destroyers Kimberley and Kandahar; the armed merchant cruisers Chakdina, Chantala, and Laomedon ;9 the sloop Shoreham ; the transport Akbar (4,043 tons), and the hospital ship Vita (4,691 tons) . Howden received the withdrawal signal from Admiral Murray at 1 .1 5 p .m. on the 15th August ; and at a conference with the Base Commandan t and a representative from army headquarters (where Major-General Godwin-Austen' had assumed command on 11th August, at which tim e it was intended strongly to reinforce British Somaliland) it was decide d that embarkation should begin at 11 a .m . on the 16th . Hobart's shipwright s had made from an old lighter an additional pontoon pier, which thus gav e three pier embarkation points, using as ferrying craft two tugs—Zeila an d Queen—and four lighters, all manned by Hobart ; and the boats of all naval ships in harbour. 2 Howden appointed Lieutenants Morrison 3 an d Malleson 4 of Hobart as his operations staff, and combined operationa l headquarters were set up in the ship . Beachmasters were appointed, an d ship to shore communications established with Hobart's signalmen. Throughout the operation, ships' armament had constantly to be manne d in anticipation of a possible surface attack by enemy destroyers or torped o boats, though none eventuated ; and in readiness for air attacks, which materialised on a number of occasions, in bomber and fighter raids . Seaward defence was afforded by Carlisle, whose radar and anti-aircraft gun s were a valuable factor ; and by an anti-submarine patrol of destroyers and sloops . Embarkation into Chakdina—delayed by air raids which otherwise di d no harm—began shortly after noon on the 16th, and by 6 .45 p .m . she had embarked 1,100 of the civilian population, including between tw o and three hundred Abyssinian women and children, and sailed for Aden . On the 17th Ceres, patrolling the coast, engaged an enemy column advancing along the Zeila-Berbera road forty miles west of Berbera, an d held up its advance . On this day intensive embarkation of troops a t Berbera into Chantala, Laomedon, and Akbar, began at 8 .30 p .m ., an d continued throughout the blowing of the kharif which caused sea conditions making heavy demands on the courage and skill of the coxswain s and crews of the ferrying craft . "To them," reported Howden, "a great part of the success of the evacuation of British Somaliland belongs . " General Godwin-Austen, with his staff, embarked in Hobart at 10 p .m . , increasing the strain on the ship's communications and signals branches . Hobart's surgeons, and members of her company not otherwise employed , ,
HMS Laomedon, armed merchant cruiser (1912), 6,491 tons . I General Sir Alfred Godwin-Austen, KCSI, CB, OBE, MC . (Served Gallipoli and Mesopotamia 1915-19 .) Comd 14 Inf Bde 1938-39 ; GOC Somaliland 1940-41, XIII Corps 1941-42 ; Director of Tactical Investigation, War Office, 1942-43 . B . 17 Apr 1889. Ferrying craft used were Zeila and Queen ; the four lighters ; two motor-boats, the pinnace, and two cutters from Hobart ; four motor-boats from Aden, including Admiral Murray' s barge ; and boats from Carlisle, Kandahar, and Shoreham . s Capt T . K . Morrison, OBE, DSC ; RAN. HMAS Hobart 1938-43 ; HMAS Australia 1944-45 . B. Melbourne, 31 Oct 1911 . 4 Lt-Cdr C . V . S. Malleson, RN. HMAS Hobart 1938-40 ; HMAS Canberra 1941 ; HMS Trumpeter 1943 ; HMS Flycatcher 1945 . B . 23 Jun 1912 .
18-19 Aug
HOBART AT BRITISH SOMALILAND
20 5
meanwhile did good work in a temporary sick bay which was establishe d in the starboard shelter deck to take care of wounded troops . At 2 .30 a .m . on the 18th August the steady stream of troops arrivin g at the embarkation points was halted, owing to the destruction of a culver t on the main line of retreat . Howden himself landed, and collected a number of Somali truck drivers, whom he placed under the charge o f Signalman Martin 5 of Hobart—a reserve rating who was a truck drive r in civil life . Martin did a resourceful job assembling a truck convoy and assisting in the withdrawal of the King's African Rifles . Howden compensated the native drivers by giving them passage in the cruiser to Aden , "except one who wished to remain in Somaliland, to whom I presented a 1940 car that had run only 51 miles" . The operations of the truc k parties were helped by Lieutenant Synnot 6 of Hobart, who was establishe d as forward observation officer on Government House tower, with a port able wireless set and a team of signalmen and telegraphists, and sent ou t cars and trucks as necessary to bring in stragglers . At 6 .20 a .m . on the 18th Hobart's aircraft was catapulted and reconnoitred all the passes on the Berbera plain, returning an hour later withou t having sighted the enemy . By early afternoon the main embarkation wa s completed, and the embarkation ships—including the hospital ship Vita, and the Chakdina which had returned from Aden for a further load — were sailed for that port . Throughout the afternoon demolition partie s from Hobart operated ashore, finally firing the wooden piers, and the da y closed with Hobart being straddled by bombs from three Italian aircraft , suffering only slight splinter damage . The night of the 18th was unusual in that the kharif was late . The surface of the harbour, a mirror in a fla t calm, reflected the light of a rising full moon and the glare of th e demolition fires which, burning on shore, crackled with the explosions o f small arms ammunition set off in the flames. The wind came away with the early morning of the 19th, and by daylight was blowing strongly . At 7 .45 a .m . Hobart commenced bombardin g Berbera, destroying Government House, the police barracks and lines , storehouses and government offices, and firing in all sixty-six rounds o f 6-inch shell . Some forty miles west along the coast, Caledon and Kandahar bombarded Bulhar . During Hobart's bombardment some stragglers wer e seen on the beach . Synnot took a motor-boat as close in to the heavy surf as possible and anchored, then he, with Able Seaman Lewis,' swam ashor e and brought off three exhausted men of the King's African Rifles . The y were the last to be embarked . At 8 .46 Hobart weighed and proceeded a t 25 knots to Aden, where she arrived at 3 o'clock that afternoon . The operation was carried out with only one loss among the embarkation craft—that of the tug Queen—and there were no damage or casualties in ° Signalman C . Martin, PA1451 ; RANR . HMAS 's Hobart 1939-42, Kalgoorlie 1942, Heros 1943-44. Of Alberton, SA; b . Alberton, 28 May 1918 . ° Cdr T . M. Synnot, DSC ; RAN . HMAS's Hobart 1938-40, Arunta 1942 ; Sqn Gunnery Officer, 1 5 Cruiser Sqn 1944-45. Of Woollahra, NSW ; b. Cooma, NSW, 15 Jan 1916 . 7 AB V. E . Lewis, PA1490, RANR. HMAS's Hobart 1939-42, Tamworth SA ; b . Glanville, SA, 8 Aug 1919 .
1942-44. Of Semaphore,
206
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1940
16-19 Aug
the ships . In all, 7,140 were embarked, comprising 5,690 combat troops , 1,266 civilians, and 184 sick . Hobart lost her Hotchkiss gun, and its cre w were at the time believed to have been killed . They were in fact made prisoners by the Italians, and were recovered at Adi Ugri, Eritrea, o n the 1st April 1941, when Italian East Africa fell to the British . The loss of British Somaliland placed the Italians on the flank of th e important convoy route through the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea . Bu t they made little use of the advantage . Their naval forces at Massawa were inadequate ; and the British blockade, combined with the retaliatory attack s made by the Royal Air Force on their bases and the hot reception given to their aircraft when they attacked convoys, restricted their activities in the air . Writing in October 1940, Lieut-Commander Walker in Parramatta said that a ship carrying a large consignment of air bombs for the Italian s had been sunk off Port Sudan, and "the effect of this loss, and the blockade , was eventually so serious that recent Italian bombs have sometimes bee n converted shells" . Mr Churchill deplored the temporary loss of British Somalilan d as our only defeat at Italian hands . At this particular moment, when formidabl e events impended in Egypt and when so much depended on our prestige, the rebuf f caused injury far beyond its strategic scale . 8
It was for its political effect that the withdrawal was chiefly regretted . The loss of Somaliland did not affect British naval operations in the Gul f of Aden and Red Sea, but rather relieved them of a commitment at a time when relief was welcome . XIII On Hobart's busiest day of the main embarkation at Berbera, Australia n ships in the Mediterranean were employed on an operation associate d with the "formidable events impending in Egypt" . The Italians in Libya, freed from any threat from Tunisia with the collapse of France, ha d brought considerable reinforcements to their eastern frontier . In the forenoon of the 16th August Cunningham in Warspite, with Malaya, Ramillies, and the cruiser Kent—which had lately joined the fleet—screened b y destroyers including Stuart, Waterhen, Vendetta, and Diamond of the 10th Flotilla, sailed from Alexandria to help the army by doing as much damage as possible to the material and morale of Italian military concentrations—troops, guns, and stores collecting at Capuzzo and nea r Bardia . A bombardment by the four big ships was carried out from 6 .5 8 a .m . to 7 .20 a .m . on the 17th August . Later air reconnaissance showe d appreciable results, especially at Capuzzo . But in his summing up o f the operation Cunningham considered that the Italians had showed suc h skill in dispersing stores and transport over wide areas, that targets offere d did not justify a repetition of such naval bombardments while warfar e in the desert remained static . However the bombardment gave useful— and heartening—exercise in cooperation with the Royal Air Force which , in conjunction with some of Eagle's fighters operating from shore, pro,
' Churchill, The Second World War, Vol II
(1949), p . 383 .
(R .A .N . Historical Section ) Temporary Pier and Tug Queen at Berbera . August 1940 .
(R . .4 . .V . HiArorical Section ) H .M .A .S . Simla
with Mediterranean Fleet .
(R .A .N. Historical Section ) Italian Destroyer Artigliere stopped and abandoned in Mediterranean Operations . 12th October 1940 .
(R .A .N . Historical Section ) German Raider Pinguin .
17-24 Aug
BARDIA AND GULF OF BOMBA
207
vided cover for the fleet . On the return voyage to Alexandria the ship s were heavily attacked by Italian bombers . The fleet suffered no damage , but the fighters, without loss to themselves, shot down twelve of the enem y aircraft, a "sight for the fleet which the sailors thoroughly enjoyed" .9 Some hundred miles west of Bardia, and fifty miles beyond Tobruk , lies the Gulf of Bomba . There the Italians had a seaplane base, and an anchorage at Jez-el-Marakeb . With the object of damaging Italian moral e and material, a night bombardment of the area was carried out on th e 24th August by destroyers under the command of Captain Waller i n Stuart. Simultaneously the gunboat Ladybird entered Bardia Harbour to do what damage she could . Supporting cover for both operations was provided by Sydney . Air fighter cover was arranged for the return journey o f the ships to Alexandria, and it was hoped that the night's activities would bring about morning air attacks on the ships in which the fighters woul d repeat their successes of a week earlier . Stuart, with Waterhen and Diamond of the 10th, and Juno and Ilex of the 2nd Flotillas, sailed from Alexandria at 4 .30 a .m . on the 23rd August , followed by Sydney six hours later . At 11 .30 Ladybird left Mersa Matru h for Bardia . The Alexandria ships made a good offing, and at 8 p .m . th e destroyers were approximately due north of Bardia and midway between the Libyan coast and Crete . From this point Waterhen was detached t o give close cover to Ladybird at Bardia, and Stuart and the remainin g destroyers headed at 27 knots for Bomba, off which Sydney was to patrol some forty miles to seaward . Stuart sighted the land shortly before 1 a.m. on the 24th, exact identification being difficult because of its lownes s and considerable inshore mist . But a patch of electric lights presumably indicated the seaplane base, and their position—for they were suddenl y switched off, suggesting that the force had been sighted from the shore — was bombarded by the four destroyers, after which a short shoot was carried out at the anchorage at Jez-el-Marakeb . Most of the destroyers ' shells were seen to burst ashore, and Waller later reported that he could confirm "that the area round the lights had an unpleasant three minutes" . The Italians made no reply to the fire, and at 1 .39 a .m . the force retired to rendezvous with Sydney and Waterhen at 8 a .m . close inshore between Salum and Mersa Matruh to bait enemy bombers . Time to keep this appointment was limited, Waller noted , by the excessive fuel consumption in my 21-year-old leader—I could not make the passage back to the rendezvous at more than 25 knots or I should have bee n dangerously low in fuel by the forenoon .
Meanwhile Waterhen had arrived off Bardia around midnight on th e 23rd, and sighted Ladybird stealing towards the harbour in the shado w of the land . Shortly after 12 .3, as the gunboat was shaping up for th e entrance, the shore batteries to the north and south of Bardia opened fir e on her, but she was not hit, and at five past one entered the harbour t o find it empty of shipping . Once inside and screened from the fire of th e Cunningham, A Sailor' s Odyssey (1951), p . 271 .
208
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
Aug-Sep t
shore batteries by the high cliffs, she spent twenty-five minutes bombardin g buildings ashore at point blank range—making a tremendous noise in th e confined space enclosed by high land—and at 1 .30 a .m . on the 24th cleared the harbour again, to the great relief of those in Waterhen. The destroyer closed the land and gave supporting fire as Ladybird, under cover of a smoke screen, again successfully ran the gauntlet of the shore batteries ' fire and, though straddled, withdrew without damage or casualties . A main object of the operation, the baiting of Italian bombers in th e forenoon of the 24th, was not achieved . Stuart had made precautions against bomb splinters in the time honoured manner by shielding he r bridge and upperworks with hammocks . But they were not needed . The hoped for air attack on the return journey did not develop, and the combined force reached Alexandria in the evening of the 24th withou t further incident . XIV Early in September the Mediterranean Fleet was reinforced by the battle ship Valiant, the aircraft carrier Illustrious, and the anti-aircraft cruiser s Calcutta and Coventry .' Valiant replaced Royal Sovereign, whose boiler s said the Commander-in-Chief, "had died on us" . Royal Sovereign left th e Mediterranean in August, and was met, escorted by Dainty, Decoy an d Defender in the Red Sea on her way south, by Parramatta on the 15th o f the month . Parramatta joined the escort "but", reported Walker, the ba d state of the battleship 's boilers notwithstanding, "we could not keep up " . The reinforcements successfully arrived from the Western Mediterranea n in what was the first attempt to pass large scale forces between Cap e Bon and Sicily since Italy entered the war . It was a comprehensive operation which engaged the Mediterranean Fleet and Force "H", from Gibraltar ; and included the passing of convoys between Alexandria and Malt a and from the Aegean to Port Said ; and air attacks on and bombardments of enemy objectives in the Dodecanese Islands . Sydney, and all th e destroyers of the 10th Flotilla except Waterhen in Alexandria with condenser trouble, took part . The operation started on the 29th . August with the sailing from Alexandria of the Malta convoy—Cornwall (10,605 tons), Plumleaf (5,91 6 tons) and Volo (1,587 tons)—escorted by Jervis, 2 Juno, Dainty, and Diamond. Before daylight the following morning the Commander-in-Chie f left Alexandria in Warspite, with Eagle and Malaya ; the 7th Cruiser Squadron, Orion and Sydney ; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Kent, Gloucester, an d Liverpool ; and twelve destroyers . That same forenoon the reinforcements , supported as far as Sardinia by Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield 3 and destroyers of Force "H", passed Gibraltar east bound . On the way to the Central Mediterranean, aircraft from Ark Royal attacked Elmas airfield at Cagliari , 1 HMS Calcutta, anti-aircraft cruiser (1919), 4,200 tons, eight 4-in guns, 29 kts ; sunk off Crete , 1 Jun 1941 . HMS Coventry, anti-aircraft cruiser (1918), 4,290 tons, ten 4-in guns, 29 kts ; sunk in E Mediterranean, 14 Sep 1942 . 9 HMS Jervis, destroyer (1939), 1,695 tons, six 4.7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts . O HMS Sheffield, cruiser (1937), 9,100 tons, twelve 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 kts .
30Aug-2Sept
MALTA CONVOYS
20 9
Sardinia, as a diversionary operation . At 10 p .m . on the 1st September the reinforcements, with destroyer escort, parted company with Force "H " to rendezvous with the Mediterranean Fleet south of Malta . Force "H" returned to Gibraltar, and made another air attack on Cagliari on the way. Meanwhile, also as a diversion, Cunningham detached the 3rd Cruise r Squadron on the 30th August to proceed north of Crete west about a s though making a raid into the Aegean, while the battle fleet proceede d close to the south coast of Crete, giving cover to the convoy farther t o the southward . The 3rd Cruiser Squadron rejoined the battle fleet at noo n on the 31st to the west of Greece . By this time the two forces, and th e convoy, were being shadowed by enemy aircraft, and shortly after noo n the convoy was bombed . Cornwall was hit and set on fire with her steering damaged . She got the fire under control, however, and, steering with th e main engines, managed to maintain nine-and-a-half knots . The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was detached to give anti-aircraft protection to the convoy. At 6 p .m . on the 31st one of Eagle's aircraft reported the Italia n battle fleet, of two battleships, seven cruisers, and destroyers, 120 mile s from Warspite . "The immediate and natural reaction," wrote Cunningham , "was to turn towards the enemy to seek action ." But night was approaching ; and the necessity to protect the convoy decided him to cover it during the night, hoping for the opportunity to engage the following day . Daylight, however, brought no sign of the enemy, either on the sea or in the air ; and in the afternoon of the 1st September the Italians were reporte d by a flying-boat of No . 228 Squadron, R .A .F., from Malta as being abou t 100 miles from Taranto and making for home . In the morning of 1s t September the convoy was split, Volo and Plumleaf proceeding at maximum speed escorted by Dainty and Diamond, while Jervis and Juno remained with the slower Cornwall . All ships of convoy and escort reache d Malta safely, under the cover of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, on th e morning of the 2nd September. By this time the reinforcements had negotiated the Sicilian Narrows , and at 9 a .m . on the 2nd September met the Mediterranean Fleet to th e south-west of Malta . Here the fleet cruised throughout the day . Valiant , Coventry and Calcutta were sent in to Malta to discharge stores they ha d brought, and destroyers were sent in to fuel as requisite . It was at this time that German dive bombers were first met with in the Mediterranean. At 3 p .m . on the 2nd, as the destroyers Janus and Imperial were enterin g Malta, they were unsuccessfully attacked by three JU-87B aircraft ; and later in the day a surprise attack by a small formation of dive bomber s was made on Eagle . No damage was suffered by the ships, and five enem y aircraft were shot down and four damaged . Bombing was inaccurate, and many bombs were jettisoned a long way from the fleet when the enem y were pursued by fighters . The passage of the Aegean convoy, and the attacks on the Dodecanese , had been planned for the return journey to Alexandria, and entailed a division of forces as on the westward voyage . At 4 .45 p .m . on the 2nd September Rear-Admiral Pridham-Wippell, commanding the 1st Battle
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1940
2-4sept
Squadron, with Malaya, Eagle, Coventry, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers (Force `E " )—including Vampire and Vendetta—wa s detached and steered to the eastward to the south of Crete . Three hours later Cunningham with Warspite, Valiant, Illustrious, Calcutta, the 7th Cruiser Squadron and nine destroyers (Force "I") followed to the eastward—but to the north of Crete . At dawn on the 3rd the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with Nubian and Mohawk, was detached from Force "E" to enter the Aegean and pick up the convoy—of five ships—in the Gulf o f Navplion . Force "I" entered the Aegean through the Kithera Channe l at 9 .30 p .m ., and an hour later the 7th Cruiser Squadron, with Ilex and Decoy, left the force to carry out their Dodecanese bombardments, whil e Stuart, who had dropped astern with a burst steam pipe, was ordered t o join the 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the convoy . During the night of th e 3rd-4th, the attack forces took up their positions for the dawn air raid s on the Dodecanese . The 7th Cruiser Squadron's objective was Scarpanto, where Orion was to bombard shore installations at Pegadia, and Sydney's target for bombardment was Makri Yalo airfield, at the southern end of the island . With Ilex in company five cables astern, Sydney approached her firing position at dawn ; and as day was breaking the amphibian aircraft was launche d "with a shattering roar" to spot . In the growing light the barren-lookin g coast lifted in jagged peaks, the hills sloping down to a flat stretch wher e the aerodrome lay . Collins had planned his approach to have Sydney heading to seaward, away from the corner between Scarpanto and th e adjacent Kaso Island, when on his firing course . Just before the whee l was put over an Italian motor torpedo boat—"E-boat"—was sighted ; and it crossed Sydney's bows at high speed a little over a mile away as th e ship swung to her helm . Two more came out from the land after it . Th e Italian vessels were immediately engaged by Ilex . Two were destroyed , one of them disintegrating in flames after a direct hit . The third escaped , damaged, to the south of Kaso Island . Meanwhile Sydney, at 6 .19 a .m . , opened fire on the aerodrome . Her bombardment lasted twenty-fiv e minutes, during which, her aircraft observer reported, the eastern en d of the aerodrome was "well plastered" with the one hundred and thirty-fiv e 6-inch shells she fired . The observer also reported two other E-boats which , not seen from the ships, came from the west side of Scarpanto and escape d to the north of Kaso . The bombardment completed, Sydney and Ilex withdrew to the southward and rejoined Orion and Decoy, whose results had been disappointing through lack of targets . While the 7th Cruiser Squadron had been thus engaged, aircraft fro m Illustrious and Eagle bombed respectively the main Italian airfields a t Kalatho and Maritza, on Rhodes . Force "I", after Illustrious had flown her striking force off to the north of Crete, passed through Kaso Strait and joined up with Force "E", and the returning air striking forces wer e landed on the carriers south of Crete between 7 .30 and 7 .40 a .m ., having caused considerable damage at their respective targets . The 7th Cruiser Squadron joined the main force three hours later. During the forenoon
Aug-Sept
FRENCH AFRICAN COLONIES
21 1
of the 4th September, three fruitless bombing attacks were made on th e fleet, which reached Alexandria in the early morning of the 5th . The convoy, escorted by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, arrive d safely the following day . The most welcome arrival among the reinforcements was that o f Illustrious with her armoured decks, Fulmar fighter aircraft, and radiodirection-finding equipment . When the new arrivals joined the fleet off Malta, and the Fulmars shot down Italian shadowing aircraft, it was, a s Cunningham later wrote : to the loud cheers of the ships' companies, who had just about as much as the y could stand of being bombed without retaliation . The tremendous effect of thi s incident upon everyone in the fleet, and upon the Commander-in-Chief as much a s anyone, was indescribable . From that moment, whenever an armoured carrier was i n company, we had command of the air over the fleet . By that I do not mean tha t bombing attacks ceased . Far from it . But we felt that we now had a weapon which enabled us to give back as good as we were getting, and also gave us vastl y increased freedom of movement .
XV While these operations were taking place in the Mediterranean, a Britis h naval force—including the cruiser Australia—was on its way from the United Kingdom to West Africa . It was part of an expedition including British and Free French military and air detachments, and was accompanie d by General de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French Movement which wa s carrying on the fight alongside Britain against the common enemy . The object was to occupy Dakar and raise the Free French flag in West Africa , thus consolidating the French colonies there and in Equatorial Africa fo r de Gaulle as a prelude to rallying those in North Africa . Both in Britain and in Germany the future of French Africa was a matter of considerable concern . The French colonies embraced the greate r proportion of the important western bulge of the continent, and extende d from the westernmost seaboard to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and fro m Bizerta in the Mediterranean to the border of the Belgian Congo, roughl y some 3,000 miles in both the west-east and north-south directions . This area was cut into to a limited degree by the Spanish strip opposite th e Canary Islands, and by Portuguese Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, an d the British colonies of the Gold Coast and Nigeria on the southern edg e of the bulge . But on the Atlantic coast, and in the interior, it occupie d strategical positions respectively on the north-south ocean routes and th e east-west transcontinental equatorial routes, both of which were importan t to British operations in the Middle East . On the coast were the naval bases of Casablanca in Morocco, and Dakar in Senegal . Dakar, lying behind Cape Verde, the westernmost point of Africa, was little over 50 0 miles north of Freetown, Sierra Leone, a British naval base and majo r convoy formation and staging port . It was thus most desirable that Daka r should be in friendly hands, and essential that it should not become a n enemy base for submarine and air operations against the sea communications . As to the transcontinental route, Britain was anxious to develop this
212
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
June-Sept
for the flying of aircraft reinforcements to the Middle East. These wer e carried by sea to Takoradi on the Gold Coast, and there disembarked , fitted with long-range tanks, and flown to their destination. The aircraft carrier Argus arrived at Takoradi on the 5th September 1940 with store s and equipment for an air base there, and with a number of Hurricane s equipped with long-range tanks for the flight across Africa . The value of Dakar and the French hinterland was thus plain to the British Government, and on the 8th August Mr Churchill, in a minute to the Chiefs o f Staff Committee, mentioned tha t a telegram from the Governor of Nigeria shows the danger of German influenc e spreading quickly through the West African colonies of France with the connivanc e or aid of the Vichy Government . Unless we act with celerity and vigour, we may find effective U-boat bases, supported by German aviation, all down this coast, an d it will become barred to us but available for the Germans in the same way as th e western coast of Europe.
Six weeks before this minute was written, the possibility of winning ove r Casablanca had been explored by Britain, but a diplomatic approac h had failed in the face of the hostility of the local French, and it wa s considered that direct action was beyond British strength . General de Gaulle, however, was convinced that the feeling in Dakar was mor e favourable, and that he would be welcomed and could carry opinio n there if he appeared with Free French forces backed by British support . His conviction was shared by other members of a committee whic h Churchill had formed to advise on French affairs . Churchill, on the 3r d August, gave his general approval to a proposal by this committee fo r landing Free French forces in West Africa, and plans were worked ou t in detail . On the 27th August the British War Cabinet gave their final general approval to the project . On that day the French colonies of the Cameroons and Lake Chad Territory, in Equatorial Africa, declared fo r de Gaulle ; a fact that augured well for success at Dakar . In Germany, the naval staff were equally alive to the importance t o the German naval effort of the West African bases, and of the Atlanti c islands . At a conference with Hitler on the 20th June 1940, discussing the armistice with France, the Chief of the Naval Staff—Grand Admira l Raeder, a sound strategist—impressed on Hitler the value of Dakar an d of other African Atlantic bases . Hitler, who was playing with an ide a to use Madagascar for settling Jews under French supervision, was apparently sympathetic, and expressed realisation of the importance of a proposa l made by Raeder to exchange Madagascar for the northern part of Portuguese Angola ; and said he would consider that suggestion . But this was i n the first enthusiasm of easy victory over western Europe and a prematur e division of the spoils . After the war, the German naval historians, Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, attributed to the undue haste in which the term s of the French armistice were drawn up, the failure to insist upon Germa n occupation of Tunis and Dakar ; which failure they considered largel y responsible for the position in which the Axis ultimately found itself i n the Mediterranean . Within a short time of the signing of the armistice, the
Aug-Sept
FRENCH AFRICAN COLONIES
21 3
power to insist upon German occupation of these and other Frenc h colonial bases had gone . The bargaining power of Vichy France was not negligible, and the trend of events quickly strengthened that power . Raeder, however, continued to press upon Hitler the desirability of securing Daka r and other bases in north-west Africa—the "main danger point", which , he urged, must be eliminated by cooperation with Vichy France . But he was handicapped by various factors, including the Italian hostility towards , and mistrust of, France ; the unpopularity with the German Supreme Command—obsessed with the idea of continental warfare—of the nava l viewpoint ; and his own personal inability to press the naval views with th e necessary persuasiveness and tenacity . Hitler, though he paid Raeder's opinions lip service while his naval chief was with him, was in his absenc e easily swayed from them by Goering and his military leaders . Furthermore, he was not always honest with Raeder . By September 1940 the dangers foreseen by Raeder were very real . It was obvious that Britain would continue to fight, and doubts as to the practicability of an invasion of the island were growing in Germany . On the 18th August, the establishment of a permanent Joint Defence Board by the United States and Canada had been announced . On the 5th September Mr Churchill told the House of Commons that "the nava l frontiers of the United States have been advanced along a wide arc int o the Atlantic Ocean " by Britain's leasing for ninety-nine years areas fo r the establishment of American naval and air bases in Newfoundland , Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St Lucia, Trinidad, and Britis h Guiana ; and that the United States Government had transferred fifty destroyers to Britain . On the 23rd August, Ciano recorded in his Diary that Mussolini had received an interesting letter from Franco in whic h the Caudillo talks about Spain coming into the war soon . He says that he has already approached the Germans to get what he needs .
But Franco was playing a wary and carefully-calculated game . Awar e of the strength of his position, he displayed a disinclination to show practical appreciation of the assistance he had received from both Ital y and Germany during the civil war period . A month after his interestin g letter to Mussolini—a month in which the German failure in the Battl e of Britain was becoming clear—Franco, on the 22nd September, replie d to a German request for naval bases in Morocco with a refusal, and als o placed objections in the way of Spanish intervention in the war, includin g doubts as to the ability to defend the Canary Islands against Britain . At a meeting with Hitler on the 6th September, Raeder suggested tha t the delivery of the fifty destroyers represented an openly hostile act b y the United States against Germany, and there was a possibility of activ e participation by America, with perhaps the occupation of Spanish an d Portuguese islands in the Atlantic, possibly even the British West Africa n possessions, in an attempt to influence, and if necessary take over, th e French West African colonies . Raeder emphasised once more the extrem e importance of Dakar for Germany in the war . Hitler agreed, and con-
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1940
Aug-Sept
sidered the occupation of the Canary Islands by the air force as bot h expedient and feasible . The question of supplies represented the onl y difficulty, as submarines could not carry petrol . Raeder believed tha t tankers could reach the Canaries from Spain . 4 No German action resulted, largely since Franco, for his part, continue d to hedge on the question of Spain's intervention in the war, and Germany was thus unable to get farther south than France on the Atlantic seaboard . In the meantime President Roosevelt, in America, knew of the impending British action against Dakar, and on the 23rd September Mr Churchil l told him : We should be delighted if you would send some American warships to Monrovi a and Freetown, and I hope by that time to have Dakar ready for your call .
At the beginning of August 1940 H .M .A .S . Australia was in Scapa Flow, attached to the Home Fleet . From the 12th to the 16th of the month, i n company with H .M .S . Norfolk, 5 she patrolled north of the Faeroes, wher e it was believed a German vessel might be trying to get through the patro l screen . From the 23rd to the 28th August, after a few days in Scapa , Australia and Norfolk proceeded to Bear Island—in the Arctic Sea nort h of Norway—to capture German trawlers, but found none there . On their way home the two ships closed the north coast of Norway . Australia's aircraft was catapulted to carry out a reconnaissance of Tromso and bom b military installations . But cloud prevented its penetration of the fiord, an d it returned to the ship after jettisoning its bomb . On the 1st September, Australia arrived in the Clyde and anchore d off Greenock . The day previously the Dakar expeditionary force had saile d for Freetown, Sierra Leone . Vice-Admiral Cunningham s was flying hi s flag in the cruiser Devonshire, and his force included the cruiser Fiji, the battleship Barham, and four destroyers, all from the Home Fleet.' Free French vessels in the expedition were a trawler and three patrol vessels . The military forces, comprising 4,200 British and 2,700 Free French unde r Major-General Irwin, 8 were in accompanying transports . For the actual operation at Dakar the naval force, when it reached Freetown, was reinforced by Resolution, Ark Royal, and six destroyers from Force "H" a t Gibraltar ; and by Cumberland, Milford, Bridgewater and the boom defenc e vessel Quannet from the South Atlantic squadron . 9 On the day Australia arrived at Greenock, Fiji was torpedoed by a submarine to the west of the Hebrides, and had to return to port ; and o n 2nd September Australia was ordered to replace her in the Dakar force. 4 Ciano Diplomatic Papers (1949), Note, p . 393, Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (1948), p . 84, and Vice-Admiral Assmann's Headline Diary . 6 HMS Norfolk, cruiser (1930), 9,925 tons, eight 8-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 32 .25 kts. 6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Cunningham, GCB, MVO; RN . Comd 1st Cruiser Sqn 1938-41 ; Chief of Supplies and Transport, Admiralty 1941-43 ; C-in-C Levant 1943 ; C-in-C Mediterranea n and Allied Naval Cdr, Mediterranean, 1943-46 ; Chief of Naval Staff 1946-48 . B . 1885. ', HMS Devonshire, cruiser (1929), 9,850 tons, eight 8-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 32 .25 kts . HMS Fiji, cruiser (1940), 8,000 tons, twelve 6-in guns, 33 kts ; sunk off Crete, 22 May 1941 . e Lt-Gen N . M . S. Irwin, CB, DSO, MC . Comd 6 Inf Bde 1939-40 ; GOC-in-C West Africa, 1946-48 . Regular soldier; b . India, 24 Dec 1892. °HMS Bridgewater, sloop (1929), 1,045 tons, six 4-in guns, 16 .5 kts . HMS Quannet (1926), 350 tons, one 3-in gun .
Aug-Sept
THE DAKAR EXPEDITION
21 5
Australia sailed from the Clyde at 8 .49 a .m . on 6th September for Sierr a Leone, and the voyage was uneventful until the night prior to enterin g Freetown, 14th September. The Dakar expedition was dogged by ill luck from the start . As was learned after the war, the Vichy Government, on the 29th August 1940 , received information that the Chad Colony had declared allegiance t o de Gaulle . Next day the French Armistice Commission asked German per mission to send three cruisers from Toulon to West Africa in order t o promote respect for Vichy authority . This request was at first refused, bu t was granted on 1st September in exchange for a guarantee that the ship s would resist any British attack . By the night of 10th September information reached London from two sources—the British Consul-General a t Tangier, and the British Naval Attache in Madrid—that a Vichy Frenc h squadron would attempt to pass westward through the Straits of Gibraltar . The British thereupon assumed that the Vichy authorities had learned of the projected Dakar operation through leakage of information . The report from Madrid which had been given officially to the Naval Attache by th e French Admiralty, said the squadron consisted of the cruisers Gloire, Montcalm and Georges Leygues, and three destroyers, which had sailed from Toulon and would pass the Straits on the morning of the 11th . 1 It was at this time a normal procedure for the Vichy Government so to advise the British of the movements of French vessels to French possession s not under German control, on the understanding that such movement s would not be interfered with by the British . But this was an instance i n which it was essential that Vichy French reinforcements should not reach Dakar. Through a series of untoward events, and although Somerville a t Gibraltar had received a copy of the Madrid signal a few minutes afte r midnight on the 10th and, being aware of the Dakar project, had brough t Renown to one hour's notice for steam, instructions from the Admiralt y to intercept the French force were not received in time for him to sto p it in the Straits . The French ships were sighted fifty miles east of Gibralta r by the destroyer Hotspur 2 at 4 .45 a .m . on the 11th ; and at 8 .35 a .m . they passed through the Straits at 25 knots and turned south-west down th e African coast . They entered Casablanca, and sailed thence southward s without being detected by British reconnaissance although a search fo r them was by then in progress, and in the early hours of the 14th Septembe r the Admiralty signalled to Vice-Admiral Cunningham—then approachin g Freetown with his force—to prevent them from entering Dakar. Australia, at this time 140 miles from Freetown and steering for that port, wa s ordered to rendezvous with Devonshire, Cumberland, and Ark Royal, and during the night of the 14th-15th September a patrol line was establishe d by these ships seventy-five miles north-west of Dakar . The following day , however, aircraft from Ark Royal established that the three French cruiser s 1 Gloire, Montcalm and Georges Leygues, French cruisers (1937), 7,600 tons, nine 6-in guns, four 21 .7-in torp tubes, 31 kts . 2 HMS Hotspur, destroyer (1936), 1,340 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts.
216
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940 16-19 Sept
were already in the port . The British ships—with the exception of Cumberland, left to patrol south of Dakar—were withdrawn to Freetown, wher e the Dakar expedition was assembling . At this stage Mr Churchill was, he later said, of the opinion that th e operation should be cancelled : This chapter of accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar . I had no doubt whatever that the enterprise should be abandoned . The whol e scheme of a bloodless landing and occupation by General de Gaulle seemed to m e ruined by the arrival of the French squadron, probably carrying reinforcements , good gunners, and bitter-minded Vichy officers, to decide the Governor, to perver t the garrison, and man the batteries .3 The British War Cabinet, however, finally decided on the 18th Septembe r in view of protests against abandonment received from the commander s on the spot, to give those commanders full authority to go ahead as the y thought fit "to give effect to the original purpose of the expedition" . In the evening of the day this decision was reached, Australia sailed from Freetown to relieve Cumberland on patrol off Dakar, and took over fro m that ship at 8 .2 a .m. on th e 19th September . Half an hour later, when steamin g north about 250 miles south of Dakar, she sighted th e ( .J three French cruisers ahead on the opposite course . Australia at once turned and shadowed them from ahead, and signalled Cumberland to join her . Through the day the two British ship s shadowed the French, steering roughly south-east at ti 151 knots . At 5 .30 p .m . th e French vessels reverse d a course and increased speed . The British ships followed suit, but with darkness fallTrack of H,M.A. S . Australi a ing the French were lost to sight . Stewart in Australia thereupon altered course direct for Dakar and increased to 31 knots to bea t the French arrival there and prevent them from entering, but shortl y afterwards sighted a darkened ship approaching from ahead . She turned out to be Gloire, which had engine trouble and reported that she was making for Konakri, to the north of Sierra Leone in French Guinea . Stewart, with some misgivings, not knowing the whereabouts of th e other two Frenchmen, turned and shadowed her, leaving Cumberland t o "Churchill, The Second World War, Vol II (1949), p . 427 .
19-23 Sept
THE DAKAR EXPEDITION
21 7
pick up the others . Not until two hours later did Stewart get definite information from Cumberland that the other two were still going north . Shortly after midnight on the 19th September, Australia was ordered by Devonshire to escort Gloire to Casablanca, and the two ships proceede d northwards at increasing speed as Gloire's engine trouble was remedied . Stewart, warned by the Admiralty of the possibility of attack by Vich y submarines, told Gloire's captain that if Australia were so attacked sh e would sink his ship . Gloire, Churchill later commented, "no doubt spoke to Dakar, and all passed off pleasantly" . Throughout the following day an d night the two ships proceeded northwards, but at 7 a.m . on the 21st , having received Gloire's word that she would proceed to Casablanca unescorted, the Australian cruiser parted company and rejoined the Daka r force . In his report Stewart stated that he "received the impression throughout that Gloire, whilst maintaining a logical point of view typical of th e French, nevertheless did all in his power to render my task as easy as possible" . And on parting he signalled to the French captain : "Bon voyage . Je vous remerci pour votre courtoisie dans une situation difficile," which was excellent in sentiment, whatever else it lacked . Australia rejoined the Flag—now flying in Barham—at 9 a .m . on the 22nd September . At dawn on the 23rd the expeditionary force, in thre e groups, arrived off Dakar. Groups 1 and 2 were of transports with escorts. Group 3 consisted of Barham, Resolution, Ark Royal, Australia, Cumber land, Dragon, and six destroyers . The day " dawned overcast and misty , with a wind from the north-west" . Visibility was down to two or three miles . Churchill listed the atmospheric conditions as another of the misfortunes dogging the expedition : A long survey of records reveals uniform, regular bright sunlight and clea r weather at this season of the year . On September 23, when the Anglo-French armad a approached the fortress, with de Gaulle and his French ships well in the van, fo g reigned supreme .
The low visibility caused the ships to close the land to be seen—as wa s desired by de Gaulle—from the shore ; and their reception was no brighte r than the weather. Free French airmen who flew off from Ark Royal were arrested when they landed ashore . De Gaulle's representative—RearAdmiral d'Argenlieu 4—who approached the boom in a motor-boat in an endeavour to interview the Governor and Admiral, was fired upon an d wounded, and de Gaulle's proposals to the Governor were rejected . Fre e French sloops with landing parties were similarly opposed . Shortly afte r 10 a .m . shore batteries opened fire on the British ships . To Cunningham's warning that if shore fire continued the ships would return it, came a repl y that if he did not wish his ships to be fired on they should retire mor e than 20 miles from Dakar . At about this time Australia, which was under fire from shore guns of small calibre, intercepted and drove back to port two Vichy Le Fantasqu e 4 Rear-Adm G . T . d'Argenlieu ; a Carmelite monk who served in the Morocco
campaign 1912-14, in the French submarine service 1914-18, and in the 1939-45 war . Governor-General of French Indo-China 1945-46 . B . 8 Aug 1889 .
218
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
23-24 Sept
class destroyers which had put to sea . By 11 a .m . the whole fleet, manoeuvring close inshore, was under fire, and by 11 .15 the destroyers Foresigh t and Ingle fields and the cruiser Dragon had been hit and slightly damaged , with some casualties, and Cumberland had been hit more seriously . At 11 .35 a .m. Cunningham withdrew his ships beyond range . Australia came into action again during the afternoon, after her ship' s company had dined at 12 .30 p .m . on bully beef stew . (A rating recorde d the gastronomical note at the time : "Rotten! " ) Just after 4 o 'clock she was ordered, with the destroyers Fury and Greyhounds to attack a Vichy destroyer reported off Goree Island, at the entrance to Dakar . The French destroyer was sighted by Australia at 4 .26, and the cruiser opened fir e with three-gun salvos from her main armament a minute later . The third salvo dismasted the enemy, and the fourth set him on fire forward . Fir e was checked after the eighth salvo as the French ship was then on fir e fore and aft, and Stewart wished to avoid causing casualties as much a s possible . Australia was shortly after ordered to rejoin the fleet . The French destroyer, L'Audacieux, 7 was observed to fire only two rounds during th e three-minute engagement, but two torpedoes were seen to be fired at about the time of Australia' s fifth salvo . A further attempt to put landing parties ashore from the sloops wa s made shortly after 5 p .m . at Rufisque, to the east of Dakar ; but again fire was met from the shore, and the attempt was abandoned . Shortly before midnight on the 23rd an ultimatum was made to the Governor of Daka r saying that failing a satisfactory reply to de Gaulle' s proposals by 6 a .m . the following day the ships would open fire . The Governor replied that he would defend Dakar to the end . Bombardments were accordingly carried out in the morning and after noon of the 24th September . In the morning Barham and Resolution bombarded Goree Fort . Australia and Devonshire, with the destroyers Ingle field, Foresight, and Forester in company, steamed into Goree Bay wit h the cruisers in Dakar Harbour as their main target . Through the mis t Australia sighted the coastline at Rufisque ahead, and the smoke of a burning destroyer—presumably her target of the previous day—which cam e under fire from Devonshire before the two cruisers attacked their harbour targets . A second destroyer near that already burning was engaged by the British destroyers . The French cruisers, apparently under way among merchant ships insid e the boom, were barely discernible in the low visibility which, though bette r than on the previous day, limited Australia's point of aim to the enemy' s gun flashes for most of the time . The engagement opened shortly afte r 9 .30 a .m., when the battleships replied to fire from the forts, and con ,
' HMS Inglefield, destroyer (1937), 1,530 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36.5 kts ; sunk off Anzio, W Italy, 25 Feb 1944. HMS Fury, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; damaged beyond repair off Normandy, 21 Jun 1944. HMS Greyhound, destroyer (1936), 1,335 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; lost off Crete, 22 May 1941 . 7L'Audacieux, French destroyer (1934), 2,569 tons, five 5 .4-in guns, nine 21 .7-In torp tubes, 3 7 kts ; sunk at Dakar, 2.3 Sep 1940. 6
24-25 Sept
H .M .A.S . AUSTRALIA AT DAKAR
21 9
tinued until 10 .24, when the cruisers were ordered to withdraw . During withdrawal they were attacked by three high-level bombers, and a furthe r air attack took place soon after they had rejoined the fleet at 11 .30 . In each attack bombs fell about fifty yards off Australia 's quarter . A second bombardment took place in the afternoon, from shortly before one o ' clock, and lasted half an hour . It was a fairly hot duel between the two battle ships, and shore batteries and Richelieu, and Barham was hit . The results of the day ' s attack were disappointing . The one success was with the French submarine A jax8 which, depth-charged by the destroyer Fortune,9 surfaced and surrendered . Wednesday the 25th September, third and last day of the attempt o n Dakar, was the brightest so far as weather was concerned, but the darkes t for the British force . Visibility was extreme, with a light northerly win d as the two battleships and two cruisers moved in to attack their respectiv e targets . Resolution was taking up position to bombard Goree Fort whe n she was torpedoed by a submarine and seriously damaged . The submarin e was sunk with depth charges by Foresight . Meanwhile Barham engage d Richelieu, and Australia her earlier target of two cruisers inside the boom . Australia opened fire at 9 .4 a .m . at a range of 26,000 yards ; and at her third salvo her amphibian aircraft, which had been catapulted to spot fal l of shot, reported a straddle . Australia was herself under accurate fire fro m the French cruisers, though one shortly ceased shooting for a period an d then resumed raggedly . Stewart believed Australia obtained a hit in this exchange . "Three independent observers reported seeing a pillar of flam e and black smoke shoot up . This would probably also account for th e cruiser' s shooting falling off ." The engagement lasted from 9 .4 to 9 .1 7 a .m ., and about halfway through, as Australia, steaming at 25 knots wa s swinging to her helm when reversing course at the end of a run past th e target, she was twice hit aft . The hits, by 6-inch shells, caused no casualties , and only slight structural damage in the officers ' galley and an engin e room store . At 9 .16 a .m . Devonshire signalled "Cruisers withdraw " . It wa s during the withdrawal that Australia suffered her casualties . From th e bridge an aircraft astern was seen to be shot down ; but not until later wa s it learned that it was the cruiser's amphibian Walrus, which was los t together with its crew . l All the ships now withdrew on a southerly course. Resolution, listin g heavily to port, was screened by destroyers, with Barham close astern and cruisers on each quarter . At 10 .45 the ships were targets for a high-leve l bombing attack, but suffered no damage . Shortly after noon, the Britis h Government decided that the operation against Dakar must be abandoned , and course was set for Freetown . During the night of the 25th-26th Resolution, whose speed was falling, laboured on under her own power , but during the forenoon of the 26th Barham took her in tow . Groups 1 S Ajax, French submarine (1933), 1,379 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, eleven torp tubes, 18 kts . HMS Fortune, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts . 1 F-Lt G. J. I . Clarke, RAAF, Lt-Cdr F. K. Fogarty, RAN, and PO Telegraphist C. K. Bunnett , RAN .
220
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
24-30 Sept
and 2 proceeded ahead, Group 3, slowed by the wounded Resolution, following at a speed of advance of between six and seven knots . At 8 a .m. on the 28th Australia was instructed to return to the United Kingdom with Ark Royal, and the two ships were detached for Freetown and reached that port—where Groups 1 and 2 had already arrived—in the early afternoon of the 28th, eighteen hours ahead of the remainder of Group 3 . At 6 .30 a .m . on the 30th September the two ships screened by Fortune, Forester and Greyhound, left Freetown for the United Kingdom . So ended the ill-starred Dakar expedition . On the British side Resolution was disabled for several months, and the cruiser Cumberland and two destroyers were badly damaged . The French lost two submarines sunk and two destroyers burnt out and beached, while Richelieu sustained damage from a 15-inch shell hit and two near misses of 250-lb bombs . French reaction, apart from that at Dakar itself, was limited to air raids upon Gibraltar from bases in North Africa on the 24th and 25th September . According to a Vichy report at the time, French casualties at Daka r were 203 killed and 393 wounded ; and a Vichy Government spokesman stated that the Dakar incident was closed as far as the French were concerned . A British official statement explaining the abandoning of th e operation said that it was decided to discontinue hostilities when it becam e plain that only a major military operation could succeed : "This decisio n was taken because it has never been Britain's policy to enter into seriou s warlike operations against Frenchmen who felt it their duty to obey th e commands of the Vichy Government ." It was a statement that placed a delicate interpretation on the action at Oran in July . There is little doubt that some of the fruits of Oran were tasted a t Dakar, where the episode, as Mr Churchill later said, illustrated "in a high degree not only the unforeseeable accidents of war, but the interplay of military and political forces . . ." . There was considerable criticism o f the conduct of the whole affair in the newspapers of Britain and the Unite d States . In Australia, where the newspapers were preoccupied with th e Battle of Britain and the results of the recent Federal elections, comment was restrained and was confined mostly to quoting that in the British press . The Australian Government, however, was concerned at the failure, an d Mr Menzies, in a telegram to Churchill of the 27th September, expresse d his Government's difficulty in understanding "why attempt was mad e unless overwhelming chances of success . To make what appears at thi s distance to be a half-hearted attack is to incur a damaging loss o f prestige ." He complained also that the Australian Government knew practically nothing of the details of the engagement and nothing at all of th e decision to abandon it until after newspaper publication . Churchill, in a long and somewhat caustic reply, outlined the course of events at Daka r and, refusing to accept the reproach of a "half-hearted attack"—an attac k made at a time when Britain was denuding herself to reinforce the Middl e East "in the face of an accumulation across the Channel and the Nort h Sea of barges and shipping sufficient to carry half a million men to thes e shores at a single voyage and in a single night"—said that he could make
Aug-Sept
ITALIAN ADVANCE IN WESTERN DESERT
22 1
no promises that regrettable and lamentable incidents would not occur , or that there would be no disappointments and blunders . As to the Australian Government's lack of information, it was the oft repeated story o f the British Government, itself lacking information, being unable to contro l the release of news from the opposing side . The exchange of message s between the Prime Ministers, which began acrimoniously but ended on a happier note, reflected more than anything the anxiety of the Australia n Government in the greatly weakened position it found itself in as th e result of the elections, and the weakened personal position in the Government of Mr Menzies following the loss of a number of his senior Minister s in an air crash at Canberra on the 13th August. 2 The effect of the Dakar experiences on the ship's company of Australia was beneficial . While the ship was in Greenock during the first week o f September, Captain Stewart had been concerned at the repeated incidenc e of leave breaking . Australia was in Greenock for specific duties in connection with the defence of Britain which he was unable to explain to th e crew, members of which resented the curtailed leave, especially as ther e were in port R .N . ships, not engaged on Australia's duties, which wer e giving longer leave . After Dakar, however, he was able to record hi s satisfaction at the conduct of his officers and men in action, and to not e that " a most noticeable ship spirit has now been born which gives m e every confidence for the future of H .M .A .S. Australia" . XVI On the 10th September 1940 the Italians, so far successful in Eas t Africa, launched their northern offensive in the Western Desert . It was a cautious approach down the Halfaya Pass to Salum, just within th e Egyptian frontier, and on to Sidi Barrani, where they arrived on the 17th . Here they paused, and began to construct fortified camps . The Italian advance brought their left flank near to the sea, whence they could be bombarded ; but the loss of Sidi Barrani deprived the British of an advanced airfield and thus lessened the fighter protection which could be given t o bombarding ships . On the other hand, Italian air forces at Sidi Barran i were brought within 200 miles of Alexandria and 60 miles of Mers a Matruh . However, Italian concentrations within reach from the sea wer e bombarded almost nightly by destroyers and gunboats, and also by heavie r units . During one of these bombardments the cruiser Kent was torpedoe d by an enemy aircraft and, struck near the propellers, had to be towe d back to Alexandria . Vendetta was one of the escorting destroyers . These bombardments had some effect, for by the 26th September most of th e targets had moved inland . Earlier in September Admiral Cunningham received a signal from M r Churchill which seemed to imply that the Mediterranean Fleet was rathe r backward in offensive operations . This caused the Commander-in-Chief t o a The Minister for the Army, Brigadier Street, the Minister for Air, James Fairbaim, th e Vice-President of the Executive Council, Sir Henry Gullett, and the CGS, Sir BrudeneU White , were among those killed .
222
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
Sept
point out that fleet operations were drastically curtailed by his shortage o f destroyers . On the 15th September he had only ten sound vessels out of twenty-two . Of the nine ships in the 10th Flotilla, only three were effective in the Mediterranean at this period . Stuart, in need of an extensiv e refit, was patching up in Alexandria . Voyager spent all of September in dockyard hands at Malta . Vampire, in Alexandria and on local escor t duties for the first few days of the month, was in dock at Port Tewfi k from the 14th to the 23rd . Defender was in Alexandria making goo d essential machinery defects . And Dainty and Diamond were escorting Re d Sea convoys . Sydney spent most of the month in harbour, and some days of it in dr y dock . These were not, however, quiet days for the ships in Alexandria , as Italian air raids were an almost daily occurrence—there were thre e on the 13th of the month. On the 24th the cruiser sailed to provid e cover for Protector, which had been ordered to intercept a Frenc h merchant ship leaving Beirut . Sydney patrolled in an area forty miles west of Cyprus, and returned to Alexandria on the 26th . During the night of the 28th-29th September, the First Division o f the battle fleet—Warspite, Valiant and Illustrious—with the 7th and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, and 2nd and 14th Destroyer Flotillas, sailed fro m Alexandria escorting Liverpool and Gloucester, which were between them carrying nearly 2,000 troops to reinforce Malta . Only one ship of th e 10th Flotilla accompanied the fleet—Stuart, who was bound for Malta to refit . Since Stuart was going to be non-operational for a month or more , Waller had transferred with his staff to Vampire on the 26th September , and command of Stuart had devolved upon her 1st Lieutenant, Robison . 3 But he was discharged to hospital the day before the ship sailed, and th e navigator, Lieutenant Teacher, 4 assumed command . Enemy aircraft were active, and the fleet was heavily bombed on th e first day at sea, two of the attackers being shot down by Fulmars fro m Illustrious, and one by anti-aircraft fire . During the air combats in th e forenoon one Fulmar was shot down five miles astern of Stuart, who turned and proceeded at high speed and picked up the crew of the crashe d aircraft . Stuart then made after the fleet, but the spurt of speed was too much for her in her bad state below, and she burst a steam pipe. Cunningham thereupon made a general signal to the fleet : "Stuart is dying on us . I am sending him back to Alex ." ; and the old destroyer turned for the Egyptian base . She had time to fill in to reach port at daylight on th e 30th, and Teacher decided to carry out an anti-submarine search on th e way . At 10 .15 p .m . on the 29th a submerged submarine was detecte d moving stealthily across the destroyer's course, and five minutes late r Stuart pounced on the quarry with an initial depth-charge attack . There followed a night-long cat-and-mouse hunt . Vainly the submarine trie d to shake Stuart off. The destroyer, circling above, held it firmly in her $ Lt-Cdr R . C . Robison, DSC ; RAN . HMAS Stuart 1939-41 ; comd HMAS Voyager until sunk Sep 1943 ; HMAS Shropshire 1943-44 . Of Liverpool, NSW ; b. Springwood, NSW, 29 May 1909 . 4 Lt-Cdr N. J . M . Teacher, DSO ; RN . HMAS Stuart 1939-42 ; HMS Quebec as CO Personnel and for Combined Ops 1942. B . 6 Feb 1914 . Killed in action 28 Feb 1943 .
29-30 Sept
ITALIAN SUBMARINE GONDAR
22 3
detecting gear, and at intervals tore backwards and forwards at hig h speed over the position to demoralise the Italians . She attacked again with depth charges at 10 .45 p .m . on the 29th, and at 1 a .m ., 4 a .m . , 5 .50 a.m . and 6 .25 a .m . on the 30th . Down below in the submarine—the Gondar5—the Italians spent a nerve racking night . As was learned after the war, Gondar arrived within si x miles of Alexandria in the evening of the 29th, with three "human torpedoes" and their six crew members on board . They were to attempt to enter Alexandria harbour and attack units of the Mediterranean Fleet , but, their quarry being at sea, Gondar was ordered to return to Tobruk , where she was bound when attacked by Stuart . 6 From the accounts of prisoners, she was on the surface charging batteries when Stuart wa s sighted, and had immediately dived . It was during the dive that the explosion had been felt of the depth charges in Stuart' s opening attack . Thos e in the second attack appeared to burst below the submarine, and put all lights out, damaged instruments and gauges, and caused leaks through th e stern glands and elsewhere . Evasive tactics were tried without success . The submarine never got beyond sound of Stuart's propellers, and the frequen t high-speed crossing of the position by Stuart gave the impression that ther e were three destroyers engaged . Each time they heard Stuart race acros s overhead, the submarine 's crew huddled together in groups of four or five and waited apprehensively for depth charges to explode . Teacher signalled to the Rear-Admiral, Alexandria, that he was attacking the submarine, and was told in reply that help in the hunt was o n the way . At 6 .30 a .m . on the 30th—five minutes after Stuart's final depth charge attack—a Sunderland flying-boat, No . L2166, of 230 Squadro n R .A .F ., appeared, and later the trawler Sindonis, 7 and the hunt was continued . By this time the air purifying plant in the submarine was out of action , and increasing leakage of water necessitated increasing the air pressure , which was now three atmospheres with the air bottles almost exhausted . At about 9 .20 a .m ., after being submerged and constantly attacked fo r eleven hours, Gondar 's captain decided to surface . When some sixty feet from the surface a near-by explosion caused the submarine to dive out of control to a depth of over 300 feet . All tanks were then blown, an d she surfaced at considerable speed, stern down . The explosion was that of a bomb dropped from the Sunderland abou t 3,000 yards from Stuart, who was closing the position when Gondar surfaced off her starboard bow . Stuart opened fire immediately, and the air craft dropped a stick of bombs which fell close to Gondar, whose captain ordered abandon ship while he set scuttling charges and opened vents . Gondar sank at 9 .50 a .m .—about twenty-five miles off the Egyptian coas t at El Daba—the explosion of about ten scuttling charges being hear d ° Gondar, Italian submarine (1937), 615 tons, one 3 .9-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 14 kts ; sun k in Mediterranean, 30 Sep 1940. ° See Elios Toschi, Ninth Time Lucky (1955), translated from the Italian by James Cleugh . ? HMS Sindonis, trawler (1934), 440 tons, one 4-in gun ; sunk by enemy aircraft at Tobruk, 2 9 May 1941 .
224
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
Sept-Oct
from Stuart as she closed in to attack . Stuart recovered twenty-eight survivors, including Gondar's captain and a destroyer captain who was takin g passage in the submarine ; and Sindonis picked up a further nineteen . Two of Gondar's crew were lost . Stuart received a rousing welcome from her flotilla companions whe n she entered Alexandria late that afternoon . Waller, watching his old ship from the bridge of Vampire, signalled : "Whacko! You did not waste much time ." Vendetta contributed "Whacko, Whiskers!", in delicate allusion to Teacher's beard . And the Commander-in-Chief in a general signa l to the fleet later described Stuart's success as "An outstanding example of a result achieved by patience and skill in operation of asdic gear"— a feather in the caps of the asdic officers, Sub-Lieutenants Cree and Griffin , and the operators, Leading Seamen MacDonald and Pike . 8 While Stuart was thus engaged, the fleet operation proceeded in wha t was becoming a pattern . About noon on the 30th September, reconnaissance aircraft from Illustrious sighted the Italian battle fleet—with four battleships including the new vessels Littorio and Vittorio Veneto— 120 miles or so to the northward, and steering northwards . After som e thought, and in view of the enemy's preponderance, the impossibility o f coming up with him, and the importance of the troop convoy, Cunningham decided not to seek action but to proceed with the main object of reinforcing Malta . This was successfully accomplished that night, and the fleet returned to Alexandria. Ajax° joined the 7th Cruiser Squadron at this time , and Voyager, who had completed her refit, sailed from Malta to join th e fleet, and arrived at Alexandria on the 2nd October . On the fleet's return journey, Orion and Sydney were detached and at 10 p .m . on the 1st October, entered the Aegean through the Antikithera Channel and swep t as far north as Tenedos . On the way back south, they carried out a minute-and-a-half's concentrated bombardment of Maltezana, chief port of Stampalia in the Dodecanese, and retired at high speed without encountering opposition . The two ships passed through Kaso Strait at 4 a .m . o n the 3rd, and reached Alexandria at 7 p .m . that day. All of the 10th Flotilla destroyers had a busy time at sea in the earl y days of October . The nine ships—as was Sydney—were engaged in a n operation early in the month when the fleet covered the passage of another convoy to Malta . Stuart, with Robison back in command, stopped on thre e occasions south of Crete because of water in the oil fuel—it "evidently had leaked in through ship's side" . There was a number of depth-charg e attacks by various of the destroyers on suspected submarines on the voyag e to Malta, but no hostile aircraft was sighted, probably because of ba d weather and thunderstorms, nor were enemy surface forces reported . 8 Lt-Cdr T . S . Cree, DSC, VRD ; RANVR . HMAS Stuart 193941 . Of Sydney ; b. Glasgow, 1 May 1914. Lt-Cdr J . B . Griffin, DSC, VRD ; RANVR. HMAS's Stuart 1940, Voyager 1940-41 . Of Longueville, NSW; b. Mosman, NSW, 7 Mar 1912. PO R . A . H. MacDonald, DSM ; 20954, RAN . HMAS's Stuart 1939-41, Vendetta 1941, Vampire 1942. Of Footscray, Vic ; b. Footscray, 14 Mar 1918. Died of wounds, 13 Sep 1942 . PO L. T . Pike, DSM; 20749, RAN . HMAS Stuart 1939-40. Of Annandale, NSW; b . Cowell , SA, 19 Aug 1916. 9 HMS Ajax, cruiser (1935), 6,985 tons, eight 6-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 32 .5 kts .
11-14 Oct
CRUISER SQUADRON
22 5
Throughout the 11th October the fleet cruised south of Malta, and the n set course for Alexandria covering an east-bound convoy . Stuart and Vendetta were left in Malta to refit . Vendetta was there until the 9th November, and Stuart until the end of the year. Shortly before 2 a .m . on the 12th, when the cruisers were spread to th e northward scouting in the moonlight, Ajax sighted a destroyer approaching on the starboard bow, and opened fire . At the same time Ajax was herself hit twice on the bridge by shells presumably from a second vessel shortl y afterwards sighted on the port bow . Ajax increased to full speed and engaged both enemy ships, and within a few minutes the first—subsequentl y known to be the Artigliere 10—was disabled and on fire, and the other blow n up. A third enemy vessel was then sighted, engaged, and destroyed . Tw o more subsequently appeared, but escaped at high speed behind smok e screens .' The remainder of the cruiser squadron concentrated on th e position on receiving the enemy report from Ajax, but were too late to intercept the escaping ships . At daylight Ajax, who suffered five more hits, and had thirteen of her crew killed and twenty-three wounded, wa s detached to Malta . Soon after daylight, British reconnaissance aircraf t sighted the disabled Artigliere in tow of another destroyer. Sydney wa s one of the cruisers detached to attack these targets ; but with the approach of the cruisers the towing destroyer slipped her tow and escaped with he r superior speed . On abandoning the chase, the cruisers returned to the crippled ship and York e—another newcomer to the station—was detaile d to sink her by gun fire and, having made certain she was abandoned b y her crew, stood off and opened fire with her 8-inch guns . It was a lovely morning with perfect visibility and a glassy sea . From the remainin g cruisers circling near by, York's shells could be seen crashing into the Italian ship until suddenly, about the fifth or sixth round, she disintegrate d in a tremendous explosion, and only a great mushroom of smoke, billowing slowly up some two or three thousand feet, remained to mark he r passing . Vampire picked up twenty-two survivors—including one officer — and Cunningham, in a plain-language signal, told the Italian Admiralt y of the position of rafts with other survivors who were duly rescued by thei r own people . On the return journey to Alexandria the fleet manoeuvred to the south ward of Crete during the 14th October while aircraft from Illustrious and Eagle bombed Leros in the Dodecanese, and did considerable damage . 10 Artigliere,
Italian destroyer (1938), 1,620 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 39 kts; sunk in Central Mediterranean, 12 Oct 1940 . 1 Commenting on this incident after the war, the German Admiral, Eberhard Weichold, who wa s liaison officer with Italian HQ in Rome in 1941 and subsequently German C-in-C Mediterranean , said that there were in all seven Italian vessels, four destroyers and three torpedo boats, o f which Ajax accounted for three destroyers, and he described it as the first time an attack wa s carried out on the British forces in the Mediterranean by torpedo boats. He attributed the Italian losses without accompanying success to the clearness of the night, and the insufficien t number of the boats employed in the tactical execution of the attack . Italian losses on this occasion were one destroyer (Artigliere) and two torpedo boats of 67 9 tons (Airone and Ariel ) On the British side, Ajax suffered some difficulty "because of the blinding effect of the flas h of her own guns, whereas the enemy were using flashless ammunition with good tracers " . (Cunningham, p. 278 . ) 8 HMS York, cruiser (1930), 8,250 tons, six 8-in guns, six 21-la torp tubes, 32 .25 kts ; sunk in Suda Bay, 22 May 1941 .
226
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
14-28 Oc t
The Italians retaliated with air attacks on the ships late in the afternoon , and Liverpool was torpedoed and had her bows blown off during on e of these . She was taken in tow by Orion and, after some difficulty, reached port safely on the 16th, Vampire, Dainty, Diamond and Decoy bein g among the destroyers screening the two ships . By this time the Italian s had developed night air attacks on Alexandria, and the battle fleet, proceeding ahead, approached the port during a heavy raid at 1 a .m . on the 15th in a most spectacular entry . "We made for the shallow water of the Great Pass at high speed," wrote Cunningham, "firing a blind barrag e on both sides with our guns flashing and the sparkle of bursting shell al l over the horizon. " At this time the recall of Tovey to the Admiralty to be appointed Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, led to changes of command in the Mediterranean . Pridham-Wippell became second-in-command and in comman d of the Light Forces ; and Captain Rawlings 3 of Valiant, with the actin g rank of Rear-Admiral, was appointed to command the Battle Squadron in his stead . Both these officers were former destroyer captains of grea t experience and proved merit . For the rest of the month Stuart and Vendetta were in Malta ; Waterhe n refitted at Alexandria from the 16th to the 29th ; and Vampire was there from the 16th to the 25th cleaning boilers and engrossed in a domestic problem in the solution of which for two days the ship was cleared and "sealed and fumigated to get rid of bed bugs and cockroaches, both o f these pests having invaded the ship in alarming numbers " . Between the 25th and 28th of the month Voyager and Vampire were with the 2n d Division of the battle fleet—Malaya, Ramillies and Eagle—on a sweep towards Kaso Strait to cover an Aegean convoy and deliver an air attac k on Maltezana . While this operation was in progress Sydney and Orion, with Jervis and Juno, entered the Aegean through Kaso Strait and went a s far north as the entrance to the Dardanelles, exercising contraband control . Great interest, Collins noted, was aroused in Sydney's company by the glimpse of Gallipoli. During the morning of the 28th October, havin g passed through Kaso Strait south bound, Sydney, in common with other ships at sea, received orders to return to Alexandria with all dispatch . The fleet had to meet the new situation created by the Italian attack on Greece . Sydney crossed the Mediterranean at 28 knots, and entered harbour a t 6 p .m . that day . XVI I Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, Italian destroyers based on Massawa mad e their presence known in the first venture of enemy surface forces in thi s area . During the night of the 20th-21st October they made a brief sorti e against a northbound convoy, and came off second best . Up to then, attack s on Red Sea convoys had been mostly by high-level bombing with little success, though the scale of attack had at times been considerable . On the 3
Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, GBE, KCB ; RN . Comd HMS Valiant 1939-40; R-A Cdg 1st Battle Sqn 1940 ; comd 1st Cruiser Sqn 1941 ; Asst Ch of Naval Staff, Foreign, 1942-43 ; F .O. W Af 1943, E Mediterranean 1943-44 ; 2nd i/c British Pacific Fleet and comd British Task Force s 1944-45 . B . 21 May 1889.
Aug-Oct
THE RED SEA FORCE
227
5th September a convoy escorted by Hobart was attacked eight times i n one morning without damage, and throughout that month and Octobe r other convoys were bombed, but only one ship was damaged—s .s . Bhima (5,280 tons), which was holed by a near miss on the 20th September, an d towed to Aden and beached . Two days before this incident those in Parramatta, then lying in Aden , "were delighted to welcome H .M .A .S . Yarra from Colombo, come to joi n the Red Sea Force" . Their pleasure was no doubt heightened by the fac t that the newcomer brought them the first "comfort" parcels they receive d from Australia—and the only ones they received in a long time . Yarra left Australia on the 28th August . On passage she spent a few hours at Cocos Islands, and the ship's company were landed on Direction Islan d to bathe, where, twenty-six years earlier, the German cruiser Emden lande d a party to destroy the wireless station shortly before she was hersel f destroyed by the first Sydney . Aden gave Yarra her first taste of enemy action in two air raids on the night of her arrival, and she quickly entere d the routine life of the force ; on Perim patrol, escorting convoys up an d down the Red Sea, and intercepting blockade-running dhows . She left Aden on the 18th October as part of the escort of convo y BN.7, the other escorting ships being Leander, Auckland and Kimberley . The convoy was bombed without result when south-east of Massawa i n the early forenoon of the 20th October, and that night found Yarra zigzagging over a calm sea on the starboard bow of the convoy in brigh t moonlight . A few minutes before 11 p .m ., when the convoy was east of Massawa, two ships were sighted approaching from ahead at high speed . Harrington—Yarra's commanding officer—challenged them, and in reply the flash of a torpedo discharge from the leading ship was seen . Harrington immediately made an enemy report to Auckland, but before the signal was passed, shells from the enemy passed over Yarra and appeared to fal l among the convoy . Auckland at once opened fire, followed after her firs t salvo by Yarra . It was believed by observers in the Australian ship tha t she scored a hit on the leading enemy vessel with her fourth or fifth salvo . In any case the Italians altered away, chased by Leander and Kimberley . Leander lost touch, but Kimberley intercepted one destroyer—the Francesco Nullo4—which went aground on Harmil Island off the northern entrance to Massawa, and blew her up with a torpedo at 6 .33 a .m . o n the 21st . Kimberley, while destroying Francesco Nullo, was herself hit in the engine room by a shell from a shore battery, and had to procee d on one engine which presently also failed, whereupon she was taken in tow by Leander to Port Sudan . Both ships were bombed on passage with out harm . By the 30th October Kimberley was repaired to the extent of being able to steam at 25 knots and to remain in service with this limitation . A few hours after the destruction of Francesco Nullo, R .A .F . bomber s claimed to have hit an Italian destroyer one mile east of Harmil Island . As Kimberley reported nothing visible above water of Francesco Nullo 'Francesco Nullo, Italian destroyer (1925), 1,058 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes , 35 kts ; destroyed, 21 Oct 1940 .
228
R.A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
1939-40
after she blew up, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, concluded tha t definite damage was caused to the second destroyer . Apart from the hit on Kimberley, no damage was suffered by ships of the convoy or escorting force. During this action the disadvantage under which the British wer e placed in night encounters through being temporarily blinded by the flas h of their own guns, was again emphasised . With them it was an ever present and serious problem, whereas the enemy were provided with flashles s cordite, and with good tracers to aid their shooting . XVII I Thoughts of an invasion of Greece had long lain in the mind of Mussolini . It was, he told a meeting of his war leaders on the 15th October 1940 , only a few days before the event : "An action which I have matured a t length for months, before our entry into the war, and before the beginning of the conflict ." In the division of Europe between the dictators , he was anxious to secure Italian direction of Mediterranean policy, and no t without apprehension of the turn things took with the German annexatio n of Czechoslovakia in 1939 . The initial step towards the consolidatio n of the Italian politico-economic sphere was taken on Good Friday, 1939 , with the invasion of Albania, which placed Italian troops on the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Greece . Britain's concern was reflected when, six days later, on the 13th April, the Chamberlain Government gave Greece a guarantee of help if Italy attacked her . For a while Italy protested her friendship for Greece ; an attitude which continued after the outbreak o f war in 1939, but which changed in 1940 . In May of that year, whe n Italy's intervention in the war appeared imminent, the Allied Suprem e War Council in Paris considered the likelihood of an Italian attack o n Greece, and decided to make sure that Crete did not fall into Italia n hands in such an event . Cunningham in the Mediterranean was told b y the Admiralty that if Greek territory were attacked by Italy, expeditions were to start for Crete immediately, and without further reference t o London or Paris . On the 31st May Cunningham told the Admiralty tha t arrangements had been made for British troops from Port Said, an d French from Beirut, to land in Crete within a few hours of the orde r being given. The British and French naval commanders in the Eastern Mediterranean were wholeheartedly in favour of the proposed Creta n operation, which would give them Suda Bay as a refuelling base for ligh t craft . 5 The operation was, however, contingent upon Italy attacking Greece , and the attack did not immediately develop. Mussolini wanted time t o build up his strength in Albania . As this was achieved, the Italian tone towards Greece changed into a growing flow of hostile propaganda, with accusations of helping the British and ill-treating Albanian minorities . 6 In Aug 1939, the C-in-C ' s yacht Aberdeen (990 tons), under cover of a pleasure cruise, mad e surveys of anchorages in southern Greece, the east end of Crete, and Antikithera and Kither a Islands, for tankers in the event of war. When Italy entered the war, but before she attacke d Greece, these anchorages were used by the British for refuelling . " But the Italians became awar e of it, bombed our ships in Greek waters, whereupon the Greeks naturally protested to us and demanded their withdrawal ." Cunningham, pp. 212 and 282 .
Aug-Oct
ITALY 'S ULTIMATUM TO GREECE
229
In August 1940 British information showed a rapid increase in Italia n forces in Albania ; and on the 15th of the month there was a further pointer to events when an Italian submarine sank the small Greek cruiser Helle6 which, dressed with flags in honour of the Feast of the Assumption , was lying peacefully at anchor off the mole at Tinos, in the Cyclades . "The incident," recorded Ciano in his Diary, "threatens to become serious . As for me, I consider the intemperance of de Vecchi [Count Cesare Mari a de Vecchi, Fascist leader] at the bottom of it . I confer with the Duce , who desires to settle this incident peacefully . " The desired "peaceful" settlement was merely to suit the timing of th e Italian moves in Africa . On the 19th September, when British Somalilan d had been occupied and the Egyptian frontier crossed, Mussolini was takin g Ribbentrop into his confidence regarding Greece . There remains, he told the German Foreign Minister, the problem of Yugoslavi a and Greece. Italy has half a million men on the Yugoslav frontier, and two hundre d thousand on the Greek frontier. The Greeks represent for Italy what the Norwegian s represented for Germany before the action of April . It is necessary for us to proceed with the liquidation of Greece, all the more so as when our land forces will have advanced into Egypt the English Fleet will not be able to remain at Alexandria . and will seek refuge in Greek ports . On the 15th October occurred the meeting of Italian war leaders a t which they were told by Mussolini that he had decided to attack Greece on the 26th October, to secure the whole coast of southern Albania, Ionia n Islands, Zante, Cephalonia, and Corfu, and occupy Salonika . This woul d be followed by the complete occupation of Greece, to put her out of actio n and ensure she remained in the Italian politico-economic sphere . The Italian General Staff was perturbed at the prospect of this adventure, and two days later Marshal Badoglio told Ciano that the forces then availabl e were insufficient, and that the navy did not feel that it could carry out a landing at Preveza—on the west coast of Greece a little south of Corfu— because the water was too shallow . But Mussolini, whether or no thes e views were expressed to him, was determined on action, and on the 19t h October wrote to Hitler, telling him of his decision . It was a matter of which Hitler had hitherto heard "only in general terms", and when, after some delay, he received the letter from his Italian colleague, he immediately replied suggesting a meeting with the hope, as he told Mussolini later when the die had been cast, of being able to expound his view s before the threatened action against Greece had been taken . Finally the date for the attack was fixed at the 28th October, an d Greece was given no chance to temporise . Six days earlier Ciano began to draw up the ultimatum for Grazzi, the Italian ambassador, to hand t o Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, at two o'clock in the morning o f the 28th . "Naturally," Ciano confided to his Diary, "that is a document that allows no way out for Greece . Either she accepts occupation or she will be attacked ." The ultimatum demanded that the whole of Greece shoul d be opened to Italian troops . It was rejected . At 5 .30 a .m. Greece was °He11e, Greek cruiser (1913), 2,083 tons, three 6-in guns, 15 kts; sunk 15 Aug 1940.
230
R .A .N. SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
Oct-No v
invaded from Albania, and Italian aircraft raided Patras at the entranc e to the Gulf of Corinth ; Corinth ; and Athens . "We attack in Albania," recorded Ciano, "and carry on a conference at Florence"—that whic h Hitler had suggested in his reply to Mussolini' s letter of the 19th . "I n both places things have gone well ." But such satisfaction was premature . The Greek Government invoked the guarantee of British help given i n April 1939 ; and the resistance of Greek forces on the frontier was immediate and strong . This was to be no easy invasion for the Italians . In Alexandria, Cunningham at once ordered forces at sea to return t o port to refuel, and preparations were made to establish a naval base i n Crete ; Longmore dispatched a fighter squadron to Greece ; and the maxi mum scale possible of air reconnaissance was instituted in the Ionian Se a and off Crete . The urgent naval tasks were to run a convoy to Suda Bay , and to prevent action by the Italian Fleet, either against the convoy o r in direct support of the invasion . A few minutes after midnight on the 28th October, Sydney, in company with Orion, York, and Gloucester of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, sailed fro m Alexandria . Early in the forenoon of the 29th a joint services commissio n left Alexandria by flying-boat for Crete, to arrange with the Greek authorities there for the establishment of the Suda Bay base . At 2 p .m . that day the first Crete convoy—of four ships including two oilers—with th e net-laying vessel Protector, and with Vampire, Voyager and Waterhen in the escorting force, sailed from the Egyptian port for Suda Bay . The 7th Cruiser Squadron joined Cunningham in Warspite with the rest of the fleet in company to the west of Crete on the 30th . Throughout that day the fleet swept to the northward as far as the latitude of Cephalonia, course being altered to the southward when to the west of tha t island at 3 .30 a .m. on the 31st. At dawn the fleet was off the west coas t of Greece, and remained within sight of the land all day ; and for the following night and for most of the 1st November remained to the wes t of Crete . It was sighted by Italian aircraft, but there was no reaction b y enemy surface forces, and air reconnaissance from Malta showed th e Italian Fleet still in its bases . Under this cover, and protected by its close escort, the convoy reache d Suda Bay safely in the evening of the 31st October and early mornin g of 1st November . A fuelling base was thus made available, and guns , stores, and equipment were off-loaded from the storeships . On the 1st als o arrived Ajax with a battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment , Bofors guns and crews . That afternoon occurred the first of many enem y air raids on Suda Bay . Twenty-five aircraft took part, and there was som e damage and a number of casualties ashore . By evening of the 1st November the troops, guns and stores had been disembarked ; a battery site and dump established ; and one indicator net laid by Protector. By midnight on the 2nd November the fleet was back at Alexandria, having suffere d no enemy interference other than a fruitless attack by torpedo bomber s on the 1st Battle Squadron, Eagle, and 7th Cruiser Squadron during tha t afternoon . "From now," Cunningham wrote later in A Sailor's Odyssey,
2-6 Nov
CONVOYS TO GREECE AND CRETE
23 1
"until the first week in December, our cruisers and destroyers were har d at it covering and escorting the convoys to Piraeus and Suda Bay . They had no rest ." This was true . The inclusion of Greece in the war brough t with it a fuelling base at Suda Bay . But it brought also fresh commitment s for an already burdened Mediterranean Fleet. The Greek Navy was small , consisting only of one old battleship and one old cruiser, ten destroyers , thirteen torpedo boats, six submarines, and auxiliary craft . ? Convoys fo r Greece and Crete called for British escorts through the Aegean . Enemy aircraft and submarines were active in the area, and the Italian Fleet, though so far quiescent, was very much "in being " . A means of modifying this last mentioned factor was in preparation . When Illustrious arrived in the Mediterranean at the beginning of September she brought with her Rear-Admiral Lyster 8 to take command of the carrier squadron . In his first interview with Cunningham he raised th e matter of an attack by his aircraft on the Italian Fleet in Taranto Harbour , and was encouraged by Cunningham to develop the idea . Plans were accordingly laid, and reached the stage when it was decided to celebrat e Trafalgar Day by carrying out the operation on the 21st October . A fir e in a hangar in Illustrious caused postponement to the 11th November , when the moon was suitable . It thus became part of a complex operatio n which included also the passage of fleet reinforcements through the Mediterranean from the west ; and the passing of Malta and Aegean convoys . Sydney and the Australian destroyers—except Stuart refitting in Malta— took part . In its general outline the operation followed the course of the earlie r reinforcement in September . The convoys for the Aegean and Malta saile d from Port Said and Alexandria on the 4th November, with Vampire, Waterhen, Voyager, Dainty and Diamond of the 10th Flotilla among thei r escorting destroyers . Sydney and Ajax embarked troops, army stores , ammunition and guns at Port Said and sailed in the afternoon of the 5t h for Suda Bay. Between them the two ships carried a thousand troops an d a Bofors battery . Sydney took on board 32 officers and 450 other ranks , and had all available space on her upper decks, including most of th e quarterdeck, piled high with cases of food, two motor-trucks, two Bofor s guns, and packs and personal equipment . The weather was fine and the se a flat, and the passage was made across the Mediterranean, and throug h Kaso Strait in daylight, at high speed without interference by the enemy , and the two ships reached Suda Bay during the afternoon of the 6th . The Cretan harbour appeared peaceful and remote from war . Almos t landlocked, its eight or nine square miles of deep, still water sheltered o n three sides by hills and mountain ridges with quiet villages and olive grove s on the slopes, it induced a deceptive sense of security . Actually, as experi Kilkis, Greek battleship (13,000 tons), bought from USA in 1914 ; Averot, Greek cruiser (9,45 0 tons), bought from Italy in 1909 . The 10 destroyers included four "Hydras" bought from Ital y in the 1920's, and King Georges I and Queen Olga (each of 1,350 tons) laid down in England and completed in the late 1930' s . The six submarines were bought from France in the 1920 ' s . 8 Admiral Sir Lumley Lyster, KCB, CVO. CBE, DSO : RN . Fifth Sea Lord and Ch of Naval Air Services 1941-42 ; Aircraft Carriers, Home Fleet, 1942-43 ; FO Carrier Training 1943-45 . B. 2 7 Apr 1888 . 7
232
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
6No v
ence was to show, the hills were a menace to the ships in the bay . The y screened the approach of enemy aircraft which, with their motors switche d off, could swoop silently down into the bay, drop their bombs, and be away again behind the ridges in a matter of seconds . This time, however ,
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there were no attacks . Sydney, alongside the pier, did a good job in disembarking her troops and equipment, lorries, guns, and 200 tons of miscellaneous stores, in two hours, with no cargo handling appliances on the pier . It was, literally, a case of "all hands and the cook" manhandlin g the cargo . "Such a hive of industry," one of Sydney's officers recorded , "I have never seen before or since ." The job completed, Sydney move d out to the bay and anchored for the night.
6-11 Nov
MALTA AND THE AEGEAN
23 3
On the day of Sydney's arrival in Crete the Commander-in-Chief i n Warspite, with Illustrious, Valiant, Malaya, Ramillies and destroyers— including the remainder of the 10th Flotilla, Decoy and Defender—saile d from Alexandria to the westward to cover the convoy movements and t o meet the reinforcements in the Central Mediterranean . The reinforcements —the battleship Barham, cruisers Berwick and Glasgow, and destroyers Gallant, Greyhound and Griffin—left Gibraltar on the 7th November accompanied by Force "H" with Ark Royal, whose aircraft bombe d Cagliari as on the previous occasion . 9 By the evening of the 7th the Mediterranean Fleet was to the west o f Crete, where it was joined by Sydney, who left Suda Bay around noon . Before sailing she had seen there Vampire and Waterhen, who arrive d escorting the Suda Bay convoy and later joined that for Malta . During the passage to that island formations of enemy bombers were sighted bu t no attacks were delivered . The convoy reached Malta on the 9th, an d that night the fleet went to the south of Malta, which was in sight 2 5 miles to the north-east at daylight next morning . During the forenoon the reinforcements, having safely traversed the Sicilian Narrows, joine d the fleet from the westward and then went in to Malta to disembark troop s and refuel. That day a Malta convoy sailed for Alexandria escorted b y Ramillies, Coventry, and destroyers including Vampire, Waterhen , Voyager, Decoy and Defender ; and Vendetta, her refit completed, also sailed from Malta escorting the monitor Terror to Suda Bay, where the two ships arrived on the 13th . The improvements in Malta's defences , of which Terror had formed part, enabled her to be dispensed with ther e in favour of Suda Bay until the shore defences of the new base could b e strengthened. Throughout the 10th the fleet manoeuvred south-west of Malta, an d at 6 p .m . the cruisers parted company to search in pairs to the north-east. Dawn of the 11th found the fleet heading into the Ionian Sea, where th e cruisers rejoined at 9 a .m . to the south-east of the toe of Italy . Th e stage was thus set to cover the Malta convoy, and to carry out the mai n operation—the air attack on the Italian Fleet . During all these movements of the British forces, the Italian Flee t remained in its bases, with the capital ships concentrated at Taranto . When, on the 17th October, Badoglio told Ciano of his apprehensions at the coming attack on Greece, he said that when the attack was mad e the fleet should immediately be withdrawn from Taranto to a safer base . This was not done . A reconnaissance maintained over the port by R .A .F . aircraft from Malta showed five battleships there, and during the 11t h a sixth entered the harbour .' The ships were protected by nets, barrag e balloons, and anti-aircraft defences ; and presumably it was considere d HMS Glasgow, cruiser (1937), 9,100 tons, twelve 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 kts . HMS Gallant, destroyer (1936), 1,335 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; damaged by mine, 10 Jan 1941, taken in tow ; bombed and sunk in Malta Harbour, 20 Jan 1941 . HMS Griffin, destroyer (1936), 1,335 tons, four 4.7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes. 36 kts . This reconnaissance was maintained by No . 431 Flight, a special unit equipped with 4 Glen n Martin aircraft and commanded by F-Lt E . A. Whiteley, an Australian in the RAF.
234
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940 10-12 Nov
that these, supported by air attacks on the British ships, afforded security . 2 Such air attacks took place on the fleet during the 10th when to th e south of Malta, without success for the attackers ; and shadowing aircraft were driven off by fighters from Illustrious on the 11th . The Italian attacks , of small scale and not pressed home, were no deterrent to the operation . In addition to the attack on Taranto, a subsidiary operation had bee n arranged, a raid by cruisers and destroyers through the Strait of Otrant o into the Adriatic, while aircraft of the R .A .F . bombed Valona and Durazz o in Albania . Shortly after 1 p .m ., when the fleet was midway betwee n Sicily and Greece, Sydney and Ajax, with the destroyers Nubian an d Mohawk, were detached to join Pridham-Wippell in Orion, and course was set to the northwards . Five hours later Illustrious, supported by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers, was also detached and proceeded to her flying off position about forty miles west of Cephalonia . She arrived there about 8 p .m ., and by 8 .40 the aircraft of the first of two striking forces were in the air and forming up . The defenders of Taranto heard their motors and opened up with anti-aircraft fire shortly befor e 11 p .m ., just as Sydney and her companions passed northward through the Strait of Otranto . The northward passage of the cruiser force was without incident . Durin g the daylight hours preparations were made in the ships for towing or bein g towed, and for repairing any damage which might be suffered during th e night . Dusk found them steaming at around twenty knots over a smoot h sea, just south and west of Corfu and starting the run into the Strait . Wit h nightfall Collins told Sydney's ship's company of their destination an d objective of "looking for trouble", and hands went to action stations . Th e night was bright, with a full moon bathing the darkened ships in its deceptive misty light ; and quiet except for the rustle of the water and the muted ship noises . Orion led the cruisers in line ahead, with Ajax an d Sydney following at intervals of three to four cables, and the two destroyers spaced broad on either bow . Abaft and above Sydney' s compass platform , where Collins and the small bridge group were on the alert, the gunner y control team in the director tower exercised the turrets in "dummy runs " against imaginary targets . In the turrets, shells lay in the loading trays, and trainers and layers were at the controls . Watertight doors in the ' tween decks were secured, and little groups at their respective actio n stations waited ready, those not immediately engaged filling in time b y reading, yarning, playing cards or dozing . Down below in the glitterin g engine and boiler rooms the staff went about their usual job of maintainin g steam and revolutions to the roar of the blowers and the hum of turbines . There was no sign of an enemy in the narrows, and Pridham-Wippel l led his force on into the Adriatic, away north of Otranto and past Valon a to the latitude of Brindisi, before turning at one o'clock in the mornin g of the 12th in a wide circle to starboard for the return run of the Strait . Shortly after the turn, at 1 .20 a .m . when the force was steering S .S .E . z The Italians may have shared the views of Admiral Pound . To the First Sea Lord the projecte dn naval air attack on the Italian Fleet "always zppeared as the last dying kick of the Mediterranea carrier before being sent to the bottom" . Cunningham, p . 273 .
12 Nov
A FORAY INTO ADRIATIC
23 5
at 20 knots, six darkened ships—four merchant vessels and two escortin g destroyers—were sighted making across to the Italian mainland from Valona Bay. Sydney's main armament was directed on to the leadin g merchant ship, but fire was held to achieve surprise and close range, th e British force altering course towards to south-east . At 1 .27 a .m . Mohawk, nearest to the enemy, opened fire and, surprise being no longer a consideration, action became general . Sydney opened fire on the leading merchant vessel at 7,000 yards, and rapidly scored hits and set the targe t on fire . For a brief interlude the peace and quietness of the night was shattered, and to the light of the moon was added the flash of gun fire, th e yellow glare of slowly falling star shells, and the flames of burning ships ; while occasional green tracer shells fired by the enemy escorts flared acros s the sky, one passing close over Sydney 's bridge . From the time of opening fire at 1 .27, the action lasted twenty-three minutes, during which one ship of the convoy was sunk, two set on fir e and almost certainly destroyed, while the fourth was damaged but escape d under cover of smoke . 3 The escorting destroyers escaped, though one wa s damaged . Sydney scored hits on three merchant ships, and also engaged a destroyer. Four minutes of her action gives an idea of the speed o f proceedings . After scoring hits on her second merchant ship target Collin s recorded that between 1 .36 and 1 .40 a .m . : Target was shifted to escorting destroyer which steaming from left to right makin g smoke. Five salvos fired at this target which drawing ahead . At 1 .38 fire shifted to original targets, now close together . Several salvos fired and more hits seen . These targets disappeared and target shifted again one ship right to ship apparently stopped . Other ships also firing at this target and many hits seen . At 1 .40 a torpedo attack was seen to pass under Sydney's stern at rightangles to her course, and eight minutes later she herself fired two torpedoe s at one of the merchant ships . At 1 .50 the action ceased, and at 1 .57 th e force—having suffered no damage or casualties—was steering south b y east for the Strait at 28 knots, passing through without interference a t 3 .30 a .m ., and joining the fleet off the west coast of Greece at 11 .15 a .m . on the 12th November, when Cunningham greeted Collins with the signa l "Did you have a wild Australian night?", to which "a suitable reply wa s made" . Collins, in his Letter of Proceedings covering this period, described th e operation as not without its element of excitement as three 6-inch cruisers found themselves wel l to the north of the Narrows with Italian bases containing vastly superior force s in their rear. The possibility of a speed hit from aircraft, E or U-boat, was in mind . It was fortunate that the torpedo fired by a convoy escort missed astern of Sydney . On the way south to rejoin the fleet, the cruisers sighted Illustrious an d her supporting force also steering south to rejoin after Taranto . Th e secret of that attack had been well kept, and not until, during the forenoo n of the 12th, Sydney intercepted a signal from the carrier giving a repor t s According to an Italian account, published after the war, all four merchant vessels, totallin g 16,938 tuns, were sunk.
236
R .A.N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
11-14 No v
of the operation, did the ship's company know that theirs had not bee n a lone adventure the previous night, and the reading of the news ove r the ship's loud speakers was greeted "with a burst of frenzied cheering" . In all it had been a bad few hours for the Italians . Subsequent information confirmed that at Taranto, of the battleships Littorio (later rename d Italia) was hit by three torpedoes and sank ; Conte di Cavour was hit by one torpedo and sank ; and Caio Duilio, hit by one torpedo, sank by th e bows . The cruiser Trento was hit by a bomb which perforated deck an d side but failed to explode ; and two destroyers were damaged by nea r misses . In the Adriatic a convoy was practically destroyed, and the ai r attack on Durazzo did serious damage . "A black day," Ciano called it , remarking that the battleships would remain out of the fight for man y months . But Mussolini, contrary to his Foreign Ministe r ' s expectations, wa s not downhearted at the news, and "does not at the moment seem to have fully realised its gravity " . There was a touch of irony in the fact that o n the 11th November, the day of the Taranto raid, Italian aircraft cooperate d with the German Air Force in a daylight raid on London, an honou r accorded at the insistence of Mussolini . Thirteen of the Italian aircraf t — seven bombers and six fighters—were shot down . The success of the attack on Taranto led to Cunningham agreeing t o a repetition on the night of the 12th November, but bad weather cause d the cancellation of the project, and the fleet returned to Alexandria, wher e it arrived without incident on the 14th of the month . The results of the attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto illustrated wit h dramatic force the potency of naval aviation as a striking weapon . "In a total flying time of about six and a half hours—carrier to carrier—twent y aircraft had inflicted more damage upon the Italian Fleet than was inflicte d upon the German High Sea Fleet in the daylight action at the Battle o f Jutland . "4 The effect upon the naval strategical situation in the Mediterranean was immediate and far reaching . Naples became the main bas e of the Italian Fleet, and thus the threat of surface action against the Aegea n and Malta convoys was reduced, as Italian entry into the Central Mediterranean through the Strait of Messina came under closer observation o f the R .A .F. reconnaissance from Malta . The reduction in Italian capita l ship strength enabled Cunningham to dispense with his slower battleships , and before the end of the month Ramillies sailed westward through th e Mediterranean for home, soon after followed by Malaya . This in tur n temporarily relieved the strain on the destroyers for fleet screening work . Of great importance was the stimulus to Britain and her friends, and th e effect on British prestige, especially in the Middle East . "Just before th e news of Taranto," the First Sea Lord wrote to Cunningham, "the Cabine t were rather down in the dumps ; but Taranto had a most amazing effec t upon them ." It had a correspondingly depressing effect upon the moral e of the Italian Navy which suffered—according to the German Admiral i n Rome—through the Italian naval staff being "completely governed by the thought that the Italian Fleet must remain secure, for they fear, by throw Cunningham, p . 286 .
Nov
CHANGES IN ITALIAN COMMANDS
23 7
ing in their forces prematurely under unfavourable circumstances to b e unable to carry out their main task—the assuring of the important se a communications in the Central Mediterranean" . The German Admiral saw Taranto as a direct consequence of this defensive attitude, an attitud e which "cripples their power of decision, and eventually the offensive spirit of the Italian Fleet; it invites an ever stronger British offensive in Italia n waters . If the strategic situation in the Mediterranean continues to develo p in the present way, serious consequences are unavoidable in all theatres , especially in the land operations in Greece and North Africa. In order to mitigate these repercussions as much as possible, a radical change i n the present Italian direction of the war is essential ." Changes in comman d were, in fact, shortly made . The Italian Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Cavagnari, resigned and was replaced by Admiral Riccardi ; and Mussolini also accepted the resignation of Marshal Badoglio, Supreme Commander of the Italian Army . But the German Admiral complained that his representations for a change in naval policy met with no success . The remainder of the month was a period of great activity for all unit s of the Mediterranean Fleet, covering and escorting complex movement s of convoys to Crete and Greece, and between Malta and Alexandria . Between the 15th and 20th November Sydney was in the Aegean, and paid her first visit to Greece when she arrived at the Piraeus on the 16th , being one of five cruisers to enter the harbour carrying a total of som e 4,000 troops with their stores, and receive a tremendous reception fro m the excited Greeks . Sydney made the 600-mile run from Alexandria t o the Piraeus in twenty-one hours at an average speed of 30 knots . Back in Alexandria on the 20th, she sailed again on the 23rd to take part in an operation which took all forces to sea and covered the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean . During the following six days important troop and equipment convoys were passed through the Mediterranean to Malta, Alexandria, Crete and Greece ; Ramillies and Berwick were passed westward through the Sicilian Narrows to join Force "H" , and the two new cruisers Manchester and Southampton, with some corvettes, came through to the Eastern Mediterranean . 5 On the 26th of th e month the fleet carried out air attacks, from Illustrious on the Dodecanese and from Eagle on Tripoli, at the two extremes of the Eastern Mediterranean . It was an indication of the measure of control of the sea establishe d by the Mediterranean Fleet—and a feature of the operation was that , throughout it, not a single gun was fired by Warspite or any of the ship s in company with her . Sydney's track chart shows that during the seven-day period at sea in this operation she steamed 2,628 miles, passed twice north of Crete — westbound and eastbound—covering Aegean convoys, and penetrated th e Central Mediterranean almost as far west as Pantelleria . She was in Suda Bay on the 24th, when three bombs, which fortunately did no damage , 5 HMS
Manchester, cruiser (1938), 9,400 tons, twelve 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 .3 kts ; sunk by Italian submarine off Tunisia, 13 Aug 1942 . HMS Southampton, cruiser (1937), 9,100 tons, twelve 6-in guns, 32 lcta ; lost after action wit4 1941, German ai ;craft east of Malta, 11
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Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, November 1940
30
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.mew (R .A.N. Historical Section )
Floating Enemy Mine off Australian Coast, with Auxiliary Minesweeper in Background .
(R .A .A .F . )
Federal Steam Navigation Company's Steamer Cambridge .
Survivors from Cambridg e picked up by H .M .A .S . Orara , coming ashore at Sealer' s Cove, Victoria, 8th November 1940 .
(Chief Stoker A . J . Doris, R .A .N .)
(R .AA' Hi (Toro a' Yeettoo Survivors from Port Bri.chane on Board H .M .A .S . Canberra, 23rd November
1940 .
Nov-Dec
SUPREMACY OF MEDITERRANEAN FLEET
23 9
suddenly arrived in the harbour out of the blue from an aircraft too high to be sighted . On the 26th she was one of the covering force for Eagle during the air strike on Tripoli ; and arrived back in Alexandria on the 29th . The destroyers of the 10th Flotilla had a similarly active period, escortin g Aegean and Malta convoys and on the battle fleet screen and, with th e exception of Stuart, all taking part in the operations from the 23rd to th e 29th . Decoy's participation was partial, for the western passage of th e battle fleet only . The Italians were making up for lack of aggressivenes s elsewhere by increasing their air attacks on Alexandria . Voyager, in harbour there from the 13th to the 21st, recorded that the port was raide d on an average five times a day during that period . In a raid on th e evening of the 13th November Decoy was struck by a bomb which di d considerable damage and killed two officers and nine ratings . She sailed o n the screen of the battle fleet on the 25th November to Malta for repairs , and her place in the 10th Flotilla was taken by Wryneck . s XIX The closing days of 1940 were invigorating and exciting for the Mediterranean Fleet . It had gained in strength in itself and was on the crest o f achievement . Vis-a-vis the Italian Fleet after Taranto it was in an increasingly favourable position ; and with the addition of Illustrious and th e fighter protection she gave, had a large measure of control in the Central Mediterranean . Things were going well . The Italians, placed on the defensive in Greece and Albania by the enthusiasm and vigour of the Gree k counter-attack, were shortly to be on the run in Egypt and Libya followin g a British land attack which opened on the 8th December . In the Aegean strength was being built up in Crete, where by the end of the year was a small garrison ; two airfields ; and harbour defences whose main lack was an efficient net defence against torpedoes . This shortcoming was th e cause of Glasgow being hit by two torpedoes dropped from aircraft on th e 3rd December, and she was fortunate in being able to return to Alexandri a under her own steam, though badly damaged . The danger of air attack made it unwise for ships to remain in Suda Bay for lengthy periods, but the harbour provided a most useful advanced base, particularly for fuelling , and on four separate occasions during November either the 1st or 2n d Divisions of the battle fleet were there, and on the 17th December th e Commander-in-Chief took the fleet in to refuel . In the Central Mediterranean, Malta, key to North Africa, reinforced with troops, aircraft, an d anti-aircraft batteries, was on the way to earning the title "this fire spewing yellow water bug" later bestowed upon the island by a German dive bomber pilot whose squadron was shattered in the endeavour to brea k down its defences . The support and nourishment of Malta during the first six months o f the Italian war was one of the most valuable achievements of the Britis h navy and merchant service, as the failure to launch a full scale assaul t e
HMS Wryneck, destroyer (1918), 1,100 tons, four 4-in guns, six 21-In torp tubes, 34 kts ; sunk by enemy aircraft in Gulf of Navplion, 27 Apr 1941 .
240
R .A .N. SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
Aug-De c
on the island in the period of its weakness was Italy's greatest mistake . The existence of Malta as a British base, even though its use by the Mediterranean Fleet was severely curtailed, limited the activity of the Italian Fleet in the Central Mediterranean and threatened Italy's vita l communications with Libya . "Under these circumstances," wrote the German Admiral in Rome in August 1940, "the elimination of Malta as a British naval and air base becomes imperative . Going by present experiences this task cannot be left to the Italian air force alone ." And he pressed, without success, a long series of plans for the elimination of Malt a as the first condition for Italian control of the Central Mediterranean . Had such elimination been possible it might have been when Italy ha d the preponderance of naval power in the Mediterranean, and Malta' s air fighting force consisted of four Hurricanes, and three Gladiators whic h had been left—still in their packing cases—by the carrier Glorious ; an d the garrison strength only permitted beach defence on an average battalion front of fifteen miles, with practically no reserves for counter-attack, as was the situation in the early months of the war, and before Italian strengt h had been committed to other ventures . ? As it was, Mussolini—without control of the sea and with his communications increasingly harassed b y air, and later surface, attacks from Malta—not content with having his large armies in Africa placed in extreme jeopardy, now further dissipate d his resources in the Greek adventure, while British strength in the Mediterranean was built up . Throughout November and December the reinforcement of Greece, Crete, and Malta continued in a series of involved operations which—together with the additional duties imposed upon it in sup porting the British attack in Libya—employed the whole fleet in coverin g and escorting convoys and in carrying out air attacks and bombardment s on Italian positions ; and in one of these Cunningham took Warspite int o Malta for a couple of days . It was her first visit since May, and was a n illustration of the improved situation of the British in the Central Mediterranean . This operation, which included an air attack on Rhodes ; the passage of convoys through the Sicilian Narrows and of Malaya to the Western Mediterranean ; and a cruiser raid into the Adriatic and a battleshi p bombardment of Valona, took place in the middle of December, and wa s the last major operation in the Mediterranean in which Sydney took part. In October 1940, it was arranged between the Naval Board and th e Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, that Hobart should return to Australia , being relieved on the East Indies Station by Perth ; and on the 28th November Perth sailed from Fremantle as part escort of A .I .F . convoy US .7, and to join the East Indies Station . During November and December ship s were sunk by mines on the south and east coasts of Australia, and in th e 7 After the war the German naval historians Assmann and Gladisch wrote : "At first neither the Germans nor Italians assessed adequately the extraordinary strategic importance of Malta, o r they would have taken it before the enemy's defences could be strengthened, for its possessio n was vital to the safe transport of supplies to Tripoli . From the German viewpoint this operatio n should have been entrusted to the Italians in 1940 when the Mediterranean war was still regarde d as primarily an Italian concern . The Axis attacks on Malta were therefore restricted to intensiv e air attacks—which however reduced their own strength on the African fronts—and to the minin g of coastal waters . It is admitted that this only temporarily restricted the island 's use as a base. "
Dec
PERTH AND SYDNEY
24 1
first week of December German surface raiders sank a number of ship s off Nauru Island . On the 9th December the Naval Board, reviewing th e situation and the naval commitments on the Australia Station, told th e Admiralty : "We are finding it extremely difficult to meet them wit h resources now at our disposal," and proposed, among other things, tha t Westralia—which since July had been in the East Indies command—an d either Perth or Sydney should return to Australia . This was approved b y the Admiralty who, on the 15th December, told the Naval Board tha t Westralia would return to Australia as soon as possible ; that Sydney would return as soon as relieved in the Mediterranean by Southampton—whic h was being redisposed from Indian Ocean convoy work to replace th e damaged Glasgow—and that Perth also would be released from the Eas t Indies Station to join the Mediterranean Fleet . Perth, which arrived at Aden on the 12th December (where she met Hobart who was on her wa y home to Australia), after a brief period of escort work in the Red Sea , passed through the Suez Canal on the 23rd December and reached Alexandria the following day . There, on the 27th-28th December she wa s painted in camouflage colours, and on the 30th replaced Sydney with Orion and Ajax in the 7th Cruiser Squadron. On the day Perth passed through the Canal, Sydney reached Malta fo r docking and refit, following a period of activity largely in the Aegean , during which she had become well-known at the Piraeus in a series o f visits . The arrival of the cruisers and convoy at Piraeus on the second occasion o f trooping (wrote Collins) aroused considerable enthusiasm, and it was remarkabl e that many of the population on the waterfront and in boats recognised the shi p and called her name and cheered as she passed . This visit to the Piraeus was made the first occasion of a mixed part y on board Sydney, when Collins entertained some guests including Lady Palairet, the wife of the British minister : "They were delighted to tast e white bread and good butter after months of black bread and ranci d butter or margarine ." During the first half of December Sydney was o n a number of occasions in the Piraeus, and the ship's company had som e of their rare runs ashore . Athens was en fete at this period . In Albania the Evzones, shouting "Aera! Aera!"—"Make room! Make room!"—wer e driving the Italians before them and had captured Argyrokastro ; and in the streets of the Greek capital crowds of excited citizens cheered, chaired , and overwhelmed with hospitality the British sailors, soldiers and airme n whenever they appeared. On the 17th December Sydney sailed from Suda Bay to join the fleet for the Adriatic operation, and at 8 .20 the following morning took statio n with the 7th Cruiser Squadron—Orion, Ajax, Sydney—with the destroyers Jervis, Juno and Janus, on the port beam of the 1st Division of the battl e fleet—Warspite, Valiant, Illustrious, with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron an d destroyers—and the force pressed northwards along the west coast o f Greece and close to Corfu in the teeth of a bitter north-east gale lade n with drenching rain . Winter had come with a rush, and the coastal
242
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
1940-41
mountains were snow clad almost down to the sea . Against this inhospitable background the heavy ships, closest inshore, smashed their way through seas which cascaded over the forecastles with every ponderou s dive ; to seaward of them the more lightly moving ships of the cruise r squadron flung the spray high from their bows ; and to seaward again the squadron's three destroyers ploughed and pitched, at times almos t hidden by enveloping sheets of water as they sliced through the large r waves . Woollen clothes were pulled out of lockers "almost overnight", an d the Commander-in-Chief himself recalled in later years that " I was gla d of a balaclava helmet knitted by my wife" . It had been intended to synchronise a bombing attack with the battle ships' bombardment of Valona, but the weather caused the cancellatio n of this phase, and at dusk Illustrious and her escort were detached . A little earlier the 7th Cruiser Squadron and destroyers had increased spee d and pressed on ahead for the Strait of Otranto, and at 10 p .m . passe d through into the Adriatic . By now the weather had fined . Gales, rain and overcast gave place t o clear moonlight and a flat calm as the striking force sped into the Adriati c in the still cold . No enemy forces were sighted, and at 1 a .m . on th e 19th, those in the force saw astern of them the flashes of the battleships ' guns as they bombarded Valona . At 1 .30 a .m . the cruisers were northward of the line Brindisi-Durazzo, and turned southwards to withdraw afte r the battleships, who had left after firing one hundred rounds of 15-inch shells into the Albanian port. The striking force passed southward through the Strait without incident at 5 a .m ., and after a final visit to Suda Bay Sydney proceeded to Malta. She made her farewells to that island on th e 8th January 1941 and, in company with Stuart who had completed he r refit, sailed for Alexandria . Seventy-two hours later, after having exchanged valedictory signals with the fleet, Sydney sailed for the last time fro m the Egyptian base . On the 12th January she passed through the Suez Canal—she had to anchor for some hours in the Great Bitter Lake in a sandstorm—and on the 5th February reached Fremantle, where Hobart and Westralia had anticipated her arrival with theirs on the 28th December 1940 and the 3rd January 1941 respectively . x In their months overseas, the ships of the R .A .N . had done much wor k and much hard steaming and, with the exception of the armed merchan t cruisers, had on many occasions been in action with the enemy . Hobart, during the first twelve months of war, steamed 60,674 miles ; spent 32 2 days in the tropics ; and had steam on her main engines for 253 days . Sydney, during 1940, steamed over 66,000 miles, which was severa l thousand miles more than she covered in the four years of her pre-wa r life ; and the destroyers' mileage was equally heavy . The greatest credit was due to the engine department staffs—and more especially those i n the destroyers, which ships were feeling the weight of their twenty-tw o years or so of age—for the way in which they kept the ships running ;
1940
DESTROYERS AND SLOOPS
24 3
nearly always at short notice for steam, and called upon for frequent an d prolonged bursts of high speed . Life in the smaller ships, the destroyer s and sloops, involved "hard lying" for their companies, and this was particularly felt in the conditions in the mess decks resulting from the lack o f ventilation at night when everything was closed down to darken ship, with , in the destroyers, the additional discomfort of wetness below in bad weather . Walsh in Vampire, whose interest in the welfare of his ship's company was always keen, was outspoken in his Letter of Proceedings in July 1940 , when he commented on the discovery of an advanced case of pulmonar y tuberculosis in the ship while several suspects were examined in the course of an inspection of all ratings . There is no doubt that this discovery, combined with poor ventilation and cracks in the deck which have developed lately, and which allow water to enter the mes s decks in head seas, have had a worrying effect upon the ship's company . Steps were taken to combat this by making such improvements as wer e possible, and these had the desired effect, "though no one is lookin g forward to winter and rough seas" . This comment brought a sharp reproof from Tovey, then Vice-Admira l Light Forces, who in a letter to Walsh—which, though marked " personal" , was copied to the Commander-in-Chief, the Naval Board, the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron, and Captain (D) 10— said : The examination of the ship's company and the discovery of a number of suspect s is a routine procedure ; the number of suspects found in Vampire was unusuall y small, and none of them has since been confirmed as a T .B . case . Your statement that the discovery of this one case had a worrying effect on the ship's company i s most improper ; either it is unfounded, or it indicates that you allowed your ship' s company, through ignorance which you took no steps to dispel, to become unjustifiably apprehensive over a perfectly normal occurrence . This was at a time of stress and strain in the Mediterranean Fleet, an d Tovey's concern that the morale of ships' companies should be maintaine d is understandable . It would seem, however, that it would have bee n equally "improper" for Walsh to have failed to comment upon an attitud e of mind among his ship's company, its causes, and the steps taken fo r its correction . Certainly the manner in which Tovey's rebuke was communicated t o other authorities was open to objection . It constituted a method pour encourager les autres among junior commanding officers which was t o be deprecated, since it might easily have deterred them from similarly incurring a mark of displeasure through bringing to the notice of their senior s matters which should have been made known to them . That lack of ventilation in the destroyer messdecks was a major proble m was made clear by the fact that in their refits in 1940, the installation o f forced draught ventilating systems was an important item in the wor k undertaken . The defects of lower messdeck ventilation were experience d also in the two sloops in the trying heat conditions of the Red Sea an d Gulf of Aden .
244
R .A .N . SHIPS OVERSEAS JUNE-DECEMBER 1940
1940
A serious defect in the construction of the ship in the very trying climate in whic h she has been operating (wrote Walker of Parramatta) has been the ventilation o f the enclosed lower messes and the galleys. Although probably adequate for peace conditions and less extreme climates, when battened down at night the space s become unbearable . In the case of all ships, hours were long, work was strenuous, an d leave was short, with few opportunities for recreation . Collins gave Sydney's normal sea routine in November : Ship's company work in two watches with all hands closed up for seventy minute s at dawn and dusk. By night second degree readiness, all hands at quarters . Some improvement was effected by closing in timber rack on the 4-inch gun deck, makin g primitive accommodation for eighteen men off duty to sleep . Known as "Bomb View Flats", this is much appreciated . . . . On normal return to base after an exacting six or seven days at sea there are usually heavy ammunitioning, boile r cleaning, and provisioning ; A/A guns to man all night ; ship to be cleaned ; an d little leisure . Leave is only possible when not duty cruiser, to one watch, and the n only to 10 p .m. ; with very rare all night leave. The average rating gets only abou t two turns of leave ashore in a month . Recreation facilities are poor. There was a Fleet Club in Alexandria which provided some facilities , and in October an Australian Comforts Fund Club was opened there . The Red Sea ships, working out of Aden, had even less opportunitie s of recreation for their crews . The men hoped, of course—wrote Walker—to work from an interesting port , and were naturally disappointed to find themselves based on Aden, which ca n provide practically no attractions for them . Port Sudan had more to offer . Yarra, there in November, managed t o get organised hockey, cricket, and swimming matches against the R .A.F . and the Worcestershire Regiment . In these matches (wrote Harrington) I am pleased to say our small ship's company was quite able to hold its own. There was considerable fraternisation between the ship's company and ranks of the Worcestershire Regiment, and much interes t taken in their accounts of their recent engagements with the Italians in th e Gallabat area . Some of the ships' companies got breaks during refits . Hobart was refitting in Colombo for a month during October and November, and the ship's company had twelve days' rest in the holiday camp at Diyatalawa . Parramatta had ten days in Bombay during December, when her company were accommodated on shore . Leander was also there refitting, an d "the two ships' companies merged harmoniously, receiving much kin d entertainment from the residents of Bombay" . The companies of the destroyers refitting in Malta were in some instances shore based for a while . Stuart, for example, was for a period of her refit so dismantle d as to be uninhabitable, and her crew found accommodation in Maltese homes, those not on watch attending on board each morning until noon . While the crews were on board during refits at Malta, all hands, excep t fire parties left on board, had frequently to leave the ships for the shelters on shore during air raids . "Progress from the ship to the particular shelter
1940
H.M .A .S . AUSTRALIA
245
allotted to Stuart was extremely rapid, and served as effective training fo r any aspirant for the world's hundred yards championship ."8 After the Dakar expedition Australia was with the Home Fleet and , based on Greenock, was occupied mainly on patrol and escort work . O n 29th October she rescued—in a gale and high sea—nine of the crew o f thirteen of a Sunderland aircraft which had force-landed on the sea wes t of the Hebrides . Early the following month she was ordered to join th e force covering the approaches to Brest and Lorient in the hope of intercepting Scheer after the German raider's attack on convoy HX .84 on the 5th November, when five ships of the convoy, and the ocean escort—th e armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay 9—were sunk ; but machinery defects prevented her doing so . On the 18th November, after providing cover for Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys, she docked at Liverpool for refit . During the nights of the 20th, 21st and 22nd December, while she was in dry dock, Liverpool was the target for a series of heavy German ai r raids, and the ship narrowly escaped serious damage in the first of these . The dock had been flooded to three feet under the ship's floating draf t as bomb protection, and on the night of the 20th a bomb fell in the wate r right alongside the ship and appeared to explode, though without causin g any damage . Subsequent examination showed that the bomb was an aeria l torpedo of about 3,500 pounds, and that the tail charge only had exploded . Slight damage was suffered the following night, when a 500-lb bomb fel l near the port quarter, the explosion damaging the aircraft catapult an d breaking ports in the captain's cabin . By the end of the month the refi t was completed, and the ship again ready for service . Morale in the Australian ships was high, especially where encounter s with the enemy were frequent . The recent warlike activities (wrote Collins of Sydney in July 1940) have had a very beneficial effect on the ship's company, who are in high spirits . Their healt h and conduct remains excellent and they have faced up to the somewhat tryin g conditions at sea with very little rest in an admirable manner . Three months later, not long after Yarra had joined the Red Sea Force , Harrington reported : The morale of the ship's company is very high, due partly to their interest bein g maintained by the fairly frequent opportunities of firing the guns . . . I fear that some do not land even when they could do so in case they should miss an air raid . l All the Australian commanding officers wrote of the ready and unstinte d cooperation of the Royal Navy. The authorities on shore and the officers and men of the various ships an d establishments of the Royal Navy have shown us invariable kindness, and hav e often gone to great trouble to help us (wrote Walker at the end of November) . This has been a most happy feature of our service in these waters . 8 Clifford, Leader of the Crocks (1945), p. 126 . B HMS Jervis Bay, armed merchant cruiser (1922), 14,164 tons, seven 6-in guns, 16 kts . (He r commanding officer, Capt Fogarty Fegen, RN, had, from January 1928 to August 1929, been Commander at the RAN College . He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. ) r This was the ineffective high-level bombing of the Italians in the Red Sea . It was a differen t matter in the Mediterranean, especially after the dive bombers arrived . When Harrington 's report quoted above was received in Navy Office, Melbourne, at the end of 1940, it was proposed t o give publicity to it. Colvin vetoed the suggestion . " There is a lot of nasty bombing to come, " he said .
246
R.A .N .
SHIPS OVERSEAS
JUNE-DECEMBER
1940
1939-4 1
In their six months of active warfare, all the ships' companies had become seasoned and practised teams . Under the tuition of the permanen t service officers and men and the practical schooling of action with th e enemy, the reservists—who made up a large proportion of the crews, particularly in the armed merchant cruisers, destroyers, and sloops— learned quickly and well . At the outbreak of war in 1939 few of th e reservists had known anything about a ship or a gun . By the end of 194 0 they had shown themselves, and the ships they helped to man, to be th e peers of any afloat . The reservists brought something fresh into the Navy (wrote the Flotilla Enginee r Officer in Stuart) . Instead of being a ship full of sailors talking about nothing bu t the sea and ships and grog and women, we were a team of sailors, clerks, rabbiters , chemists, students, butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers, talking about everythin g under the sun . . . and women . War at sea is ninety-nine per cent utter boredo m and one per cent spine chilling excitement . The Rockies entertained us ninety-nin e per cent of the time and behaved like heroes during the one per cent of action . What more could one ask? 2
Between them, ships and crews had seen many seas, fought in numerou s engagements, and filled important places in the dispositions which enabled the British Navy to keep control of the ocean routes . Not the least o f their contribution lay in their part in securing Egypt and the Middl e East, and in protecting the successive convoys of Australian troops whic h crossed the Indian Ocean to help to build up the land forces there before the end of the year. With the year's end some of the ships had returned to Australia . But the dawn of 1941 found a number still serving with the Royal Navy outside the Australia Station—Perth and the five destroyers in the Mediterranean ; Australia in Great Britain with the Home Fleet ; and Parramatta and Yarra with the Red Sea Force . And, H .M . Ships but manned by Australians, the armed merchant cruisers Kanimbla on the East Indie s Station, and Moreton Bay and Arawa on the South Atlantic .
2 Cdr (E) W. H . S . Rands, RAN . "The Rockies, God Bless 'Em" (1950)—an article in Spindrift, the journal of Flinders Naval Depot, Dec 1950, p . 41 . "Rockies "—the sailor's name for reservists.
CHAPTER
6
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAS T JUNE-DECEMBER 194 0 HROUGHOUT 1940 active warfare was still distant from the Australia
in the Atlantic an d T Station, but repercussions from the storm centres Niagara and the discovery
Mediterranean—already felt in the sinking of of enemy mines in New Zealand waters—came in growing numbers an d increasing force. In July the failure of merchant ships to reach thei r destinations was evidence that raiders were again operating in the India n Ocean, and on the 9th of the month Admiral Colvin told the War Cabine t that the Norwegian Tirranna, with important A .I .F. stores on board, was many days overdue at Mombasa, a disappearance which was followed a few days later by those of the British ships City of Bagdad and Kemmendine . These were normal occurrences in sea warfare, and an increase i n the scale of raider attack was to be anticipated as more German arme d merchant cruisers became operative . Evasive routeing and the consequent dispersal of ships on the ocean routes, with naval patrols affording suc h general cover as was practicable and hunting groups searching when th e presence of a raider in any area was confirmed by a distress message from a victim, were means of meeting this threat . It was one which did not directly menace Australia's security and which was, outside the Australi a Station, a problem to be met by the Admiralty, albeit with the assistanc e of Australian ships under Admiralty control . The immediate responsibility of the forces controlled by the Naval Board was the protection of coasta l waters, and of shipping—especially of troop convoys—within the limits o f the station . It was a responsibility shared by the army with its fixed shor e defences, and by the air force with seaward reconnaissance and ai r cover within the range of its aircraft . There were, however, other repercussions which carried greater weight , and suggested the possibility of the war storm covering the Pacific an d beating on the shores of Australia . From Japan, events in Europe wer e watched with interest . Since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, th e Japanese Army, modelled upon that of Germany and with officers who , always chauvinist, were now imbued with Nazi ideas, had steadily increase d its political power . Moderating influences in Japanese policy were over awed by assassinations, and the idea of the "Imperial Way"—"the harmonious fusion of the true spirit underlying the foundations of Japan wit h the great ideal of the Japanese nation"'—was popularised . National expansion was glorified and raised to religious duty . "The first Emperor," Genera l Araki told the nation, "established the Imperial Army to extend the heavenly work . . . . We of the Imperial Army are leaders in displaying th e Imperial Way ." The Japanese Navy was different . Its traditions were formed on the British model, and it was the conservative element in th e 1 From the speeches of General Sadao Araki, The Spirit of the Soldiers of our Empire.
248
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST
1940
1937-39
collective military dictatorship which governed Japan ;2 but a change in its attitude was apparent after 1935 ; a change which had begun to germinate after the Washington Conference in 1922 . Angered by the limitations imposed by the naval treaties, and inspired by the acquisition of the mandated Pacific islands—the " anchored aircraft-carriers " paving the way to southern advancement—the navy began to see wider horizon s beckoning it on . Behind lay the knowledge of Japan's shortages i n essential war materials, and the nation's driving force became the hunge r of the fighting services to increase their war potential by acquiring contro l of the tempting spoils within sight—the minerals of Manchuria and China ; the oil and rubber and tin of the East Indies and Malaya . The growing momentum of this force had long been apparent outsid e Japan . In China—invaded in July 1937—the war did not go accordin g to Japanese plan and dragged on . Britain and America tried by peaceful means to stop it, but these were not sufficient . In December 1937, th e Japanese "by mistake" sank the United States gunboat Panay (450 tons ) by air bombing in the Yangtse River. An American naval court o f inquiry brought out unmistakable evidence that the sinking was deliberate but, anxious to avoid war, the Government accepted th e "mistake" theory, and in an unofficial but representative poll in Americ a 70 per cent of those interviewed, and had an opinion on the subject , favoured a complete American withdrawal from China . 3 The following , year, in a series of amphibious operations, the Japanese Army occupied th e shores of the South China Sea in an attempt to debar China from outsid e help . On the 3rd February 1939 the Japanese consolidated their positio n by seizing Hainan Island off the Lieuchow Peninsula, the southern extremity of China ; and next month annexed Spratly Reefs, ninety-six cora l islets barely above water but providing shelter in lagoons midway between North Borneo and French Indo-China . In May and June of that year, i n an endeavour to eliminate British, French, and American influence i n China, the Japanese Army made life as difficult as possible for shore nationals in Shanghai and began blockading the British and French con cessions at Tientsin . . , Britain was Iwo preoccupied in Europe and too weak in the Far Eas t to take any action other than to add to Japan's difficulties in China b y supplying the Chinese Nationalist Government with munitions to carry on the war, the main supply routes being overland through French Indo China and Burma . The United States, however, after the Japanese mov e 2
The Japanese constitution provided that the Emperor, as C-in-C, was advised on military an d naval matters not by the head of the government but by the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs and the War and Navy Ministers . The Minister of War was appointed by the Hig h Command—the C.G .S ., the Inspector-General of Military Training, and the Minister of War . He therefore helped to choose his own successor . The Minister of War was a Lieut-General o r General on the active list ; the Minister of the Navy a Vice-Admiral . The size of the army and nav y were part of the Imperial prerogative reserved by the constitution for the High Command, an d the government could not prevent any increase in the army or fleet which the fighting chief s thought necessary . Theoretically a check was placed on the fighting chiefs by placing financia l power in the hands of the legislature, but this power was reduced by a regulation which provided that if the budget for the year failed to pass, the appropriations voted for the previou s year should automatically continue ; and was further restricted by the practice of presentin g military and naval five-year plans with continuing appropriations which, once voted, wer e beyond the control of the legislature .—Hugh Byas, The Japanese Enemy (1942), pp . 54-5 . 8 S . E . Morison, U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, Vol III (1948), pp. 17-18 .
1939-40
UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY AND JAPAN
24 9
to Hainan Island and the Spratly Reefs, transferred the fleet—which ha d been concentrated in the Caribbean—to the Pacific . It passed through the Panama Canal on the 20th April . In the following July the United States took a further step and denounced the 1911 Treaty of Commerc e with Japan, thus clearing the way for the imposition of economic sanctions when the treaty expired in January 1940 . Before then the war broke out in Europe, with all the chances it might offer to Japan ; they were chances Japan's leaders were agreed to seize upon as they arose . The only difference lay in the course to be followed—an immediate alliance wit h Germany and Italy, or to play a lone hand and take opportunity as i t came . The second alternative was followed. At this stage the situation of the United States vis-a-vis the Allies an d that of Japan vis-a-vis the Axis powers were similar in that, though ther e was no question where respective interests lay, there was no guarantee t o the Allies on one hand or the Axis on the other of present action to the point of war in any eventuality . The United States wished to preven t any formal alliance between Japan and the Axis which would give a n opportunity of southward expansion, and through diplomatic channel s counselled Japan to maintain strict neutrality ; advice which Japan countered with suggestions that she be left with a free hand to settle the Chin a " incident" . In Britain, Mr Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty , calculated the respective strengths of the Allied, Axis, United States an d Japanese navies, and felt that Japan's main preoccupation was America , and that the naval balance was such that "in the first year of a world wa r Australia and New Zealand would be in no danger whatever in thei r homeland, and by the end of the first year we might hope to have cleane d up the seas and oceans" .4 He realised that Britain could not defend a point north of Singapore in the Western Pacific if Japan entered the war , but believed that Singapore could be held until the Mediterranean was saf e and naval forces could be diverted to the Far East . Events in Europe in the second quarter of 1940 moved with a rapidity which had immediate effects in the Pacific . In April the Japanese Foreign Minister, General Arita, anticipating German moves on land, said tha t whatever happened to Holland "relations of economic interdependence an d of co-existence and co-prosperity between Japan and the Netherlands Eas t Indies must be maintained" . The United States Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, promptly declared that any armed intervention in th e Netherlands East Indies "would be prejudicial to the cause of stability , peace and security in the Pacific" . Shortly afterwards the American Flee t was moved from West Coast ports to Pearl Harbour "until further notice " because of the deterrent effect it was thought its presence might have o n a possible Japanese advance into the East Indies . On the 10th May the German offensive in Western Europe began. Within six weeks the fall of France and the withdrawal of the French Fleet from the fight readjuste d the balance of naval power in Japan's favour . On the 7th June General 'w.
S . Churchill, The Second World War, Vol I (1948), p . 327 .
250
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST 1940
Apr-June
Marshall,5 United States Chief of Army Operations, warned the commander in Hawaii to be on the alert "against an overseas raid from th e west by a hostile Nation" .6 According to the reports of the German Naval Attache—Vice-Admira l Weneker—in Tokyo at that time, the Japanese Navy, early in April 1940, received "increased readiness" orders for attack on the Netherland s East Indies, operative from 1st May, together with instructions to b e prepared for war against the United States and Britain . The final orde r for action depended on Germany's intentions in Holland, on which Japan sought information . But on the day—17th April—that Weneker was tol d this by the Japanese, it was repudiated by Vice-Admiral Kondo, the pro German Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, who stated that for the presen t war with the United States and Britain must be avoided at all costs, an d that Japan was trying to maintain the status quo in the East Indies . Th e Cabinet, then led by Admiral Yonai, was also anxious to pursue this policy . ? In Australia, the possibility of aggression in the Pacific was clear wit h the deteriorating situation in Europe, and a War Cabinet agendum of th e 12th June raised the question "whether or not we should continue to rely on the pre-war undertaking that a British squadron of capital ships woul d proceed to Singapore immediately on hostile action in the Pacific" . Six day s later the whole question of Australian defence was reviewed at a Wa r Cabinet meeting which discussed a press report that the probable peac e terms to be imposed on France would include allotment to Japan of the New Hebrides and New Caledonia . Such a possibility was one o f pressing concern to Australia . Possession of New Caledonia and the Ne w Hebrides would give Japan naval bases from which, with her superio r sea power, she could completely sever Australia's Pacific Ocean communications. Apart from the menace this would be to Australia, it was a prospect in a possible global war far more threatening to British interest s than a German occupation of Dakar would have been . The Chiefs of Staff were present at the War Cabinet, and Admira l Colvin told the meeting that he assumed that the British would remain in charge in the New Hebrides (which was administered under an Anglo French Condominium) if the French failed to participate, but that Ne w Caledonia was a purely French possession . Should the Commonwealth decide to carry out a military occupation of the islands it would be unabl e to hold them against Japanese action because of Japan's superior se a power. Commenting on a reference to the possibility of invasion of Australia by the Japanese, and the advisability of reinforcing Darwin an d Port Moresby, Colvin said that if Japan should come into the war an d the United States should not, there would be no point in holding Darwin , and the naval oil supplies there should be drained in such a contingency . 6 General of Army George C. Marshall . Chief of Staff, US Army, 1939-45 ; Ambassador to Chin a 1945-47 ; US Secretary of State 1947-49 . B . 31 Dec 1880 . 6 Morison, pp . 43-4 . ', From documents in the German Naval Archives .
June
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
25 1
The defence of the northern part of Australia hinged on a battle flee t based at Singapore . If such were not possible, the situation becam e radically changed. This was a plain statement of fact. As protection against full scal e invasion, reliance was placed on Britain's ability to exercise control o f the wider seas, and Singapore was the key to such control in the Western Pacific . Australia' s own defence measures had been the continua l development of an effective policy the first objective of which had bee n laid down by the Government's advisers as the completion of defenc e against a minor scale of attack . To achieve this a program for th e expenditure of £43,000,000 had been approved some time before th e war, and had been expanded to greater dimensions after Munich . "The present position was that the navy had in commission all the ships i t could obtain or build ; the strength of the army for local defence wa s being increased to 250,000 men ; the air program was based on the early completion of the Salmond 8 Scheme plus our contribution to th e Empire Air Scheme . In regard to munitions, the Director-General ha d been informed that the sky is the limit and time is the essence of th e contract. " The outcome of the meeting was that a cable was sent to the Britis h Government stating that Australia was concerned about the report o n the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, and requesting urgent advice o n two main alternatives, (1) that the United States might exercise the sam e deterrent effect as in the case of the Netherlands East Indies ; (2) tha t Australia might take action to forestall Japan by occupation with he r own forces . "However, this might furnish a precedent to Japan fo r action in the N .E .I . We also realise that Japanese sea power could rende r impossible the maintenance of such forces . On the other hand, it is necessary to weigh whether Japan would risk war with the Empire and U .S .A . over these islands . " The British Government, replying in a series of messages a few day s later, said that the United States Government could not then go beyon d the declaration made in connection with the Netherlands East Indies, bu t that better results might be obtained from immediate American diplomati c approaches in Tokyo. It was agreed that occupation of the islands b y Australian forces would provide Japan with a dangerous pretext for actio n against the Netherlands East Indies . In general, with her limited resources , Britain could not attempt to occupy French overseas territories, but in some cases her control of sea communications should enable her to deny the resources of those territories to the enemy . "We hope it may be possibl e to stimulate continued resistance on the part of the French Colonia l Empire forces . " The Australian War Cabinet agreed with this attitude and decided, o n the 25th June, that discussions with the French authorities in the island s "Marshal of RAF Sir John Salmond, GCB, CMG, CVO, DSO . Chief of Air Staff 1930-33 ; Director of Armament Production and D-G Flying Control and Air Sea Rescue 1939-45 . B. 17 Jul 1881 .
252
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST
1940
25-28 Jun e
should be on a basis of trade relations in which the Commonwealth woul d offer to facilitate shipping from Australia to the islands and help in th e solution of economic problems and the maintenance of stability . In the meantime, the French Resident Commissioner in the New Hebrides — M. Sautot—in close consultation with his British colleague—Mr R . D . Blandy—declared for de Gaulle, and on the 26th June the local elective council of New Caledonia, supported by the majority of the French population—though not by some among the wealthier merchants, officials, an d military officers—passed a resolution affirming the colony's determinatio n to continue the struggle against Germany. In July Mr B . C. Ballard, a solicitor who represented Australian interests in the New Hebrides, wa s appointed Australia's representative in New Caledonia . The Governor , M. Pelicier, responded favourably to Australian advances, and expresse d his readiness to discuss all relevant questions with Ballard. There, for the moment, matters rested . Before then, however, the British Government—in a telegram of th e 28th June—told the Commonwealth that it was now not possible t o divert naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Far East owing to the loss of the French Fleet, and that it was therefore desirable to reinforce Malaya with military and air strength . It had for some time been obviou s that, if Britain intended to remain in the Mediterranean, she would b e unable to send a fleet to Singapore . Nevertheless the statement of th e obvious at this juncture, when the only certainty in the Pacific was th e presence of a powerful and increasingly menacing potential enemy, was no t a pleasant one for the Australian and New Zealand people . The situatio n was, however, capable of a measure of control . During the following weeks, in a number of exchanges between the respective British governments, a calm appreciation was made, and a more or less elastic polic y evolved to meet the demands of a world wide strategy . Its Pacific partner s were shortly told by the British Government that the decision regarding a fleet at Singapore was not the final word . In certain contingencies a fleet would be sent . In the meantime, in a situation fraught with danger s and weighted with factors of uncertainty, reliance upon control of se a communications as the basis of Empire defence, in whole or in territoria l part, remained ; and Australia, though denuded to the limit of naval force s for the protection of trade in her own waters or for defence against mino r raids on her territories, made no demands for the return from oversea s of her ships employed in Admiralty dispositions . Fundamental to Empire defence was Britain's ability to resist invasio n of the homeland and maintain her own oversea communications . If she could do that, though her naval strength was thinly stretched, it wa s growing rapidly, and even at its existing standard it was possible for her to ease the strain in one area to meet urgent and vital demands in anothe r if necessity arose . To a degree the imminence of danger from Japan coul d be estimated, and regulated by diplomatic action . Among the uncertain factors entering into an assessment of the hazards in the Pacific was the attitude likely to be adopted by the United States and the Netherlands
June-Aug
BRITISH STRATEGY
25 3
East Indies in the face of Japanese aggression . It was an attitude likel y to be determined largely by the success or otherwise of British defenc e in the immediate future. In his message of the 16th June, on the eve of the capitulation o f France, Mr Churchill told the Dominions Prime Ministers of the "soli d reasons" underlying the belief that the British Islands could be defended successfully ; and that, even if beaten down there, the fleets would be sen t overseas to protect the Empire and enable it to continue the war and the blockade . The events of the succeeding weeks justified the confidence h e expressed, and on the 11th August he gave the Australian and New Zealand Governments a comprehensive appreciation of the war situation , and an outline of British strategy based on the growing conviction tha t Britain herself would successfully resist invasion, and that development s overseas could be met, and to an extent directed, by weighing events from day to day and using available—and mounting—resources to th e utmost . With Great Britain secure, this strategy aimed at defeating Italy in the Mediterranean, holding Egypt and the Middle East, and preventing a German break out from Europe to the southward or eastward . In the Pacific, attempts to avoid war with Japan were being made "both by conceding on points where the Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture, and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous" . If, however, Japan should declare war, her first objective outside the Yello w Sea probably would be the Netherlands East Indies . Though the United States had expressed the serious view she would take of an attack o n the East Indies, she had given no undertaking of support to Britain i n such an event, but "her main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty" . Britain would defend Singapore , and base on Ceylon a battle cruiser and fast aircraft carrier which, with all the New Zealand and Australian cruisers and destroyers—which woul d be returned to eastern waters—would act as a powerful deterrent upo n hostile raiding cruisers . We hope to maintain ourselves in Egypt and to keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war, should that occur . . . . If however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading Australi a or New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and sacrific e every interest, except only the defence and feeding of this Island, on which al l depends, and would proceed in good time to your aid with a fleet able to giv e battle to any Japanese force which could be placed in Australian waters, and abl e to parry any invading force, or certainly cut its communications with Japan . The foregoing message from Churchill was a foreword to a long appreciation of the Far Eastern situation by the British Chiefs of Staff, whic h was sent to the Dominion Governments the following day, the 12th August . Pointing out that the territorial integrity of Australia, New Zealand , and the Far Eastern colonies depended primarily on the control of sea communications, it stated that the foundation of strategy remained to base
254
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST
1940
June-Aug
on Singapore a fleet strong enough to provide cover to communication s in the Indian Ocean and South-West Pacific, and to frustrate Japanes e expeditions against British territories—but that until Germany and Ital y could be defeated or their naval strength drastically reduced, the defenc e of the Far East must be attempted with an inadequate fleet . In th e absence of a fleet the object would be to restrict damage to British interest s and retain a footing whence the position could be retrieved when force s became available .9 The British Government recognised the untenable position in Nort h China and decided to withdraw the garrisons from Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai . These withdrawals, together with the closing of the Burm a Road, had been demanded by the Japanese in June ; and in accord with the policy of conceding on points where a rupture might be forced—an d in deference also to Australian representations—these demands were met. Britain closed the Burma Road for three months on the 18th July , Churchill, in his message of the 11th August, telling the Australian an d New Zealand Governments : "In adopting against the grain a yielding policy towards Japanese threats we have always in mind your interests an d safety . " Hong Kong, as a British colony, would be defended as long as possible, recognising the inability to reinforce or relieve it. Singapore would be defended, and it was believed it could be held by military an d air forces until a fleet could be provided . It was considered that an attack on Singapore would probably be made by an up country landing and a southward advance rather than by direct attack on the island from th e sea ; and it was recognised that Japanese penetration of Indo-China o r Thailand (Siam) would facilitate this approach and enable the enem y to establish shore-based aircraft within range of Penang, Singapore, the Malacca Strait and Rangoon ; and make the defence of Burma and Malaya more difficult. Such penetration would not, however, seriously endange r vital British sea communications, so that, under existing conditions, Britai n did not consider Japanese moves in Indo-China or Thailand a justificatio n for declaring war . Vital to the entire British defence system, second in importance only t o "the integrity of Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore", were the Nether lands East Indies. The loss of these to the Japanese would seriousl y imperil the security of Indian Ocean communications, close the seas t o the north of the Malay Archipelago, provide the Japanese with a base fo r an attack on Singapore, and secure oil and other raw materials to th e enemy . In the absence of a capital ship fleet we are unable to secure our vital interest s in the Far East. The problem is to make the best dispositions possible to secure the most important of these interests without the cover which capital ships coul d provide . If in addition to the defence of Malaya we could deny to the Japanes e the establishment of bases in the N .E .I ., and if the movement of their naval force s ['Comparative naval strengths in the Pacific at this time were : British—one 8-in cruiser, two modern 6-in and four old 6-in cruisers, six AMC's, five old destroyers, three A/S escort vessels , eight MTB 's . Dutch forces in the NEI were : two cruisers, seven destroyers, sixteen submarines . Japanese naval forces available for "new ventures" were : ten battleships, three to seven aircraft carriers, and the appropriate cruiser and destroyer forces .
11-29 Aug
CHIEFS OF STAFF APPRECIATION
25 5
through the line of these islands could be impeded, the security of our interests would be considerably improved. We should aim therefore to secure the full militar y cooperation of the Dutch. In the absence of such cooperation we should concentrat e on the defence of Malaya . An estimate was given of the land and air forces needed to defen d Malaya, Burma, Borneo, and adjacent islands, and to afford protectio n to the Indian Ocean routes in focal areas—both with and without Dutch cooperation—and the whole appreciation was based on the importan t assumptions that : (1) Britain would, for the time being, have to retain a fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean ; (2) Reliance could be placed o n a measure of economic and material support from the United States, bu t that America ' s active cooperation could not be anticipated ; (3) Britain would go to war with Japan if she attacked the Netherlands East Indie s and provided the Dutch resisted . On this last point the views of the Dominions were sought, the Britis h Government remarking that it appreciated the "strategic disadvantage s of failure to take up a Japanese challenge, and the point for examinatio n is whether our limited resources justify action in the event of Japan attacking the N.E.I . Also what would be the consequences of failure so to do. " The Australian Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with th e United Kingdom appreciation, and told the Commonwealth Governmen t of their conclusions that Churchill 's assurance regarding sending a flee t to Singapore was of such importance that Australia should endeavou r to the utmost to cooperate in the defence of that area, which strategicall y now became of greater ultimate importance to her than the Middle East . They expressed the view that cooperation with the Dutch in the defenc e of the East Indies was of great consequence and should be afforded unless some weighty factor ruled otherwise ; and that staff talks with the Dutch should be instituted "as soon as our forces are adequate" . The Chiefs o f Staff reaffirmed the view expressed in their report of 27th May 193 9 (see Chapter 1) that a medium scale of attack, or even invasion o f Australia, should be envisaged, instead of the minor scale of attack considered probable by the United Kingdom appreciation . They conclude d that Australia could send no further naval or air forces to Singapore in the existing circumstances . In a telegram of the 29th August, the Australian Government thanke d the British Government for "assurances regarding naval dispositions tha t will be made", and expressed its willingness to send troops to Malaya — air force detachments had already left Australia for there in the transport s Orontes (20,097 tons) and Strathallan (23,722 tons) in July and August . As the naval forces remaining in Australian waters were the minimu m required for trade protection against possible surface raiders, no direc t Australian naval support could be given at Singapore until a British flee t was sent there . The Australian Government considered that should Japa n become established in the Netherlands East Indies "Singapore would b e partially neutralised and the strategic position such that Australia would almost inevitably find herself at war with Japan". For the present, however,
256
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST
1940
July-Aug
it was considered that no unilateral obligation should be undertaken, bu t that any Japanese aggression should be viewed realistically in the ligh t of the contemporaneous military position . "Suggest views of Empire should be put to U .S.A . with suggestion adoption similar realistic attitude i f contingency arises ." As to the other Dominion partners, South Africa considered tha t however precarious the position in the Far East, diplomacy was the only weapon there for the time being, and it was desirable "for the moment " to concentrate forces on vital British and Mediterranean fronts . Britis h and Dutch interests in the Far East would have to be joint to be effective . New Zealand believed that the problem could not be considered solel y or even primarily as a military one, and that the political aspects wer e even more important. "Our honour and reputation for fair dealing ar e among the most valuable attributes of the British Commonwealth, s o valuable that without them our cause might not prevail" ; and the Dominio n Government's views were summarised : (a) we are bound both by honour and interest to act with all possible vigour in case of Japanese aggressio n against the N .E .I . ; (b) we should accept and so far as possible prepare against our present disadvantageous position vis-a-vis Japan ; (c) th e Dutch should be advised of our attitude and urged to resist Japan ; (d) the Dutch should be advised of our difficulties but that steps wer e already under way to overcome our military limitations ; (e) the Dutc h should be advised of the obvious result of failure to concert plans . Th e above policy should be outlined to the U .S.A . Government . Canada , as she had done previously, replied that the matter was outside her field , and she had no views to express . The foundation of a common policy between Britain, Australia an d New Zealand was laid by this exchange of views, and the way paved fo r later talks with the Dutch and the Americans . In the meantime, pointer s were not wanting to suggest the trend of future events . On the 9th July the Admiralty told the Naval Board that the Dutch were laying defensiv e minefields in the Netherlands East Indies ; and on the 18th Australian Naval Intelligence recorded fully confirmed reports of abnormal Japanes e transactions in the attempted purchase of up to one million barrels of aviation petrol for delivery by the 1st September . It was during July, also, that the first flight of what was to become an increasing flow of refugees from Asia and the Asian islands left the Philippines . They saile d from Manila in four Dutch liners—Johan de Witt, Christiaan Huygens, Indrapoera, and Slamat1 —and reached Australia in August . The three last-named vessels then formed part of A .I .F . Convoy US .5, which lef t Australia for the Middle East the following month . In Japan, as a result of overwhelming anti-British and anti-America n feeling in the army, the moderately-inclined Yonai cabinet was forced to resign on the 16th July and was succeeded by that of Prince Konoye, wit h General Hideki Tojo—a prominent militarist—as Minister of War, an d the pro-German Yosuke Matsuoka as Minister of Foreign Affairs . Th e 1 Of 10,474, 16,287, 10,825 and 11,636 tons respectively.
July-Oct
JAPAN SIGNS AXIS PACT
25 7
new government had the declared policy—said to be in line with th e Japanese Navy's wishes—of the ending of the war in China, an under standing with Soviet Russia, orientation to the south, and independenc e from America . For the time being—according to information availabl e after the war—the navy restrained the aggressive designs of the army . The navy realised that after supplies of oil from America ceased, the y would have to be obtained elsewhere, and desired to procure them fro m the Netherlands East Indies by peaceful means, resorting to force only if such means failed . Penetration and pressure continued, however, an d on the 30th August the French Vichy Government consented to a Japanes e military occupation of northern Indo-China and the construction of airfields there—thus establishing one of the conditions favourable to a n attack on Malaya foreseen by the British Chiefs of Staff . On the 19th September von Ribbentrop called on Italian Foreign Minis ter Ciano in Rome with "a surprise in his bag", the text of a militar y alliance with Japan, to be signed within the next few days . Mussolini wa s in complete agreement with the plan . "One must bear in mind," he explained, "that the Americans are very much afraid of Japan and o f her fleet in particular since the American fleet, while being qualitatively large, must be considered an amateur organisation like the English army ." 2 The pact—between Germany, Italy, and Japan— was signed at Berli n on the 27th September . By it, Germany, Italy and Japan recognised and respected each other's leadership in establishing a "new order" in Europ e and the Far East respectively, and agreed to cooperate on that basis and assist one another economically, politically and militarily in the cas e "of an attack by a Power not at present involved in the European wa r or the Sino-Japanese conflict" . The agreement was not to affect th e political status existing between the Soviet Union and the three partie s to it . The pact was signed—recorded Ciano in his Diary—"more or les s like that of the Pact of Steel . But the atmosphere is cooler . Even th e Berlin street crowd, a comparatively small one composed mostly o f school children, cheers with regularity but without conviction ." The signing of the pact determined Britain 's relations with Japan . On the 8th October the Admiralty instructed the Commander-in-Chief, China, to withdra w from Wei-Hai-Wei—where a base had been leased from China unde r terms which expired on the 30th September, and which the Japanes e puppet Government at Nanking refused to recognise or renew—and on th e same day Mr Churchill announced that the Burma Road would be re opened on the 18th of the month . On the 19th October Air Chief Marsha l Sir Robert Brooke-Popham3 was appointed Commander-in-Chief, responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff, of all British land and air forces i n Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong . And from the 22nd to the 31st Octobe r a conference of representatives of Great Britain, Australia, Burma, India , New Zealand, the British East Indies and Malaya—with a United State s 2 Clano Diplomatic Papers
(1949), p . 392.
a Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, GCVO, KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC . IG RA F 1935-36 ; Governor of Kenya 1937-39 ; C-in-C Far East 1940-41 . B . 18 Sep 1878. Died 20 Oct 1953 .
258
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST 1940
1940
naval representative attending unofficially as an observer—was held a t Singapore with the main object of making the best dispositions possible t o ensure the defence of the Far East without the cover which a capital shi p force could provide . II While these developments were going forward, preparations for loca l defence continued on the basis that the outlying defences—to which Australia was already contributing or had agreed to contribute—were the Middle East and Malaya, and the ocean communications ; and that despite the present absence of a fleet from Singapore, Australia was not inevitabl y open to invasion . The garrisons of all three Services at Darwin, Thursda y Island and Papua were slowly built up, and in June 1940 the coasta l steamers Zealandia (6,683 tons) and Orungal (5,826 tons) were requisitioned as transports and employed on this work ; 4 and on the 1st August Papua and the mandated territory of New Guinea were constituted a new Australian military district . The transport of troops to the Middl e East from the Commonwealth and New Zealand proceeded, and betwee n July and December 1940, six convoys, comprising twenty-two transports carrying a total of approximately 49,000 troops, sailed from south-easter n Australia . 5 The escorting of these convoys from eastern Australia t o Colombo and Bombay was done by the R.A .N. It will be remembered that at the end of June 1940 Canberra had sailed from Fremantle for service with the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic . She arrived at Capetown escorting the troopship Strathmore on the 11th July, and for the rest of the month was on patrol and escort duties on the South Atlantic Station . On the 4th August she sailed from Simonstown for Australia for attention to defects in a propeller tail shaft, and spen t the second half of August in Sydney undergoing repairs and refit . On the 30th August she sailed from Sydney and escorted Convoy US .4 to Colombo . Thereafter, for the rest of the year, a regular escort routin e of the US convoys was carried out by Perth and Canberra ; with Perth— wearing the flag of the Rear-Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron — escorting from Sydney to Fremantle, or beyond to the vicinity of the Coco s Islands ; and Canberra then taking over and escorting to Colombo an d Bombay, whence onward escort was provided by cruisers of the Eas t Indies Station . In each case the two Australian cruisers, having hande d over the convoys to their on-taking escorts, returned to Sydney and th e eastern Indian Ocean respectively to pick up the next convoy . This routine continued until November, when Perth went overseas to replace Sydney in Admiralty dispositions, and escorted convoy US .7 to the Red Sea on her way to the Mediterranean . The final convoy of the year—US .8, which l Orungal's career as a troopship, because of her unsuitability, was short . She was released for return to trade in Aug 1940, and on 21 Nov went ashore at Barwon Heads, Victoria . She later caught fire while ashore and became a total loss . `Convoys US.4 (Mauretania, Empress of Japan, Orcades, Aquitania) ; US.5 (Christiaan Huygens, Jndrapoera, Slamat, Nieuw Holland) ; US .5a (Nieuw Zeeland, Johan de Witt) ; US.6 (Queen
Mary, Aquitania, Mauretania) ; US .7 (Batory, Orion, Strathmore, Stratheden) ; US .8 (Queen Mary, Aquitania, Mauretania, Awatea, Dominion Monarch) . Of the total numbers carried, approximately 39,800 were Australians, including 500 RAN and 50 RAAF. The balance wer e New Zealanders.
1940
AUSTRALIAN COASTAL PATROL
25 9
sailed from Bass Strait on the 30th December—was escorted from Sydney to Colombo by Canberra . A routine was also established with the larg e transports—Queen Mary, Aquitania, and Mauretania—which were regularly employed in the US convoys, and which trans-shipped their troop s at Colombo or Bombay for onward passage to the Middle East an d returned independently to Australia for subsequent convoys . The recurring absence of Perth from eastern Australian waters, and the presence of Canberra in the eastern Indian Ocean during these convo y escort operations, led to some readjustment of the small force remainin g on the Australia Station . Throughout July Adelaide remained as Western Force cruiser based on Fremantle, but on the 6th August she sailed for Sydney for refit and remained in the east until the end of the year . Throughout most of August and until the middle of October Manoora, based on Fremantle, patrolled and escorted in Western waters, and spen t the rest of the year on the same duties on the north coast between Darwin, Thursday Island, and Port Moresby . Of the sloops which remained o n the Australia Station at the 30th June 1940, Yarra went overseas tw o months later to join the Red Sea Force, but her place in the 20th Mine sweeping Flotilla was taken by the newly-completed Warrego, which commissioned at Sydney on the 22nd August under Commander Wheatley . 6 The auxiliary minesweeping groups based on the various ports, whic h at the 30th June 1940 comprised twelve ships in five groups at Sydney , Melbourne, Fremantle, Brisbane, and Newcastle, were increased by a further seven vessels by the end of the year, and by the establishment o f a group—70—at Darwin . Six of these ships were trawlers and smal l coasters requisitioned from trade, but the seventh—HMAS Bathurst, l which commissioned on the 6th December under Lieut-Commande r Bunyan8—was the first of the corvettes to be completed under th e Government's shipbuilding program . 9 The auxiliary groups carried out intensive training, separately and in conjunction with the 20th Mine sweeping Flotilla, and routine sweeps of searched channels ; and were i n addition increasingly called upon to carry out searching sweeps as a resul t of reports of suspicious actions by ships in coastal waters, and of object s sighted . A typical report was that of the 17th August 1940, when th e coastal steamer Period (2,791 tons) sighted "three spherical objects , possibly mines", floating off Botany Bay . The port of Sydney was temporarily closed, ships at sea were ordered to keep twenty-five miles from the position of the sighting, and Doomba and Orara of the 20th Flotilla , with six auxiliary sweepers, searched without result for the "mines", whic h 6 Capt R . V. Wheatley, OBE ; RAN. (HMAS Australia, 1918 .) OIC Hydro Branch 1939 ; Comd HMAS Warrego and SO 20th MS Flotilla 1940-42 ; NOIC Townsville 1942-44 ; D/NOIC New Guinea 1944-45 ; Comd HMAS Swan and Capt Mine Clearance 1945. B . Adelaide, 19 Dec 1900 . 7 HMAS Bathurst, corvette (1940), 733 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts . 8 Cdr A. V. Bunyan, DSC, RD; RANR(S) . Comd HMAS ' s Swan 1940 and 1943-44, Bathurs t 1940-42, Manoora 1943, Kanimbla 1944-45 . Of St Kilda, Vic ; b. Leith, Scotland, 17 Feb 1902 . 8 The six additional auxiliary minesweepers requisitioned from trade were : Group 50 (Sydney ) HMA Ships Samuel Benbow (122 tons), 5 Sep 1940; Group 54 (Melbourne) Durraween (27 1 tons), 29 Jul 1940; Group 66 (Fremantle) Alfie Cam (282 tons), 28 Jul 1940 ; Gunbar (48 1 tons), 18 Dec 1940 ; Group 70 (Darwin) Tolga (418 tons), 30 Dec 1940 ; Group 74 (Brisbane ) Goonambee (222 tons), 9 Aug 1940 . The dates are those of commissioning .
260
AUSTRALIA STATION AND THE FAR EAST
1940
Aug-Oct
were subsequently assumed to have been fishermen's buoys . As was learned later, the first enemy mines in Australian waters in the war of 1939-4 5 were not laid until October 1940 (though four dummy mines were lai d off Albany in September) . Mines were, however, still being swept up in the Hauraki Gulf, New Zealand ; and a few days after the Period alarm came evidence of the presence of an enemy raider in the Tasman Sea . In August 1940 the French steamer Notou (2,489 tons) sailed fro m Newcastle, New South Wales, bound for Noumea . She was due at the New Caledonian port on the 17th of the month, but failed to arrive . Soo n after 5 p .m . Eastern Australian time on the 20th, wireless signals fro m the British steamer Turakina (8,706 tons), which had sailed from Sydne y bound for Wellington, New Zealand, reported that she was being shelle d by a raider approximately 260 miles north-west of Cape Farewell, th e northernmost point of the South Island of New Zealand . There followed a brief period in which Turakina broadcast her distress signal severa l times, then silence . At this time preparations for the sailing of Convoy US .4—Mauretania, Empress of Japan, and Orcades from New Zealand, and Aquitania from Sydney—were under way . Achilles, which was to escort the New Zealand transports to Australia, was in Wellington . In Sydney were Canberra and Adelaide—both refitting—and Perth who, it had been arranged, would provide supporting cover to Achilles and her convoy while crossing the Tasman. On receipt of Turakina's broadcas t Achilles—around 9 p .m .—sailed from Wellington to the position of th e attack, and about the same time Perth left Sydney for a covering positio n in mid-Tasman. Sailings between Australia and New Zealand were suspended, and air searches were carried out from Australia, New Zealand , the Solomons and Rabaul, but without result . Nothing further was hear d from Turakina, nor did Notou reply to wireless signals calling her . Sailings across the Tasman were resumed on the 22nd August, and fruitless ai r searches continued for a further two days . The first tangible evidence o f the fate of the two ships was a gangway from Notou found on a beac h near Noumea in October 1940, and wreckage from Turakina washed ashore on the west coast of New Zealand's north island the followin g month. Thirteen days after her attack on Turakina, however, the raider—subsequently known to be the German Orion, which had laid the mines in Hauraki Gulf in June—was sighted by an aircraft of the R .A .A .F . 13 0 miles south of Albany, Western Australia . Convoy US .4, escorted b y Canberra, was at this time approaching the western Bight on its passag e to Fremantle, and on the 3rd September an aircraft from Albany takin g part in the covering searches in the convoy's track, sighted an unidentifie d ship "of about 7,000 tons" . The aircraft twice circled the raider, but could not identify her because of poor visibility ; and later searches faile d to sight her, though aircraft motors were heard from the ship whil e she was hidden in a rain squall . Her identity as being probably that of the Tasman raider was, however, correctly inferred by the Naval Staff, and Colvin so informed the War Cabinet on the 10th September .
May-Aug
26 1
GERMAN RAIDER ORION
As was later learned, this approach to the Australian coast was on e of a number made by Orion between August and November 1940 . After minelaying in New Zealand and capturing the Norwegian vessel Tropic Sea (5,781 tons) in May, she spent some days patrolling the Pacific routes to the north-east of New Zealand without finding a victim . On the 10th August in the South Coral Sea she sighted the British Phosphate Commission steamer Triona (4,413 tons), but abandoned the chase "because of insufficient superiority in speed and the rapid approach of darkness " . Orion's Captain—Kurt Weyher—thought Triona would report his presence on reaching port, but she did not do so . Meanwhile, from Australian broadcasts, the raider received a partial picture of the Commonwealth' s 105° Mala
135°
120°
150°
165
ya
"
180°
ITalyd^hers Borneo
5
Ellic e
,lomon
0 Darvo
h is
'
CORA L SEA
15
15 Suv a
Townsville
Tonga
AUSTRALIA Brisban e 35°
30 IeFremantl e ~. Au :r arcs
Bight
i Adelaide Uv
Newcastle ney?
c port with staff officers on board. "Thus," he wrote , "the first British naval EGYP T officer to reach Massaw a by sea was Lieutenant G . W. A . Langford,8 R .A.N ., in charge of m y boat ." E RITp.8 Kea ge ? Force Parramatta herself Masswa1~ 3 ~. Platt — anchored off Massawa _ A N G L 0Assab ,Ad~ n harbour the following J EGYPTIAN / Fr.So morning, and Walker SUDAN i 'Berbera found that "the Italian A 8 h -S ' i naval base presented a ~ Y s s N Britis 1 a \ I strange sight, as scuttled /'l c merchant ships lay in f 1 ~_ N ~ fantastic positions in the y z r lf SM as a e E : :~u 'To destroyers Vincenzo MILE S Orsini and Giovann i Acerbi . 9 The occupation of Massawa virtually completed the conquest of Eritrea and lessened the possibility of attack on ships in the Red Sea and it s approaches . One important result was that on the 11th April Presiden t Roosevelt issued an order declaring the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden n o longer "combat zones"' and thus now open for United States merchan t ships . The possibility of attack by surface raider or submarine, at any rate in the Gulf of Aden or nearby ocean area, remained . This was evidenced later in April and early the following month, when three British ships, Empire Light (6,537 tons), Clan Buchanan (7,266 tons ) and British Emperor (3,663 tons), were intercepted and sunk by th e German raider Pinguin, in the north-west Indian Ocean . Pinguin, after o
'
Lt G. W . A. Langford ; RAN . 1st Lt Parramatta 1940, temp CO 1941 . Of Roseville, NSW ; b. 27 Aug 1912 . Lost in sinking of Parramatta, 27 Nov 1941 . 9 Giovanni Acerbi, Italian destroyer (1916), 669 tons, six 4-in guns, four 18-in torp tubes, 33 kts ; bombed by British naval aircraft, 1 Apr 1941 . In Nov 1939 the provision of the U .S. Neutrality Act, which forbade the entry of American merchant ships into defined "combat zones", came into force . 9
Mar-June
37 3
H.M .A.S . PARRAMATTA
her activities off Australia and in the southern Indian Ocean (Chapter 6) , operated in the Antarctic and South Atlantic, and in March 1941 spent sor ae days at Kerguelen refitting, before proceeding north in the India n Ocean . Here her presence was disclosed by a distress message from Clan Buchanan . In the afternoon of 8th May she was intercepted by H .M .S . Cornwall, and in the resulting sharp engagement she blew up and sank . The improved situation south of Suez enabled the release of a numbe r of ships of the Red Sea Force for service in the Mediterranean, among them Parramatta . Befor e leaving she spent a fe w hours in Massawa harbour , RED and there embarked th e three ratings from Hobart, Jones, 2 Sweeney 3 and Hurren, 4 who were captured a t Berbera and recovered by the army at Adi Ugri (some fifty miles south-west of Massawa) when that poin t was taken on the 1st April . Petty Officer Lewis of Parramatta said that the three men "nearly died of excitement" when they found the y were to be embarked in an Australian ship . 6 They were landed at Suez, and went on to Australia in Queen Mary, which, in compan y with Queen Elizabeth a s convoy US .10A, and escorted as far as Perim by Canberra, reached Suez on MILE S 3rd May, the same day as ; Parramatta . On the 1st Jun e (after some days at Suez during which she refloated the steamer Mount Othrys (4,817 tons) aground on a sand spit, was degaussed, and met Vampire bound for Australia) Parramatta entered the Suez Canal, and reached Alexandria on the 3rd June . She had spent nearly forty unbroke n weeks in the Red Sea . Before she left it, Walker and his crew had the 30
20
40
z PO H . Jones, 19657, RAN. HMAS 's Hobart 1939-40, Australia 1943 . Of Kalgoorlie, WA; b. Kalgoorlie, 14 Nov 1914 . " AB H . C . Sweeney, 19348, RAN. HMAS Hobart 1938-40. Of Brisbane ; b. Dalby, Q1d, 19 Jun 1911 . E AB W . J . Hurren, 21641, RAN . HMAS's Hobart 1938-40, 1945-46, Bataan 1945, 1946-47. Labourer ; of Brisbane ; b. Plymouth, Eng, 9 Apr 1919 . PO S . F. Lewis, 12037, RAN . HMAS' s Parramatta 1940-41, Moresby 1943-44 . Of Maylands, WA ; b . Maylands, 8 May 1904 . 5 P . and F. M . McGuire, The Price of Admiralty (1944), p . 236.
6
374
THE MIDDLE EAST
1939-4 1
satisfaction of receiving from Admiral Leatham the signal : "I am sorry to lose your services which have been invaluable . Good luck to you all " , and of learning that the Duke of Aosta, Italian Governor of Abyssini a and Commander-in-Chief East Africa, had surrendered on the 19th May . The East African campaign was won . V Britain, from the time of Napoleon, realised the importance of th e Middle East, at the crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa ; and it gained additional strategical importance to her in the earlier years of th e twentieth century with the substitution of oil fuel for coal in the Roya l Navy and the Admiralty purchase of a controlling interest in the Anglo Persian oil company . In 1939, though the Middle East states had stron g nationalist aspirations, Britain was the greatest power in the area : but the defeat of France and the German successes in 1940 reduced Britain 's prestige, particularly in Iraq and Persia . After the first world war Iraq was placed under British mandate . Subsequently Britain undertook to recognise Iraq as an independent state, an d in 1930 a treaty was signed under which Britain was given the right t o maintain peacetime air bases near Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf , and at Habbaniya some 300 miles to the north-west ; and have the right o f transit for military forces and supplies at all times, while in war she shoul d have "all facilities and assistance" . In return, Iraq received the promis e of assistance in the event of war, and sponsorship for entry to the Leagu e of Nations . The security of Persia was vital to Britain, with its great oil producin g areas to the north of the Gulf, and the refinery and shipping port o f Abadan on the Shatt-el-Arab . Britain ' s policy towards Persia had been to encourage her independence and court her friendship ; but German prestig e stood high, and an active German mission was installed in the capital , Teheran . The Persian Gulf, covering an area of some 97,000 square miles, an d joined to the Gulf of Oman by the 29-mile wide Strait of Hormuz, i s almost an inland sea . Its length from the coast of Oman to the head of the Gulf is about 500 miles ; its width varies from 180 miles to the 29 mile s of the Strait. Within the Strait the Gulf is very shallow, and deep soundings range from 40 to 50 fathoms, with the line of greatest depth neare r the Persian than the Arabian coast . Numerous islands dot the expanse of the Gulf, especially in the western part . Those of the Persian littoral are rocky and scarped ; those on the Arabian side are shoal islands an d coral islets . Cool, dry and bracing from November to April, the Gul f is hot and humid in the summer, with maximum temperatures ranging between 108 and 120 degrees . As with the Red Sea, navigation is tricky , with high refraction causing false horizons . By night the richly phosphorescent water marks a ship's passage in coils and flashes of gree n light . Adjacent to the north-eastern boundary of Kuwait at the head of
Apr-May
IRAQ
37 5
the Gulf, Iraq had a narrow but important entrance in the Shatt-el-Arab , the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers . For some fifty miles from the coast the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab formed the boundar y between Iraq and Persia . Within this narrow entrance Iraq expanded int o a large country north to Turkey, north-west to Syria, and west to Jordan . On the 2nd May, the day before Parramatta reached Suez on her way to the Mediterranean, Walker recorded that "hostilities commenced agains t Iraq this day" . The event was the culmination of some months of Axi s intrigue and of the overthrow of the Iraqi government by a coup d'etat ; and closely concerned Parramatta's sister Yarra, then in approximately Parramatta's latitude but some 1,000 miles to the eastward, at the head o f the Persian Gulf. German leaders had for long recognised the importance of fomentin g Arab opposition to Britain and France in the Middle East, and som e months before the outbreak of war had, in 1938, taken steps to establis h there organisations willing to work for a Pan-Arab united front with German support. When, early in March 1941, the British proposed stationing troops in Iraq with right of transit in the terms of the treaty, th e proposal was opposed by the Iraqi Government, and Germany and Italy were given to understand that this opposition would be backed by military action if arms were forthcoming from the Axis powers . The Germans trie d to arrange delivery of arms via Turkey and Persia, and from Japan . On the night of the 3rd-4th April 1941 the existing Cabinet in Iraq , some members of which were inclined to agree to the British proposals , was overthrown by a coup d'etat, and the pro-German Rashid Ali becam e Prime Minister. The pro-British Regent, Amir Abdul Illah, took refug e in H .M .S . Cockchafer'' at Basra . Britain wasted no time in getting troop s to Iraq and early in April, by arrangement with the Indian Government , a brigade group and regiment of field artillery already embarked at Karach i for Malaya were diverted to Basra . Yarra was part of the escort . Yarra left the Red Sea in the middle of March for Bombay, where sh e docked and refitted until 9th April . On that date she sailed for Aden, but the following day was diverted to Karachi where she arrived on the 11th . On the 12th she sailed as escort to the Basra convoy of eight ship s (BM .7) and reached Basra (being joined en route by H .M. Ships Falmouth and Cockchafer) on the 18th . H .M .S . Emerald was there, and a few hours later the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (Leatham), arrived in Leander. The landing of the troops at Basra was unopposed and the official attitud e was friendly ; but the Iraqi Government said no more troops could lan d until those already in Iraq moved on . The British Government replied that in view of the situation in Egypt, additional troops were already on thei r way . (They were in convoy BP .1, which left India on the 22nd April . ) Leander, with Leatham, left Basra for Colombo on the 23rd April . In view of possible opposition to the forthcoming landing, H .M . Ships Hermes and Enterprise were disposed in a covering position thirty mile s 7 HMS
Cockchafer, river gunboat (1915), 625 tons, two 6-in guns, 14 kts .
376
THE MIDDLE EAST
Apr-May
south of the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab ; but convoy BP.1 arrived without incident on the 28th April, and was escorted from the mouth of th e Shatt-el-Arab to Basra by Yarra . The incident, however, forced Rashid Ali's hand. On 30th April Iraqi troops concentrated around the R.A .F. establishment at Habbaniya . On the 2nd May they opened fire on the British cantonments and the two countries were at war . Axis help for Iraq was inadequate and tardy . It was the 9th May before the German Foreign Office told Rashid Ali their proposed supportin g measures, which included making Syria available as a supply base an d sending to Iraq a first bomber formation of twenty aircraft . Four mor e days passed before the first German aircraft, and first trainload of supplie s from Syria, reached Mosul . By then the siege of Habbaniya was over, the Iraqi forces were in retreat towards Baghdad, and the Iraqi air force had been virtually destroyed . On the 29th of the month the British were attacking Baghdad, and on the 30th Rashid Ali and the most senior officer s fled to Persia . The following day, 31st May, an armistice was signed , Amir Abdul Illah was reinstated as Regent, and a new Government too k office . British forces rapidly occupied all the important points in th e country . Yarra's service in the war with Iraq, carried out under the orders o f the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf 8 (Commodore Cosmo Graham 9 ) was in the Shatt-el-Arab . For the first three weeks of May she operated i n support of land forces occupying Basra and its port of Ashar, securing a bridge over Qarmat Ali Creek above Ashar to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements, and occupying Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-el Arab . On the 2nd of the month the Iraqis, who had previously mined th e Qarmat Ali bridge, attempted to destroy it in the face of attack by a platoon of Sikhs advancing from the south . The charge misfired, and Yarra landed her Gunner,' who withdrew the charges . They, Harrington recorded, " were found to consist of wet guncotton manufactured at Waltham Abbey i n 1937 . Misfire due to most inefficient fitting of primer " . On the 24th May Harrington commanded the naval force in the combined operation "Scoop", the object of which was "to attack and disperse all enemy found on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab in the vicinity o f Habib Shawi [some seven miles up river from Ashar] and to inflic t maximum casualties" . The naval task was to bombard objectives, to lan d two companies of Gurkhas and battalion headquarters, and subsequentl y to re-embark the force landed and cover the withdrawal . The operation was preceded, on the night of the 22nd-23rd, by a reconnaissance of the landing position when six ratings from Yarra, disguised as Arab fishermen in a native bellum, took soundings . Harringto n 's flotilla, Yarra, the tugs Souriya and Shamal, and two native mahailas, weighe d "The short title was SNOPG, and the verbal reference was always to " Snop-Gee". Rear-Adm C . M. Graham, CB ; RN. (Comd HMS 's Victor 1916-17, Springbok 1917-19 .) Comd HMS Shoreham 1939-41, and SNO Persian Gulf 1939-42 ; Cmdre Cdg Burma Coast 1942 ; FO Cdg Humber Area 1942-45 . B . 13 Feb 1887. Died 5 Nov 1946 . 1 Gnr (later Lt) J . S . Godfrey, MBE ; RAN . HMAS Yarra 1938-41 ; HMAS Australia 1941-42 . Of Earlwood, NSW ; b . Darlinghurst, NSW, 25 Oct 1899.
24-31 May
IRAQ
37 7
from Ma'qil, just above Ashar, at 3 .20 a .m. on the 24th . Yarra had on board the battalion headquarters and two trench-mortars with a crew o f Iraq levies ; the two companies of Gurkhas were in the tugs . They were in position upstream at 4 a .m ., and Yarra opened fire on two main objectives, "Big House" and a date godown, covered the landing with a smoke o PEN screen, and later engage d r ' targets of opportunity farN SAND r ther upstream . By 9 .42 a .m . 1, 1 Yarra was back in her berth at Ma'qil, the operation, PLAI N Harrington recorded, "bein g successfully completed, and `Big House' and `South Village ' being left in flames . Expenditure of ammunition -43 rounds 4-inch H .E . , 216 rounds 0 .5-inch and 550 rounds .303-inch" . On the 31st May, the day th e armistice was signed, Yarra was at anchor off Ashar . The conduct of Yarra's company during this period Ali was, Harrington recorded , "excellent", but health wa s "lamentable . The sick list now numbers about 25, and MILES ash Bas z 3 . 5 s it appears will remain at about this figure during th e malaria season . . . . Only one signalman now remains off the sick list . . . . At present, due to sickness, only two guns can be manned ." All, however, remained cheerful and willing, and Yarra's only casualties at this perio d were those caused by mosquitoes . VI Britain's success in Iraq was simultaneous with her failure in Crete . On the 31st May, the date the armistice was signed in Baghdad, the fina l embarkation from Sfakia was carried out . Possession of Syria now became of first importance ; and here the Germans had established a foothold in connection with their efforts to support Iraq. For some weeks the future of Syria had been a subject of concer n to the British Government and of discussion between it and General Wavell . In a message to Mr Churchill on the 22nd May, Wavell remarked that :
378
THE MIDDLE EAST
May-June
German Air Force established in Syria are closer to the Canal and Suez than they would be at Mersa Matruh . . . . The whole position in Middle East is at presen t governed mainly by air-power and air bases . Enemy air bases in Greece make our hold of Crete precarious, and enemy air bases in Cyrenaica, Crete, Cyprus an d Syria would make our hold on Egypt difficult . The object of the army must be to force the enemy in Cyrenaica as far west as possible, to try to keep him fro m establishing himself in Syria, and to hang on to Crete and Cyprus . Wavell was, he said, moving reinforcements to Palestine " after full discussion with Cunningham, Tedder and Blarney, because we feel we mus t be prepared for action against Syria, and weak action is useless" . The foremost German agent in Syria was Rudolph Rahn, Counsello r at the German Embassy in Paris . His mission in Syria was twofold, t o organise a supply base for Iraq, and to organise Syria against possible British attack . He secured the confidence and cooperation of General Dentz , Vichy High Commissioner in Syria and Commander-in-Chief Frenc h Forces in the Levant, but was handicapped by the inability to secure reinforcements for the defence of the country . The German High Command was desirous of holding Syria, but was preoccupied with the impending attack on Russia, of which Rahn was apparently unaware . As a preliminary to that attack, Germany was negotiating a pact of friendship with Turkey (it was signed on the 18th June) and this precluded an y immediate German support of Syria by land from the north . Both the German and Italian High Commands regarded Cyprus as the key to th e defence of Syria, but the severe handling German airborne troops an d paratroops had received in Crete made impossible their immediate use in any attempt to take Cyprus, which was more favourably placed fo r British defence . A German suggestion that the Italians should invad e Cyprus from the Dodecanese, with German air support, came to nothing . Rahn's endeavour, therefore, was to delay any possible British attac k on Syria by concealing as far as could be any German activity ther e which would encourage such attack . As stated above, however, Britain was aware of the Axis foothold in Syria, and of its dangers . Early on the 8th June, British and Australian troops attacked in the south from Palestine and Transjordan . The Syrian campaign, fought in a country with a restricted coasta l corridor and a vital coast road with long stretches in full view from th e sea, was ideal for naval cooperation. There were, however, a number of naval problems : the difficulty of finding ships after the losses and exhaustion of the Greek and Crete campaigns ; enemy air attack which largely confined naval movements to darkness hours unless continuous fighte r protection could be given ; and the presence of two large French flotill a leaders (almost in the category of light cruisers), three submarines, an d some smaller vessels at Beirut . As a further complication, what Admira l Cunningham later described as "this comparatively petty campaign" absorbed the entire effort of all reconnaissance aircraft available for nava l cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean excepting those based on Malta ; and even so, reconnaissance was inadequate . The available aircraft of the
37 9
SYRIAN CAMPAIGN
7-9 June
Fleet Air Arm had to be concentrated in Cyprus for reconnaissance t o the north and west against the arrival of enemy reinforcements . Reconnaissance on the Syrian coast had to be left to aircraft of the Palestine and Transjordan Command, which had no sea experience and consequently made some misleading reports—in one instance resulting in Perth bein g bombed by our own aircraft . Naval operations were T U R K E under the command o f Vice-Admiral King (15th Cruiser Squadron) wh o left Alexandria on th e 1 A och n f`~ 7th June in Phoebe, with Ajax, Kandahar, Kim r- .. berley, Janus and Jackal. The day previously Glengyle, escorted by Isis and Hotspur, had left Por t Said with commando Fa agusta . troops to land at the CYPRUS Litani River, just north ~~Q:. . . A.. of Tyre, and capture Khan bridge . The initial iFy attempt, made on the h Tripol i .f night of 7th-8th June, x 4/P° was abandoned owing to heavy surf on the Beirut beaches . Glengyle reDamour CO turned to Port Said and Isis and Hotspur, with Damascus Coventry, joined King a t S ti 0 6 a .m. on the 8th . Shortly after, King s force close d the coast south of Tyre Haifa ,S and tried to gain touch with the head of the army P column, but the situation 40 MILE S ashore was not clear to King until 3 .30 p .m . , when it appeared that Tyre had been captured . Kimberley carried out th e initial naval bombardment of the campaign on some French positions nea r Khan bridge between 8 and 9 p .m . Early in the morning of the 9th the force closed the coast to suppor t Glengyle in the second landing attempt (which was successful) at th e Litani River ; after which King stood off to the westward . The French flotilla leaders, Guepard and Valmy,2 apparently well served by air reconFrench Destroye r LE CHEVALIER PAU sunk June
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v
a
:L
250
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w
60
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100
and Valmy, French destroyers (1929-30), 2,436 tons, five 5 .4-in guns, six 21 .7-in torp tubes, 35 .5 kts ; scuttled at Toulon, 27 Nov 1942 .
'Gufpard
380
THE MIDDLE EAST
Jun e
naissance, seized the chance to sneak in and bombard Australian troop s on both banks of the river. King heard of this just after 10 a .m. an d closed the coast at full speed but the French ships had gone, driven of f by artillery fire of the 2/4th Regiment . In the early afternoon they were encountered off Sidon by four of King's destroyers, Janus (Senior Officer) , Hotspur, Jackal and Isis . The Frenchmen had the advantage in speed and range, and Janus, some way ahead of her consorts, at the outset bore the brunt of the enemy fire . She received five hits, which killed or wounde d all on the bridge except the captain, and disabled and stopped the ship . She was quickly supported by the others, whereupon the French ships retired at high speed to Beirut, easily outdistancing the pursuing British . Later that evening Phoebe, at the request of the Naval Liaison Office r ashore, bombarded supposed enemy positions on the northern side o f Khan bridge, but the ridge fired on was in fact then occupied by Australian troops . The following morning, however, Kandahar and Kimberle y carried out a most useful bombardment of French motor-transport, tanks , and ammunition dumps north of Khan bridge ; and on the 11th a nava l officer was attached to the Australian 7th Division Headquarters as a visual signal link with the destroyers . Thereafter calls for naval fire were made and answered with accuracy and rapidity . Throughout June King's force operated along the coast, in support o f the army and guarding against enemy reinforcement from the sea . Its composition changed from time to time as other ships became available , including Stuart, Nizam and Perth. Stuart was the first Australian ship to join, on the 10th, and remained until the 13th . Her spells of duty consisted of patrolling in support of the inshore bombarding forces . "Our Syrian effort," one of her company later remarked, " was very short-live d and taking it all round not very exciting . "3 Nizam, having followed Crete with a "ferry" run between Alexandria and Tobruk, joined King ' s force in company with Naiad (which now became flagship), Kingston an d Jaguar, on the 17th June . Perth, after making good in Alexandria the damage suffered in the Crete campaign, joined nine days later, on th e 26th, relieving the New Zealand Leander, which had been with the force since the 13th . Compared with the strain and vicissitudes of the Greece and Cret e campaigns, that of Syria was something of a relaxation for the navy . Of sailing for Alexandria for five days' boiler cleaning after a week with th e force, Hodgkinson, Hotspur's 1st Lieutenant, wrote : In a way it was a pity to leave the Syrian coast . After Greece and Crete it was an excellent tonic to be doing something aggressive again . Everybody loved Haifa [there were "excellent dinners at Pross's"] and it is always more pleasant to wor k with a small independent squadron than to work with the battle fleet . And, on returning five days later to the force : The Syrian campaign for the next three weeks was a honeymoon . The weather was perfect. At last we had a real squadron of fighters overhead, and each tim e ' Clifford,
The Leader of the Crocks (1945), p . 189 .
15 June-2 July
SYRIAN CAMPAIGN
38 1
we went out, which was only about half the time, we had some amusement . Th e other half was spent in harbour . 4 However, the campaign had its moments of encounter. German aircraft put in more than one appearance . In the evening of the 15th Jun e German dive bombers severely damaged Isis with near misses ; and two hours later a formation of sixteen or so French aircraft attacked the forc e and similarly damaged and incapacitated Ilex . Two French destroyer s of the Cassard5 class attempted to reinforce their forces from the west . One, Le Chevalier Paul, 6 was sunk, by Fleet Air Arm aircraft from Cyprus , north of Rouad Island (off the Syrian coast between Tripoli and Latakia ) on the 16th June . The other succeeded in reaching Beirut under strong air escort on the 21st . Guepard and Valmy made frequent sorties and tip-and-run raids, bot h singly and in company ; and King's force was continuously on the watch for them . There was a brief encounter on the 14th June, described b y Cunningham as "merely irritating" . They kept out of range and retire d within their shore defences . There was a more promising meeting in th e early morning of the 23rd . King in Naiad, with Leander, Jaguar, Kingsto n and Nizam, was about ten miles north of Beirut ("which was brilliantl y lit as if there were no war " ) 7 sweeping south in search of the enem y ships . Jervis, Havock, Hotspur and Decoy were on anti-submarine patrol in the offing . At 1 .48 a .m . Naiad sighted the two French ships on a northerly course close inshore, distant about 5,000 yards. They turne d away making smoke, and retired under the coast defence battery o f Nahr el Kelb, which opened fire ; and were engaged by King's forc e for some eleven minutes . At the time it was believed by the British tha t several hits were scored on the enemy ; but this was subsequently foun d to be incorrect. Only one French destroyer was hit, by a 6-inch shel l from Leander, stated to have been blind . The British force, however, did considerable material damage to th e French ashore in bombardments, and had a marked influence in lowerin g the defenders' morale. Perth, when bombarding in company with Naiad, Kandahar, Kingston, Havock and Griffin on the 2nd July, earned a special mention from Admiral King for accurate shooting at a battery at Abey in the Damour area, in which she destroyed four guns and blew up a n ammunition dump . It was when south of Tyre on the return from thi s bombardment that the force was reported by a British reconnaissanc e aircraft as "three French destroyers with three merchant ships " , and Perth was bombed. Fortunately the bombs fell wide. k Hodgkinson, Before the Tide Turned, pp . 164-5 . Hodgkinson tells a story of Nizam, lying outside Hotspur during one of their spells alongside in Haifa . Some of Nizam's liberty men "discovere d a lighter lying ahead of us completely unguarded by the army . And guess what was in that lighter. It's hardly conceivable, but it was beer . Some of the sailors were still tight next morning, an d one insisted on falling in with the Hotspurs and scrubbing our decks instead of theirs, and he had to be led gently back . Windfalls like that aren't common ." (p. 168 . ) 6 Cassard, French destroyer (1932), 2,441 tons, five 5 .4-in guns, seven 21 .7-in torp tubes, 36 kts; scuttled at Toulon, 27 Nov 1942 . ', Le Chevalier Paul, French destroyer (1932), 2,441 tons, five 5 .4-in guns, seven 21 .7-in torp tubes , 36 kts . 7 Hodgkinson, Before the Tide Turned, p . 165.
382
THE MIDDLE EAST
June-Aug
Damascus was captured by Australian and Free French troops on th e 21st June, but for some days the advance on the coast was halted whil e progress was made inland . It was resumed on the 4th July, when Naiad , Ajax, Jackal, Nizam, Kimberley, Havock and Hasty carried out a preliminary bombardment . Bombardment support was given on the 5th, 6th and 7th, as the army made steady progress against stiff opposition ; and on the 7th King recorded that by the end of that day "it was clear that the capture of Damour [the last strong defensive position before Beirut ] was only a matter of time" . It was captured by the 7th Australian Divisio n on the 9th . On that day General Dentz asked for an armistice, an d hostilities ceased at one minute past midnight on the 11th . The armistic e was signed at Acre on the 14th July at 8 p.m . and on that day King, with most of his force, including Perth, sailed from Haifa for Alexandria . Of the naval participation in the Syrian campaign, Admiral Cunning ham recorded that at the outset : Both the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and the General Officer Commanding, Palestine and Transjordan, were not a little sceptical of the valu e of having naval forces operating on the flank, in spite of experience in the Cyrenaica n campaign . It was actually suggested that owing to their need for fighter defenc e they should be withdrawn from the flank of the army so that the fighters coul d be released for army support. This produced a categorical statement from th e Brigadier on the left that he would prefer to be without fighters rather than los e his naval support on the left flank . General Lavarack, in his report on operations of the I Australian Corps , listed Two factors of the highest importance which contributed to the British victory . . . the bombardments provided in the coastal sector by the Royal Navy, and ou r superiority in the air . . . . The naval bombardments caused a great deal of destructio n of enemy transport and armoured fighting vehicles on the coast road, engage d (frequently with good effect) the enemy's gun positions, and last, but not least , caused a considerable deterioration in morale amongst troops exposed, without hop e of retaliation and little of protection, to the gruelling flank fire from the sea .8 The success of the campaign in Syria improved Britain's strategi c position in the Middle East. It was followed immediately by the consider able reinforcement of Cyprus, which began on the 18th July . Two Australian ships took part in the initial movement from Port Said . Th e Australian merchant ship Salamaua (6,676 tons) carried the motor trans port of the 20th H .A . Battery and No . 80 Fighter Squadron of the Roya l Air Force, and was escorted by Parramatta, which ship thus made th e first of a number of passages to Famagusta . The operation continued until the 29th August, and employed numerous ships, including Hobart, which joined the Mediterranean Station early in that month . With the safe guarding of Cyprus and the occupation of Syria, enemy penetration eastward from the Mediterranean was forestalled ; the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal was extended northwards ; and the relief on her southern frontier strengthened and comforted Turkey . By now, however, German y 8
According to a statement by Rahn, in the early stages of the campaign naval bombardments caused 3,000 casualties in a few days .
June-Aug
PERSIA
38 3
was advancing eastward north of the Black Sea . On the 22nd June 194 1 German armies invaded Russia. By the middle of August they were approaching Leningrad in the north, had captured Smolensk in the centre , and were threatening the Crimea in the south . VII In September 1941 Commodore Cosmo Graham, Senior Naval Office r Persian Gulf, wrote in his "Report on Operation COUNTENANCE" : "With the German advance into Russia the Persian thorn began to prick ." The thorn was the numerous German population in Persia, centred in Teheran , and well organised as a spearhead for intrigue and action . The security of Persia had now assumed extra significance to Britain . Not only were the oil supplies of prime importance, but the country offered a desirabl e alternative route to the Arctic passage for material aid to Russia . Th e elimination of German influence became imperative, but the response o f the Persian Government to a request for the expulsion of Axis nationals was unsatisfactory . Intelligence on the spot indicated that the Persian s were augmenting their defences along the Shatt-el-Arab and the islan d of Abadan . On the 18th June operational control of British forces in the Persia n Gulf, which from early in May had rested with Middle East Command , passed back to India Command ; and on the 17th July Wavell (who had assumed the appointment of Commander-in-Chief, India, six days earlier ) telegraphed to the War Office : It is essential to the defence of India that Germans should be cleared out o f Iran [Persia] now. Failure to do so will lead to a repetition of events which i n Iraq were only just countered in time . It is essential we should join hands with Russia through Iran, and if the present Government is not willing to facilitate thi s it must be made to give way to one which will. . . . This view was already held by the British Cabinet and the Chiefs o f Staff, and on the 23rd July Cosmo Graham, at a conference in Basra, wa s told that pressure was to be brought on Persia to expel the Germans, an d that "the strongest force available was to be made ready to occupy Abada n and Khorramshahr by the 29th July and thereafter to be kept at immediate notice" . On the 13th August terms were agreed upon between Britain an d Russia for respective notes to Persia, these to represent "the final word" . They met with an unsatisfactory response, and entry into Persia by Britis h forces from the south and Russian from the north was fixed for the 25t h August . Naval forces available for the intended operations at the head of th e Gulf (Code name COUNTENANCE) were not large, and consisted of thre e sloops, H .M. Ships Shoreham, and Falmouth, and H .M .A .S. Yarra ; th e gunboat Cockchafer ; the corvette Snapdragon ;9 two armed yachts, H .M.S . e HMS Snapdragon, corvette (1940), 955 tons, one 4-in gun, 17 kts ; sunk by aircraft in Central Mediterranean, 19 Dec 1942 .
384
THE
MIDDLE
EAST
Aug
Seabelle and H .M .I .S . Lawrence ; l the trawler Arthur Cavanagh ; 2 two armed river steamers and some tugs, motor-boats, and dhows . Cosmo Graham was placed in command of the naval operations, and in respons e to his request for additional forces the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot 3 ) offered him the Australian-manned H .M .S . Kanimbla, "which I gladly accepted " .4 Surprise was essential for the speedy success of the undertaking, an d the distribution of naval objectives necessitated the use of the availabl e ships in three separate but simultaneous operations : at the Persian naval base of Khorramshahr ; at the port and refinery of Abadan ; and at the port of Bandar Shapur, southern terminus of the 872-mile Trans-Persian railwa y from the Caspian Sea . The left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab from its mouth to the junction wit h the Karun River, a distance of forty miles, is the western side of Abada n Island . The northern end of this island is some two miles wide, and o n it the Persian naval base of Khorramshahr faces the town of that nam e across the narrow Hafar Channel of the Karun River . In 1941 the base consisted of 600 yards frontage on the south bank of Hafar Channel , where there were five "T" jetties for small vessels . There was also 100 yards of frontage on the Shatt-el-Arab, with a boat pier and steps . Barrack s and other buildings were on shore, among palm groves . Eleven mile s downstream from the Karun River junction, and round an abrupt bend i n the river, the refinery and town of Abadan and the adjacent Bawarda , with numerous berths for large ships, stretched for some three miles alon g the island bank of the Shatt-el-Arab . The eastern side of Abadan Island is bounded by a narrow river, Kho r Bahmanshir, which runs from the Karun River and discharges into th e Gulf eight miles east of the Shatt-el-Arab . East again some thirteen miles is the western side of Khor Musa, a wide opening which extends north wards into flat, low-lying, sparsely vegetated land to a distance of som e forty miles due east of Khorramshahr and then turns eastward . Along this eastern stretch, forty-seven miles due east of Khorramshahr, is Bandar Shapur. The tasks at these three points were to capture the naval base at Khorramshahr and neutralise Persian forces there ; to occupy Abada n without damage to the refinery and oil installations ; and to capture Axis merchant ships at Bandar Shapur. At Khorramshahr three of the five "T" jetties were occupied—in order from the Shatt-el-Arab—by the Persia n sloop Babr, the naval school ship Ivy, and two gunboats . It was believe d that there were about 1,000 men at the base, which was under the coin 1 HMIS Lawrence, sloop (1919), 1,210 tons, two 4-in guns, 15 kts . 2 HMS Arthur Cavanagh, trawler (1918), 277 tons . 2 Admiral Sir Geoffrey Arbuthnot, KCB, DSO ; RN. C-in-C East Indies in succession to Leatham on 22 Apr 1941 . B. 1885 . r "Kanimbla, a 12,000 ton armed merchant cruiser, a ship which at first sight appeared mos t unsuitable as a reinforcement for work in narrow waters but which turned out to be probably th e only ship in the navy which could have supplied what I required in the way of a great numbe r of hands, vast administrative endurance and spacious accommodation." Cosmo Graham, "Report on Operation `Countenance' ", 26 Sep 1941 .
PERSIA
Aug
38 5
mand of Admiral Bayendor. At Abadan, where the contingency to b e avoided was fire in the oil refinery and installations, was the Persian sloo p Palang . 5 At Bandar Shapur were the Persian gunboats Karkas and Chahbaaz ; 6 a floating dock ; two American merchant ships, Puerto Rican (6,076 tons) and Anniston City (5,687 tons) alongside the jetty, and , anchored in the stream, eight enemy merchant vessels, the German Hohenfels, Marienfels, Sturmfels, Weissenfels, and Wildenfels (of 6,000-8,00 0 tons) ; the Italian merchant ship Caboto (5,225 tons) and tankers Bronte (8,238 tons) and Barbara (3,065 tons) . The task was to neutralise the gunboats and capture the floating dock and enemy merchant vessels before they could be scuttled . On the bank of the Shatt-el-Arab both above and below the Karu n River were a number of Persian strong-posts, with machine-guns and, i n one instance on Abadan Island, field pieces. In considering the oppositio n likely to be encountered, Cosmo Graham based his view on experience i n the Iraq campaign when our light forces found themselves in more tha n one hazardous situation" ; and he decided "that all action should be resolut e and no account should be taken of doubtful morale among the Persian s particularly as their equipment was known to be modern and efficient . Kanimbla (Captain Adams ), which had been patrolling and escorting on the East Indies Station, arrived in the Persian Gulf on the 7th August . She anchored and remained some thirty miles south of the Shatt-el-Ara b light vessel and, by the use of canvas screens, tried to disguise her identity as an armed merchant cruiser . On the 8th August Cosmo Graham (a t Basra) wrote to Adams outlining the situation : We are pressing the Persians to clear out the Germans . If they are recalcitrant we shall move by land, sea and air. The earliest date is 12th August. . . . We have got to get Abadan—the . main objective . I have a few ships over—including you , which gives us a chance to capture Bandar Shapur and the shipping there . . . . You will be—must be—in charge of the Bandar Shapur party . . . . "
"
7
That party was to consist of Kanimbla, Cockchafer, Lawrence, Snapdragon , Arthur Cavanagh, two dhows, two tugs, and a R .A .F . motor pinnace . The Abadan force was the armed yacht Seabelle (wearing Cosmo Graham's broad pendant), Shoreham, a minesweeper, two armed river steamers , five motor-boats, two dhows and a launch . The sloop Falmouth was in charge of the Khorramshahr force, with Yarra, H .M . Kenya Launch Baleeka, and the armed river tug Souriya . 8 6 Babr and Palang, Persian sloops (1932), 950 tons, three 4-in guns, 15 kts ; sunk 25 Aug 1941 . 7 Karkas and Chahbaaz, Persian gunboats (1931), 331 tons, two 3-in guns, 15 .5 kts. 7 Rear-Adm W . L . G . Adams, CB, OBE; RN . HMAS Canberra 1940 ; comd HMAS Kanimbla 1941 43, HMS Wasp and CF Base, Dover, 1943-44 ; Director Coastal Forces Material Dept 1944-45 . B. 2 0 Apr 1901 . (He relieved Capt Getting in command of Kanimbla on 25 Mar 1941 . Getting returned to Australia to take up the appointment of Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. ) 7 "The
naval force comprised such vessels as I was able to collect . They included ships and launche s manned by the RN, the RAN, the RIN, together with their Reserves and Volunteer Reserves ; the RCNVR and the Royal Kenya Naval Volunteer Reserve . Amongst the ratings were include d some belonging to the South African Naval Service . New Zealand was also represented . Th e officer in command of the whole operation was a South African ." Cosmo Graham, "Report on Operation `Countenance' " . Most of those in Kanimbla and Yarra were reservists of the RAN. All Kanimbla ' s officers with the exception of Adams and the Commander (Cdr G . C. F. Branson, RN, Emergency List) were reservists .
386
THE MIDDLE EAST
Aug
The earliest provisional date for the operation had been fixed at th e 12th August, but there were many postponements and uncertainties . The delays however afforded opportunity for landing and boarding exercises , and for reconnaissance of the river passages in which Kanimbla ratings enjoyed themselves disguised as Arabs in one of the dhows . Finally, on the 23rd August, Cosmo Graham received the Chiefs of Staff telegra m ordering that "D .1" for Operation COUNTENANCE be the 25th of the month . "So we passed from waiting to execution of my plans which wer e substantially unaltered from the original design . " On the 24th August the two forces for the Abadan and Khorramshah r operations were, with the exception of Shoreham, upstream at or nea r Basra, where they embarked Indian troops, a total of 1,250 in th e Abadan force, while Yarra had one platoon and Falmouth two platoons and Company Headquarters of the 3/10th Baluch Regiment to dea l
with Khorramshahr . Shoreham was at Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-elArab . Of the Bandar Shapur force, Kanimbla, with her smaller craft fast alongside, was at anchor in the Gulf south of the Shatt-el-Arab . She had on board two companies of the 3/10th Baluch Regiment, which she had embarked from Lawrence on the 11th August . Zero hour for all three operations was 4 .10 a.m . on the 25th, and Kanimbla's force, having th e greater distance to travel, was the first under way . The problem of its approach had caused much thought . There were many navigational danger s in Khor Musa which made it hazardous for a ship of Kanimbla's size to go up in the dark . On the other hand she would have been visible ove r the fiat, low land, at a distance of fifteen miles or so in daylight . To keep the element of surprise Adams decided to risk the night passage . One o f the dhows ("Dhow 8", manned from Kanimbla), and the R.A .F. motor pinnace, left the Gulf anchorage in the afternoon of the 24th, with hurri-
24-25 Aug
PERSIA
38 7
cane lamps to mark any unlighted buoys in the Khor Musa channel . The remainder of the force got under way at 8 .15 p.m . The Abadan force left the Basra area in sections around midnigh t on the 24th, and as soon as they were clear the Khorramshahr ship s weighed and followed them down the river. The night was dark and still , ("every sound seemed like a thunder clap") with no moon, but the clea r sky was star-studded . The ships stole quietly downstream, and though th e darkened craft passed under the noses of Persian strong-posts on the left bank, and the naval base at Khorramshahr, they were unchallenged and unmolested . 9 The Abadan force reached its objective precisely at 4 .1 0 a .m . Fire was opened on machine-gun posts on shore, and within te n minutes the first troops were landed . The Persians put up considerabl e opposition, and by 5 a .m . fighting was general along the Abadan fore shore, which was subjected to heavy enemy machine-gun fire . Meanwhile Shoreham had come up river from Fao, and at 4 .13 a .m . opened fire on the Persian sloop Palang at one of the jetties, and sank her. This ac t apparently caused the precipitate withdrawal across the Khor Bahmanshi r of Persian forces on Abadan Island excepting those manning the waterfront strong-posts, who " fought with tenacity and in many cases literally to the last man" . 1 Fighting continued throughout the forenoon, with Shoreham moving up and down the river engaging such targets as offered , and it was noon before the foreshore was secured . By evening the whole refinery area was in British hands . As the Khorramshahr force left Basra, Falmouth took the ground when turning. Harrington, in Yarra, in anticipation that the Persian ships a t Khorramshahr might interfere with the landings at Abadan, decided t o carry on to Khorramshahr independently, and arrived there at 4 .8 a.m . On the way downstream he determined to sink the Persian sloop Babr on arrival . His reasons were threefold : to discourage further resistance ; to remove a threat in his rear while he boarded the gunboats ; and t o disallow the opportunity of escape of the gunboats which his boarding o f Babr would have presented. His arrival off Khorramshahr was apparently unobserved and, in order not to spoil the surprise of the Abadan forc e he lay concealed behind an anchored merchant ship until he heard gunfir e downstream. He then cleared the line of sight, past the northern poin t of Karlin River, illuminated Babr by searchlight, and opened fire . After ten salvos Babr was burning fiercely ; the explosion of her after magazine blew a hole in her bottom, and she subsequently sank . Yarra then moved up the Karun River, and with machine-gun and rifl e fire silenced some rifle fire from the naval barracks and the two gunboats . Harrington then went alongside the gunboats, boarding parties went over , and the two ships and their crews were quickly secured . By 4 .59 a.m . "all was quiet", but Harrington decided to await the arrival of Falmouth 9 "A reason which seems not improbable for this inaction was given by a Persian officer unde r interrogation : `You had passed down river at night so often before' . " Cosmo Graham, "Report on Operation 'Countenance' ". 1 Cosmo Graham, Report .
388
THE MIDDLE EAST
25 Au g
before landing his troops. Falmouth entered the Karun River at 5 .30 a .m . and secured alongside the school ship Ivy, and she and Yarra landed thei r troops . By 7 .30 a .m . Yarra had transferred her prisoners to Ivy, and washed down the ship. The soldiers on the northern bank of the Karun were moving in quietly "and it became very hot " . The Persian gunboat s had Italian engineers who "were invited to place the engines of the gun boats in working order" . They agreed without hesitation, and by evenin g both gunboats were entirely serviceable . On shore the main oppositio n was on the northern bank of the Karun in the vicinity of the wireless station , where Admiral Bayendor led a defence which collapsed when he wa s killed. "His death," wrote Cosmo Graham, " was regretted by all who knew him . He was intelligent, able, and faithful to Persia . "2 By nightfall the occupation of the Khorramshahr area was complete, and at 9 .30 p .m . Yarra slipped and sailed down river and Gulf to Bandar Abbas . Kanimbla, with the remainder of her force, had an uneventful passage up the Gulf from the anchorage . At 3 .15 a .m . the force was well in th e Khor Musa, and reached Bandar Shapur at the appointed time of 4 .10 a .m . It was subsequently learned that the German ships were prepared for incendiarism and scuttling, but were under orders to await the alarm fro m Hohenfels before taking action . As Kanimbla' s force approached Banda r Shapur Hohenfels, at 4 .10 a .m ., sounded her siren, and Adams arrived to find that "incendiarism was taking place on a greater scale than wa s anticipated, and Weissenfels was seen to be in a serious condition ". Thi s ship's chief engineer had anticipated the alarm from Hohenfels. She wa s burning furiously and so continued unapproachably all day . Bronte wa s badly on fire, and Adams took Kanimbla alongside her and secured, and salvage parties went on board . Meanwhile parties from the smaller ship s boarded the other enemy merchant vessels (with the exception of Weissenfels) and proceed to fight fires and nullify scuttling action . These parties included 16 officers and 111 ratings from Kanimbla's ship's company. The Persian gunboats offered no resistance, and shortly arrived alongsid e Kanimbla under their own officers but wearing the White Ensign . Whil e alongside Bronte, Adams started landing his troops by boat at the jett y a mile distant . They met little opposition ashore until nine-tenths of th e town had been occupied . Kanimbla had little cause to use her main armament . She opened 6-inch fire with two guns on a railway train (whic h made good its escape), and fired with 3-inch high angle guns on aircraf t (which were, it later transpired, British) . When the fires in Bronte were under control shortly after noon, Kanimbla went alongside the jetty (where the two American merchant ships cooperated most willingly by shiftin g ship as needed and taking Kanimbla's lines) and landed the rest of th e troops and stores . By 5 p .m . on the 25th the situation ashore at Banda r Shapur was calm, the principal persons were in custody, and arrangement s were in hand for supplying water, and food from Kanimbla, for the local population, normally supplied by train . Of the enemy merchant ships, al l 2
Admiral Bayendor was buried in the Khorramshahr naval base which, with its capture, becam e HMS Euphrates, depot for the Royal Navy in the Gulf throughout the war.
Aug-Oct
PERSIA
38 9
except Weissenfels (which subsequently sank in deep water) were saved , and sailed or towed with prize crews to Indian ports . Kanimbla carried out a major salvage feat on Hohenfels . There was one more enemy merchant ship saved in Persian waters , the Italian Hilda (4,901 tons), which Yarra was sent to secure at Banda r Abbas, on the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz . Yarra arrived from Khorramshahr off Bandar Abbas just before 8 p .m . on the 27th August, and found Hilda anchored off the town, abandoned and badly on fire . The flames and heat were too great to do anything that night, but at 9 p .m . on the 28th Harrington took Yarra alongside the Italian, whose fires were now glowing and smoking, and by midnight had them sufficiently unde r control to start towing the damaged ship alongside . By the forenoon o f the 29th Harrington was able to tell Cosmo Graham that he would hav e Hilda in tow astern by noon, with all fires extinguished and most leak s stopped . In reply he was told to tow towards Karachi, which he did at speeds gradually decreasing, owing to head winds, from four-and-a-half to two-and-a-half knots . In the afternoon of the 2nd September Harringto n took his tow into Chahbar Bay, a few miles west of the Persia-Indi a boundary, and there anchored her to await the arrival of a salvage tu g from Karachi . The tug, the Sydney Thubron (439 tons), arrived on th e 5th September, and on the 7th Yarra sailed for Kuwait, carrying with her a kitten and "an animal of unattractive appearance and surly disposition" , subsequently identified as a Sind Gazelle, which she had rescued from th e burning Hilda . That ship, in the tow of Sydney Thubron, sailed from Chahbar Bay for Karachi on the 8th September. From its start on the 25th August, the campaign in Persia moved to a swift conclusion . On the 27th August the Persian Government resigned , and next day their successors ordered resistance to cease . Joint British Russian proposals were accepted on the 2nd September, but attempt s by the Shah to circumvent this led to his abdication in favour of his so n on the 16th September . The following day British and Russian forces entered Teheran, where they remained until the 8th October, by whic h time communications through the country were secured . It was as a highway to Russia that the Persian Gulf was to become familiar to man y members of the R .A .N . in the war years ahead.
CHAPTER
1 1
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF 194 1 RITING after the war of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranea n
W consequent on the loss of Crete, Admiral Cunningham said :
The immediate repercussions were threefold. The supply and hence the safety o f Malta were jeopardized ; attacks on the Libyan convoys were made very hazardous ; and the route through the Mediterranean was virtually closed . The answer seeme d clear . We had lost the northern flank and were unlikely to regain it . Therefore we must try and get the southern flank. If the army could reach, say, Derna, a good deal would have been done to ease the situation.) The British key points on this southern flank were Malta and Tobruk , each of which contributed to the enemy's difficulties in maintaining hi s communications in North Africa, while the nourishment of each impose d heavy burdens on the Mediterranean Fleet . Events were to show that British success or otherwise in dealing wit h the Axis sea supply line to North Africa varied in almost direct proportion to the naval and air strength that could be based on Malta . As wa s told in Chapter 7 it was possible to base surface forces there for a fe w weeks during April and May 1941 ; but these were withdrawn in Ma y to reinforce the fleet in the struggle for Crete, and thereafter surfac e forces were not again based on Malta until October 1941 . Attacks o n enemy convoys had to be left to submarines and aircraft, and for a tim e Malta had to rely for supplies, including petrol, on two minelaying sub marines . On the African coast the supply of Tobruk was largely maintaine d by a shuttle service of destroyers from Alexandria and Mersa Matruh . It was instituted in May 1941, and for a considerable time was carrie d on by ships of the 10th Flotilla, becoming the main occupation of the ol d Australian destroyers for the remainder of their stay in the Mediterranean . Voyager and Waterhen made an initial run on the 5th and 6th May , and Vendetta followed them on the 8th. The three ships were then, however, caught up in the Crete operations, which employed Voyager for th e rest of the month and Waterhen and Vendetta until the 19th and 26t h respectively . Vampire entered the service on the 15th May, when sh e left Alexandria with troops and stores for Tobruk and returned with 180 wounded. She made only two runs . On her return to Alexandria fro m her second, on the 21st May, her defects had become so numerous an d vibration at speeds over 18 knots so excessive that she was withdraw n from the station for a thorough refit . First of the original Australian destroyers to leave the Mediterranean, she sailed from Alexandria o n the 28th May for Singapore, where she arrived on the 19th June . Waterhen began her unbroken series of runs on the 20th May ; Vendett a on the 29th ; Voyager on the 5th June and Stuart on the 16th . The ship s ' Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p . 395 .
May-Sept 1941
39 1
TOBRUK FERRY
of the "Tobruk Ferry Service " ran to a regular routine. Stuart's diarist briefly described it : The following fits any or all of the runs. Morning of first day, sailed fro m Alexandria for Tobruk with troops, ammunition and stores . Air attacks at so and so and so and so during the day . Arrived Tobruk in dark, unloaded and took o n so many wounded, 200 troops, and ammunition empties, and proceeded to Mers a Matruh . Air raid at Matruh . Next day embarked ammunition and stores and sailed for Tobruk . Air attacks . Arrived Tobruk, unloaded, embarked wounded, troops and ammunition empties . Tobruk continuously raided throughout stay . (At times also shelled at random by the enemy.) Air attacks on passage . Arrive Alexandria. And then, 36 hours later, the same thing all over again .
It was a wearing, wearying routine, with little rest and few occasion s when sleep was unbroken by the call of battle . 2 There were, however, brief hours of relaxation, as when, in Mersa Matruh (a peacetime holida y bathing resort ) we were berthed only a few feet from the sandy foreshore, and the water wa s crystal clear. We could see some soldiers bathing from the white sandy beac h a few hundred yards astern of us . The June day was terrifically hot, and very soo n most of the ships' companies were bathing. . . . The earlier days of our Inshore Squadron duty came back to us when we found that the S .N .O. Inshore Squadron [Captain Poland] was to be our passenger this trip . How different these days were to that cold and wind-swept January . Today the sea was as calm as it could be , the heat was shimmering off the burning sandy beaches, and it was a relief t o slip from the pontoon early in the afternoon to the cooler atmosphere off shore , when, with Voyager, we set our course for Tobruk. 3
In all, the Australian destroyers made a total of 139 runs in and ou t of Tobruk during the period of the regular "Ferry" . Vendetta holds th e record with 39 individual passages : into Tobruk, 11 from Alexandria an d 26
24`
36
28°
30
._ .— ._ ._ MEDITERRANEAN
•
SE A
32°
_ 34
Destroyer s Sloe Conooys AustralianT i IOth Flotilla Ships suniton obruk Service
'NTT
32-
AR^AMATTA
Tobruk ER Bardia• Salurn
=
Stli Ba rra m Mers a Matru h Bl Caba
LIBYA E 30
24°
26°
G
Y 2~
-
P
T r
, Cairo 3G'
32°
Xs o
9 from Mersa Matruh ; and from Tobruk, 8 to Alexandria and 11 t o Mersa Matruh . From the end of May until the first week in Augus t z Waller, when he returned to Australia in August 1941, listed lack of sleep as the greatest tria l in the "Tobruk Ferry Service " . s Clifford, The Leader of the Crocks, pp. 193, 196 .
t
392
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
June-Sept
she was without intermission on the Tobruk shuttle service, and carrie d 1,532 troops to Tobruk ; brought 2,951 away, including wounded and prisoners of war ; and transported 616 tons of supplies into the port. 4 The other Australian destroyers were similarly employed for varyin g periods : Stuart from mid-June until the end of July ; Voyager from th e beginning of June until the middle of July ; and Waterhen from the last ten days of May until the end of June . Later, when all the Mediterranean Fleet destroyers were given turns on the shuttle service, Nizam served on it for most of August, and Napier for a short period in September . There were other, and even less attractive, methods of supplyin g Tobruk by sea ; by small schooners which crept along the coast; by " A " lighters ; and by slow, escorted convoys . For these convoys there was n o night dash through the danger area . Their passage from Alexandria t o Tobruk took some forty-eight hours with, on the round voyage, at least two full days of daylight within enemy bombing range, and lacking ai r cover. Among the Australian ships Parramatta was engaged on this work and, later in the year, Yarra . Parramatta reached Alexandria on the 3rd June from the East Indie s Station . On the way she gleaned information of the ordeal through whic h the Mediterranean Fleet had passed . Kipling and Vampire, met at Suez, gave "startling intelligence of actions in the Mediterranean and of damag e sustained by the fleet " . The damaged Barham was passed in the Canal , and Dido with "a great crater in her near the bridge . Her crew however went past singing lustily " . Walker was concerned about dive bombing , of which his crew knew nothing "except the evidence of its effects . It was some days before we regained a balanced perspective and I am gla d we were not dive-bombed until this was attained . " There was little time for its attainment . Parramatta spent a few days in Alexandria, then suffering almost nightl y air raids . On the 15th June she sailed to Mersa Matruh in connection wit h Operation BATTLEAXE, by which it was hoped to " get the southern flank ". 5 After the failure of that operation she returned, on the 19th June, t o Alexandria . On that day, with the R .N . sloops Flamingo and Auckland, she was transferred to the operational control of the Rear-Admiral, Alexandria, for escort duties on the Tobruk supply service . On Sunday evening, 22nd June, in company with Auckland (Senior Officer), she left Alexandria escorting the small petrol carrier Pass of Balmaha (758 tons) to Tobruk . The program was to hug the coast for the first day to get fighter protection ; to gain a good offing the followin g night ; and to approach Tobruk on a south-westerly course in the after noon of the following day . Pass of Balmaha would make the last forty •Rhoades, Vendetta's commanding officer at the time, later wrote that Vendetta made "twentyfour night runs into Tobruk harbour", a record "never beaten, as far as is known, by any other destroyer " . He was possibly including a number of runs she made into the port i n April 1941, before the regular shuttle service was instituted . See H.M .A .S. Mark III (1944), p . 72 . "Operation BATTLEAXE was designed to drive the enemy west of Tobruk and re-establish lan d communication with that fortress, and was launched by General Wavell on the 15th June . Unexpected enemy mechanised strength was met, and the operation failed, the British fallin g back to near their original positions after a three days' battle.
24-25 June
AUCKLAND SUNK
39 3
miles into Tobruk alone in darkness, and the sloops would remain at se a to pick her up later and escort her back to Alexandria . For the first thirty-six hours all went well . During the morning o f the second day, the 24th June, there were some isolated, fruitless air attacks ; but soon after 5 .30 p .m . three formations, each of sixteen div e bombers, attacked . Two formations concentrated on Auckland, and th e third on Parramatta . At 5 .50 p .m . Auckland was hit. She emerged from a cloud of smoke out of control and heading for Parramatta, who had to turn to avoid her. " As she passed, " recorded Walker, "I saw that sh e was a wreck abaft the mainmast, with no stern visible . She was on fir e aft, but her forward guns were firing ." After about fifteen minutes ther e was a brief respite . Auckland, stopped, abandoned ship, and Walker closed her and dropped whalers and skiffs, life-belts and floats, to rescu e the survivors in the water. At the same time he reported the attack by wireless, and Waterhen and Vendetta, who had left Mersa Matruh at 1 .3 0 p .m . for Tobruk, at once made for the scene . Further air attacks developed at 6 .28 p .m . Parramatta was caught at a disadvantage, as Auckland's survivors were all around her in the water . They were machine-gunned by the attacking aircraft . At this time Auckland blew up with an explosion that lifted her "slowly and steadily about six or seven feet into the air . Her back broke with a pronounced fol d down the starboard side " and she rolled over and sank . Parramatta managed to get clear and moved away some three miles as so slowl y the westering sun dropped towards the horizon and more dive-bombin g formations gathered for the attack . "There seemed always one formation falling about like leaves in the zenith and then diving in succession, one moving forward into position, and one splitting up and coming in a t 45 ° ." For two hours the ordeal continued, the last attack ceasing whe n "the sun's lower limb touched the horizon at 8 .25 p .m .", and shelterin g darkness gathered as Waterhen and Vendetta reached the scene. Parramatta picked up Auckland's 164 survivors (two of whom died on board ) while the destroyers circled her, and she then proceeded to Alexandria, where she arrived at 7 .45 p .m . on the 25th . Pass of Balmaha, damaged in the bunkers, was taken in tow by Waterhen to Tobruk, with Vendetta giving anti-submarine protection . Vendetta entered Tobruk to disembark , and on leaving met Waterhen and Pass of Balmaha in the swept channel in the early hours of the 25th . Waterhen here handed her charge over t o a tug, and the destroyers proceeded in company to Alexandria, where they arrived that evening . In a careful estimate reached from the evidence of all available witnesses, Walker concluded that the air attacks were made by forty-eigh t dive bombers, and some five or ten high-level bombers, apparently protected by a number of fighters "which remained at a great height lookin g like flies (estimates vary up to thirty)" . Three of the bombers were shot down, and Walker reported of his crew : "All weapons were constantly firing and the men fought excellently, especially as this was, for the most part, their first experience of a close action." The First Sea Lord, in a
394
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
June-July
personal signal to Cunningham a day or so later remarked of thi s episode that "the ship handling and shooting of H .M .A .S . Parramatta must have been very good" . As stated above, Waterhen did not enter Tobruk on the night of th e 24th-25th June, nor was she again to do so . On the 28th of the month , this time in company with her 10th Flotilla companion Defender, she lef t Alexandria on her last run . At 7 .45 p.m . on the 29th, when off Salum , the two ships were attacked by dive bombers and Waterhen was cripple d and holed by very close misses, fortunately without casualties . Defende r went alongside and took off the troops and ship's company . With the fal l of night she returned to the abandoned Waterhen (while closing her sh e fired on a surfaced submarine which crash-dived and apparently escaped ) and took the Australian destroyer in tow . It was not possible to sav e her, however. When it was clear that she was sinking, the working party was taken off, and at 1 .50 a .m . on the 30th Waterhen, the ol d "Chook" as she was called by her crew in the homely vernacular, rolle d over and sank . She was the first ship of the Royal Australian Navy to be lost through enemy action, and fourth of the 10th Destroyer Flotill a so to go. Admiral Cunningham wrote her epitaph when he signalled t o Lieut-Commander Swain, " late of H .M .A .S . Waterhen" : " His Majesty ' s Australian Ship Waterhen having been sunk by enemy action it is m y direction that she is to be regarded as having been formally paid off o n Monday the 30th day of June, 1941 . " s Defender survived Waterhen by only a few days . Shortly after 1 a .m . on the 11th July she and Vendetta left Tobruk for Alexandria . It was a night of bright moonlight, when the creaming wakes of the destroyers wer e tell-tale marks for bombers themselves only revealed by the noise fro m the engines or the explosion of their bombs . At 5 .18 a .m . those i n Vendetta saw a flash and burst of smoke from Defender . She had been near-missed by a heavy bomb which exploded under and flooded the engin e room, and broke the ship 's back . Vendetta went alongside (picking up from the water as she did so one of Defender's crew blown overboard b y the explosion), embarked 275 troops and equipment, and took the cripple d ship in tow . Defender was settling, however, and finally Vendetta took off her crew, speeded her end with a torpedo, and at 11 .15 a .m . on the 11th July she sank seven miles north of Sidi Barrani, not far from wher e Waterhen had gone twelve days earlier. The supply of Tobruk by sea was, as Cunningham later remarked , 6 The loss of Waterhen raised in the Admiralty the question of financial adjustment between a Dominion and UK Government when a vessel of war was lost in the war . The conditions of loan of Waterhen and the other three destroyers lent with her were : "No provision was made in the conditions of loan to cover the possibility of the vessels being lost while on loan. It was, however, laid down that the Commonwealth Government would be responsible fo r returning the vessels to England on the termination of their service or, if the vessels wer e scrapped while still on loan, for paying to IIM Government their scrap value . " In a letter to th e British Treasury, the Admiralty wrote : "It might thus be held that the date on which th e vessel was due for scrapping having long passed, the Commonwealth Government should no w make a payment in respect of Waterhen equal to her scrap value . While, however, such a claim for payment might reasonably have been against the Commonwealth Government had Waterhen been lost in time of peace, My Lords do not think it appropriate to make any claim in vie w of the actual circumstances of the vessel 's loss." With this view the Treasury agreed, and no claim was made .
July-Sept
CUNNINGHAM
'S
FAREWELL
39 5
a costly undertaking. In addition to the strain imposed by enemy action , that of hard running was telling on the old Australian ships which "wer e literally dropping to bits after much hard work . Indeed, patched up again and again and all in need of extensive refits, they were only kept runnin g by the sheer grit and determination of the officers and men of their engineering departments . " 7 Hitherto the Tobruk work had been done by the ships of the 10t h Flotilla, but now (July) all destroyers were put on in turn, and the fas t minelayers Abdiel and Latona8 were also used . One by one the old Australian ships dropped out, withdrawn for extensive refits . Voyager, who left Tobruk on her last run on the 13th July and finished the passag e to Alexandria on one engine, sailed from the Egyptian port for home on the 24th July . First of the flotilla to get back to Australia, she reache d Darwin on the 12th September 1941, and Sydney on the 25th . Stuart made her final Tobruk run on 25th-26th July . Earlier in the month, in company with Decoy, she came safely through a crowded hou r when she recorded, on the 9th, "heavy moonlight and dawn attacks b y enemy bombers at 0508, 0509, 0512, 0520, 0521, 0535, 0538, 0607 , 0616" . On the 22nd August, with her port engine out of commission , she sailed from Alexandria for Australia . Waller had by then left her to go on ahead by air, and the old ship was under the command of LieutCommander Robison . Steaming on the starboard engine only, she reache d Fremantle on the 16th September, and Williamstown on the 27th September 1941 . The day Stuart left Alexandria, "the C .-in-C . having come alongsid e unexpectedly with the `Affirmative ' showing" , Admiral Cunningham went inboard and asked that the lower deck be cleared . This was done, an d he told the ship ' s company : "Well, you're off home! And I didn't thin k I could allow your ship to leave without coming on board to say a fe w words of goodbye to you ." He spoke from the heart, of Stuart and the other Australian destroyers ; of Waller (who would, as he later wrote , "always remain in my mind as one of the very finest types of Australia n naval officer. Full of good cheer, with a great sense of humour, undefeate d and always burning to get at the enemy . . . greatly loved and admire d by everyone . " ) He told them : "I am grateful to you for what you hav e done and for the example you undoubtedly set ." He had "a special wor d for the Black Squad . They have done magnificently to keep these ship s going. . . . The whole Fleet will part with you with great regret . We ar e very proud to have had you with us, and I hope you are proud to hav e been in the Mediterranean Fleet . I hope you will have a very happ y home coming, and that the folks `down under ' will give you the welcome you deserve . Goodbye to you all ." Stuart's diarist recorded that "as the barge passed astern of Stuart on its way back to Admiralty House, th e 7
Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p . 403. "HMS Latona, minelayer (1940), 2,650 tons, six 4-in guns, 39 .75 kts ; sunk 20 Nov 1941 .
396
MEDITERRANEAN
TO
END
OF
1941
June-Dec
C .-in-C . stood up and waved his cap to Stuart and her assembled ship's company" .9 Stuart's departure marked the end of the old 10th Destroyer Flotilla . Of the two sole remaining ships, Vendetta was transferred to the 7t h Flotilla, Decoy to the 2nd . Vendetta made her final Tobruk run on 2nd3rd August . Thereafter she was employed on convoy work, mainl y between Syria, Egypt, and Cyprus . She sailed from Alexandria on th e 20th October for Singapore, where she arrived on the 8th December 1941 . Rhoades, who had been in command since March 1940, left Vendetta a t the end of August 1941, and the ship completed her Mediterranean servic e and made the passage out to Singapore under the command of Lieut Commander Stephenson. l II Meanwhile, apart from the withdrawal of the old destroyers, there wer e other changes in Australian naval representation in the Mediterranean . O n the 4th June 1941 the Australian War Cabinet considered a proposal b y Admiral Colvin that if the permanent repairs needed in Perth could b e effected in Australia, she should return from the Mediterranean but b e replaced there by Hobart "in view of the losses of cruisers sustained b y the Royal Navy " . This was agreed to . The offer of Hobart was "mos t gratefully" accepted by the Admiralty, and she left Sydney on the 20t h June and reached Aden on the 9th July . Captain Howden found that conditions in the Red Sea presented a most peaceful contrast to those o f 1940 . Intelligence received at Aden (where Rear-Admiral Hallifax 2 was now established as Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea 3 ) was that "all surfac e vessels could be considered friendly ; no submarines would be encountered ; and attack by aircraft could be considered most remote" . He was quickly to find this last an over-optimistic appreciation . During July the Germans began to pay attention to the Red Sea entrance to the Mediterranean . They made heavy air attacks on Port Said, Ismailia, Port Tewfik, an d Suez, and mined the Canal on several occasions . These attacks were continued throughout August ; and in September the enemy penetrate d some way down the Red Sea, attacking convoys with long-range aircraft . Hobart reached Suez on the 12th July, and entered the Canal in th e 6
On 23rd August Admiral Cunningham sent the following signal to the Naval Board : "It is wit h great regret that we part with HMAS Stuart from the Mediterranean Station . Under the distinguished command of Captain Waller she has an unsurpassed record of gallant achievement . She has taken a leading part in all the principal operations of the Mediterranean Fleet an d has never been called upon in vain for any difficult job . The work of her engine room department in keeping this old ship efficient and in good running order has been beyond all praise . The Mediterranean Fleet is poorer by the departure of this fine little ship and her gallant ship ' s company . " In addition to Admiral Cunningham, the Rear-Admiral (D) visited the ship to say goodbye before she sailed, and she received valedictory signals from V-A 1st Battle Squadron (Pridham Wippell) ; R-A(D) (Glennie) ; CS7 (Rawlings) ; and Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Medway and 1st Submarine Flotilla ; and Captain(D)7 (Arliss) .
1 Cdr C . J . Stephenson, OBE ; RAN . HMAS Yarra 1939 ; comd HMAS ' s Orara 1940, Vendetta Sep-Nov 1941, 1942-43, Napier 1944, Nepal 1944-45 . B . Norfolk I, 14 Mar 1910. s Vice-Adm R . H . C . Hallifax, CB, CBE ; RN . (HMS's Queen Elizabeth 1914-16, Iron Duke 1917-18.) Comd Home Fleet Destroyers 1939-41 ; FO Cdg Red Sea Force 1941-43 and Suez Canal Area 1942-43 . B . 24 Jul 1885 . Killed in air crash, 6 Nov 1943 . 7
Rear-Adm Murray, who occupied what Walker called "the charmingly short-titled office of SNOBS " from early 1940 to early 1941, relinquished it because of sickness . He was succeeded by Cmdre C . P . Clarke, RN, who was in turn succeeded by Rear-Adm Hallifax in June 1941 .
July 1941
CONVOY TO MALTA
39 7
evening of the 13th, but the presence of acoustic mines caused her retur n to Suez . Shortly after midnight on the 13th heavy raids by dive bomber s developed on the port and anchored ships . At 3 .13 a.m . on the 14th th e large, crowded transport Georgic (27,759 tons) received a direct hit an d was soon burning fiercely . She got under way in an endeavour to beach herself, and collided with Glenearn, which ship she damaged, set on fire , and dragged aground . Hobart had a busy night, with boats and medica l parties away transferring Georgic's passengers and crew to the shore, among the passengers being Swain, lately Waterhen's commanding officer. That afternoon Hobart successfully refloated Glenearn, towed her clear, and turned her over to tugs which berthed her at Port Tewfik . Georgic, fast ashore, burned fiercely throughout the day and the following night . 4 At 10 a .m . on the 15th Hobart sailed, and the following day entered the Mediterranean and joined the 7th Cruiser Squadron under Rawlings . Perth sailed from Alexandria on the 18th July for Australia . She reache d Fremantle on the 6th August and Sydney on the 12th . Another Australian ship entered the Mediterranean at this time, bu t did not then get east of Malta . Third of the new "N " Class destroyers , H .M .A .S . Nestor commissioned at Fairfield's yard on the Clyde on th e 3rd February 1941 under Commander Stewart . 5 The first five months of her commission she spent with the Home Fleet . On the 19th July (no w under command of Commander Rosenthal 6 ) she arrived at Gibraltar to take part in Operation SUBSTANCE . By the middle of July 1941 the supply situation at Malta was becomin g acute, and operation SUBSTANCE was designed to run a convoy of on e personnel ship (Leinster, of 4,302 tons) and six military transports (Melbourne Star, Sydney Star, City of Pretoria, Port Chalmers, Durham , Deucalion') to the island from the west . The operation was under th e direction of Admiral Somerville with Force "H" reinforced by Nelson, an d some cruisers, and destroyers including Nestor. Opportunity was take n under cover of the operation to run to the west from Malta six merchan t ships and Breconshire (10,000 tons) which had been immobilised i n Malta through inability to take them east in the face of enemy air power . The role of the Mediterranean Fleet was to create a diversion by sweepin g westward from Alexandria to give the impression that SUBSTANCE wa s being run right through the Mediterranean . SUBSTANCE and its escorting and covering groups (a number of whic h also carried troops, including Nestor, who embarked four officers an d fifty-two other ranks at Gibraltar) started the eastward passage in th e early hours of the 21st July . Soon after leaving Gibraltar in thick fog , 5 Georgic
was later salvaged, and after the war entered the Australian trade as a Governmen t chartered migrant ship . 6 Capt G. S. Stewart, RAN . (HMAS Australia 1920.) HMAS Hobart 1939-40; comd HMA S Nestor 1941, HMS Porcupine 1942, HMAS Qulberon 1943-44, HMAS Napier, as Capt(D) 7 Flotilla 1945 ; NOIC New Guinea 1946 . B . Colac, Vic, 20 Dec 1902 . e On 14 May 1941 Stewart was succeeded in command of Nestor by Cdr C . B . Alers-Hankey , RN, the ship then being at Scapa Flow . Six days later Rosenthal (who relinquished comman d of Westralta at Colombo on 25 Sep 1940) assumed command of Nestor vice Alers-Hankey . Of 12,806, 11,095, 8,047, 8,535, 10,893 and 7,516 tons respectively .
398
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
22-24July
Leinster ran ashore on Carnero Point at the entrance to Algeciras Ba y and had to be left behind . For the first two days Nestor was on the scree n of Force "H" (Renown and Ark Royal) . At 11 .10 p .m . on the 22nd , when the force was about seventy miles N .N .W . from Cape Bougaroni on the African coast, Sub-Lieutenant Colclough,8 Nestor's anti-submarin e officer, and second officer of the watch, detected hydrophone effects of torpedoes and sighted tracks crossing from starboard to port . He at once ordered "Hard a starboard" and an alarm report was made to Renown . Two torpedoes passed under Nestor, who for over an hour hunted an d attacked the responsible submarine, though without definite result. 9 In the early morning of the 23rd July Force "H" and the escorte d convoy (which had hitherto been about thirty miles apart) joined company, and Nestor took station on the convoy screen under the comman d of Rear-Admiral Syfret,' Rear-Admiral Commanding, 18th Cruiser Squadron, in Edinburgh . 2 At 9 .42 a.m . the fleet was attacked by torpedo an d high-level bombers ; the destroyer Fearless was crippled and had to b e sunk, and the cruiser Manchester was badly damaged and returned t o Gibraltar . Other attacks developed during the day . At 5 .13 p .m . convo y and escort reached the entrance to the Sicilian Narrows and Force " H " parted company and withdrew westward to cover Manchester and the westbound convoys from Malta . At 7 .45 p .m . the SUBSTANCE convoy was attacked by high-level bombers and the destroyer Firedrake3 was damage d and returned to Gibraltar . At 2 .30 a .m . on the 24th July the convoy was due north of Pantellari a some eight miles distant. Shortly after, an attack by Italian motor torped o boats developed, and persisted at intervals for about an hour . It was an affair of brief glimpses of the enemy vessels illuminated by searchlight ; of gun flashes and bright streams of tracer bullets ; of the evasion of torpedoes . Between six and twelve torpedo boats were present ; one wa s sunk, one possibly sunk, and two others damaged . They succeeded in torpedoing, but not sinking, one of the ships of the convoy . When the attack developed, Nestor was screening on the starboard quarter of the convoy . No enemy activity was observed in her vicinity , but "firing in considerable volume was heard and seen to port and ahead and astern of the convoy, a lot of tracer ammunition was being use d and illumination being provided by searchlight " . At about 2 .55 a .m . Nesto r saw one ship of the convoy dropping astern, and on investigation foun d 8
Lt-Cdr P . S . Colclough, DSC ; RANVR . HMS Lady Elsa 1940-41, HMAS's Nestor 1941-42 , Norman 1942-43, Orara 1944-45 . Journalist ; of Kew, Vic; b. Essendon, Vic, 10 Dec 1919 .
° In his report on the operation, Admiral Somerville wrote : "Subsequent Italian claims that a U-boat had sunk an unspecified ship suggests that Nestor's boat escaped and made a false claim based on hearing her torpedoes exploding at the end of their run ." Writing of "outstanding points" in the operation, he also said of this submarine attack on the force : "The successful avoiding action taken by the heavy ships at 2315/22 was only rendered possible by the promp t action taken, and quick and accurate report made, by Nestor. " 1 Admiral Sir Neville Syfret, GCB, KBE ; RN . Comd Force " H" 1942-43 ; Vice-Chief of Naval Staff 1943-45 ; C-in-C Home Fleet 1945-48. B . Capetown, S Africa, 20 Jun 1889 . 'HMS Edinburgh, cruiser (1939), 10,000 tons, twelve 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 .5 kts ; sunk, after U-boat damage, in Barents Sea, 2 May 1942 . 8 HMS Firedrake, destroyer (1935), 1,350 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; sunk by U-boat in N Atlantic, 16 Dec 1942 .
(RA .N. Historical Section ) Georgic and Glenearn aground in Suez Bay, with H .M .A .S . Hobart approaching ,
14th July 1941 .
(R .A .N . Historical Section ) Crew of H .M .A .S . Hobart bathing in Bitter Lake, 15th July 1941 .
(R .A .N . Historical ,1,,
~> u
Boat's Crew from H .M .A .S . Perth, in Alexandria Harbour .
(Yeoman N . O . Taylor, R .A .N . )
Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, followed by Lieut-Commander J . S . Mesley and Commande r L . E . Tozer, inspecting H .M .A .S . Hobart's Communications Division .
Manning Anti-aircraft Gun, H .M .A .S . Perth .
Water Polo, from a n Australian Destroyer .
(R.A.N . Historical Section)
H .M .A .S . Kanimbl a alongside Italian Oiler Bronte at Bandar Shapur, 25th August 1941 .
H .M .S. Barham blowin g up, 25th November 1941 . (R .A .N Historical Section)
(R .A .N .
Historical Section)
24-28 July
CONVOY TO MALTA
39 9
Sydney Star steaming slowly on the opposite course to that of the convoy . Rosenthal closed her, found that her boats were being lowered, and learne d that she had been torpedoed, had thirty feet of water in No . 3 hold, an d was believed by her master to be sinking . The two ships were now onl y about four miles from Pantellaria, and Rosenthal decided to embark Sydney Star's troops . He took Nestor alongside the transport and secured at 3 .15 a .m . This operation was helped by Leading Seaman Anderson4 and Able Seaman McLeod, 5 who, on their own initiative, jumped down into one of Sydney Star's boats between the two ships, and got it clea r at a time when "delay was unacceptable" . While alongside, Rosenthal impressed on Sydney Star's master the importance of keeping that ship afloat and moving . Three enemy torpedo boats were sighted while the ships lay together, but the transfer of troops (467 officers and other ranks ) and of twenty of Sydney Star's own complement s was 'completed at 4 . 5 a .m . without interference, and at 4 .10 a .m . Nestor cast off and proceeded , and Rosenthal had the satisfaction of seeing Sydney Star follow at 1 2 knots . At 8 a .m . the cruiser Hermione' joined company, and the thre e ships successfully weathered a dive and high-level bombing attack at 1 0 a .m . and reached Malta safely at 2 p .m . It was a great day in Malta . RearAdmiral Syfret in Edinburgh, with Arethusa and Manxman,8 steamed into Grand Harbour at 11 .30 a .m . with ships' companies fallen in and band s playing ; two-and-a-half hours later Hermione, Nestor and Sydney Star arrived ; and at 3 .30 p .m . the main convoy with its destroyer escort passed through the breakwaters . 9 Meanwhile the west-bound convoys had sailed from Malta . Syfret and his cruisers and destroyers, including Nestor, followed them during th e evening of the 24th . Between the 26th and 28th July all the west-boun d forces and convoy groups reached Gibraltar safely, thus concluding a highly successful operation . The following month another Australian ship made a brief visit to th e Mediterranean . It will be remembered (Chapter 6) that Bathurst, first of the corvettes to be completed under the Australian Government's shipbuilding program, commissioned on the 6th December 1940 under Lieut a PO R. J . Anderson, DSM, 20556, RAN . HMAS's Moresby 1939-40, Nestor 1941-42, Napier 1942, Mildura 1945 . Of Subiaco, WA ; b. Newington, Southwark, Eng, 21 Apr 1916 . 5 AB J . S . McLeod, DSM, 22181, RAN . HMAS ' s Perth 1939-40, Nestor 1941-42, Norman 1942-44, Goulburn 1945-46. Of Kirribilli, NSW ; b . Coolac, NSW, 24 Jul 1920 . 6 Nestor then had on board her own complement of 231, her own military contingent of 56 , and 487 from Sydney Star ; a total of 774 . As it was not possible to stow all troops below , top weight was considerable, and made itself felt when using full wheel during subsequent div e bombing attacks. 7 HMS Hermione, cruiser (1941), 5,450 tons, ten 5 .25-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 33 kts ; sunk in E Mediterranean, 16 Jun 1942. HMS Manxman, minelayer (1941), 2,650 tons, six 4-in guns, 39 .75 kts. 9 Somerville later wrote : "The safe arrival of Sydney Star reflects great credit on the Commanding Officer of Nestor, Commander A. S . Rosenthal, RAN, who showed judgment, initiativ e and good seamanship in handling a delicate situation so close to the enemy's coast and in th e presence of enemy E-Boats. It was appropriate that the C .O . and most of his crew should be Australians . " Rosenthal reported of his officers and ship's company that they "behaved in a most satisfactory manner : they were keen and enthusiastic, and displayed a coolness in action which wa s the more creditable in view of the fact that not more than 15% of the total complement ha d been in action before " .
400
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
Jan-Dec
Commander Bunyan . On the 25th January 1941, Lismore, l second of the class, commissioned under Lieut-Commander Crawford . 2 On the 21s t February 1941 both ships sailed from Sydney for the East Indies Station . They reached Aden on the 22nd June and joined the Red Sea Force, and throughout July carried out survey sweeps of convoy anchorages in the Red Sea . On the 4th August Bathurst arrived at Alexandria to join th e Mediterranean Fleet, but she was returned to the Red Sea on the recommendation of the Rear-Admiral, Destroyers, that she was unsuitable t o operate in waters subject to daylight air attacks owing to insufficiency of armament. From the end of August to mid-December she and Lismore were employed off the coast of French Somaliland on Tadjoura Gulf patrol . Here, on the 9th October, the Vichy French battery at Heron Plateau, Jibuti, fired two projectiles at Bathurst, both of which fell short . On the 16th December the two ships left for the Far East, and reached Colombo o n the 29th of the month . III Not only the British faced supply difficulties in the Mediterranean ; a t this period the problem was an increasing one for the Axis powers . Fro m April to December 1941 the average monthly gross tonnage of ships i n the Axis Libyan convoys was 114,000 tons, with an averag e monthly loss of 21,000 tons sunk and 9,000 tons damaged . O f this the German liaison admiral at Rome (Admiral Weichold) wrote : "A loss of more than a quarter of the shipping space allotted to th e African convoys meant a tremendous reduction in the shipping pool which in the long run could not fail to have serious consequences . " The percentage of loss mounted steeply in the second half of the year, whe n increased air strength at Malta and the basing there of surface forces enabled sharper action against the convoys . From 17 per cent in July , the percentage figures of tonnage losses in the Axis convoys mounte d in the succeeding months to 33, 39, 63, and a peak of 77 per cent i n November, before dropping to 49 per cent in December . More Germa n than Italian tonnage was lost in the convoys, and the situation led t o considerable criticism in the German High Command of Italian conduc t of the naval war . In July Hitler wrote to Mussolini a survey of military operations in Russia. Ciano wrote of it in his Diary at the time : It is a broad politico-military survey, and finally—this is the real reason for th e letter—asks to take over our air and navy commands . I don't know what they can do more or better than we can. Our Navy, especially, is giving excellent result s in proportion to its opportunities and equipment . Admiral Raeder, in a report to Hitler on the 26th August, pressed fo r increased use of Italian shipping, and pointed out that Italy had availabl e 1
HMAS Lismore, corvette (1940), 733 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts ; transferred to Royal Netherlands Navy July 1946 and renamed Bat/am. ' Capt S . H. Crawford, MBE, RD ; RANR(S) . HMAS Hobart 1940-41 ; comd HMAS's Lismore 1941-43, Kantmbla Jun-Aug 1944 and Aug 1945-Jan 1948 . Of East Lindfield, NSW ; b . London , 2 Apr 1905 .
July-Dec
GERMAN SUBMARINES
40 1
299 ships of various types totalling over a million tons . The report continued : Previous experiences have shown that the Italians are very reluctant to use thei r shipping . Their intention to retain their shipping for commercial use during th e period after the war when there is a shortage of shipping is obvious . Very stron g pressure by the Government is necessary here . In order to carry out German transports most effectively it is necessary that the Italians surrender ships to the Germa n Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, for purely German use .3 On the 25th July Hitler first proposed sending German submarines t o the Mediterranean, a proposal opposed by the Naval High Command . Raeder on this occasion replied that it was impossible to send submarine s into the Mediterranean as this would handicap operations in the Atlantic . " Moreover, British submarines and aircraft are the forces used in th e Mediterranean to attack transports, and these cannot be combatted wit h submarines ." Hitler returned to the point later, and at a conference o n the 22nd August (though Raeder reiterated that submarines were mor e urgently needed in the Atlantic) ordered that six submarines be transferred immediately to the Mediterranean . On the 17th September Raede r told Hitler that "two boats are en route, two will leave at the end of th e week, and the remaining boats will be ready on 22nd and 27th September " . On the 12th December Raeder reported on submarine dispositions wit h the aid of a map, and showed that "at present thirty-six submarines ar e in or en route to the Mediterranean", where it was proposed to statio n fifty .4 By October 1941 German submarines were in the Mediterranean in some force . Meanwhile the British strengthened their position in the Central Mediter ranean . Early in September Malta was well reinforced by fighter aircraft flown from carriers from the west ; and at the end of the month operatio n SUBSTANCE was repeated successfully when a convoy of eight large merchant ships and Breconshire (Operation HALBERD) were run to the islan d from Gibraltar . One merchant ship, Imperial Star (10,733 tons), was torpedoed and sunk . The following month, with the added defensive fighte r strength at Malta, and the reduction in enemy air attacks due to withdrawal of German air forces from Sicily for the Russian campaign, i t again became possible to base surface forces on the island . Force "K" , the cruisers Aurora and Penelope 5 and destroyers Lance and Lively, 6 a Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941 . *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941 . Cunningham, A Sailor ' s Odyssey, p. 422, says :
" Twenty German U-boats had entered th e Mediterranean in October . " Weichold ("Essay", 1945) says : "Owing to unfavourable course of war German High Command, after long hesitation, was obliged, at the end of August 1941 to bring in naval force s to assist. In the first place German U-boats were ordered to the Mediterranean . The OK M [Naval High Command] viewed this allocation of German naval forces to the Mediterranea n with displeasure, as they were completely concerned with the war against shipping in the Atlantic . Accordingly they at first succeeded in limiting number of U-boats to 21 . Later the German High Command ordered increase to 36 . However after a time C-in-C U-boats succeeded in obtaining a reduction to 25 U-boats . " ', HMS's Aurora and Penelope, cruisers (1936-37), 5,270 tons, six 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes , 32 .25 kts ; Penelope sunk by U-boat, Anzio area, 18 Feb 1944 . ', HMS 's Lance and Lively, destroyers (1941), 1,920 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes , 36 .5 kts ; Lance sunk by aircraft off Malta, 9 Apr 1942 (subsequently salved) ; Lively sunk b y aircraft in E Mediterranean, 11 May 1942 .
402
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
Aug-No v
arrived there on the 21st October . In the early hours of the 9th November the force intercepted and destroyed an Axis convoy (the 51st Transpor t Squadron) of seven merchant ships escorted by two 8-inch cruisers an d ten destroyers . All seven ships of the convoy, totalling some 35,000 tons, were sunk. One destroyer, the Fulmine, 7 was sunk in the action, and a second, the Libeccio, 8 was sunk later in the day by the submarin e Upholder . 9 The two Italian cruisers, Trieste and Trento, with four of the destroyers were five miles astern of the convoy at the time of the attack . From the time that Aurora's force sighted the convoy till the first sho t was fired seventeen minutes elapsed, during which the Trieste's force was steaming on the northward leg of their patrol and failed to come to th e help of the convoy or be seen again by Force "K" . Fire was opened a t three minutes to 1 a .m. at a range of 5,700 yards, and the first three 6-inc h salvos hit the Fulmine . The action then became general . At 1 .25 a.m . Aurora led the force across the bows of the convoy, all ships of which were by then in flames . On the 12th November further fighters were flown into Malta fro m the Ark Royal, but the next afternoon on her return passage west the carrier was torpedoed by the German submarine U 81 . 1 She sank a few hours later when 25 miles east of Gibraltar . In the Eastern Mediterranean complete changes of the garrisons a t Tobruk and Cyprus made heavy demands on the fleet . The Commonwealth Government, concerned about the decline in physical resistance of its troops in Tobruk, requested their relief . This was opposed by the British Government and General Auchinleck 2 (who were then planning a major offensive in Libya), and by Cunningham (who was concerne d at the strain which would be imposed on the navy), but the Australian Government was insistent ; and the troops were brought out, and their reliefs put in, during August, September and October . The troops were carried in destroyers and the fast minelayers Abdiel and Latona, covered by the fleet. In all, some 19,400 troops were taken into Tobruk and some 18,900 brought out in these three operations, during the first of whic h the cruiser Phoebe was torpedoed but managed to reach Alexandria, while at the conclusion of the last Latona, hit by a bomb, blew up and sank . Hobart, Napier and Nizam took part in these operations . The two destroyers also participated in the Cyprus operation in November, when approximately 14,000 men of the garrison were removed from the island an d replaced by an equal number of fresh troops from Palestine . The Mediterranean had one more Australian newcomer before the en d of the year. Yarra spent September and October in the Persian Gulf. In *Fulmine, Italian destroyer (1932), 1,220 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in toga tubes, 38 kts; sunk in Central Mediterranean, 9 Nov 1941 . B Libeccio, Italian destroyer (1934), 1,449 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in tor) tubes, 38 kts; sunk in Central Mediterranean, 9 Nov 1941 . *HIn4S Upholder, submarine (1940), 540 tons, one 3-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 11 .25 kts ; lost off Tripoli, 14 Apr 1942 . 1 U 81, German submarine (1940), 740 tons, one 4 .1-in gun, six 21-in tor) tubes, 18 .5 kts. *Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE. C-in-C India 1941, 1943-47 ; C-in-C Middle East 1941-42. B. 21 Jun 1884.
Aug-Nov
SUPPLIES FOR TOBRUK
40 3
November she joined the Mediterranean Station which, the previous month , had been extended to embrace the Red Sea, with the Senior Officer Re d Sea Force (Hallifax) transferring his flag from Aden to Suez . On th e 14th of the month Yarra reached Port Said where she met Parramatta, an d the two ships arrived at Alexandria the next day to take up Tobruk convoy escort duties . Parramatta had spent August on the Port Said-Haifa Cyprus convoy run, but early in September went to the Gulf of Suez . Mos t of that month was spent as anti-aircraft guard ship at Attaka, in Sue z Bay, where, wrote Walker, "it was intended that my presence shoul d inspire confidence in the crews of several American merchant ships " at the anchorage . October was spent in the Gulf of Suez on survey an d other work which included a hazardous and finely executed rescue, fro m a reef in heavy weather, of the survivors of a bombed merchant ship . Early in the morning of the 18th November 1941 the British Eight h Army launched the long-planned attack to drive the enemy out of Libya . That day Yarra (Senior Officer) and Parramatta left Alexandria escorting a slow convoy to Tobruk . The weather was wild, and apart from attempte d enemy interference by aircraft and submarine, the voyage was mad e difficult by one ship of the convoy breaking down repeatedly and, at on e stage, being taken in tow by Parramatta . The task was completed success fully, however, and the two sloops returned to Alexandria on the 23rd . Meanwhile, fierce fighting by the Tobruk garrison, which had broke n out on the 21st in an attempt to link up with the British troops advancin g from the east, had produced an acute shortage of ammunition . To reliev e this situation Parramatta was sailed from Alexandria on the 25th in company with the destroyer Avon Vale, 3 escorting the fully laden ammunitio n ship Hanne (1,360 tons) to Tobruk . The merchant ships used on thi s convoy run were small, slow, and in many cases non-British . Escort-toconvoy communication had often to be made by megaphone, which meant the dangerous procedure of the two communicating ships slowing dow n right alongside one another . 4 It happened on this occasion . At midnight on the 26th November the convoy was just to the north east of Tobruk . The night was dark with frequent showers . A heavy sea was running . Hanne was not clear as to her route into Tobruk, an d Parramatta closed her to communicate by megaphone . At twenty-fiv e minutes to one in the morning of the 27th the two ships lay close along side one another, making about three knots . 5 Avon Vale was some distance away . HMS Avon Vale, destroyer (1940), 1,025 tons, six 4-in guns, 27 kts. "It is, " Harrington later wrote in one of Yarra's reports, "the only means of communicating after dark, as these small merchant vessels do not for the most part answer a dim signallin g light and, having answered, require some considerable time to understand a short and simpl e signal . This is possibly in part due to their being unable to understand English . " 6 Evidence of Signalman Stewart, a survivor, who was duty signalman at the time on Parramatta's bridge . (Chief Yeoman of Signals H . Stewart, 21663, RAN. HMAS's Sydney 1939-40, Parramatta 1940-41, Napier 1941, 1943-44, Nestor 1942, Lismore 1942-43, Gawler 1943, Wollongong 1944, Manoora 1945-46 . Of Wellington, WA; b . Wellington, 12 Jan 1921 .) 8
404
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF 1941
27 Nov
For nearly two hours the convoy, unknown to those in it, had been stalked by the German submarine U 559 . 6 Cruising off the Tobruk approaches her captain, at 10.45 p .m. on the 26th, sighted silhouettes to the north-east. By some trick of the light he saw "three merchant ships, with two destroyers . stationed astern and what appears to be two fishin g vessels ahead" . The convoy ran into a rain squall, lit up by lightning. He followed it, and by midnight had manoeuvred into position for attack . Twelve minutes later, at a range of 2,000 metres, he fired a spread o f three torpedoes at a "three thousand ton merchant ship behind which a smaller vessel was also visible" . All three torpedoes missed . His presence still undetected, the German continued to stalk . "I cannot wait because the convoy is just off the Tobruk approach route ." At fourteen minutes to one on the 27th (his time was eleven minutes differen t from Parramatta's) : I fire a single torpedo at a range of 1,500 metres using the same estimations . The target is a destroyer with one funnel . Hit! Two explosions take place one after the other . The destroyer breaks up and sinks . Shortly afterwards there wa s another heavy explosion . Probably her depth charges . I make off towards the southeast . The fishing vessels and/or the destroyer are searching. They are sighted once more and then disappear into the rain . Depth charges are heard for a long time .7 The torpedo struck Parramatta amidships at twenty-five minutes t o one, and there was an almost simultaneous explosion, probably the magazine, under the quarterdeck, so that survivors believed that two torpedoe s had struck and exploded . The ship was instantly crippled, lighting failed , and she rolled over to starboard and sank within a few minutes . Walke r was last seen on the bridge, where he gave the order to abandon ship . Few other than those on deck got away—probably about one-third of the total complement. For a while thirty or so (including two officers $ ) clun g to an Oropesa float drifting among the debris . There was much wreckage floating, including the ship's stern which reappeared and floated for som e time . Those on the Oropesa float could hear shouts from around the m in the darkness . Shortly a black shape was sighted some distance off . Som e thought it the submarine, others the Avon Vale . Two men, Signalma n Stewart and Stoker Greenfield9 decided to take the chance and swim to it . The chance came off, and a three-quarter-mile swim brought them t o Avon Vale at 3 .5 a .m . on the 27th . The destroyer, which did everything possible to pick up survivors from the debris-cluttered sea in the darkness, had already picked up nineteen survivors . Stewart and Greenfiel d were the last two she was able to find . Nothing more was seen of those 6
U559, German submarine (1942), 517 tons, five torp tubes, 16 .5 kts ; sunk in E Mediterranean , 30 Oct 1942 . From the War Diary of U 559. U 559 was sunk in the Eastern Mediterranean on 30 Oct 1942 , by HM Ships Pakenham, Petard, Hero, Dulverton and Hurworth, and Wellesley aircraft of No . 47 Squadron RAF. She was the 132nd German submarine to be destroyed in the war . • Lt-Cdr P. W. Forwood, RANR . HMAS Parramatta 1940-41 . Of Walkerville, SA ; b . Woodville , SA, 22 Jan 1906 . Lost in sinking of Parramatta, 27 Nov 1941 . Lt V. V . Johnston, RANR(S) . HMAS Parramatta 1940-41 . Of Adelaide; b . Brisbane, 12 Sep 1905 . Lost in sinking of Parramatta, 27 Nov 1941 . 'Stoker F . H. Greenfield, S4876, RANR . HMAS's Parramatta 1941, Napier 1941-42, Doomba 1942-43 . Of Strathfield, NSW ; b . North Sydney, 26 Nov 1917 . 7
Oct-Nov
RAEDER
CRITICAL
40 5
who remained with the Oropesa float ; nor were any more taken up fro m the sea . Subsequently, however, three ratings reached the shore betwee n Tobruk and Bardia, and were there found by advancing British troops . In all, twenty-four ratings survived the sinking . Of the ship's complemen t of 160, one hundred and thirty-seven, including all the officers, lost their lives ; one R .N . officer on passage was also lost . l Hanne, with her cargo of ammunition, was safely delivered at Tobruk by Avon Vale. 2 IV In a personal report to Hitler on the 13th November 1941, Raeder wa s outspoken in his criticism of Axis conduct of the war in the Mediterranean . Today the enemy has complete naval and air supremacy in the area of th e German transport routes ; he is operating totally undisturbed in all parts of th e Mediterranean. Malta is constantly being reinforced . Patrols in the Straits o f Gibraltar have been intensified, evidently as the result of German submarine operations . The Italians are not able to bring about any major improvements in th e situation, due to the oil situation and to their own operational and tactical impotence . 3 Raeder instanced the destruction of the 51st Transport Squadron during the night of October 8th-9th . He had reason for dissatisfaction, for British power in the Mediterranean was in the ascendant . In support of the land operations the Mediterranean Fleet ranged at will, safeguardin g and strengthening British lines of communication, harassing and weakenin g the enemy's, and carrying out frequent telling bombardments of enem y positions in Libya. Yet within the next six weeks the situation wa s drastically to change, and British sea power in the Eastern Mediterranea n to be reduced to a shadow by a series of heavy blows . The first of these fell on the 25th November . In the early hours of the day before, two enemy convoys were reported at sea making for Benghazi . The 7th and 15th Cruiser Squadrons (the 15th now under the comman d of Rear-Admiral Vian 4 ) sailed from Alexandria to try to intercept, followed later on the 24th by the battle fleet to provide heavy cover . Hobart was absent from the 7th Cruiser Squadron on this occasion . She was left at Alexandria, and Howden recorded that on boar d a feeling of gloom prevailed, the ship knowing that the remaining ships of the squadron were operating on the enemy shipping routes, while Hobart was left in harbour awaiting docking for the removal of particularly heavy marine growth . Parramatta's complement totalled 9 officers and 151 ratings . Of these, 23 ratings survived, all RAN . Of the complement 7 ratings were RN on loan . There were also one RN officer and one RN rating on board taking passage, but not included in the complement of 160 . Of these, the officer was lost but the rating saved . Total losses of RAN personnel—9 officers, 121 ratings ; of RN personnel—one officer (on passage), 7 ratings . Total on board when ship sunk, 162 . z On 29 Nov 1941, two days after the loss of Parramatta, Admiral Cunningham signalled to the Naval Board : "I deeply deplore the loss of HMAS Parramatta . This fine little ship had built up for herself a splendid standard of efficiency and achievements fully in keeping with recor d of HvIA Ships in Mediterranean. HMAS Parramatta was lost in defence of an important convo y under her charge which arrived safely at its destination . Please express my sympathy and that of Mediterranean Fleet to RAN and to bereaved. " s Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941 . Vice-Adm King relinquished command of the 15th Cruiser Squadron to take up an appointmen t at the Admiralty . For a few weeks the squadron was commanded by Capt M . H . A. Kelsey , RN, of Naiad, until Vian assumed command on 1 Nov 1941 . (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip Vian, GCB, KBE, DSO; RN. Comd HMS Cossack 1940-41, 15 Cruiser Sqn 1941-42, 1 Aircraf t Carrier Sqn 1944-45 ; C-in-C Home Fleet 1950-52. B . Kent, Eng, 1894.)
406
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
Nov-Dec
At 4 .25 p .m . on the 25th, when the battle fleet was patrolling between Crete and Cyrenaica, Barham was struck by three torpedoes from a submarine, and blew up with the explosion of a main magazine . Nizam was one of the destroyers on the screen, and with Jervis, Jackal and Hotspu r closed the position, the four ships rescuing some 450 survivors . Barham's captain, 55 officers and 806 men were lost, but Admiral Pridham-Wippell , who was blown overboard by the explosion, was safely recovered b y Hotspur . Nizam and Jervis later attacked what was believed to be a submarine, but without confirmation that it really was such . 5 The cruise r squadrons did not encounter the convoys ; but on the afternoon of the 24th November the Malta surface forces intercepted and sank an enem y convoy of two merchant ships . At the end of the month the Malta forc e was reinforced by Ajax, Neptune, Kimberley and Kingston from Alexandria . On the 14th December the cruiser Galatea 6 was sunk by a submarine , and further blows fell on the 19th December . On the 17th Vian, wit h the 15th Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, including Nizam, was escorting Breconshire from Alexandria with oil fuel for Malta . The enemy wa s simultaneously attempting to pass convoys to North Africa . The Italia n Fleet, of two battleships with cruisers and destroyers, was at sea, and at 5 .45 p .m . was sighted to the westward by Vian's force . Vian detache d Breconshire to the southwards and closed in to attack . After firing a few salvos which straddled the British ships, the enemy retired to the north . Vian thereupon retrieved Breconshire, and shortly after passed her over to the Malta force which had come out to meet him . He returned to Alexandria on the 18th. That day the Italian Fleet turned south again , thus indicating that the enemy convoys would try to reach Africa during the night . The Malta force, the cruisers Neptune, Aurora, Penelope, and destroyers Kandahar, Lance, Lively and Havock, sailed to try to intercept off Tripoli . Early in the morning darkness of the 19th, in wild weathe r and a heavy sea, they ran into an enemy minefield . Neptune and Kandahar were sunk, and Aurora was badly damaged . Neptune sank off Tripoli at about 4 a .m . on the 19th . At just about tha t hour two Italians were found clinging to the bow buoy of Valiant i n Alexandria harbour. They were members of a party of six who ha d managed to enter the harbour on three torpedoes, the explosive heads o f which, fitted with time fuses, they attached to Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, and the tanker Sagona (7,554 tons) . Shortly after 6 a.m . on the 19th, the charges exploded . All three ships and the destroyer Jervis were badly damaged, the two battleships being put out of action for several months. Thus, in less than four weeks the Mediterranean Fleet lost its thre e battleships and was reduced to a small force of cruisers and destroyers . 5 which The loss of Barham was kept secret until 27 Jan 1942 . The responsible submarine was U 331 , was subsequently sunk by aircraft in the Mediterranean on 17 Nov 1942, when he r captain, Freiherr von Tiesenhausen, was captured . HMS Galatea, cruiser (1935), 5,220 tons, six 6-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 .25 kts ; sunk by German submarine off Alexandria, 14 Dec 1941 .
Dec 1941
TO THE FAR EAST
407
Meanwhile events farther afield affected the Mediterranean . On th e 7th December Japan attacked in the Western Pacific, and with a sudde n naval-air blow on Pearl Harbour crippled the United States fleet whe n it was most needed . Not only did the necessity for all possible naval sup port in the Far East defer the day when the Mediterranean could b e reinforced by heavy units and aircraft carriers ; it also made a drain on existing forces there . On the 9th December the Australian Advisory War Council recommended that the British Government be requested to return Hobart and Yarra to the Australia Station, and on the 11th the War Cabinet approve d dispatch of a cablegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affair s asking that urgent instructions be issued to give effect to this request . So far as Hobart was concerned the Admiralty had apparently alread y issued instructions . The cruiser (whose two final operations in the Mediterranean were participation in a bombardment of the Bardia-Tobruk roa d on the 21st November, and the escorting early in December of Breconshire back to Alexandria on her return from the Malta passage mentione d above) sailed from Alexandria on the 9th of the month for the Far East . On the 18th December she arrived at Colombo, after calling at Miniko i in the Maldive Islands to investigate reports of native unrest there . Sh e left Colombo on the 24th December, and escorted troop convoy BM .9A (Devonshire, Lancashire, Varsova, Ethiopia and Rajula 7 ) to Singapore , where she arrived on the 3rd January 1942 . While escorting Breconshire to Alexandria on the 7th December , Hobart intercepted signals from Yarra reporting that she was being attacked by aircraft off Tobruk . Yarra was then on her final Tobru k convoy escort run, in company with the British sloop Flamingo . The air attack she reported was by about thirty-five aircraft, including dive bombers , and in it Flamingo was put out of action by a near miss, and Yarra had to tow her into Tobruk . The Australian sloop returned to Alexandri a on the 9th December, and on the 16th sailed thence for the Far East . She reached Colombo on the 30th December . Other units were also sailed from the Mediterranean for the Far East, among them Napier, Nizam and Nestor. This last-named, after a perio d with Force "H", and spending October and November undergoing engin e repairs in the United Kingdom, returned to Gibraltar on the 16th December . At 10 .50 a .m . on the previous day, when south-west of Cape S t Vincent in company with the destroyers Gurkha, 8 Foxhound and Croome, 9 Nestor sighted a submarine (later identified as U 127 1 ) on the surface . Rosenthal at once turned towards and increased speed, and at 11 a .m . opened fire at 11,000 yards . The submarine submerged, and at 11 .1 5 a .m. Nestor obtained contact and attacked with depth charges . Subse4
Of 11,100, 9,557, 4,701, 5,574 and 8,478 tons respectively . 8 HMS Gurkha, destroyer (1941), 1,920 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 .5 kts; sunk in Eastern Mediterranean, 17 Jan 1942 . 9 HMS Croome, destroyer (1940), 904 tons, four 4-in AA guns, two 21-in torp tubes, 27 .5 kts . 1 U 127, German submarine (1940), 740 tons, six torp tubes, 18 .5 kts ; sunk 15 Dec 1941 .
408
MEDITERRANEAN TO END OF
1941
Oct-Ian
quently a heavy under-water explosion was felt. Oil, and samples o f wreckage and human remains collected by the destroyers, confirmed th e destruction of the submarine, which was credited to Nestor . 2 U 127 was the first submarine to be destroyed during the war by a ship of the Royal Australian Navy, but not the first to be destroyed by a shi p commanded by an Australian officer . On the 4th October 1941 the trawle r H .M .S . Lady Shirley,3 commanded by Lieut-Commander Callaway, 4 en countered a surfaced submarine south-west of the Canary Islands . Th e submarine submerged, was forced to the surface by depth charges, an d then engaged by gun fire . This was so effective that the Germans coul d not man their own gun (though they did bring a machine-gun into action ) and within a few minutes three of the submarine's officers, including th e captain, and five ratings were killed. The surviving senior officer surrendered and gave orders to abandon and scuttle the vessel . Lady Shirley picked up the forty-five survivors, one of whom died. The submarin e had a total complement of 53 ; the Lady Shirley, whose gunlayer was kille d in the action, had little more than half that number . On the 22nd December Nestor sailed from Gibraltar on the screen of the cruiser Dido, which was rejoining the Mediterranean Fleet afte r repairs. Malta was reached on the 24th December, and here convoy ME . 8 (including Nestor's earlier companion Sydney Star) was picked up an d escorted to Alexandria, which was reached on the 29th December. Nesto r then joined the 7th Flotilla with Napier (D)7, and Nizam . The three ships took part in a bombardment of Bardia on the 31st December . On the 3rd January 1942 they sailed from Alexandria and passed throug h the Suez Canal on their way to join the Eastern Fleet . For the first time for over two years there were no ships of the Royal Australian Navy i n the Mediterranean . In Libya the land fighting had gone well for the British . On the 8th December Tobruk was relieved after a siege of 242 days . Derna wa s captured on the 19th of the month and Benghazi on the 24th . But on the 2nd December Hitler had issued " Directive 38" ordering the transfer t o the South Italian and North African area of an Air Fleet and th e necessary air defences released from Russia . These forces were placed under the .command of Field Marshal Kesselring, whose primary task wa s "To achieve air and sea mastery in the area between Southern Italy an d North Africa and thus ensure safe lines of communication with Liby a ! Able Seaman McLeod first sighted the submarine . Sub-Lieut Colclough first confirmed it as such. Able Seamen Healey and Krautz were Asdic operators throughout the attack . Mr Fennessy operated the plot. AB J . V. Healey, DSM, 20854, RAN . HMS Maori 1940 ; HMAS ' s Nestor 1941-42, San Michele 1942, Townsville 1943 . Of Henley Beach, SA ; b. Norwood, SA, 10 Aug 1917 . Ldg Seaman A . M . Krautz, 21095, RAN . HMS Fearless 1939-40 ; HMS Nimrod 1940-41 ; HMAS Nestor 1941-42 . Of Toowoomba, Qld ; b. Toowoomba, 6 Jul 1918 . Instr Cdr R. G . Fennessy, DSC; RAN . HMAS 's Adelaide 1940, Nestor 1941-42, Napier 1942. Of South Yarra, Vic; b. Warrnambool, Vic, 25 Jun 1910. *HMS Lady Shirley, trawler (1937), 472 tons ; sunk with all hands (presumed torpedoed) i n Straits of Gibraltar, 11 Dec 1941 . 4 Lt-Cdr A . H . Callaway, DSO ; RANVR. HMAS Yarra 1939-40 ; HMS's Badger Feb-Mar 1941 , Paragon Mar-Jun 1941. B. Sydney, 3 Apr 1906 ; lost in sinking of HMS Lady Shirley, 11 Dec 1941 .
Jan1942
LOWEST EBB
409
and Cyrenaica" . At a time which, as Cunningham later wrote, found "ou r naval forces in the Mediterranean at their lowest ebb", Kesselring wa s able to achieve his object to a marked degree and to swing the pendulu m of supply to an extent which broke the British hold on Cyrenaica, endangered Malta, and once again made the nourishment of Tobruk a majo r naval problem . For the British the New Year of 1942 came darkly ove r the Mediterranean scene .
CHAPTER
12
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—194 1 N the Australia Station the year 1941 was, in the main, a perio d a major scale in the Far East . Long recognised as a possibility, suc h extension increasingly loomed as a probability as the year progressed , until the storm finally burst in the Pacific in December . Meanwhile, after the German raider attack on Nauru Island on th e 27th December 1940, the Australia Station had remained free from enem y attack until November 1941 . Alarms and false reports were not wantin g however, mainly of sightings of " submarines " ; nor was there lack of evidence of the visits of the raiders the previous year . Scarce a month of 1941 passed without one or more of the mines then laid being swep t up, sighted floating, or found washed ashore on beaches, to a total o f forty-nine .' Most of them were from, and near, the fields laid off the Spencer Gulf, Hobart, Bass Strait, and the New South Wales coas t between Sydney and Newcastle ; but one of the dummy mines laid by Orion in September 1940 off Albany, Western Australia, was in November 1941 washed ashore in King George Sound, and the following mont h a German mine was recovered in Hervey Bay, Queensland . The swept mines were accounted for by the ships of the 20th Minesweeping Flotilla in conjunction with the minesweeping groups based o n the ports in the various areas . Some of the "floaters" were sighted (and in a number of instances destroyed by rifle fire) by coastal merchant ships . One, which was sighted off Montague Island in November 1941, wa s picked up by the auxiliary minesweeper Uki,2 landed on her deck, and brought to port . About a third of the mines were found washed ashore o n beaches and were dealt with by R .M .S . (Rendering Mines Safe) parties from the nearest naval depot . Casualties resulting from enemy mine s in Australian waters during 1941 were fortunately few . Only one vessel was sunk, and a total of nine lives lost . On the 26th March the trawle r Millimumul (287 tons) fishing off the New South Wales coast, fouled an d exploded a mine in her trawl and was lost with seven of her crew ; and on the 14th July two ratings 3 of an R.M .S . party from the Port Adelaide depot were killed when a mine exploded on the beach at Beachport , South Australia . Millimumul sank just on the 100 fathom line thirty mile s due east from Broken Bay and twenty miles S .S .E . from where Nimbin was similarly lost in December 1940 . The mine was sighted in the traw l before it exploded and its condition, heavily covered with marine growth ,
O of building up in preparation for an extension of the war on
1 At the end of 1941 the total of German mines accounted for in Australian waters was 73— 24 in 1940, 49 in 1941 . This was from a total of 234 laid, including the dummies laid b y Orion off Albany, W .A . 2 HMAS Oki, auxiliary minesweeper (1923 ; commnd RAN 1939), 545 tons, one 12-pdr gun, 9 kts . ° AB W. L. E. Danswan, 20548, RAN. HMAS Canberra 1935-Feb 1941 . Of Temora, NSW; b . Temora, 16 Mar 1918 . Killed by mine explosion, 14 Jul 1941 . AB T. W . Todd, PA439, RANK. Of Glanville, SA ; b . Glanville, 18 Apr 1911 . Killed by mine explosion, 14 Jul 1941 .
1940-42
NEW CORVETTES
41 1
indicated that it came from a field as old as that which sank Nimbin . The Beachport mine was probably from the Spencer Gulf field . At intervals during the year's sweeping operations the 20th Flotilla wa s joined for varying periods by new corvettes, fourteen of which, buil t under the Government 's naval building program, came into commissio n in 1941 . 4 It will be recalled that at June 1940 the naval shipbuilding progra m included 17 corvettes ; seven for the R .A .N . and 10 on Admiralty account . The following August this program was expanded . In that month th e Naval Board told the Government that it considered a minimum of 5 9 local defence. vessels for minesweeping and anti-submarine work wa s then essential "in the light of the present position in Europe and as a n assurance against the possibility of Japanese intervention" . Of this number 34 were already approved, seven corvettes and 27 vessels requisitione d from the coastal trade . It was proposed, and approved, that a furthe r 17 corvettes be built for the R .A .N ., bringing the total to 24 ; and tha t eight more coastal traders be requisitioned for local work, making the requisitioned total 35 . In addition, a further 10 corvettes were ordered for Admiralty account and four for the Royal Indian Navy, so that i n August 1940 the corvette building program was for 48 vessels, 20 o f which were for the Admiralty .° The requisitioning of another nine coasta l vessels for minesweeping° was approved in February 1941, and th e following July the naval shipbuilding program was again expanded by the inclusion of 12 additional corvettes (bringing the total up to 60, a t which it remained) and six of a new and larger type known as frigates . The old terms "Corvette" and "Frigate " were revived by the Admiralty in 1940 and 1942 respectively to meet the need for some designation of new warship types brought into being by the changing conditions of sea warfare. The prototype of the corvette had been called "whaler" which was, Churchill pointed out, "an entire misnomer as they are not going to catch whales " . The Australian corvettes were of 650 tons, mostl y armed with a 4-inch gun (though some had a 12-pounder as main armament) and light anti-aircraft guns, and had a speed of 151 knots . They were named after Australian towns . The Australian frigates were of 1,42 0 tons, armed with two 4-inch guns and light anti-aircraft guns, and with a speed of 20 knots . They were named after Australian rivers . In the war of 1939-45, as in the previous world conflict, the shortag e of merchant ship tonnage quickly became a matter of concern to Australia . Preliminary moves towards the establishment of a merchant ship 4 Lismore (Jan) ; Goulburn (Feb) ; Burnie (Apr) ; Bendigo (May) ; Lithgow, Maryborough (Jun) ; Mildura (July) ; Ballarat (Aug) ; Warrnambool (Sep) ; Wollongong, Toowoomba (Oct) ; Delorain e (Nov) ; Katoomba, Townsville (Dec) . The months are those of commissioning . Of these, Goulburn, Burnie, Lithgow, Maryborough, Mildura, Ballarat and Warrnambool operated at som e time or another with the 20th Flotilla during 1941 . 6 The corvettes built on Admiralty account were : Bathurst, Ballarat, Bendigo, Broome, Burnie,
Cairns, Cessnock, Gawler, Geraldton, Goulburn, Ipswich, Kalgoorlie, Launceston, Maryborough, Pirie, Tamworth, Toowoomba, Whyalla, Wollongong .
6 During
Lismore,
1941 the following auxiliary minesweepers, requisitioned from trade, were commissioned : Toorie, Terka (Jan) ; Coombar (Apr) ; Paterson, Bombo (May) ; Narani (Jun) ; Birchgrove Park (Aug) ; Allenwood, Kianga, Warrawee (Sep) ; Marrawah (Dec) .
412
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
1939-41
building industry had been made before the outbreak of war, and in June 1939 the Tariff Board reported on the establishment of a bount y for shipbuilding. The matter was carried a step further in April 194 0 when the Full Cabinet considered a submission from the Department o f Trade and Customs, based upon a report by A. R . Townsend , on th e possibilities and problems of merchant ship construction in Australia . Th e Cabinet referred the matter to a sub-committee which the following mont h recommended the construction of standard ships as soon as possible . Other urgent matters, including the increase in naval building, tended t o crowd out the question of merchant ship construction, but towards the end of 1940 the Third Naval Member of the Naval Board (Engineer Rear Admiral McNeil) presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum on th e position of shipbuilding and the possibility of future developments . H e stated that if action were taken immediately it should be possible to hav e five or six berths equipped for merchant shipbuilding with the taperin g off of the naval construction program towards the end of 1941 . Arising from these preliminary moves a Shipbuilding Board was established i n March 1941, with McNeil as deputy chairman and Director of Ship building while retaining his position on the Naval Board . As the beginning of a program which was subsequently recast in the light of events, order s were placed for eight ships, each of 9,300 tons deadweight . The keel o f the first of these, the River Clarence, was laid at Cockatoo Island Dock yard on the 29th July 1941 . 8 The combined naval and merchant shipbuilding programs as they stoo d in July 1941 were then estimated to absorb all building facilities availabl e in Australia until around the end of 1943, so that the Naval Board foun d it impossible to undertake further naval construction for the Admiralt y and the Royal Indian Navy, though that had been sought . The prospect of meagre shipping space for exports made merchant ship construction i n Australia (as Mr Menzies told the War Cabinet in May 1941 on his return from Britain) " appear to be an essential corollary both from the practica l and political angles " . In addition to new construction work, Australian shipyards during th e war up to September 1941 fitted 214 ships with defensive armament, 216 with paravanes, and degaussed 198 vessels .9 The naval building program naturally called for an increase in th e numbers of officers and men in the R .A .N . to man the ships as they commissioned . This applied not only to the vessels intended for the R .A .N . , but also to the twenty corvettes being built for the Admiralty, as it ha d 7 A. R . Townsend, OBE . Chief Investigation Offr, Customs Dept, and C' wealth Govt Shipping , Cotton, Tobacco and Sugar Adviser . Of Canberra ; b . Brunswick, Vic, 3 Mar 1891 . Died 24 Apr 1944. 8 Known as "River" class freighters, eight of these vessels were completed before the end of th e war : one at Cockatoo Island Dockyard ; one at Williamstown Dockyard ; 2 at Evans, Deakin' s yard at Brisbane ; and 4 at the yard of the Broken Hill Pty at Whyalla . For details of merchant shipbuilding see S . J . Butlin, War Economy (in this history) . 6 Degaussing was a method of demagnetising ships by fitting coils which could be electricall y charged and thus counter the magnetism generated in the vessels when building . It was a safeguard against magnetic mines. Ships defensively armed were : British and Allied 171, Australia n 43 ; equipped with paravanes : British and Allied 132, Australian 84 ; degaussed : British an d Allied 120, Australian 78 .
1 94 1
RECRUITING
41 3
been agreed that the R .A .N. would man these . In addition, while Mr Menzies was in Britain early in 1941, it was proposed to him that th e Australian Navy might be prepared to man a further three "N" clas s destroyers, making a flotilla of eight of this class . This was agreed to i n July 1941, 1 when it was estimated that a regular monthly intake of 40 0 recruits (which rate had been decided upon by the Naval Board i n December 1940) would achieve an expansion sufficient to meet all manning requirements then visualised . Recruiting offices had been opened in capital cities in all States, and in March 1941 an Inspector of Nava l Recruiting 2 was appointed . His headquarters were at Navy Office, and h e was responsible for the general organisation of recruiting, including publicity. By September 1941 the R.A .N . had 68 ships in commission (excluding those manned for the R .N . and classified as H .M . Australian Ships ) ranging from cruisers to a tug . Mobilised strength was 19,740 officers an d men. Of this number 8,640 were in H .M .A . Ships on the Australia Station ; 3,500 were in H .M .A . Ships overseas ; 300 were in H .M . arme d merchant cruiser Kanimbla ; 900 were on special service in the Roya l Navy 3 and in defensively armed merchant ships ; and 6,400 were i n Australian shore establishments, including wireless stations, boom defenc e depots, war signal stations, base staffs, and recruits under training . In order to balance numbers in the permanent service at post-war complements, all recruits were, as a wartime measure, entered through th e Royal Australian Naval Reserve, and signed an agreement for the duration of hostilities instead of the customary twelve years ' engagement . A quota system operated as between the various States . Recruits whe n entered were drafted to Flinders Naval Depot where they received twenty weeks' intensive training, after which they could be drafted to sea fo r additional training under practical conditions . There was no shortage o f applicants, and recruiting offices in all States had waiting lists and unmobilised pools . The limiting factors controlling the rate of intake wer e In the event only two additional RN destroyers were manned by the RAN, Quiberon and Quickmatch . By the time Australian agreement to man the three extra ships was received, th e Admiralty had allocated all the "N" class, Napier, Nizam, Nestor, Norman and Nepal to th e RAN and two to the Dutch and one to the Poles. The Admiralty then proposed that the RA N should instead man three "M" class vessels, Meteor, Musketeer and Myrmidon, due to complet e about the middle of 1942. There was however difficulty regarding the supply of ammunition in the Far East to these ships (stocks of their type not being carried) and in January 1942 th e Admiralty proposed that the RAN should instead man three "Q's" completing contemporaneously , Quiberon, Quickmatch and Quality, ships which "have an endurance approximately 15% greate r than that of the class destroyers and are therefore exceptionally well suited to the lon g ocean passages involved in Far Eastern waters" . The Naval Board concurred in this proposa l in January 1942, but the following March told the Admiralty that they now found difficulty in providing sufficient ratings to man all three destroyers, and suggested manning Quibero n and Quickmatch only. The Admiralty agreed . Conditions governing the commitment to man the five destroyers and the 20 corvettes were : The Commonwealth accepted the liability for the pay and allowances of the crews, but th e Admiralty provided the ships and retained entire liability for their maintenance . They were commissioned as HM Australian Ships . 2 Cdr O . A . Jones, RD ; RNR . (HMS Donegal 1914-18 .) Inspector of Naval Recruiting RAN 1941-45 . Of Double Bay, NSW; b. Highbury, Eng, 15 Jun 1893 . $ Up to September 1941 the RAN supplied the RN with 96 Reserve officers and 172 Reserve ratings with limited anti-submarine qualifications ; and had recruited for the RN and sent to th e United Kingdom 160 officers and 200 ratings brought in under the "Yachtsmen Scheme " — selected from men with yachting experience .
414
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Feb-Oct
primarily lack of experienced instructors and of accommodation in sea going ships for the practical training of recruits . The expansion in numbers (manning the destroyers and corvettes fo r the R .N . alone involved some 3,000 officers and men) necessitated th e provision of increased accommodation and training facilities at the naval depots in the various States and at Flinders ; and the numbers of both uniformed and civil base staffs, in the States and at Navy Office, gre w rapidly . Among other naval works the building of large new blocks progressed at Flinders Naval Depot ; and in February 1941 approval wa s given to the construction of a new naval depot at Balmoral, Sydney ; 4 and in July to the building of a naval base at Fremantle . On the 1st March 1941 the main administrative departments at Navy Office move d into a commodious new four-storey building (which they hencefort h shared with the Air Force central administration) in the Victoria Barrack s compound in St Kilda Road, Melbourne . 5 The uniform of the naval rating was now familiar in the seapor t cities of the Commonwealth, especially in Sydney and Melbourne, wher e were the greatest concentrations, at Sydney as the main fleet base, and a t Melbourne because of the proximity of Flinders Naval Depot . To an extent ratings suffered by reason of their uniforms, and it was found tha t certain of the leading hotels and some other establishments such as mor e expensive dance halls, refused them accommodation or admission . Naval Intelligence Officers sent to interview offending proprietors and manager s were met with specious explanations such as : the rule was "dress", an d naval ratings wore no collars or ties ; or the ban was really in the interes t of ratings, who would feel uncomfortable in the presence of officers . This offensive practice, by means of which some individuals took it upon themselves to deprive volunteers in the naval service of their citizen rights , was by no means widespread, but was sufficiently prevalent to merit notic e and protest by the Director of Naval Intelligence . The catering, with accommodation and food, to the needs of larg e numbers of ratings from distant States on week-end leave in Melbourn e and Sydney, constituted a problem which was largely met by voluntar y effort on the part of interested citizens . Naval pay was not high, and at the outbreak of war ranged in the Seaman Branch from is 9d a da y for an Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class, under 17 years of age, to 7s a da y for an Able Seaman and lls a day for a Chief Petty Officer, with slightl y higher rates for tradesmen .° In October 1941 these rates were increase d by is a day to meet increased cost of living, and there was a furthe r The Balmoral depot commissioned as HMAS Penguin II in July 1942 . It housed a pool draw n upon for urgent fleet requirements, and for various duties around Sydney . 6 Through its Victualling Dept the RAN supplied large quantities of victualling stores to Admiralt y victualling yards at Alexandria, Singapore, Colombo, Capetown and Durban, and to the Wa r Board, India . Up to September 1941 the value of stores so supplied since the outbreak o f war in 1939 was £1,797,000 . The RAN also supplied provisions to the AIF abroad to th e value of £208,000, until this service was taken over by the Army . 6 For example a Chief Mechanician, 1st Class ; a Chief Engine Room Artificer, 1st Class ; a Chief Shipwright, 1st Class ; received 14s 6d a day . All married ratings qualified for a marriag e allowance of 4s 6d a day for a wife, and, for children, daily allowances of 3s for the first , 2s for the second, and is 6d each for any others .
1940-42
WOMEN ENROLLED
41 5
similar increase of 6d a day in August 1942 . Ratings, however, ha d generally little money to spend on necessities on week-end leave . In Sydney a naval centre where inexpensive accommodation and food coul d be obtained had for long been in existence ; and in July 1940 Admira l Colvin arranged at his home a preliminary meeting of persons intereste d in accumulating a naval fund, part of which would go to the establishment of a similar hostel in Melbourne . The result was the establishment of th e Royal Australian Naval Patriotic Committee under the chairmanship o f Mr D . York Syme, a prominent Melbourne shipowner, with Mr R . Collins, a brother of Captain Collins, as honorary secretary . Premises wer e secured in the Western Market at the south-east corner of the Collins William streets intersection, and "Navy House" was opened on 18th October 1940 . Under the guidance of the committee, and staffed entirely by devoted voluntary women workers, it functioned throughout the wa r supplying low-priced accommodation and food to naval ratings, 7 an d providing an invaluable service . The expansion in numbers in naval service had a further effect, a short age of trained telegraphists which led to the enrolment of women an d ultimately to the establishment of the Women's Royal Australian Nava l Service . The suggestion that women might be enrolled as telegraphists ha d its genesis in the work of the Women's Emergency Signalling Corps, a voluntary organisation inaugurated in Sydney in 1939 by Mrs F . V . McKenzie . $ In response to a naval newspaper advertisement appealin g for radio amateurs to enlist as telegraphists, Mrs McKenzie in December 1940 wrote to the Minister for the Navy (Mr Hughes) offering the service s of members of the Women's Emergency Signalling Corps . The followin g month Commander Newman, 9 Director of Signals and Communications , examined some members of the corps and found them highly proficien t in wireless telegraphy procedure, and recommended to the Naval Boar d that they be employed at port war signal stations and other shore establishments . This recommendation was supported by Commodore MuirheadGould, Commodore-in-Charge, Sydney .' The Naval Board agreed in principle, and on the 18th April 1941 Mr Hughes approved the employment o f twelve telegraphists and two attendants—selected from the Women' s Emergency Signalling Corps—for duty at Harman wireless station, Canberra . These first fourteen of a branch ultimately to reach a peak wartim e establishment of 105 officers and 2,518 ratings engaged in many activitie s + Scales of charges were : bed and breakfast, is 6d; dinner (roast lamb, green peas, potatoes , fruit salad and cream) 9d ; tea or coffee, Id ; milk, 2d ; plate of soup, 3d ; eggs and bacon, 6d . From its establishment in October 1940 until it was closed in July 1946, Navy House provide d 214,607 beds, and 659,857 meals to ratings in Melbourne . s Mrs F. V. McKenzie, OBE, founded in 1939 and directed the Women 's Emergency Signalling Corps, which trained 1,000 girl telegraphists for the Services and gave instruction to som e 12,000 servicemen during the war . Electrical engineer ; of Sydney ; b . Melbourne. u Capt J . B . Newman, RAN . (HMS Canada, 1917 .) Specialised in signals. In 1939 appointe d Officer-in-Charge Shore Wireless Stations and Director of Naval Communications, Navy Office , where he remained throughout the war . Supt Weapons Research Estab, Woomera, since 1954 . Of Melbourne ; b. Geelong, Vic, 14 May 1899. 1 Rear-Adm G . C . MuIrhead-Gould, DSC ; RN. Cmdre-in-Charge, Sydney, and Principal Se a Transport Officer, NSW, 1 Apr 1940-19 Mar 1942 when promoted to Rear-Admiral and continued with title Flag-Officer-in-Charge Sydney and PSTO, NSW, until Sep 1944, when reverted to Roya l Navy . Was Naval Attache, Berlin, 1933-36 . B . London, 29 May 1889. Died 26 Jun 1945 .
416
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
194042
and serving in all mainland naval centres, took up their duties at Harma n on the 28th April 1941 . By the end of the year the W .R .A .N .S . establishment had grown to about fifty communications ratings, most of the m brought in from the original Sydney source . It was not until Octobe r 1942 that general recruiting for W .R .A .N .S ., to be employed in a variety of duties, was opened in all States . The year 1941 saw also the birth of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol . This organisation had its genesis in a suggestion by Captain Burnett , Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, in December 1940 (arising from th e German raider activity at Nauru) that use be made of yachts and yachts men on a volunteer basis to supplement patrols of swept channels and harbour anchorages . There were at the time three volunteer yachtsmen 's organisations in existence, two in Sydney which were employed in providin g security patrols in the harbour in conjunction with the State police, an d one at Maryborough, Queensland, which, though not actively employed , was eager to provide similar service . Of the Sydney organisations, th e Volunteer Coast Patrol and the National Emergency Service Yachtsmen' s Auxiliary, the first named was of longer standing . It was founded during 1936 by a young Sydney business man, Harold Nobbs, 2 a patrioti c and enthusiastic yachtsman with a profound knowledge of, and connection s along, the Sydney waterfront . He suggested its formation to Commander Long, then Staff Officer (Intelligence), Sydney . Nobbs proposed formin g a group of yachtsmen who might be debarred, by age or inability t o pass the medical tests, from volunteering for any of the Services in th e event of war. This group would provide boats and crews for harbour an d coastal defence purposes, on a voluntary, spare-time basis . Long endeavoured, unsuccessfully at the time, to interest the naval authorities in this proposal . Nobbs and his supporters went ahead with an organisatio n which they named the Volunteer Coastal Patrol, and approached Captai n Blackwood, a retired officer of the Royal Navy, to lead and train th e organisation . On this basis it went ahead, and in May 1941 had a membership of approximately 400, with subsidiary organisations at 29 out ports in New South Wales, while tentative arrangements had been mad e for its establishment in 22 outports in Victoria and one in Queensland . Members were trained in elementary navigation, signalling, seamanshi p and first aid, and some 200 vessels were on the register . In June 194 1 the Naval Board agreed to the formation of an organisation based on tha t of the Volunteer Coastal Patrol, and to be known as the Naval Auxiliar y Patrol . A member of the Volunteer Coastal Patrol 3 was enrolled as lieu tenant in the R .A .N .V .R . to act as liaison officer and build up the organisation, which would operate on an entirely voluntary and honorary basis in coastal waters . As a preliminary step, recruiting officers wer e a Lt H. W. G . Nobbs, RANVR . Special Intell Duties and with Security Services 1941-45 . Company director ; of Manly, NSW; b . Toronto, Canada, 7 Dec 1908 .
a
Lt R . H . W. Power, RANVR. Plans Division, Navy Office, 1941-44 . Of Sydney; b . Auckland , NZ, 5 May 1894 . The Naval Auxiliary Patrol was disbanded at the end of the war, but the Volunteer Coasta l Patrol was then reorganised on its original basis, and as such grew in strength .
1940-41
COLVIN RETIRES
41 7
appointed in Melbourne and Sydney . By the end of the year the organisation was in process of formation at a number of mainland ports and in Tasmania. 4 The year witnessed changes in the Naval Board . At the end of December 1940 Commodore Boucher, who had been Second Naval Member sinc e May 1939, reverted to the Royal Navy and was succeeded by Commodore Durnford,5 a British officer who had seen service in command in th e war of 1914-18 and also in the war now being fought . He had also good knowledge of the R .A .N . in which he served on exchange for four year s from 1928 to 1932, during part of that time commanding the destroye r flotilla . He was bluff and forthright, easily approachable, and sympatheti c to the Australian outlook. In April 1941 membership of the Board was expanded by the appointment of Mr Brain, 6 a Melbourne company directo r and secretary, as Business Member . In July Admiral Colvin, on whom the strain of four strenuous year s as First Naval Member had told, retired owing to ill health . He had done good service for Australia and the R .A .N ., and it was largely due to his recommendation that the ships should experience overseas wa r service that, by the time of his retirement, every ship of size in the R .A .N . had used its guns in action, and a large proportion of officer s and men in the navy had gained actual and invaluable experience unde r the new conditions of air-sea warfare . He had informed the Governmen t in February 1941 of the necessity for his retirement on medical advice , and negotiations were opened with the Admiralty regarding his successor . In the succeeding months prior to his relief he led the Australian delegation to the American-Dutch-British conferences at Singapore in April . During his absence from Australia, and from his office owing to il l health, Durnford acted as First Naval Member, and Captain Crane,7 Captain Superintendent of Training, acted as Second Naval Member . Colvin, succeeded as First Naval Member and Chief of the Naval Staf f on 18th July 1941 by Vice-Admiral Royle, 8 returned to Britain . A t Colvin 's final attendance at a War Cabinet meeting on the 10th July 1941 , l Conditions under which the NAP was established were : It would be recruited on an entirel y voluntary basis, would be controlled by its own officers, and members could wear authorise d uniform while on duty, they themselves providing uniforms and badges at their own expense . The NAP would operate with the official approval of the Naval Board . The Department of th e Navy would bear the cost of any alterations or special equipment to fit vessels for specia l duty ; but generally speaking the allowable costs would be limited to the provision of fuel an d oil consumed on duty . Enrolment and service with the NAP would not release a member fro m any obligation for service under the laws of the Commonwealth . Subsequently a number of th e yachts were chartered or purchased outright by the navy; and in April 1943 the NAP was transferred to the RANVR; all members were medically examined and fit men were mobilised . Those not medically fit could continue as unmobilised members . 6 Vice-Adm J . W . Durnford, CB ; RN . (Comd destroyers 1914-18.) On loan to RAN 1928-32, when executive officer Adelaide, Albatross, Brisbane, and commanded Aust destroyer flotilla . CSO Malta 1937-39 ; comd HMS Suffolk 1939-40 ; 2nd Naval Member ACNB 1940-42 ; com d HMS Resolution 1942-43 ; Dir of Naval Training, Admiralty, 1944-47. Of London ; b. 25 Oct 1891 . 6 H . G. Brain, OBE, MSM . (1st AIF : Pte 31 Bn 1915, capt and DAAG 1918 .) Chairman , Baillieu Education Trusts ; Business Member, Aust Naval Board, 1941-42 and 1944-46 ; DAQMG VDC, Vic, 1943-46 . Of Elsternwick, Vic ; b. Toorak, Vic, 3 Dec 1890. Cmdre H. B . Crane, CBE ; RN . On loan to RAN as Capt Supt of Training 1939-41 ; comd HMS Birmingham 1941-43 ; Cmdre RN Barracks, Sydney, 1944-45 . B. 19 Jun 1894. 6 Admiral Sir Guy Boyle, KCB, CMG; RN . Naval Attache British Embassy, Tokyo, 1924-27 ; comd HMS Glorious (aircraft carrier) 1932-34 ; Naval Secretary to 1st Lord of Admiralty 193437 ; Vice-Adm comdg Aircraft Carriers 1937-39 ; 5th Sea Lord 1940-41 ; Chief of Naval Air Services 1939-41 ; 1st Naval Member and CNS 1941-45 . B . 1885 . Died 4 Jan 1954.
418
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Aug-Oct
the Prime Minister referred to the value placed by the War Cabine t on his rich and varied experience in naval matters, "particularly his wis e views on strategy, which had always been expressed with the greates t frankness" . With his retirement his services were not entirely lost to Australia, and soon after his arrival in England in October 1941, h e was appointed naval adviser to the Australian High Commissioner in London. Colvin's successor, Vice-Admiral Royle, was a British officer of wide experience, both operational and administrative, and with an outstandin g record . He knew the Japanese, having been British Naval Attache in Tokyo 1924-1927 ; he specialised in naval aviation, and had commande d aircraft carriers in peace and war ; his immediately preceding appointmen t was administrative, that of Fifth Sea Lord on the Board of Admiralt y where he represented the Royal Navy's aviation interests . He came to Australia a sick man, temporarily mentally exhausted from a period o f considerable strain overseas, to shoulder increasing burdens . A political crisis during August and September 1941 resulted, firs t in the removal of Mr Menzies from leadership of the Government, an d then in the defeat of the Government in the House of Representatives . On the 3rd October a Labour government assumed office at Canberra , with Mr Curtin as Prime Minister . Mr Makin' succeeded Mr Hughe s as Minister for the Navy . One result of the changes, both of nationa l and naval administrations, was a gradual shift of emphasis away from the navy in the Australian war effort, with its voice carrying less weight in policy-shaping deliberations . Coming events were to give prominence t o the naval air weapon, the success of which, in Japanese hands in a serie s of spectacular naval engagements, tended to obscure the fact that th e success was due to the use of the weapon as an adjunct to the naval surface weapons, and not to some quality in the air weapon which mad e those surface weapons obsolete . Hitherto in the war the record of th e Royal Australian Navy had been one of almost unbroken successe s enhanced by almost complete freedom from casualties . In the immediatel y forthcoming months losses, both of ships and men, were to be heavy and unmitigated by compensating triumph in action . Lacking Colvin' s experience in the Australian political field, and the status he had held as a n adviser both during the immediate pre-war years and the war years of nava l prosperity, Royle, in his tired condition, was handicapped in combatin g fallacious arguments which represented air power as a decisive weapon i n itself, and not as an addition to existing land and sea weapons ; and in consequence was also handicapped in upholding the navy ' s prestige with th e Government . In the circumstances, his association with the Governmen t was less happy than that of his predecessor with the previous administration . There were also changes, and expansion, in the Naval Staff, which ha d been reorganised in May 1940 with the establishment of Operations an d ; Speaker 1929-31 ; Min for Navy and for i Hon N . J . O . Makin . MHR 1919-46 and since 1954 . Aust Ambassador to USA 1946-51 . Of WoodMunitions 1941-43, for Aircraft Producn 1945-46 ville, SA ; b . Petersham, NSW, 31 Mar 1889 .
1923-41
MINING POLICY
41 9
Plans Divisions, and the appointment of Directors thereof. Commander Burrell became the first Director of Operations, and Commander Martin 2 of Plans . 3 The appointment of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff wa s advanced to that of Deputy Chief. In May 1941, Captain Burnett, wh o held the position up to then, was appointed in command of H .M .A .S . Sydney vice Captain Collins . He was succeeded at Navy Office by Captain Getting from Kanimbla . II In many directions work proceeded to bring the country's naval defence s to the best possible state to meet a threat in the Pacific . During 194 1 preliminary excavation went ahead on the capital ship graving dock i n Sydney (eliciting vehement protest from sections of the Potts Point community who objected to a naval base in proximity to their homes), an d towards the end of the year the construction of the coffer-dam by th e Sydney Maritime Services Board was well advanced . At that time a pro gram of work provided that the dock should be ready to take a shi p in August 1944 . By September 1941 seaward defences were establishe d or under construction at Fremantle, Sydney and Darwin . Indicator loops were installed and operating at these ports ; and in January 1941 an antitorpedo boom was launched and secured at Fremantle . At Darwin th e main section of the boom was completed, and an anti-submarine net wa s being laid . In addition to boom defences, a naval mining policy was, in Septembe r 1940, submitted to the War Cabinet, and approved . As early as 1923 the Admiralty recommended to the Naval Board that naval mines should b e manufactured in Australia. 4 No action resulted for some time, though th e subject was kept alive by repeated suggestions from the Admiralty ; an d in December 1937 it was still stated, in reply to a request from th e Admiralty, that the manufacture of mines in Australia was not the n possible, but the position would be reviewed within twelve months . During that period negotiations proceeded with the Ford Manufacturing Company of Australia for the production of complete units, mineshells an d sinkers, at an annexe to the company's works at Geelong, Victoria ; an d in October 1939 an agreement with that company was signed . The following month the first order for 500 mines was placed . In April 1940 (i n which month the Admiralty placed an order for 500 mines) it was decide d to prepare plans for normal defensive minefields to meet a possible Eastern 2
Cdr W . H. Martin, RAN . Comd HMAS Moresby 1939 and 1940 ; Dir of Plans 1940 ; Officer-in Charge Hydrographic Dept 1941 . Of Robertson, NSW; b. Robertson, 18 Feb 1903. Lost in sinking of HMAS Perth, 1 Mar 1942 .
$ The Director of Operations was responsible for trade defence, troop convoys and cover, movements, local defence (operational), naval control and examination services, and general curren t staff problems . The Director of Plans was responsible for war plans, training policy and th e use of weapons, local defence policy including anti-submarine and minesweeping vessels an d equipment, minelaying, booms, asdics, and liaison with the army and air force . Later an officer solely responsible for navigational problems was included in the Operations Division . • At that time responsibility for defensive submarine minelaying rested with the army. It was not until January 1924 that the Council of Defence decided that submarine minelaying i n Australia would be regarded as a naval liability .
420
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
1940-4 1
war, and in September a mining policy was approved by the War Cabinet , who approved also of the immediate requisitioning of a 3,000-ton merchan t ship as a minelayer . The coastal vessel Bungaree6 was taken up in Octobe r 1940 and put in hand for conversion to a minelayer with a capacity o f 423 mines ready to lay . She commissioned on the 9th June 1941 unde r Commander Calder . ? In July the Admiralty ordered another 1,000 mines . During August 1941 Bungaree laid the first defensive minefield at Por t Moresby ; and in October and November laid additional fields in Torre s Strait and in passages through the Barrier Reef . By September mine production was approaching 3,000 units a year, and orders had been place d for 2,500 for the R .A .N ., 1,500 for the Admiralty, and 300 and 10 0 respectively for New Zealand and Noumea . It will be recalled that in the early months of the war Area Combine d Headquarters (A .C .H .) were established at Melbourne and Port Moresb y for coordination of operational control in joint naval, military, and ai r operations ; more especially (at that stage) joint operations by the navy and air force in defence of sea communications . In August 1940 thi s organisation was amended by the establishment of a Combined Operationa l Intelligence Centre (C .O .I .C .), on a recommendation of the Joint Planning Committee which was ratified by the Defence Committee . 8 Th e primary duty of the C .O .I .C . was "to collate and consider operationa l intelligence received from all sources and to submit the same with appropriate appreciations thereon" . In its early stages C .O .I .C . worked as a committee of three officers representing respectively the Director of Nava l Intelligence, the Director of Operations and Intelligence, Air Board, an d the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence . This committee , which held its first meeting on the 16th October 1940, met daily at 1 0 a .m . "and at other times on the receipt of urgent operational intelligence" . Otherwise its members carried on their normal duties as Intelligence officer s for their respective Services . Senior of the three by rank was the ai r force representative, Wing Commander Malley, 9 and he was elected chair man of the C .O .I .C . Committee, which met in the Air Intelligence roo m at the Victoria Barracks, Melbourne . This arrangement had serious shortcomings from the point of view o f Commander Long, Director of Naval Intelligence . At this stage the opera "HMAS Bungaree, auxiliary minelayer (1937), 3,155 tons, two 4-in guns, 423 mines, 11 kts . 7 Cdr N. K . Calder, OBE ; RAN . Entd Royal Aust Naval College 1913 (HMS Royal Sovereign 1917) . DNO, NSW, 1939; comd HMAS Bungaree 1941-43 ; Dep Dir Naval Ordnance, Torpedo and Mines, 1943-45 . Of Melbourne ; b. Geelong, Vic, 17 Nov 1899 . In a report on the manufacture of mines and on the defensive mining of Australian waters , Calder subsequently wrote : "Mining had never been seriously considered by the Aust Comm Naval Board until 1940 and even then the local manufacture of mines was established purel y on Admiralty initiative and for Admiralty requirements outside Australia . It may be assume d that, without this Admiralty requirement, there would have been no Australian minelaying i n the 1939-45 war . " s Joint Planning Committee, composed of the Deputy Chiefs of the three Services . Defence Committee, composed of the three Chiefs of Staff and an officer of the Defenc e Department Secretariat, and able to consult with the Controller-General of Munitions, the Con troller of Civil Aviation, and the Chairman of the Principal Supply Officers' Committee . s Gp Capt G. F . Malley, MC, AFC . (1st AIF : 1 Art Bde and 4 Sqn Aust Flying Corps .) Aviatio n adviser to Chinese Govt 1930-40 ; Dir of Combined Opnl Intell RAAF 1942-44 ; SO i/c Chinese Section, Aust Security Service, 1944-45 . Warehouse manager; of Mosman, NSW ; b. Mosman , 2 Nov 1893,
1940-41
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
42 1
tional war as it affected the Australian mainland was that against surfac e raiders only . The Army directorate was "Operations and Intelligence " (D .M .O. and I), and its main duty was domestic. The Air Force directorate also was "Operations and Intelligence" (D.A .O . and I), and th e intelligence side had not been developed . On the other hand the Naval Intelligence Division was long established, was a separate directorate, an d was a direct branch of British Admiralty Intelligence with its world-wide network . Practically all the intelligence received by C .O .I .C . was naval in origin and importance, a great deal of it from the Admiralty dealin g with the future movements of naval and other important ships and of no concern to other Services, to which, by this method of operating C .O .I .C . , it became too widely and freely available . Also the situation arose of a wing commander, R .A .A .F ., deciding the distribution and action necessar y on naval intelligence . These were conditions which jeopardised the continued receipt of intelligence from the Admiralty . Long protested unavailingly, and in November 1940 the Joint Plannin g Committee, by direction of the Defence Committee, proceeded to make a comprehensive review of the machinery required for the coordinated control of operations and intelligence . Before this review was completed however, came the German raider attack on the ships at Nauru . As a result of this, Admiral Colvin instructed Long to detail immediately thre e officers for operational intelligence duties ; they were to have no other duties, to keep continuous watch, and to report their findings direct to Long as Director of Naval Intelligence . The officers were appointed ) and started their duties on that day in special C .O .I .C . accommodation made available in the Naval Intelligence Division . C .O .I .C . thus became virtually a naval full-time organisation in which, for some months, the army an d air force representatives continued to meet for a few minutes only eac h day . 2 By agreement with the Directors of Intelligence of the other tw o Services Long assumed responsibility for its organisation and administration, and in January 1941 he became, in addition to Director of Nava l Intelligence, the first Director, Combined Operational Intelligence Centre . In January 1941 the Joint Planning Committee completed its review , its proposals being broadly the establishment of a Central War Roo m 1 Lt-Cdr (later Cdr) J . M. Luke, RAN . Entd RAN College 1916 (HMAS
Brisbane 1920) . Resigned 1930 at time of naval retrenchment . Joined C'wealth Public Service, and placed on naval Emergency List . Mobilised 1939 as Lt-Cdr and appointed to Naval •Intell Div . Apptd COIC Dec 1940, Director COIC GHQ SWPA Aug 1944 . Demobilised Aug 1946 and apptd Naval Hist Research Officer, NID, Melbourne. B . 21 Feb 1902 . Pay Lt (later Cdr) G . J . Brooksbank, VRD ; RANVR. Of Melbourne ; b. St Kilda, Vic, 29 Jan 1907 . Pay Sub-Lt (later Lt-Cdr) G . J . Connor, RANVR . Of Middle Brighton, Vic ; b . Clifton Hill , Vic, 21 Jan 1913 . From 4 p.m . on 18 Dec 1940 until noon on 23 Aug 1945 when COIC, then in Luzon , Northern Philippines, under the directorship of Cdr Luke, completed its task, continuous watc h was kept by an officer of the Australian Naval Intelligence DIvision . Luke and Connor served with COIC throughout. The RAAF appointed W Cdr Malley a full-time officer (day duty only) in COIC in Ma r 1941, and the following month appointed two more full-time officers who from then on, wit h Malley, maintained 24-hour watches with one always on duty with the Navy . In Apr 1941 the Army detailed four officers for COIC duties . Each took a duty 24 hours of which only one hour was actually spent in COIC . For the rest of the time they carried out their norma l Military Intelligence duties by day, and were available by telephone at night . The Army continued this practice until Japan entered the war in Dec 1941, when they appointed full-tim e watch keepers .
422
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Jan-Jun e
in Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, for the exclusive use of the Chiefs o f Staff ; a C .O .I .C. as adjunct thereto ; the establishment of Area Combined Headquarters at Melbourne, Fremantle, Darwin and Townsville (this last-named replacing Port Moresby) ; and of Combined Defence Headquarters and C .O .I .C's for each Army Covering Force Area in whic h defended ports were situated, these including the four A .C .H . ports above . 3 Recommended by the Defence Committee, these proposals were approve d by the War Cabinet in February 1941 and (after some discussion on th e desirability of the substitution of Sydney for Melbourne as A .C .H . South Eastern Area, which was decided in favour of Melbourne) were put int o effect . By the middle of 1941 the general network was in operation . Because of its geographical situation and the area it controlled (whic h included New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomons ) Townsville A .C .H . became the most important outside Melbourne, an d was made senior to Darwin . Wing Commander Garing, 4 RAAF, Chief of Staff to the Air Officer Commanding North Eastern Area (Group Captain Lukis,5 RAAF) who had recently returned to Australia fro m operational service in Britain, established at Townsville an A .C .H . Operations Room on the British model which became the criterion for all othe r Area Combined Headquarters in Australia and New Zealand. The C .O .I .C . at Townsville was established by Lieut-Commander Luke from Melbourn e C .O .I .C ., and that at Darwin and Fremantle respectively by Lieutenan t Brooksbank and Pay Sub-Lieutenant Ryan,° both of whom had experienc e in C .O .I .C . Melbourne . The transfer of A .C .H . North Eastern Area from Port Moresby t o Townsville entailed a corresponding move of the coastwatcher centre from Papua to the Queensland base ; the move being accompanied by some administrative changes . It will be recalled that Lieut-Commander Feld t was in 1939 appointed Staff Officer (Intelligence) Port Moresby with th e primary task of filling the intelligence gaps in the northern screen b y completing and administering the coastwatching organisation in the islands . Since his function was the collection and distribution of intelligence hi s place was at A .C .H . By this time the chain of coastwatchers, equipped where necessary with teleradios and instructed in their duties, was established throughout the islands extending as far eastward as the Ne w $ Combined Defence Headquarters were recommended at Fremantle, Darwin, Adelaide, Newcastle , Melbourne, Sydney, Hobart, Thursday Island, Townsville, Brisbane, and Port Moresby . The function of the Central War Room was the control of operations on the highest military plan e by direct meetings between the Chiefs of Staff or their deputies ; that of COIC was the making o f intelligence appreciations on strategical and important questions for the Chiefs of Staff, and th e distribution of urgent intelligence to appropriate authorities . The function of the Area Combined Headquarters was to ensure naval and air cooperation in trade defence in the focal areas , i .e . for South West Australia at Fremantle, South East Australia at Melbourne, North East Australia at Townsville and North West Australia at Darwin . The object of Combined Defenc e Headquarters was to coordinate the operations of the naval, military and air forces allotted fo r the defence of areas including a defended port . ' Air Cmdre W. H . Garing, CBE, DFC . SASO N Cd and NE Area, RAAF, 1941-42 ; com d 9 Op Gp 1942-43, 1 OTU 1943-44 ; Dir Tactics and Opnl Reqmnts 1944-45 . Regular airman ; of Melbourne ; b Corryong, Vic, 26 Jul 1910. 6 Air Cmdre F . W . F. Lukis, CBE. (1st AIF : 10 LH Regt and 1 Sqn Aust Flying Corps. ) AOC NE Area, RAAF, 1941-42; Air Memb for Personnel 1942-43 ; comd 9 Op Gp (later Northern Cd) 1943-45. Regular airman ; of South Yarra, Vic ; b. Balinjup, WA, 27 Jul 1896 . Lt J. H . P. Ryan, RANVR. Of Brisbane ; b. Townsville, Qld, 10 Jul 1914 .
42 3
THE COASTWATCHERS
1941
Hebrides . Under the control of Feldt, general supervision over the island coastwatchers was exercised by civil officers of the administrations ; bu t about the middle of 1941 the Director of Naval Intelligence decided t o appoint Intelligence officers to key points since, should an emergenc y arise, the civil officers of the administrations would have their hands ful l with their own affairs . Staff Officers (Intelligence) were therefore appointe d
PACIFIC
- OCEAN
(•
TrIeradio Stations)
iirau I .
Noe J r
P,i„ rck
Se a
s Straii -
CORAL
SE A
Northern Screen Coastwatcher Station s
to Rabaul, Port Moresby, Thursday Island, Tulagi, and Vila, each wit h his network of coastwatchers . ? So far as could be done, this branch o f Naval Intelligence (under the immediate supervision from Townsville o f Feldt with the new title of Supervising Intelligence Officer, North Easter n Area) was fully grown and bearing fruit before Japan entered the war . It was an organisation which ensured that any intruder through the islan d screen, whether by sea or air, would be reported promptly both to loca l forces and to the distant high command . Thus during 1941 the Australia n machinery for the conducting of war in the Pacific was established . It wa s controlled from the Central War Room in Melbourne, whence radiate d the channels of communication through the C .O .I .C ' s, the A .C .H 's, and the Combined Defence Headquarters, to the confines of the Australia n 7 Rabaul, Lt Mackenzie,
RAN ; Port Moresby, Sub-Lt Gill, RANVR ; Thursday Island, Lt-Cdr Crawford, RANK ; Tulagi, Sub-Lt Macfarlan, RANVR; Vila, Lt Bullock, RANVR . Lt-Cdr H . A. Mackenzie, RAN . (HMS Glorious 1917-18 .) DSIO, NE Area, 1943-45 . Planter and trader in New Guinea ; b . Braidwood, NSW, 16 Aug 1899 . Died, as result of accident, 1 9 Sep 1948 . Lt 7 . C . H . Gill, RANVR . Of Brisbane ; b . Brisbane, 12 Feb 1916 . Lt-Cdr H . A. G . Crawford, VRD ; RANK. Of New Farm, Qld; b . Brisbane, 29 Nov 1908 . Lt-Cdr D . S . Macfarlan, RANVR. Of Melbourne; b. Aberdeen, Scotland, 12 Mar 1908 . Lt H . W . Bullock, RANVR . Of Sydney ; b. Toowoomba, Qld, 10 Feb 1916 .
424
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
194 0
defence area . Inwards these channels carried intelligence and information ; and outwards such operational orders based thereon as were consonant with the nation's limited material resources to meet any possible aggression . II I In their joint planning to meet the possibilities of a Far Eastern wa r Australia, New Zealand, Britain, the United States and the Netherland s East Indies, were handicapped by lack of any definite knowledge regarding if and when the United States would enter such a war . In December 1940 the Commonwealth Government asked Britain whether, in vie w of the improved naval situation in the Mediterranean, and the increas e in the number of capital ships, the possibility of basing three or fou r capital ships on Singapore could be considered. Mr Churchill, in a repl y on the 23rd of the month, gave his opinion that the danger of Japa n going to war with Britain had receded, and went on to detail reason s (increase in German capital ship strength, the appearance of a Germa n battleship raider in the Atlantic, the possibility of undamaged portion s of the French fleet being betrayed to Germany) why it was not possibl e to divert capital ships to Singapore . For all these reasons we are at the fullest naval strain I have seen either in this or the former war . The only way in which a naval squadron could be found for Singapore would be by ruining the Mediterranean situation . This I am sure yo u would not wish us to do unless or until the Japanese danger becomes far more menacing than at present . Mr Churchill went on to say that he wa s persuaded that if Japan should enter the war the United States will come in o n our side which will put the naval boot very much on the other leg, and be a deliverance from many perils. The President of the United States, whatever his personal inclinations , was by no means certain of this . Mr Roosevelt, in his talks with hi s Foreign Secretary, found that Mr Hul l would never envisage the tough answer to the problem that would have to b e faced if Japan attacked, for instance, either Singapore or the Netherlands Eas t Indies. The President felt that it was a weakness in our policy that we could no t be specific on that point.8 Though Mr Churchill spoke with such confidence to the Australian Government in December 1940, two months later, when Mr Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal envoy, was in London , Eden, the Foreign Minister, asked me repeatedly what our country would do i f Japan attacked Singapore or the Dutch, saying it was essential to their policy t o know . Of course, it was perfectly clear that neither the President nor Hull coul d give an adequate answer to the British on that point because the declaration o f war is up to Congress, and the isolationists, and, indeed, a great part of th e American people, would not be interested in a war in the Far East merely becaus e Japan attacked the Dutch . ° s Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (1948), p . 428 . 9 Quoted by Sumner Welles in Seven Major Decisions (1951), pp . 97-8.
Jan-Feb 1941
SINGAPORE
42 5
It was an uncertainty that was to continue until Japan attacked Pear l Harbour at the end of the year. But, on the military side, such joint discussions were held and plans made as were possible in the circumstances . The British Chiefs of Staff maintained that the security of Singapor e and of Indian Ocean communications was the main defence of the whol e British Commonwealth in the Far East . In January 1941 the British Government asked Australia and New Zealand to modify their nava l dispositions proposed in the report of the October 1940 Singapore Conference . It was suggested that instead of Australian and New Zealan d forces being concentrated in the Tasman Sea area and south-western Australia in the event of war with Japan, a proportion should be use d in defence of Indian Ocean communications . In a reply in February the Australian Government pointed out that it was greatly concerned as t o the naval strength which would be available in the Indian Ocean, and lacked information as to the existing position "and any action propose d to augment it in the event of hostilities with Japan " . As to the disposition of Australian and New Zealand naval forces the Australian Government , on the advice of its Chiefs of Staff, expressed the view that the south-wes t Pacific area must be considered as a whole, irrespective of station limits ; that in the event of war the Japanese would aim at maintaining a cruise r force (possibly with heavy cover) in the Tasman Sea area to cut Australian communications across the Pacific ; that the minimum naval forces to counter such a threat could be provided only by the return of all Australian and New Zealand ships overseas ; and that they should be disposed mainly in the Tasman Sea area "at any rate until U .S .A. has shown her hand" . This view was re-affirmed in a combined Far Eastern appreciation o f the Australian Chiefs of Staff which was discussed in their presence b y the War Cabinet on the 14th February 1941 . Also present at this discussion was the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, Air Chie f Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who visited Australia from 8th to 18th February as a preliminary to Anglo-Dutch-Australian staff conversations at Singapore, which had been arranged for later in the month . O n the day of the War Cabinet meeting the Acting Prime Minister (M r Fadden) and Opposition leaders issued a joint warning to Australia tha t it was "the considered opinion of the Advisory War Council that the wa r has moved to a new stage involving the utmost gravity " . This arose from various indications 2 pointing to aggressive action by the Japanese in th e near future which caused the British Chiefs of Staff on the 12th Februar y to warn naval Commanders-in-Chief ; the Commanders-in-Chief in the Fa r s On 11 Feb the Australian Minister at Tokyo told the Government that the British Embass y there regarded the situation so seriously that the staff had been instructed to be ready fo r emergency. On the same day the Dominions Office itemised to the Australian Government a s "straws in the wind " : (a) landing of Japanese troops on the mainland near Hong Kong ; (b) increase of Japanese troops from 6,000 to 13,000 in the Tonking area ; (c) presence of Japanese warships in the Hainan area and off the coast of Indo-China ; (d) the recent mining of the Suez Canal ; (e) Japanese efforts with German assistance to reach an agreement with Russia .
426
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
14 Feb
East, Middle East and India ; and the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief i n the Middle East, to adopt increased vigilance and take unobtrusive pre cautions against possible attack . However Brooke-Popham, at the meeting of the War Cabinet, spoke in confident tones of Britain' s ability to defend her Far Eastern possessions if the Japanese attacked . Hong Kong, he said, could in his opinion defend itself for at least four months at a minimum . Plans for Singapore were based on the assumption that it could defend itself for six months unti l capital ships could arrive to relieve it, but it would probably be possible to hold on for nine months, and before he left England Mr Churchill had assured him that "we will not let Singapore fall" . The supreme need at Singapore was munitions and more aircraft . He anticipated that any Japanese attack on Singapore would be by infiltration from Thailand an d a gradual move down the Kra Isthmus before declaring war . For thi s reason it would help him if a decision could be reached as to what actio n by Japan would constitute a casus belli . The conclusions reached and policy outlined in the Chiefs of Staff appreciation (a summary of which was cabled to the United Kingdom an d the British authorities in the Far East) were that the security of Australi a and New Zealand, the Singapore Base and Malaya, the Netherlands Eas t Indies, and the Indian Ocean and Pacific sea routes, were Australia' s vital interests, and that their defence formed one strategic problem . Th e responsibility of each government concerned for the defence of its ow n and common interests must, however, be arranged and clearly defined , and a practical scheme worked out for the reinforcement of any threatene d point with forces drawn from the strategic area as a whole . The most likely course of Japanese action was seen as an attack on Malaya, possibly as the first step towards a major attack on Australia . The main requirement in the Far East being a capital ship fleet, the retention of Singapor e Base was vital ; and the security of Singapore and of Australia was closel y bound up with that of the Netherlands East Indies . Plans must therefore provide for coordination with and assistance for the Dutch . The security of the south-west Pacific was essential for the passage of an American fleet and its operation in the East Indies area if America intervened . In the absence of a British fleet the defence of our Far Eastern interests coul d be secured by the arrival of an American fleet ; but in the absence of either, the defence of territory must depend primarily on the local force s in each area . As to policy, naval and air forces should be used to fore stall the establishment of enemy naval and air bases within striking distanc e of vital points, while adequate forces were retained for local defence an d the security of sea communications . The main army forces in each allotte d area should provide final opposition against invasion, and garrison outlyin g bases to ensure the continued operations of naval and air forces . Actin g on this last-mentioned recommendation the War Cabinet decided i n February upon the military reinforcement of the Darwin, Port Moresby , Thursday Island and Rabaul areas, and the installation of two additional
22-27 Feb
CONFERENCE
AT
SINGAPORE
42 7
6-inch coast defence guns each at Darwin and Rabaul, and the provisio n of two for the Free French at Noumea . Also, on the 27th February, the War Cabinet directed that both the Central War Room and the Combine d Operational Intelligence Centre were to be manned on a full-time basis — a direction which, as stated above, had been anticipated by the navy s o far as C .O .I .C . was concerned . Broadly, the Chiefs of Staff appreciation formed the basis of the AngloDutch-Australian conference, which assembled at Singapore under th e presidency of Brooke-Popham on the 22nd February, and sat until th e 25th . Naval representatives were Vice-Admiral Layton, Commander-in Chief, China Station ; Admiral Staveren, Chief of the Naval Staff Nether lands East Indies ; and Rear-Admiral Crace, Rear-Admiral Commandin g the Australian Squadron, as leader of the Australian and New Zealan d delegation . 3 Present as observers were Captain Archer Allen, U .S .N . , and Captain Purnell, U .S .N., Chief of Staff of the United States Asiatic Fleet. The agreement reached by the conference (subject to ratification b y the respective governments and involving no political commitments) wa s for mutual assistance in the event of Japanese attack . Because of th e uncertainty of America ' s attitude, planning was on the basis of Anglo Dutch-Australian action without active American cooperation . It wa s considered that an invasion of Australia and New Zealand could be ruled out initially, and that the probable Japanese course would be an attac k on Singapore via Indo-China and Thailand ; but that the possibility of an alternative move against Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies must be taken into account . In the event of an attack on Singapore the Dutc h would assist with air support and the operation of submarines in th e South China Sea ; Australia would help with the provision of army units , and an air striking force at Darwin, to reinforce Ambon and Koepang . In the event of the attack being against Borneo and the Netherlands Eas t Indies the above Australian support proposed for Singapore would assis t in making the passage of the northern line of Dutch possessions as difficul t as possible. In either instance the defence of sea communications would be of majo r importance, and it was deemed essential to have capital ship cover fo r troop convoys in the Indian Ocean ; cruiser escort for troops and trad e convoys in the Indian Ocean, Australian and New Zealand waters ; evasiv e routeing for merchant ships in the Pacific outside focal areas, and in th e Southern Ocean (Australia-Cape route) ; and air reconnaissance and striking forces in focal areas . $ Crace was accompanied by his SO (0 and I) (Lt-Cdr Oldham, who was appointed to tha t position from Navy Office in May 1940) ; the Director of Signals and Communications (Cd r Newman) ; and Cdr Kennedy, from the Operations Division, Navy Office . On 24 Feb a conference of RN, RAN, and NEI signals officers met in Singapore to discuss combined communication s procedure . Cdr V . E . Kennedy, OBE ; RAN . Ent RAN College 1915 (HMS Tiger 1919) . Aust Fleet Ai r Arm pilot 1925. Aust NLO to C-in-C Royal Netherlands Navy Feb 1941 to Mar 1942 . SO (Ops ) Fremantle 1942-44 . Comd HMAS 's Ladava (Millie Bay) 1944, Leeuwin (Fremantle) 1945 . Of Melbourne ; b . Bendigo, Vic, 3 Feb 1901 .
428
THE
AUSTRALIA
STATION—1941
Jan-Feb
The British naval forces 4 which would become available for the defence of communications in the Indian Ocean were one battle cruiser ; two aircraft carriers ; one 8-inch gun and eleven 6-inch gun cruisers and five armed merchant cruisers ; destroyers and small craft ; with possibly (dependent on the raider situation in the South Atlantic) an additional aircraft carrier and three 8-inch gun cruisers . The Dutch would contribute two 6-inch gun cruisers or one cruiser and two destroyers . Australian and New Zealand forces in the south-west Pacific would comprise (with the return of their ships from overseas) two 8-inch gun and six 6-inch gu n cruisers, three armed merchant cruisers, five destroyers, and smaller vessels . The conference agreed on what Japanese actions should necessitate active military action by the Allies . These were : a direct act of war b y Japanese armed forces against British, Dutch, Australian or New Zealand territory or mandated territory ; the movement of Japanese forces into any part of Thailand west of Bangkok or south of the Kra Isthmus ; the movement of a large number of Japanese warships or escorted merchan t ship convoys into the Gulf of Siam ; the movement of Japanese force s into Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands close to the east ; a Japanese attack on the Philippines . In general the Australian War Cabinet approved the findings of th e conference . Though it agreed with a recommendation of the conferenc e that the return of the Australian and New Zealand ships serving oversea s should be deferred until the Japanese threat became more of a reality in the Far East, it expressed the view that capital ship cover for troop convoys in the Indian Ocean in the event of war with Japan was insufficient, and that capital ship escort should be provided . It also expressed great concern at the failure of the conference to produce a complete naval pla n for the Far East . Representations were made to the United Kingdom o n both these points . Meanwhile, across the Pacific, Anglo-American staff conversations ha d opened in Washington on the 29th January .5 Their object was to determine how best British and American forces could be disposed and employed to defeat the Axis powers "should the United States be compelled to resor t to war" . Two important points emerged from these conversations . Th e first and major one incorporated the basic strategic decision of the war — that the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisiv e In a telegram of 24 Feb, while the conference was sitting, the Admiralty stated that "in th e event of war in the Far East in the near future no major redistribution of force is intended othe r than move of one battle cruiser, one aircraft carrier and one cruiser from Gibraltar to India n Ocean and return of those Dominion cruisers now serving with Imperial forces to thei r Dominions" . The Admiralty went on ("to assist in planning") to forecast the total forces likel y to be available, and added : "You will appreciate that we are forecasting for hypothetical dat e and it cannot be guaranteed above named units will actually be available when time comes . Numbers and types as above should however be used as a basis for planning . Question of relief of force from Gibraltar and of Dominion numbers drawn from other stations will be dealt wit h when situation arises . " 6 British military representatives were : Rear-Adm R. M. Bellairs, RN, Rear-Adm V . H. Danckwerts , RN, Major-Gen E . L . Morris, Air Vice-Marshal J . C . Slessor and Capt A. W. Clarke, RN . Representatives of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were in the British delegation but wer e not present at joint meetings .
Jan-Feb
UNITED STATES INTENTIONS
429
theatres The other was the divergence of British and American views a s to the value of Singapore . The British believed that Singapore (as the base of a battle fleet) was essential to the security of the Malay Barrier and Indian Ocean communications, and pressed the Americans to base there a proportion of the Pacific Fleet .7 This the Americans refused to do on the grounds that they doubted Singapore's value and that to detac h warships to Singapore or to reinforce their Asiatic Fleet at the expens e of the Pacific Fleet would merely offer the Japanese an opportunity t o defeat the U .S . Navy in detail . Admiral Colvin, summarising the America n views for the War Cabinet, said tha t Singapore, while very important, was not in the U .S . view absolutely vital, and its loss, while undesirable, could be accepted. This view was not accepted by the British Delegation at Washington . As between Great Britain and the United States at Washingto n It was agreed that for Great Britain it was fundamental that Singapore be held ; for the United States it was fundamental that the Pacific Fleet be held intact . 8 Briefly, as a result of the Washington talks, it was arranged that th e defence of the Pacific Ocean area and the strategic direction of their ow n and British forces there would be a United States responsibility in the even t of them entering the war . United States intentions were to use the Unite d States navy principally in the Atlantic, reinforcing their Atlantic Flee t from the Pacific Fleet if necessary . Sufficient strength would be based on Hawaii, however, to protect the West American seaboard and Pacific communications ; operate offensively against Japanese mandated island s and sea communications ; and support British naval forces in the South Pacific. It was not intended to reinforce the U .S . Asiatic Fleet9 which , under its Commander-in-Chief, Admiral T . C . Hart, was based on the Philippines, and it was anticipated that those islands would not be abl e to hold out very long against determined Japanese attack . The United States Navy was prepared to provide sufficient capital ships for th e Atlantic and for Gibraltar as would permit the release of British capita l ships from those areas to reinforce the Far East' . With the Pacific Ocean an undivided American responsibility there was no need for joint planning there . The Washington talks however resulted in an agreement (subject to Dutch approval) regarding the Fa r "There can be no question of the rightness of this decision . When it was reached the Pacific area was still in a state of uneasy peace, and it was not beyond possibility that the Japanes e might be dissuaded from attack. But in any eventuality they could not be as dangerous enemie s as the Germans, with whom in the field of science they were not to be compared . There were good grounds for the apprehension that, given time, the Germans might produce irresistibl e "secret " weapons . a On 1 Feb 1941 the US Fleet was renamed the Pacific Fleet . "Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific (1948), p . 50, quoting from Minutes of the Washingto n staff conversations, 10 Feb 1941 . a Of one 8-inch gun cruiser, two 6-inch gun cruisers, 13 destroyers and 29 submarines . (Actually submarines of the Asiatic Fleet were gradually increased to that number during the last few months of 1941 . ) 1 Colvin's summary for the War Cabinet . Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p . 51, says : "The British agreed, in case of war with Japan, to send at least six capital ships to defend Singapor e if the United States Navy would assist the Royal Navy in watching the Mediterranean . That arrangement was in the course of being carried out when the surprise attack on Pearl Harbou r altered everything .
430
THE
AUSTRALIA
STATION—1941
19-30 Apr
East, for collaboration in the formation of strategic plans . It was agreed that the British Commander-in-Chief, China, should be responsible for th e strategic direction of the naval forces of the three powers, except tha t the Commander-in-Chief, U .S . Asiatic Fleet, would be responsible fo r naval defence of the Philippines . Part of the Asiatic Fleet would, however, come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, China, immediatel y on the outbreak of war, and the remainder under his strategical direction when Manila became untenable . As a result of the Washington talks, an American-Dutch-British Commonwealth Conference was held at Singapore from 21st to 26th Apri l 1941 to formulate plans for a war in the Far East between Germany , Italy and Japan on the one hand, and the British Commonwealth and it s allies, including the United States, on the other . Brooke-Popham pre sided, and the conference was attended by Admiral Layton ; the Chief of the General Staff, Netherlands East Indies, Major-General ter Poorten ; Captain Purnell U .S .N . representing Admiral Hart ; and an Australian delegation led by Admiral Colvin and consisting of his Naval Secretary , Pay-Captain Foley ;2 the Director of Plans, Navy Office, Commande r Nichols ;3 and Colonel Rourke' and Group Captain Bladin 5 as Army and Air advisers respectively. The Australian delegation reached Singapore in H .M .A .S . Sydney on the 19th April, and sailed for Australia on the 30t h in H .M .A .S . Australia . Plans formulated were based on the decisions reached at the Anglo Dutch-Australian Conference in February, and the Washington talks ; bu t the divergence between British and American views was at that stage a n insuperable obstacle to reaching a workable war plan for the Far East . The British held their ground as to the importance of Singapore, an d Brooke-Popham maintained the optimistic view he had expressed to th e Australian War Cabinet in January . Plans for the employment of nava l forces were in two phases—from the outbreak of war with Japan unti l the arrival of the British capital ship fleet at Singapore, and operation s subsequent to this . In phase 1, the forces would be used for local defenc e of bases ; in defence of vital sea communications (mainly Indian Ocean) ; and in attack on Japanese sea communications . In phase 2, with the arrival of a British capital ship fleet operating from Singapore, the Allied nava l strength should be superior to that of the Japanese, enabling the associate d powers to gain the initiative . Should it (considered an unlikely event ) prove impossible for the British fleet to operate from Singapore, it woul d operate from Indian Ocean bases, with the object of securing the vital se a a Captain (S) J . B . Foley, CBE ; RAN . Joined RAN as Pay-Midshipman, 1915 . (HMAS Australia 1915 .) Sec 1st NM, ACNB, 1931-44 ; NLO London, 1944-48, 1951-55 ; Admin Asst to 2nd NM, 1948-51 ; Director-General Supply and Secretariat Branch Navy Dept ; and Chief Naval Judg e Advocate and Director of Administrative Planning since 1955 . Of Melbourne ; b. Ballarat, Vic, 24 Jun 1896 . a Capt R . F. Nichols, RN . (HMS Erin 1917-19 .) Dir of Plans RAN 1940-42 ; Dep Ch of Naval Staff RAN 1942-43 ; comd HMS 's Caledon 1943-44, Ready 1945 . B . 9 Sep 1900 . & Brig H . G. Rourke, MC. (1st AIF : Major 7 Fd Arty Bde .) GSO1 8 Aust Div 1940-41 ; BGS I Corps 1942 ; Mil Asst to Aust representative in UK War Cabinet 1943-45 . Regular soldier ; of Sydney ; b . Ashfield, NSW, 26 Jun 1896 . a AVM F. M. Bladin, CB, CBE . Director of Ops and Intel] RAAF 1940-41 ; AOC Southern Area 1941, N-W Area 1942-43 ; SASO 38 Gp RAF 1943-44 ; Dep CAS RAAF 1945 ; C of S BCOF, Japan, 1946-47 . Regular airman ; of Kew, Vic ; b . Korumburra, Vic . 26 Aug 1898 .
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
German Mine on Deck of H .M .A .S . Uki, 19th November 1941, off Montague Island .
(Department of Information )
Launching of H .M .A .S . Arunta at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, 30th November 1940 .
Scene in Galley of H .M .A.S . Sydney .
(R .A .N Historical Section)
Scene in Engine Room of a Cruiser .
Apr-July
AMERICAN DISSENT
43 1
communications in that ocean and Australian and New Zealand areas ; would dispute any further advance by the enemy to the southward o r westward ; and if possible relieve pressure on Malaya by operations in th e Malacca Strait and against any enemy activities on the west coast o f Malaya. The Dutch agreed with this concept, and undertook to emplo y their naval forces in phase 1 primarily for the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and the narrow passages between the islands, but to mak e one cruiser, two destroyers, and two submarines available to operat e under British control in defence of sea communications . Australia als o agreed, and approved of a new Australian naval commitment—the operation of one Australian 6-inch gun cruiser in North Australian waters t o escort troop convoys to Ambon, Koepang, and Singapore, and then t o be at the disposition of Commander-in-Chief, China . (This resulted from the agreement reached at the Anglo-Dutch-Australian conference in February, to station Australian military and air forces in the Netherlands Eas t Indies, thus being outside the area of Australian naval operational control . ) Captain Purnell, the American representative, dissented from this concept of operations . He held that over-emphasis on escort-of-convoy woul d deprive naval striking forces of the strength to break up Japanese amphibious and fleet attacks ; and that if the United States were to assis t in the defence of the Malay Barrier the best strategy would be an attac k by the Pacific Fleet on the Marshall Islands, thus forcing the Japanes e to shift weight to the north and east .s The Singapore conference thu s dissolved on the 27th April having agreed upon a combined operatin g plan of local defence forces only in the event of war with Japan . On the 3rd July the United States Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Stark and Genera l Marshall, rejected the conclusions and resolutions of the Singapore conference "for several reasons, but mainly because the whole thing pivote d on Singapore . They notified the British Chiefs of Staff that an earlier permission, given to Admiral Hart to operate his Fleet under Britis h strategic directions, was revoked ." 7 They did, however, agree to the recommendations made by the conference, which were in line with those of th e earlier Anglo-Dutch-Australian conference, as to the Japanese move s which should be considered to constitute a casus belli ; and they recommended their acceptance to President Roosevelt . The main conference at Singapore was followed by a further meetin g to clear up outstanding points arising out of the Anglo-Dutch-Australia n talks of February . In the event, those talks resulted in the only forwar d planning for combined operations in the Far East in anticipation of a Japanese attack. Apart from the various conferences, machinery was gradually set u p for the closer interchange of information between the navies of the prospective allies . In 1940 political representation between Australia and th e United States was established on the ambassadorial level, and legation s were opened in Canberra and Washington respectively . Early the followin g °Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p . 55. °Morison, p . 55.
432
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Jan-Jun e
year naval attaches were appointed, Commander Burrell to Washington and Commander Causey, U .S .N., to Canberra . 8 At the same time the U.S . Navy appointed an observer, Commander Collins, to Darwin . In February 1941 the R .A .N . and the Royal Netherlands Navy exchange d liaison officers . Commander Kennedy, R .A .N ., was appointed to the staff of Admiral Helfrich, the Commander-in-Chief R .N.N ., at Batavia ; and Commander Salm, R .N.N., was appointed to Navy Office, Melbourne . As a result of the April conference at Singapore the proposal was made t o the Admiralty that Captain Collins, R .A .N ., be appointed to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, China . This was agreed to, and he assume d duty at Singapore, as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral Layton fo r combined planning operations, on the 17th June 1941 . In January 1941 general permission for the use of Australian and mandated territorial waters for the fuelling of Dutch warships was granted by the Australian Government . The matter originated in October 1940, when the Dutch decided to institute a naval patrol between the meridian s of 130 and 180 degrees east to protect Dutch merchant ships crossing th e Pacific, and sought refuelling bases . It was first approved that a Dutch tanker could be stationed at Port Moresby . Later the Department o f External Affairs passed the opinion that the alliance between the Netherlands and British Commonwealth Governments in the prosecution of th e war ipso facto determined all questions of international law, and it was purely a matter of mutual agreement as to the use of each other's territories and resources . At various times thereafter during 1941 Dutch tankers were at Port Moresby and Rabaul to refuel the patrolling and escortin g cruisers Tromp and Java, 9 and these two ships also became familiar if occasional visitors at Queensland ports . In March 1941 four American cruisers and a destroyer squadron visite d Australia and New Zealand on a flag-showing cruise . The first intimation was a cablegram to the Department of External Affairs stating that th e ships had left Samoa and that it was proposed that the Australian detachment of two cruisers and five destroyers' . under Rear-Admiral Newto n 9 Burrell, from Navy Office, was in Washington only a short period before being appointed to
command HMAS Norman . Subsequent wartime appointments to Washington were : Cdrs D . H . Harries (Apr 1941 to Oct 1942) ; A . S . Rosenthal (Oct 1942 to Nov 1944) ; S. H. K . Spurgeon (Nov 1944 to Dec 1948) . Rear-Adm D . H. Harries, CBE ; RAN . Ent RAN College 1917 (HMS Conqueror 1921) . Comd HMS Seagull 1939-40 ; HMS Niger 1940 ; NA Washington 1941-42 ; Exec Offr HMAS Shropshire 1942-44; DCNS Navy Office 1944-45 . Of Melbourne ; b . Melbourne, 27 Jun 1903 . Capt S. H . K . Spurgeon, DSO, OBE ; RAN . Ent RAN College 1916 (HMAS Brisbane 1920) . Comd HMS Echo 1939-40, and while in this ship was recipient of first Australian decoration of the war, for anti-submarine activities . Comd HMAS Stuart 1942-43 ; Dir Anti-Sub Warfare, Navy Office, 1943-44 ; NA Washington 1944-48 . Of Melbourne ; b. Gosport, Hants, Eng, 1 5 May 1902 . Commander Lewis D. Causey, USN, was NA Melbourne until 1944 when he was succeede d by Cdr Malcolm Mackenzie USNR. 9 Tromp, Dutch cruiser (1940), 3,350 tons, six 5 .9-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 33 kts . lava, Dutch cruiser (1925), 6,670 tons, ten 5 .9-in guns, 31 kts; torpedoed in Battle of Jav a Sea, 27 Feb 1942 . 1 Chicago, US cruiser (1931), 9,300 tons, nine 8-in guns, 32.7 kts ; sunk at the Battle of Rennell Island, 30 Jan 1943 . Portland, US cruiser (1933), 9,800 tons, nine 8-in guns, 32 .7 kts. Clark, US flotilla leader (1937), 1,805 tons, eight 5-in guns, eight 21-in torp tubes, 37 kts . Cassin, Conyngham, Downes and Reid, US destroyers (1937), 1,500 tons, five 5-in guns , twelve 21-in torp tubes, 36 .5 kts ; Cassin and Downes lost in Jap attack on Pearl Harbour, 7 Dec 1941 .
1941
VISITING CRUISERS
43 3
flying his flag in Chicago, should visit Sydney from 20th to 23rd March and Brisbane from 25th to 28th . It was requested that advance arrangements be kept as secret as possible as it was desired that the ships shoul d "pop up"2 unexpectedly at various places . The visit was a great success ; and the sailors created a good impression in both ports by their appearance and behaviour . Chicago, in a massive and cumbersome square frame work she carried on her mainmast, gave those in the R .A .N . who ha d not been off the Australia Station, their first view of radar equipment . The squadron sailed from Brisbane for an unknown destination on th e 28th March, and "popped up" again at Suva on the 1st April befor e finally vanishing in the Pacific vastness . United States cruisers made one more peacetime visit to Australia in 1941 . In August the Northampto n (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Taffinder) and Salt Lake City3 spen t five days at Brisbane before returning eastward via Port Moresby an d Rabaul . The occasion of the first American cruiser visit coincided with a practical illustration of Dutch cooperation with Australia when the world' s largest motor ship, the Dutch Oranje (19,850 tons) reached Sydney o n the 31st March . Oranje made her maiden voyage just before the outbreak of war in 1939 . In February 1941 she was in Batavia when the Netherlands Government offered to equip and operate her as a hospital ship between Australia and the Middle East . The offer was accepted . Conversion at Dutch expense was undertaken at Sydney, and on the 1s t July 1941 Oranje sailed from that port on her first voyage to Suez . She was Australia's second hospital ship. In May 1940 the Australia n coastal vessel Manunda (9,115 tons) was requisitioned and converted , and sailed from Sydney on her maiden voyage to the Middle East in October of that year . A third was acquired in May 1941, when the Australian Wanganella (9,576 tons) was taken up and equipped . She saile d from Sydney at the end of August 1941 on her first hospital ship voyage . Throughout 1941 the passage of the "US" convoys carrying Australia n and New Zealand troops across the Indian Ocean to the Middle East continued. In addition, with the sailing of the first of the series in this year (US .9) there started the regular transport of Australian troops t o Singapore . Early in December 1940 the Australian Government, concerned regarding the defence of Malaya, told the British Government tha t it would be willing to send to Malaya, as a temporary expedient and to complete its training there, a brigade group and the necessary maintenance troops with a modified scale of equipment . This offer was accepte d by the British Government and arrangements were made for the 22n d Infantry Brigade and attached troops to embark for Malaya early i n 2 President
Roosevelt told Admiral Stark he wished to send more ships on similar cruises "to keep them popping up here and there, to keep the Japs guessing "—a suggestion which did not appeal to the US Chief of Naval Operations . Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p . 56. 8 Northampton, US cruiser (1930), 9,050 tons, nine 8-in guns, 32 .7 kts; torpedoed in Battle of Tassafaronga, 30 Nov 1942. Salt Lake City, US cruiser (1929), 9,100 tons, ten 8-in guns, 32 .7 kts.
434
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
1940-41
February .' This they did, and sailed from Sydney, a total of 5,718, in the transport Queen Mary in convoy US .9 on the 4th February 1941 . Other ships in the convoy, destined for the Middle East, were Aquitania and Nieuw Amsterdam (this last-named carrying New Zealand troops ) from Sydney, and Mauretania from Melbourne . The convoy was escorted to Fremantle by Hobart; and sailed from that port escorted by Canberra on 12th February . Four days later, some 200 miles south-west of Sund a Strait, the convoy was met by H .M .S . Durban from Singapore, and Queen Mary was detached and escorted by the British cruiser to that port, where they arrived on the 18th February . The remainder of the convoy proceeded towards Bombay, and in a position west of Colombo on the 20th Februar y Canberra handed over escort to the New Zealand cruiser Leander, and herself proceeded to Colombo . Leander and the convoy reached Bomba y on the 22nd February . With the sailing of US .10 in April, the transport Queen Elizabeth, th e world's largest ship, joined the "US" convoys, and thereafter throughou t the year she and Queen Mary made four passages together to the Middl e East, with or without other ships in convoy, maintaining a 60-day cycl e to Suez. Completed just about the time of the outbreak of war in 1939 , Queen Elizabeth secretly and safely crossed the Atlantic in March 1940 . After some months in New York she sailed thence and on the 17t h November 1940 left Trinidad for Singapore, where she arrived via th e Cape on the 13th December . She sailed from Singapore for Fremantle on the 11th February 1941 to form part of convoy US .10 . In general the "US" convoys followed the same procedure, any ship s destined for Singapore being detached south-west of Sunda Strait an d escorted onward from there by a China Station cruiser, the remainde r going on to Colombo (or, in the case of the Queens, to Trincomalee ) and thence to Suez . Escort from Australia to the limit of the Australi a Station, or beyond to Ceylon, was provided by the R .A .N . During 1941 , seven "US" convoys, comprising twenty-three transports carrying a tota l of approximately 92,000 troops, sailed from south-eastern Australia, th e last for the year, US .13,5 leaving there on the 3rd November . By th e end of the year, in the sixteen " US " convoys, comprising sixty-eight ships, which had sailed from Australia since their institution in 1940, there had been carried in round figures some 134,000 (including 14,80 0 to Malaya) Australians, and 46,200 New Zealanders . In addition to the "US" convoys, the "ZK" convoys were introduced in March 1941 for the transport of troops to northern Australia and 4 This was not long to remain a "temporary expedient", but was the initial move in sending the 8th Australian Division to Malaya. For the detailed story see Vol IV of the Army series. ', Convoys US.9, Queen Mary, Aquitania, Mauretania, Nieuw Amsterdam ; US .10, Queen Mary , Queen Elizabeth, Mauretania, Nieuw Amsterdam, Ile de France; US .11a, Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, Aquitania ; US.11b, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Marnix van St Aldegonde, Sibajak ; US .12a, Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth ; US .12b, Aquitania, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Marnix van St Aldegonde, Sibajak ; US.13, Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth. Of the total numbers carried , approximately 70,000 were Australians, including some 3,800 RAAF and RAN . The balance were New Zealanders . More than half of the grand total of 92,000 (just over 50,000) were carried in the two Queens.
„_„_
Convoy US. I . Convoy US. 3 US. Fast Convoys - Australia to Bombay or Ceylo n Onward Convoys from Bombay or Ceylon to Suez Convoys for Singapore detached from US. Middle East Convoys
The A .I .F . Convoys
436
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Mar-No v
the New Guinea area, to implement the War Cabinet decision of the previous month to reinforce outlying bases. The coastal vessel Katoomb a was requisitioned and, with Zealandia, formed convoy ZK.1 which, escorted by Manoora, sailed from Brisbane for Thursday Island, Port Moresby and Rabaul with 1,496 troops on the 15th March . During April Katoomba , again escorted by Manoora, carried 687 troops and equipment from Sydney to Darwin, after which she was returned to trade ; and during th e same period Zealandia, escorted by Adelaide, carried 739 troops to Rabaul , whence the two ships proceeded to Noumea where Zealandia embarked Free French soldiers for Australia . During July, August and September a further two northern voyages were made by convoys ZK .3 and ZK .4, comprising Zealandia and Montoro (4,088 tons) with Manoora as escort . On these occasions a total of 1,190 troops were transported . 6 During the year Zealandia, in May and November, made two trooping voyages, carrying a total of 1,713 A .I .F. troops to Singapore, plus 18 4 R .A.N . and R .A .A .F. On each occasion she was escorted from Fremantle to a position south of Sunda Strait by H .M .A .S . Sydney, whence onwar d escort was provided by H .M . Ships Danae in May and Durban in November . The possibility of the need for an extension of the convoy system i n view of trends in the international situation was visualised . During Augus t 1941 the Plans Division at Navy Office prepared plans for Australian coastal convoys in the event of war with Japan ; and these were ready for implementation when war broke out, though they were not brough t into force until some time later . ? IV Time was an important factor in the considerations of the major powers regarding the possibility of war in the Pacific in 1941 . Hitler desired a Japanese attack on Singapore as early as possible to hasten the defea t of Britain, and at a conference with the Chief of the Operations Staff o f the Combined Forces High Command (General Jodi) and Admiral Raede r on the 18th March, he said that Germany must make every effort to ge t Japan to attack at once . " If Japan holds Singapore, all other Far Easter n questions in connection with the U .S .A . and Britain will be solved, including Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies . "8 Japan, however, was hastening slowly, to an extent waiting on events, and consolidating her position step by step before irrevocably committing herself. Timing was important to her, in that it was necessary to build up he r resources, especially of oil, and to be in a position quickly to secure b y e In the
"ZK" convoys prior to Japan entering the war, 4,112 troops were carried north ; 525 to Thursday Island ; 1,078 to Port Moresby ; 1,593 to Rabaul; and 916 to Darwin . P The plans were for five convoy series : (1) once weekly each way between Sydney-Brisbane and Brisbane-Barrier Reef ; (2) twice weekly each way between Newcastle-Sydney-Melbourne ; (3) once each way every 20 days between Sydney-Wellington, not including trans-Pacific passenge r ships which were subject to special arrangements ; (4) once every 10 or 11 days westward fro m Melbourne with outward bound overseas vessels ; (5) once each way every 30 days betwee n Adelaide and Fremantle with coastal vessels and outward bound overseas vessels which require d to call at Fremantle . 8 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 18 Mar 1941 .
1941
JAPANESE
IN INDO-CHINA
43 7
force the sources of supply which would be denied to her if she wen t to war with Britain and the Netherlands . In spite of German successes in Europe, Britain was still undefeated ; and the Japanese Foreign Minister , Matsuoka, had "grave misgivings" about Russia . Matsuoka, during March and April visited Russia, Germany and Italy . In Berlin efforts were mad e to persuade him of the advantages to Japan of a speedy attack o n Singapore . He learned of strained relations between Germany and Russia , and that Hitler hoped to avoid war with the United States . In Mosco w on the 13th April, on his return journey from Germany to Japan, Matsuoka stilled his " grave misgivings" about Russia by concluding a Russo Japanese non-aggression pact . This pact which, according to Hitler i n conversation with Raeder 9 a few days later, was concluded with Germany's acquiescence, secured Japan's Manchurian frontier and release d forces for a southward advance . By March this advance was well unde r way through "peaceful penetration" when Japan, already ensconced i n Northern Indo-China, received from the Vichy French Government the right to occupy the airport at Saigon, which enabled her to dominate th e whole of Indo-China and brought her within bombing distance of Singapore . The pattern bore a strong resemblance to that woven b y Hitler in the West . Britain and the United States desired peace in the Pacific, since neither was ready for war there . Britain had her hands full in the Atlantic an d Mediterranean, and had no naval forces immediately to spare for th e Far East . Her priorities during 1941 were listed by Churchill as : first , the defence of the Island (Britain) including the threat of invasion an d the U-boat war ; secondly, the struggle in the Middle East and Mediterranean ; thirdly, after June, supplies to Soviet Russia ; and, last of all , resistance to a Japanese assault . It was, however, always understood tha t "if Japan invaded Australia or New Zealand the Middle East shoul d be sacrificed to the defence of our own kith and kin" ? The United States was as yet unprepared for war, and her position in the Pacific was further weakened by the decision to regard the Atlanti c and European area as the decisive theatre . The United States Congres s passed the "Two-Ocean Navy " Bill in July 1940, but it would be at leas t two years from then before the two-ocean navy could be built . Meanwhile President Roosevelt adopted the political strategy of helping England , and later Russia, to withstand Germany (which made control of th e Atlantic an essential to the United States) and of "babying Japan along " by diplomacy . Peace in the Pacific was, as Roosevelt told a member of hi s g Fuehrer
Conferences on Naval Affairs, 20 Apr 1941 . Hitler said he "valued the Russo-Japanes e pact because Japan is now restrained from taking action against Vladivostock and should b e induced to attack Singapore instead " . In August however (Fuehrer Naval Conferences, 22 Aug 1941) when Germany and Russia were at war, Hitler was "convinced that Japan will carry out the attack on Vladivostock as soon as forces have been assembled . The present aloofnes s can be explained by the fact that the assembling of forces is to be accomplished undisturbed , and the attack is to come as a surprise move." It was an example of Hitler ' s fatal tendency to project his hopes in an illusory picture . 'Churchill, The Second World War, Vol III (1950), p . 523 .
438
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Mar-July
Cabinet in July 1941, "terribly important for the control of the Atlantic . . . . I simply have not got enough navy to go around . " 2 America's first "Lend-Lease" bill became law on the 11th March 1941 . At the end of April the United States Government asked that of Britai n its views on a proposal to move the greater part of the Pacific Fleet t o the Atlantic, leaving in the Pacific forces of the order of three or fou r battleships, nine cruisers and 30 to 40 destroyers . The Admiralty suggested that the size of the fleet proposed to be left in the Pacific seemed undul y small ; that it was most important to retain aircraft carriers in the Pacific ; and that the arrival of a British fleet in Singapore in the event of war wit h Japan would be considerably advanced . The Australian Government , whose views were sought by the British, 3 concurred in the Admiralty view in a telegram to London early in May, but added that the strongest concern was felt at the position of Singapore, and that with the transfer of U .S . ships to the Atlantic, "consideration should be immediately given to the release against the event of war with Japan of adequate Britis h capital ships to at once reinforce Singapore " . Actually the transfer of units of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic ha d already been ordered . On the 4th April Admiral Stark described the Atlantic situation in the face of German attacks on British convoys a s "hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it" . Three days later he ordered the transfer of the battleships Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico; the aircraft carrier Yorktown ; the light cruisers Philadelphia , Brooklyn, Savannah and Nashville ; and two flotillas of destroyers from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet . The transfer was effected by the end o f May . 4 The move left the Pacific Fleet inferior to the Japanese in every category of combat ship ; but (except in aircraft carriers) left the balanc e roughly equal if the combined strength of the potential allies in the Fa r East were ranged against that of the Japanese . In carriers the Japanese superiority was about one hundred per cent . During the decade up to 1941, Japan experienced considerable economi c growth, a proportion of the raw materials contributing to which cam e from Manchuria and North China, both open to her exploitation . Certain vital materials however, such as oil, bauxite, tin, rubber and nickel, cam e from regions beyond her control . Of these, oil was one of the resource s 2 Sumner Welles,
Seven Major Decisions (1952), p. 92 , $ This consultation with the Australian Government was upon the insistence of Mr Menzies , who was then in London . At a discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff on the 1st Ma y he learned that the American proposal had been made the previous night and had bee n accepted by the Defence Committee . His claim that the Dominion Governments should hav e been consulted resulted in the British Government withholding expression of its views to Washing ton until those of the Dominions had been obtained . 'Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic (1947), pp . 56, 57 . Idaho, Mississippi and New Mexico, US battleships (1919, 1917, 1918), 33,400, 33,000, 33,400 tons, twelve 14-in and sixteen 5-in guns, 22 kts . Yorktown, US aircraft carrier (1938), 19,900 tons, eight 5-in and sixteen 1 .1-in AA guns , 81-85 aircraft (space for over 100), 34 kts ; foundered after being torpedoed, Battle of Midway , 7 Jun 1942. Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Savannah and Nashville, US cruisers (1938), 9,700, 9,700, 9,475, 9,650 tons, fifteen 6-in guns, 32 .5 kts .
1937-41
CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE
43 9
in which Japan was most deficient, and which was most vital to her . ' She relied almost entirely upon imported oil, eighty per cent of whic h came from the United States, ten per cent from the Netherlands Eas t Indies, and the remainder from such widely diverse sources as Mexico , Bahrein, and Rumania . Her economic interest was therefore keen in the areas to her south, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, which i n 1939 produced nearly 8,000,000 metric tons of oil—almost as much a s Japan's stockpile, which reached its peak in that year . As a Japanes e economist wrote in October 1940 : "If proper approaches are made, it ma y be easy for Japan to import one-third of that [the N .E .I . annual production of oil] or about 2,700,000 metric tons . In the case of the actual formation of the East Asia economic bloc, shipments to Japan of th e entire oil output in the Dutch colony can be assured ."e This comment appeared at a time when the Japanese vernacular press was flooded wit h articles discussing Japan's need for raw materials, and means of securin g them. The Netherlands East Indies, however, strenuously opposed any suggestion that they should join the East-Asian economic bloc, or "Co Prosperity Sphere" as the Japanese called it . Japan's interest had been manifested over some years in a series of economic delegations to Batavia . In 1937, after prolonged discussions, an economic agreement favourabl e to Japan was negotiated . Three years later (after the Netherlands were occupied by the Germans) further Japanese economic delegations visited Batavia and pressed for more oil and larger immigration quotas . They were refused after many weeks of discussion, and negotiations were finall y broken off on the 18th June 1941 . A few days later the Japanese decide d to accelerate their moves to take what they could not get by peacefu l means . As has since been learned, a conference in the presence of th e Emperor on the 2nd July 1941 agreed upon an "outline policy in con sequence of changed international situation", and approval was given t o an advance by Japanese forces to South Indo-China . Through intercepted messages sent out by the Japanese Governmen t the United States authorities (who had succeeding in breaking Japanes e ciphers) became aware of this decision . The United States thereupon told Britain that if the Japanese made any overt move in the Far Eas t the United States would impose economic and financial embargoes upo n her ; and told Japan that if she moved into Indo-China, the negotiation s then in progress between her and the United States in the hope of settlin g differences peacefully, would be broken off. This warning had no effect . 'Interrogated after the war, Fleet Admiral Nagano, supreme naval adviser to the Emperor , stated : "I think one of the large causes of this war was the question of oil . . . Not only th e two services but the civilian elements were extremely interested, because after the U .S., Grea t Britain and the Netherlands refused to sell any more oil, our country was seriously threatened by the oil shortage . Consequently, every element in Japan was keenly interested in the souther n regions ." Admiral Nomura, former Ambassador to the United States, expressed similar views . (Jerome B . Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (1949), p. 133) . But it was Japan's obvious intention to move south which led to the freezing of her assets and thus t o the denial of oil . ' Yamada, Fumio, in Tosei Keizai, Tokyo, Oct 1940. Quoted by Cohen in Japan's Economy i n War and Reconstruction, p . 46 .
440
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
July-Sept
On the 24th July a Japanese invasion force was reported at Camranh Bay , on the east coast of Indo-China . President Roosevelt at once sent for the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and told him that he had permitted the continued export of oil to Japan in the hope that this woul d tend to keep war out of the South Pacific ; but if Japan attempted to seize Netherlands East Indies oil, war would certainly result . He then proposed that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indo-China, he would do all in his power to obtain from the Government s of China, Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States, a declaration to regard Indo-China as a neutralised country . The following day, however, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Unite d States Ambassador in Tokyo (Mr Grew) that the Vichy Government ha d consented to admit Japan to a joint protectorate over Indo-China .' Japanese occupation of land, sea and air bases in Indo-China proceeded immediately . On the 26th July the United States Government froze all Japanese asset s in America ; and the British and Dutch governments took similar action . Japan was now in a quandary . Until she could secure oil from outsid e to augment her own small annual production, natural and synthetic, of approximately 500,000 metric tons, she had to draw on reserves . Thes e in 1939 were at a peak total of some 8,100,000 metric tons 8 to meet a n estimated wartime annual call for 5,500,000 metric tons to cover army , navy and civilian requirements . She had to decide her course . Though conversations with the United States Government were resumed in August , the price demanded by the Americans for the release of the economi c stranglehold—Japanese withdrawal not only from Indo-China but fro m China itself—was unacceptable to the more extreme elements in Japan , led by the army ; and the Supreme Command began seriously to conside r conditions for operations against America, Britain and the Netherlands . In these considerations it was agreed that in the event of war Japan mus t capture the rich natural resources of the southern area at the beginnin g of the war, otherwise her minimum requirements of mobilisatio n supplies could not be fulfilled . She must therefore at the outset secure command of the sea and air to ensure the speedy defeat of her enemies . From this point of view various plans were studied, and about the middl e of August it was decided to adopt one which, though it disregarded the German advocacy to delay as long as possible American entry into th e war, seemed to offer the best chance of success . It was to start operations against the Philippines and Malaya simultaneously, and then to procee d southwards to capture the Netherlands East Indies from the east and west . On the 6th September, at a meeting of the Japanese Supreme Wa r Council presided over by the Emperor, resolutions presented by the arm y were adopted . These were : to proceed with war preparations so that the y would be completed toward the end of October ; at the same time to *On 29 July a protocol providing for the "joint defence " of Indo-China was signed betwee n the French and Japanese governments in Vichy . *At 7 Dec 1941, when Japan attacked, the oil reserve was down to 7,000,000 metric tons du e to United States, Dutch and British embargoes. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, pp. 134-35 .
July-Oct
TOJO
44 1
endeavour by diplomatic means to have Japanese demands agreed to b y America and Britain ; to prepare for war against America, Britain an d Holland if, by the early part of October, there was no reasonable hop e of agreement through diplomacy . At the same time a list of "Japan's mini mum demands and maximum concessions", 9 which in effect allotted the demands to Japan and the concessions to America, Britain, and Holland , was adopted . At the conference Admiral Nagano likened Japan to a patient who was certain to die if nothing was done, but might be save d by a dangerous operation . Detailed operational plans were put in hand . From the 10th on throug h the 13th September the navy carried out table top exercises at the Nava l College, Meguro, Tokyo, under the supervision of Admiral Yamamoto , Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet . The items studied were : (1) a naval operation for seizing command of the sea in the West Pacifi c (the capture of American, British, Dutch areas in the Orient) ; (2) a surprise assault against Hawaii . There remained in Japan more moderate elements, including the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, who wished to avoid war if possible, an d their views were voiced at a meeting of cabinet ministers on the 12t h October. The stumbling block was the American demand that the Japanes e withdraw from China, which the intransigent group, led by General Tojo , the War Minister, refused to consider . A few days later Konoye resigned ; and on 17th October a new ministry, dominated by the army, assume d office with Tojo as Prime Minister, War Minister, and Minister for Hom e Affairs . V These and other indications of the growing danger of war were not lost upon the Australian and British Governments . For some months plans had been discussed for the withdrawal of European women and children from Nauru and Ocean Islands . l In July these plans were implemented, and on the 17th of that month H .M.A .S. Westralia, with th e merchant vessels Skagerak, Vito and Kenilworth2 (these two last-name d with passengers from Ocean Island) sailed from Nauru with a total o f ninety-three refugees and reached Australia without incident . Arrangements were also made to demolish moorings, phosphate loading gear , wireless stations etc at a later date . There remained on the islands administrative and phosphate staffs and native labourers, the native populations , and the small military detachments, "Wren" at Nauru and "Heron" a t Summarised, this list was : 1. United States and Britain must let Japan settle "China incident " , must close Burma Road and give no more assistance to Chiang Kai-shek . 2. There must be no increase of British or American military forces in the Far East, even i n their own possessions. 3. No interference with Japanese-French relations as to Indo-China . 4. American cooperation for obtaining needed raw materials, by restoration of free trade an d assisting Japan "to establish close economic relations with Thai and Netherlands East Indies". 5. Japan will not use Indo-China as a base for operations against any country except China and will evacuate Indo-China "as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East" . 6. Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines. "These plans were first approved in principle at a War Cabinet meeting in May 1941 . ' Of 4,244, 5,181 and 5,457 tons respectively .
442
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Feb-Aug
Ocean Island, each of about 50 men and two field guns, which had bee n installed in February 1941 against a possible repetition of the German raider attacks. During August there were indications that the Japanese were with drawing their merchant ships from world trade, and, nearer borne, a Malay pearling skipper reported that all Japanese luggers operating of f Bathurst Island had been ordered to proceed to Palau and lay up . In August the British Prime Minister, crossing the Atlantic in th e new battleship Prince of Wales,3 met and conferred with President Roosevelt at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland . This was the Atlantic Meeting whereat was drawn up the Atlantic Charter, a joint Anglo-American Declaration of Principles, the substance and spirit of which was, in its first draft (but little amended in the Declaration's final form) a British production composed by Mr Churchill . This Declaration was published simultaneously in London and Washington on the 14th August . The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, said of it in Parliament six days later that th e United States and Great Britain had entered into "a great moral partner ship by which they make themselves in substance the joint champion s of that way of life for which we in Australia stand" . The following month , in London, the Atlantic Charter was accepted and endorsed by the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, U .S .S .R., Yugoslavia, and Free France . During the conversations at Placentia Bay Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt discussed the situation in the Far East, and agreed to take parallel actio n in warning Japan that any further encroachments on her part woul d compel their governments "to take countermeasures even though those might lead to war" between their countries and Japan . Mr Churchill arrived back in London on the 19th August . Six days later he raised with the Admiralty the question of the formation of a n Eastern Fleet . In a minute to the First Sea Lord on the 25th of the mont h Mr Churchill suggested sending one of the new King George V battleships ,4 with Repulse or Renown and one fast aircraft carrier, to the Far East . This force could show itself in the triangle Aden-Singapore-Simonstow n where "it would exert a paralysing effect upon Japanese naval action" . 5 The Admiralty, who had been considering this matter for some time , replied that it was proposed to send to the Indian Ocean between mid September 1941 and the end of January 1942 the battleships Nelson and Rodney and the four "R" class ships Revenge,6 Royal Sovereign, Ramillies and Resolution (the "R's" being ships of about 2,500 miles enduranc e at 20 knots in smooth water), and the battle cruiser Renown . The aircraft $
HMS Prince of Wales, battleship (1941), 35,000 tons, ten 14-in and sixteen 5 .5-in guns, 28. 5 kts; sunk by Jap naval aircraft in S China Sea, 10 Dec 1941 . 6 King George V class : British battleships, King George V, Prince of Wales, Duke of York , Anson, Howe. 6 Churchill, Minute to First Sea Lord, 25 Aug 1941 . (The Second World War, Vol III (1950) , p . 768 . ) e HMS Revenge, battleship (1916), 29,150 tons, eight 15-in and twelve 6-in guns, two torp tubes , 21 kts.
Aug1941
CHURCHILL DISAGREES
44 3
carrier Hermes was already there, and it was proposed to send there Ark Royal in April 1942, and Indomitable ? in an emergency. The Admiralty ' s reasons for the proposed dispositions were that the four " R's", used meanwhile as troop convoy escorts in the Indian Ocean, would relieve cruiser s of that duty and deter the Japanese from sending raiding battleships to the area ; would be free from submarine and aircraft attack ; and would eventually form part of the Eastern Fleet, formation of which wa s dependent on the availability of cruisers and destroyers, of which ten and twenty-four respectively were needed. Nelson and Rodney would giv e the best backing to the "R's" when the Eastern Fleet was formed, th e combination constituting the most homogeneous fleet which could b e provided as regards speed . It was hoped that the combination of a battle cruiser and aircraft carrier would deter the Japanese from sending heav y cruisers to attack Indian Ocean trade . The Admiralty conceded that i t might be desirable in the first instance, as a deterrent against Japan goin g to war, to send Nelson, Rodney, Renown and Hermes to Singapore ; but if war eventuated they would have to retire thence to Trincomalee . Finally, the Admiralty suggested that the presence of all these ships in the India n Ocean would " go some way to meet the wishes of Australia and Ne w Zealand for the Far East to be reinforced " . Mr Churchill disagreed with these proposals, and in a further minute of the 29th August referred to the Admiralty 's insistence on keeping th e new battleships in the Home Fleet to counter any possible Atlantic sortie s by the German Tirpitz . Tirpitz (he said) is doing to us exactly what a K .G .V . in the Indian Ocean would do to the Japanese Navy. It exercises a vague general fear and menaces all point s at once. It appears, and disappears, causing immediate reactions and perturbation s on the other side . 8 There is a curious similarity between this suggestion by Mr Churchill and that, referred to earlier, by Mr Roosevelt to keep United States ships in the Pacific "popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing " . It is interesting, too, that while Mr Churchill was a former First Lord o f the Admiralty, Mr Roosevelt was a former U .S . Assistant Secretary of the Navy . They were, as Mr Churchill referred to himself in correspondenc e between them, "Naval Persons" . Nevertheless, the situations cited by Mr Churchill were not analogous . The "vague general fear" exercised by Tirpitz was of attack on Atlantic convoys . The German Navy was in no position to contemplate a flee t action, but might risk a raiding sortie . The Japanese Navy was in a different position . It was a powerful balanced fleet, capable of forming a line of battle against any force Britain could oppose to it . A British forc e such as that envisaged by Churchill, though it "menaced all points at once " in the Indian Ocean where there were no points or Japanese trade or troo p "HMS Indomitable, aircraft carrier (1941), 23,000 tons. sixteen 4.5-in guns, over 60 aircraft. 31 kts. 8 Churchill, Vol III, p . 773 .
444
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Aug-Oct
convoys for it to menace, need have caused no "vague general fear" to a Japanese fleet well to the north of Singapore . Such a fleet need only have been concerned at the presence in its own waters, or in waters where it was necessary for it to operate, of an enemy force powerful enoug h to seek a fleet engagement. An analogy did, however, lie in the example offered by the Britis h Navy's experience in the Aegean during the German invasion of Crete . Then, as to its influence in the Crete campaign, the presence of a powerfu l Mediterranean fleet caused the Germans little concern while it remaine d south of the island . When portion of it penetrated into the Aegean th e Germans, with no surface fleet but with great air strength unopposed in the air, were able to make the Aegean untenable for the British ships, and to inflict on them losses comparable to those which might have bee n expected in a major fleet action . In August 1941 the Japanese were already within bombing range of Singapore and had a powerful fleet also . The dangers inherent in this situation were clear to the Admiralty, a s is evidenced by their proviso (mentioned above) that, if war with Japa n eventuated, a fleet based on Singapore would have to retire thence to Trincomalee . In the event, what was considered to be political expediency won th e day, and the Admiralty was overruled in a series of discussions whic h took place during August, September, and October. The Admiralty plan, which was the sound one, could not be implemented before the end o f the year . The increasing likelihood of Japan resorting to war led to a political desire for a gesture calculated to deter her . Support for thi s came from various quarters, from Singapore, from Australia, and fro m the British Foreign Office . At a conference at Singapore on the 29t h September9 attended by Sir Earle Page, a former Prime Minister of Australia, who was appointed Special Representative of the Australian Government to the United Kingdom War Cabinet, emphasis was laid on the propaganda value of even one or two battleships in Singapore . This was supported, on Earle Page ' s recommendation, by the Australian Labour Government which assumed office on the 7th October, and which urged the British Government to dispose capital ships in the Far East as soo n as possible for the defence of Empire interests in the eastern hemisphere , for the maintenance of communications to the Middle East, and for sustaining generally the war efforts of the Dominions in the Pacific and thei r overseas forces in particular . The importance of including a modern capita l ship in the force was stressed . The Defence Committee in London discussed the matter on the 17t h October, at about which date the British Naval Attache, Tokyo, reporte d that various indications showed that all units of the Japanese Navy wer e mobilised on a complete war basis). Earlier in the month Repulse, which ', Those at the conference were the Rt Hon A . Duff Cooper, recently appointed British Minister of State in the Far East; Brooke-Popham ; Layton ; Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of Malaya ; Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador at Chungking ; Sir Josiah Crosby, British Ministe r at Bangkok; and Sir Earle Page. ' DNI Melbourne received this information from the Captain on the Intelligence Staff, Singapore , on the 20 Oct.
Oct-Nov
ADMIRAL PHILLIPS
44 5
had escorted a Middle and Far East troop convoy (WS .11) south through the Atlantic, reached Durban and joined the East Indies Station . A t the Defence Committee meeting Churchill urged that she be joined a t Singapore forthwith by a King George V battleship and fleet carrier . The Admiralty adhered to the view that Rodney, Nelson and the four "R's " should be sent, and the modern ships retained in the Atlantic . The y argued that the presence of six battleships at Singapore, even though four were obsolescent, would force the Japanese to detach a large part o f their fleet and uncover Japan to the United States Navy, of whose co operation the Admiralty felt assured . But Churchill visualised Japanese attacks on Indian Ocean routes by fast raiding battleships as a more likel y danger than an attack in force on Singapore, and against such attack s he considered the "R's" would be impotent . He wanted Prince of Wales sent to Singapore at once . The Foreign Office supported him, and the Admiralty lost the day. It was intended to send with Prince of Wales and Repulse, the modern armoured aircraft carrier Indomitable, as a first and immediate instalment of a Far Eastern Fleet, later to be joined by Nelson, Rodney, and th e four "R's" . Unfortunately Indomitable, "working up" in the West Indies , ran ashore while entering Jamaica and had to be docked for repairs . Thu s a vital unit, with her aircraft, was denied to the force . The loss in November of Ark Royal removed that ship also from any Far Eastern Fleet . As from the 24th October Admiral Sir Tom Phillips 2 was appointe d Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and on that day hoisted his flag i n Prince of Wales at Greenock . He was an officer with considerable destroye r experience afloat (he was Commodore (D) and later Rear-Admiral (D ) Home Fleet Flotillas from April 1938 to May 1939) and he had a lon g and brilliant staff record . As Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff he had been in closest possible touch with the naval side of the war at sea . But h e had no actual experience of that war, especially as it was being fought under the conditions imposed by naval aviation . Only three days elapsed between his relief at the Admiralty after a period of years there as Directo r of Plans and Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, and his hoisting his flag in Prince of Wales. The next day, the 25th October, the flagship sailed fo r Singapore via the Cape, accompanied only by two destroyers, Electra and Express. Force "G", as the three ships were designated, reached Free town on the 5th November, Simonstown on the 16th and Ceylon on th e 28th, where they were joined by Repulse, and the destroyers Jupiter an d Encounter3 from the Mediterranean . On the 26th October Mr Churchill telegraphed to Mr Curtin tellin g of the intention to build up an Eastern Fleet by the end of the year : 'Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, KCB ; RN . (HMS' s Bacchante 1915, Lancaster 1916-19 .) Principal Staff Officer to COS, Mediterranean Fleet (Cmdre Dudley Pound) 1925-27 ; Director of Plans , Admiralty 1935-38 ; Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiralty, Jun 1939-Oct 1941 . B . 19 Feb 1888 . lost in sinking of HMS Prince of Wales, 10 Dec 1941. 'HMS's Electra, Express and Encounter, destroyers (1934), 1,375 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, four 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts; Electra and Encounter sunk in Java Sea, 27 Feb and 1 Mar 1942 . HMS Jupiter, destroyer (1939), 1,690 tons, six 4 .7-in guns, five 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk in Java Sea, 28 Feb 1942 .
Oct-De c 446 THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941 In the interval (he said) in order further to deter Japan, we are sending forthwith our newest battleship, Prince of Wales, to join Repulse in Indian Ocean . Thi s is done in spite of protests from the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, and is a serious risk for us to run. Prince of Wales will be noticed at Capetown quit e soon . In addition the four "R" battleships are being moved as they become read y to eastern waters .
In a speech at the Lord Mayor's Luncheon at the Mansion House on the 10th November the British Prime Minister delivered "A Warnin g to Japan" in which he touched on naval dispositions : We now feel ourselves strong enough to provide a powerful naval force o f heavy ships, with its necessary ancillary vessels, for service if needed in the India n and Pacific Oceans. Thus we stretch out the long arm of brotherhood and mother hood to the Australian and New Zealand peoples and to the peoples of India. And he added : I take this occasion to say, and it is my duty to say, that, should the Unite d States become involved in war with Japan, the British declaration will follow withi n the hour. To say that the "powerful naval force of heavy ships" had its necessary ancillary vessels was to overpaint the picture . On the 24th November the Admiralty directed that Prince of Wales, Repulse, Revenge, 4 Electra , Express, Jupiter, Encounter, "and such other units of the China Station a s were desired by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet", were to be considered as forming part of the Eastern Fleet . The units on the Chin a Station were three old "D" class 6-inch gun cruisers engaged on convo y escort duties, seven destroyers (including the Australians Vampire and Vendetta, the second-named of which was in dockyard hands), and a number of escort vessels, minesweepers and patrol craft . There was little here with which to attempt to build a balanced force ; and in addition, lackin g an aircraft carrier, the force was without its all-important self-containe d air cover and air striking arm . When, to the tune of world-wide "deterrent " publicity, Force "G " reached Singapore on the 2nd December, Admiral Phillips notified his command of the names of eight vessels which wer e to form the Eastern Fleet until further orders . They were the seven mentioned above, and H .M .A .S . Vampire, now under the command of Commander Moran .' It was an unbalanced token force with which to fac e grave and growing naval responsibilities in the Far East . VI As stated at the start of this chapter, the Australia Station during 194 1 was free from enemy attack until November . At least four German surfac e raiders entered the station however ; and news of raider activity in adjacen t areas was received from time to time . In February the raider Kome t Revenge never joined Force "G". She reached Aden, escorting Convoy WS .12 from the Unite d Kingdom, on 20 Nov . From there she went to Bombay, and on 13 Dec to Trincomalee . 'Cdr W . T. A. Moran, RAN. Entered RAN College 1917 (HMAS Brisbane 1921) . Torpedo specialist. Cdr RANC 1939 ; HMAS Canberra 1939-41 ; comd HMAS Vampire 1941-42. B . Kalgoorlie, WA, 11 Dec 1903 . Lost in sinking of Vampire, 9 Apr 1942.
(R .A .N . Historical Section ) Launching a "Walrus" from Catapult in H .M .A .S . Canberra .
T
(Australian War Memorial )
Naval Auxiliary Patrol .
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
Members of the Australian Naval Board 1941 . From left to right : Mr R . Anthony, Financ e Member ; Engr Rear-Adm P . E . McNeil, 3rd Naval Member ; Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin , Retiring 1st Naval Member ; Mr G . L. Macandie, Secretary Naval Board; Vice-Adm Si r Guy Royle, 1st Naval Member ; Mr A . R . Nankervis, Secretary, Department of Navy ; Commodore J . W . Durnford, 2nd Naval Member ; Mr H . G . Brain, Business Member .
(Department of Information
New Entries marching at H .M .A .S . Rush( litter .
H .M .A .S . Sydney leadin g Convoy "U .S .12a" Queen Mary , Queen Elizabeth
past Wilson's Promontory , 4th September 1941 .
H .M .A .S . Bungaree— Minelayer—in Sydne y Harbour.
iR . .4 .;A
Nt,torica( Section)
Captain J . Burnett on Bridge o f H .M .A .S . Sydney .
Survivors fro m
Kormoran . 1 . G . Rippon)
(R .4 .N . Historical Section)
Feb-Sept
GERMAN RAIDERS
447
traversed the station west-bound well to the south of Australia, afte r her activities at Nauru . In March her Nauru companion, Orion, followe d her. Orion spent some fruitless weeks in the Indian Ocean, and in June rounded the Cape and entered the Atlantic . Komet was at Kerguelen during March, but in April moved eastward and entered the western extreme of the Australia Station . She was some 350 miles west of North West Cape on the 14th May, whence she steamed south-west to mee t the captured whaler Adjutant (350 tons) . Towards the end of the month the two ships made for the Pacific, and during June passed eastwar d through the Australia Station well to the south . On the 25th of the month they were off New Zealand, and Adjutant laid mines, ten in each instance , in the approaches to Lyttelton and Wellington .° After this operation Adjutant developed engine trouble, and was subsequently scuttled . Komet cruised in the south-west Pacific with no success throughout July, and the n moved north-east toward the Panama isthmus . Here, during August, she had better luck. On the 14th of the month, masquerading as the Japanes e Ryoku Maru in the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands, she intercepted an d sank the steamer Australind (5,020 tons) which, loaded with concentrates, had left Port Pirie for Panama early in July . Three days later she intercepted and captured Kota Nopan (7,322 tons), a Dutch ship which sailed from Thursday Island on the 21st July, and had a valuabl e cargo of rubber and tin . This ship, with a prize crew, was despatched to France, and reached Bordeaux in November . Two days after her meeting with Kota Nopan, Komet, on the 19th August, met and sank the British India steamer Devon (9,036 tons), bound from Liverpool to New Zealand . Some two months after Komet passed eastward through the Australia Station from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, another German raider , Atlantis, followed her. This ship, after her operations in the north-wes t Indian Ocean in January and February 1941 rounded the Cape an d entered the Atlantic in April . Here, on the 19th April, she met a newcomer to the raider fleet, Kormoran, 7 which had been operating in the Atlantic and was now bound for the Indian Ocean . Atlantis remained in the Atlantic until July, sinking five ships including the Australian Rabaul (5,618 tons), which was bound from Milford Haven to Capetown when attacked and sunk with the loss of nine of her crew some 700 miles north west of Walvis Bay on the 14th May . About the middle of July Atlantis rounded the Cape and re-entered the Indian Ocean . She was there for the best part of a month without making any attacks, and in Augus t passed through the Australia Station to the south and entered the Pacific . On the 11th September she captured the Norwegian Silvaplana (4,79 3 tons) about 800 miles north-east of the Kermadec Islands, and sent he r to France, and on the 20th, just about midway between Sydney an d ' These mines, of magnetic type, were probably defective when laid . They have apparently neve r detonated, and their presence was not known to the New Zealand authorities until it wa s revealed by captured German documents after the war . 7 Kormoran, German auxiliary cruiser (1938), 9,400 tons, six 5 .9-in guns, six torp tubes, 320 mines, 18 kts; sunk off Western Australian coast on 19 Nov 1941, after being in action wit h HMAS Sydney .
448
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
1940-4 1
Valparaiso, met Komet, which had returned south-west after her successe s off the Galapagos Islands . After that meeting the two ships set out on their separate ways to Germany . Komet was successful . She rounded the Horn on the 9th October, and reached Hamburg on the 30th November . 8 Atlantis was less fortunate . She rounded the Horn on the 29th October, and on the 22nd November 1941, was brought to action and sunk b y H .M .S . Devonshire north-west of Ascension Island. Three days before this, Kormoran, which ship Atlantis had met in the South Atlantic, wa s also sunk—on the Australia Station as the result of an action wit h H .M .A.S . Sydney . Kormoran, formerly the Steiermark of the Hamburg-Amerika line, wa s a fast, converted twin-screw cargo ship of 9,400 tons gross, with a spee d of 18 knots when clean . She was driven by diesel electric motors, an d had an endurance of 70,000 miles at 10 knots, of 50,000 miles at 1 7 knots . Built in 1938, she was the most modern of the German raiders . As converted she was heavily armed with six 5 .9-inch and four 3 .7-inch guns ; five anti-aircraft machine-guns ; and six torpedo tubes, one submerge d and two on deck on each side . She carried two aircraft and approximatel y 300 mines . She commissioned on 9th October 1940 under Lieut-Commander Anton Detmers, a determined and capable officer who had visite d Australia as a lieutenant in the cruiser Koln in 1933, and who had war experience in command of a destroyer in the Norwegian campaign . Sh e sailed from Gotenhafen on the start of her cruise on the 3rd Decembe r 1940, reached the open Atlantic via Denmark Strait ten days later, an d entered her operational area south of latitude 40 degrees north, on th e 19th December . On the 6th January 1941, Kormoran sank her first ship, the Greek steamer Antonis (3,729 tons), and her second, the tanker British Union (6,987 tons), on the 18th . In this second attack, which was made afte r nightfall by the light of searchlights and star shells, the raider narrowl y missed an encounter with the Australian-manned armed merchant cruise r Arawa . That ship, bound for Freetown, sighted searchlights and gunflashes, heard the raider alarm report from British Union, and closed the position . She found nothing in the darkness, but next morning rescue d one boat's crew of survivors from the tanker. Arawa then fruitlessly searched the area for three days before resuming her course for Freetown , where she arrived on the 26th January . On the 29th January Kormoran was some 800 miles west of Freetown , and on this day sank two more ships, the British A Eric Star (11,900 tons) and Eurylochus (5,723 tons) . On the 1st February she crossed the equator, and on the 7th met the supply ship Nordmark (ex-Westerwald, 10,000 tons) to which she transferred 170 prisoners . On the 25th, some 800 miles south-south-east of St Helena she met the raider Pinguin bound fo r Kerguelen to refit, after which she went north again to operate in th e vicinity of the equator . Here she experienced bad engine trouble and n o Komet, starting a second cruise in Oct 1942, was sunk by British destroyers on the 14th o f that month off Cape de la Hague, in the English Channel .
Mar-Sept 1941
KO R M O R AN
44 9
operational success . On the 16th March she met Scheer returning to Germany after her Indian Ocean operations . Throughout the rest of March and most of April Kormoran remained in the Atlantic, adding to her lis t of victims with the British ships Agnita, Canadolite, and Craftsman, and the Greek steamer Nicolaos D .L ., 9 all of which were sunk, excepting Canadolite, which reached France as a prize . On the 19th April, in th e South Atlantic, Kormoran met Atlantis, and during the night of 1st-2nd May she rounded the Cape into the Indian Ocean . Here Detmers (now promoted Commander) had no success until th e 26th June, when Kormoran sank the Yugoslav steamer Velebit (4,15 3 tons) in an attack during the darkness of early morning in the Bay of Bengal . In the afternoon of the same day she met the Australian steamer Mareeba (3,472 tons), bound from Java to Colombo . The raider was at this time disguised as the Japanese Sakito Maru (7,126 tons) , and her approach was concealed by a rain squall . When she reached a favourable position she ordered Mareeba to stop . Mareeba's master, Captain Skinner,' was an outstanding example of the fine type of office r produced by the Merchant Service ; patriotic, courageous, learned in the ways of the sea . He was well-known in the Australian trade . "I kne w him, " recalled Long, the Director of Naval Intelligence, "when I went to Sydney as Staff Officer (Intelligence) in 1934-35, right through unti l he sailed on his last voyage, and a finer man and seaman hasn ' t been born ." On this occasion he was true to type, and on being challenged by the raider he immediately warned other ships and the naval authoritie s by broadcasting a distress message . The raider thereupon opened heav y fire, one of the first salvos destroying her victim 's wireless room . Mareeba' s complement of forty-eight were taken on board the raider, where on e subsequently died from a heart attack . The ship herself was sunk b y scuttling charges in 8°15'N ., 88°06'E . Kormoran then proceeded to a position about 900 miles south of Ceylon and midway between the Chagos Archipelago and Sumatra, wher e for about a fortnight she underwent an overhaul, and changed camouflag e from that of a Japanese ship to " the best disguise of all—insignificance " . At the conclusion of this period, in mid-July, the raider, until the end o f September, cruised over a wide area from within the Australia Statio n some 200 miles west of Shark Bay, to the north-west Indian Ocean . O n the evening of 13th August, when some 200 miles west of Carnarvon , she sighted her first ship in seven weeks, a steamer of about 6,000 tons ; but suspicious of this ship's actions, which made him think she must b e a decoy, Detmers refrained from attacking . He then considered, but dismissed as not worthwhile, the idea of laying mines off Geraldton an d Carnarvon, and instead proceeded north ; and on the 26th of Augus t those in the raider sighted the first land they had seen in 258 days Of 3,561, 11,309, 8,022 and 5,486 tons respectively . 1 Capt M. B . Skinner . (Served at sea throughout 1914-18 war ; in 1914-15 as Third Officer in Mallina while acting as collier to HMAS Australia .) Master of Tanda to Mar 1941, Mareeba Apr-Jun 1941 . Lost after sinking of German prison ship, 2 Feb 1942 .
450
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Feb-Nov
a mountain peak on the island on Enggano, off south-west Sumatra . On the 23rd September, between the Maldives and Seychelles in the northwest Indian Ocean, Kormoran met and sank her eleventh and last merchant ship victim, the Greek steamer Stamatios G . Embiricos (3,94 1 tons) .2 Detmers was now ordered by the German Admiralty to rendezvou s with Kulmerland (the supply ship which had accompanied the Naur u raiders in December 1940) which, now disguised as an American steame r of the Luckenbach Line, left Kobe on the 3rd September . The two ships met on the 16th October about 1,100 miles west of Fremantle, and saile d leisurely north in company for ten days. During this period the raide r provisioned and fuelled from Kulmerland, and transferred to her all her remaining prisoners (except four Chinese taken from Eurylochus) . 3 After parting from Kulmerland, Kormoran moved off to the westward where an engine refit was undertaken . Detmers apparently intended to lay a minefield off Perth ; but received information from the German Admiralt y that a convoy was due to leave Fremantle escorted by H .M .S . Cornwall,4 and this caused him to abandon the project and decide instead to investigate the area off Shark Bay . Around the middle of November, Kormora n was steering easterly, and then north-easterly towards her new objective . From February 1941 H .M .A .S . Sydney was mainly employed on patrols and convoy escort in Australian waters . In April she carried Admiral Colvin and the Australian delegation to Singapore to the ABD conference . On her return to Fremantle Captain Burnett (on the 15th May) succeede d Collins in command . One of the original 1913 entry at the Naval College , Burnett was an officer of professional achievement and promise . He was the third college graduate to reach the rank of captain in the Roya l Australian Navy, being promoted in December 1938 . His predecessors were Farncomb (June 1937) and Collins (December 1937) . He was a gunnery specialist, and had a "Five First Class" record in lieutenant' s courses . In 1932 he passed the Staff Course, and he shone as a staff officer . He was in England when war broke out in 1939, and on hi s return to Australia was, in November of that year, appointed to Nav y Office as Assistant_ Chief of the Naval Staff, and later as Deputy Chief , to Admiral Colvin . In a letter to The Times, London, on 19th December 1941, Colvin wrote of him : 2 when Stamatios G . Embiricos became overdue and it was suspected she was another raide r victim, HMAS Australia, then on convoy escort duty in the Indian Ocean, was sent to reconnoitre Kerguelen and Crozet Islands. She sailed from Colombo via Mauritius and reache d Kerguelen Island on the 1st November 1941, remaining there until the 4th, when she sailed for the Crozets. She returned to Durban on the 11th November . At Kerguelen was the wreck of a French trawler, which had been used in connection with the whaling factory at Por t Jeanne d 'Arc. There was also evidence (worn out scrubbing brushes, straw bottle containers , and an empty bootblacking tin with German labels) that a German ship of some kind ha d used Kerguelen within the year . Before leaving Kerguelen, Australia laid a small number of magnetic mines there in case raiders subsequently visited the island . Kulmerland later met the blockade runner Spreewald (5,083 tons) and handed the prisoners over to her. Spreewald was sunk in the Atlantic by a German submarine, and many of th e prisoners, including Capt Skinner, among 26 of Mareeba's survivors, were lost. Convoy US.13, escorted by Canberra, sailed from Fremantle on 8 November ; escort was taken over by Cornwall from Canberra off Cocos Island. On her return voyage to Fremantle Canberra must have passed close to the raider .
May-Nov
SYDNEY
OVERDUE
45 1
He had much service in ships of the Royal Navy and came to me from them as my Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff a few months after the outbreak of war wit h high recommendations . These were not belied, for his capacity to grasp a situatio n rapidly and to formulate decisions was quite remarkable . His thoroughness, his appetite for hard work and his powers of organisation were invaluable, and h e had a special faculty for getting at the heart of a problem and of stripping i t of unessentials which is given to few . Sydney's employment subsequent to Burnett's taking command wa s routine work . During May and June she escorted Zealandia to Malaya from Fremantle, handing over escort to H .M.S . Danae off Sunda Strait, and later taking over from Danae in the same position and escorting the troopship back to Fremantle . Towards the end of June she escorted a convoy, including Zealandia, to Sydney . July, August, and most of September she spent in the east, escorting to New Zealand and Suva, an d patrolling off Melbourne . At the end of September she escorted convo y US .12B from the vicinity of Melbourne to Sunda Strait, and returne d to Fremantle on the 7th October . There she was to be based for a while , and Burnett was told that she would be required about the 24th Octobe r to escort Zealandia to Singapore . Zealandia, which had been on a trooping voyage to Port Moresby an d Rabaul (Convoy ZK .4) returned to Sydney on the 13th October to embar k troops for Malaya . Her departure thence was delayed for over a wee k owing to an industrial dispute with her engineers, and it was the 29t h October when she eventually sailed, escorted by Adelaide, towards the west, where Sydney took over escort. On the 11th November, Sydney and Zealandia left Fremantle for Sunda Strait, where onward escort was t o be taken over by H .M .S . Durban . Sydney signalled her expected time of arrival back at Fremantle as p .m. on the 19th or a .m . on the 20th November . This she later amended to Thursday, 20th November . That was the last heard from her. She did not arrive on the 20th, and th e District Naval Officer, Western Australia, reported accordingly to the Naval Board at 11 a .m . the following day . 5 This did not immediately cause concern . The arrival of Zealandia at Singapore was reported as some hours later than had been anticipated i n Navy Office, and it was assumed that Sydney would be correspondingly late returning to Fremantle . There was also the possibility that she might have been diverted for some purpose, and had not broken wireless silence . When, however, she had not returned by the 23rd November, she wa s instructed by the Naval Board to report by signal . There was no reply . The following morning all high power wireless stations in Australia wer e instructed to call her continuously . There was no response ; nor did an air search carried out that day by R .A .A .F . aircraft from Pearce, Wester n Australia, produce any positive result . The Commander-in-Chief, China , was then informed that Sydney was thirty-six hours overdue, and replie d that she had handed over Zealandia to Durban off Sunda Strait at noon 6 Except for the account of the action, times used in this narrative are those of Easter n Australian time .
452
THE
AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
17-27 No v
on the 17th . The Commander-in-Chief, Netherlands Navy, Admiral Helfrich, was thereupon requested by the Naval Board to carry out an ai r search south from Java ; but within two hours of the despatch of tha t request came news . Shortly after 6 p.m. on the 24th the Trocas—the British tanker which Stuart had taken in tow when disabled in the Mediterranean—reported by wireless that she had picked up a raft carrying 25 German naval men in a position approximately 120 mile s W.N .W. of Carnarvon . Action was at once taken . Six merchant ships in the area, Pan Europe, Saidja, Herstein, Sunetta, Centaur and Hermion, 6 were instructed to pas s through the position of the raft found by Trocas and keep a lookout for other survivors . Four auxiliary naval vessels, Yandra, 7 Heros, 8 Olive Cam 9 and Wyrallah, l were sailed from Fremantle to meet Trocas and then search the area . Aircraft were removed from Pearce to Carnarvon to search from there, and two R .A .A.F. Catalina flying-boats were transferred from NorthEastern Area to cover a wide ocean reconnaissance . Later on the 24th wireless stations were instructed to cease calling Sydney . It seemed clear that she had been in action, and the discovery by Trocas defined a search area that was closely and widely covered, by air from Australia an d Java ; by sea by merchant vessels and the naval vessels from Fremantle , and the Dutch cruiser Tromp which left Sunda Strait on the 25th to follow Sydney's track to 20 degrees south and then search towards Surabaya on the chance of the cruiser, damaged, making for that port . These searches, though negative regarding Sydney, quickly produced results . By the 30th November six boats and two rafts had been found, eithe r at sea or ashore near Carnarvon . They carried a total of 315 German officers and ratings (including twenty-six taken on to Sydney in the trans port Aquitania) and two Chinese . They were survivors from Kormoran, which was sunk on the 19th November after being in action with H .M .A .S . Sydney. It was by then known that thirty-three hours had been lost in th e search through failure immediately to report the rescue, earlier than that of the Trocas, of German survivors from one of the rafts mentione d above . At 8 .30 a.m . on the 24th November, Aquitania, bound from Singapore to Sydney, rescued twenty-six Germans from a raft in a positio n some forty-five miles south-west of where Trocas later met hers . From their accounts, Aquitania's captain gathered that the Germans' ship ha d been in action with a cruiser. He did not report immediately by wireles s because he considered that the cruiser would herself have already reported , and he did not wish therefore to break wireless silence . Not until Aquitania passed Wilson's Promontory at 1 .20 p .m . on the 27th and was able to "
Of 9,468, 6,671, 5,100, 7,987, 3,222 and 5,202 tons respectively . HMAS Yandra (1928), 990 tons, commnd 22 Sep 1940, one 4-in gun, 11 kts . B HMAS Heros (1919), 382 tons, commnd 3 Jul 1941, one 4-in gun, 12 kts . 'HMAS Olive Cam (1920), 281 tons, commnd 6 Oct 1939, one 12-pdr gun, 9 .5 kts. ' HMAS Wyrallah (1934), 1,049 tons, commnd 2 Sep 1940, one 4-in gun, 11 kts ; name changed , in Feb 1942, to Wilcannia .
19 Nov
EXCHANGE OF SIGNALS
45 3
pass a visual signal, did the Naval Board learn that she had met the raf t and had prisoners on board . From Sydney herself no word was ever received, and only one small shell-torn float was found as tangible evidence of her loss, in spite of wide and thorough searching. The story of her last action was pieced together through exhaustive interrogation of Kormoran ' s survivors . No room was left for doubt as to its accuracy . Just before 4 p .m .2 on Wednesday, 19th November 1941, the Germa n raider Kormoran was off the Western Australian coast, approximatel y 150 miles south-west of Carnarvon . There was a gentle S .S .E. wind and slight sea, a medium S .W . swell . The day was very clear, and visibility extreme . Nightfall was some three hours distant . Kormoran, with a complement of 393 officers and men, was steering N .N .E . at 11 knots . At 3 .55 p .m . the lookout reported a sighting fine on the port bow . It wa s at first thought to be a sail, but was soon identified as a warship. At 4 p.m . Detmers—Kormoran ' s captain—sent his crew to action stations , altered course to W .S .W. into the sun, and ordered full speed—about 15 knots, which the temporary breakdown of one engine limited to 1 4 knots for about half an hour . The warship, now identified as a Perth class cruiser, steering southwards and some ten miles distant, altere d towards and overhauled on a slightly converging course on Kormoran's starboard quarter . She made the letters NNJ continuously on her search light. To this Kormoran made no reply . When about seven miles distant, Sydney signalled to Kormoran by searchlight to hoist her signal letters . Detmers hoped to avoid action by passing Kormoran off as a Dutch vessel . He therefore showed Dutch colours, and hoisted the flag signal PKQI for Straat Malakka on the triadic stay between the foremast an d funnel . So placed it was difficult to read, and Sydney repeatedly signalled : "Hoist your signal letters clear ." Ahlbach, Kormoran's yeoman of signals , drew the halliards to the starboard side to make the flags more visible to Sydney. In the early stages Kormoran ranged Sydney on a 3-metre rangefinder, but when the cruiser, overhauling on the starboard quarter and showing a narrow silhouette, had approached to within five miles, thi s was discontinued for reasons of disguise, and a small rangefinder was used . At 5 p .m ., to further the deception, Kormoran broadcast a "suspiciou s ship" message in the name of Straat Malakka . This was picked up, faint and in mutilated form, by the tug Uco, and by Geraldton wireless station , at 6 p .m. Western Australian time (eight hours ahead of Greenwich, s o that sending and receiving times tally, Kormoran's time being only seve n hours ahead) . In the mutilated portion read by Geraldton only the tim e and part of a position were readable, and there was no indication tha t it was a distress message . When, after ten minutes, there was no repetition , Geraldton broadcast all ships asking if there was anything to report . N o reply was received . Apparently no significance was therefore attached t o 'The Germans kept time for 105 east longitude, 7 hours ahead of Greenwich, and it is use d in this account of the action .
454
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
19 Nov
the original message, of which the Naval Board did not learn until th e 27th November. Soon after 5 .15 p .m . Sydney had drawn almost abeam of Kormoran to starboard, less than a mile distant . Both ships were steering approximately W .S.W . at about 15 knots . The cruiser was at action stations wit h all guns and torpedo tubes bearing . Her aircraft was on the . catapult with, apparently, the engine running . She signalled, both by flags and light : "Where bound?" Kormoran replied : "Batavia ." The crucial moment wa s approaching . Sydney made a two-flag hoist, the letters IK, which the raide r could not interpret . They were in fact (and their being quoted correctl y under interrogation is corroboration of the German story) the centre letter s of Straat Malakka's secret identification signal, which was unknown to the Germans . They made no reply . Sydney then made by light the fateful signal : "Show your secret sign . " It told Detmers that he would have to fight. He answered immediately by dropping all disguise, striking the Dutch colours and hoisting the German , and giving the order to open fire with guns and torpedoes . It was the n 5 .30 p.m . Simultaneously with opening gun fire, Kormoran fired two torpedoes . Lieutenant Fritz Skeries, the raider's gunnery officer, directed the gunnery from the control position above the bridge in this last engagement. According to his and corroborative evidence, Kormoran's initial single gun ranging salvo at just over 1,400 yards was short . A second at 1,750 yards was over. Hits were scored, within about four seconds of opening fire, o n Sydney's bridge and director tower, at a range of 1,640 yards . Thes e were followed immediately by a full salvo from Sydney which went over and failed to hit . Kormoran again scored quickly with two salvos whic h hit Sydney on the bridge and amidships : "Fifth shot the cruiser's aeroplan e (burnt)—motor ran and then shut off—shots fired systematically—luck y shot that aeroplane was hit . " The range was so short that Kormoran used her anti-aircraft machineguns and starboard 3 .7-inch guns effectively against Sydney's bridge, torpedo tubes, and anti-aircraft batteries . For a few seconds after her initial salvo Sydney did not reply . It would seem that her "A" and "B" (forward ) turrets were put out of action (according to Skeries by Kormoran's third and fourth salvos) ; but after the raider's fifth or sixth salvo the cruiser' s "X" turret (foremost of the two after turrets) opened fast and accurat e fire, hitting Kormoran in the funnel and engine room . "Y" turret fired only two or three salvos, all of which went over. At about this time one of th e raider's two torpedoes struck Sydney under "A" and "B" turrets . Th e other passed close ahead of the stricken ship, which was being repeatedl y hit by shells . Her stem low in the water, Sydney now turned sharply towards Kormoran as though attempting to ram . As she did so, the top of "B" turret flew overboard, blown up, Skeries said, by the raider's tenth salvo . The cruiser passed under Kormoran's stern, heading to the southward an d losing way . Kormoran, maintaining her course and speed, was now on
2
3
110*30
40
5
110a5 '
55 '
5 261 5
N f~ f
A
10
15
NAUTICAL MILES
N
O C E A
25
2
111't5
05'
26*r s
N
2
o=, ,
.ovi
,;s, 00'
110'
120'
130'
t .
t
BORNE O CELEBES
2630
JAVA
10
TIMOR
10
Darwin .
a Kormoran fired one torpedo missed
6 .45 p.m. ~
'` -5.30 p.m . Kormoran opened fire with guns and torpedoe s
4. p .m . 19th Nov 1941 .
four torpedoes - misse d 30' -
.—Ike .
Sydney last seen a t approximately this position
Kormoran sank at 12 .30 am 2ONov at approximately this position
Kormoran
264 25'
1103 0
20 •Carnarvon
5.45 p .m . Sydney fire d
6 p .m
*Broom e
20
35
40
11045
50
55 '
111*00*
HucnWGaosra
Sydney-Kormoran Action
05
40 100'
AUSTRALIA
30
•Fremantl e
r 110'
t
120'
t 30'
456
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
19 Nov
fire in the engine room where the hits by Sydney's "X" turret had cause d severe damage . Smoke from the fire hid Sydney from Kormoran's bridge , but the raider continued to engage with her after guns at a range lengthening to approximately 4,400 yards . At about 5 .45 p .m. Sydney fired four torpedoes . Detmers was then turning to port to bring his broadside to bear, and as he did so Kormoran' s engines began to fail . The torpedo tracks were sighted, but Kormora n just cleared them and they passed close astern . Simultaneously the raider's engines broke down completely. Sydney, crippled and on fire from the bridge to the after funnel, steamed slowly to the southward . Apparentl y her turrets were now out of action, but she continued to fire with her secondary armament, and Skeries stated : "Shots from 1-inch guns o f cruiser mostly short. " She was constantly hit by gun fire from the raider , whose forward control position was working with the port broadside in action at 5 .50 p .m ., when the range was about 6,600 yards . Ten minute s later, at a range of 7,700 yards, Kormoran fired one torpedo, which missed Sydney astern . The action had then lasted half an hour . Both ships were crippled an d on fire, the raider in the engine room, now untenable ; and Sydney fa r more extensively . Kormoran fired her last shot at 6.25 p .m., at a range of about 11,000 yards . In all she fired 450 rounds from her main armament, and probably some hundreds from her anti-aircraft batteries . She wa s now in a bad way, her engines wrecked and her engine room ablaze , and with her full equipment of mines, some 200, still on board . Dusk wa s creeping from the eastward over a sea that was rising with a freshenin g breeze . At 6 .25 p .m . Detmers ordered abandon ship, and lowered all boats and life-saving equipment. With the gathering gloom the form of Sydne y disappeared from view, last seen about ten miles off, heading approximately S .S .E. Thereafter, until about 10 p.m ., a distant glare in the darkness betokened her presence . Then occasional flickerings . Before midnight they, too, had gone . By 9 p.m . most of Kormoran's boats and rafts were lowered, filled an d cast off . Almost all the officers, and enough ratings to man the guns , remained on board while the final scuttling arrangements were made . A t midnight, with smoke increasing heavily on the mining deck, the scuttlin g charge was fired, and the last boat cast off . Half an hour later the mine s exploded, and Kormoran sank rapidly stern first . Of her complement of 393 officers and men, 78 lost their lives, about 20 killed in action on board and the remainder drowned through the capsizing of an overloade d raft. Two of the four Chinese from Eurylochus were also lost. Of Sydney' s total complement of 42 officers and 603 ratings, not one survived . The story of how Sydney was lost would appear to be straightforward . What induced Burnett to place her in the position where her loss in such a way was possible, must remain conjecture . Burnett had the usual peacetim e sea experience of an R .A.N . officer on the permanent list, both in ship s of the R.A .N . and on exchange with the Royal Navy ; but by reason of his wartime appointment at Navy Office, and the employment of his
Apr-Nov
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
45 7
first wartime sea command in routine duties in an area which for nearl y twelve months had known no enemy action, he lacked that experienc e which, gained in a recognised war zone, sharpens suspicion and counsels caution on all chance meetings . Yet, as Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff at Navy Office, he had participated as a behind-the-scenes-operator in th e earlier raider attacks on or near the Australia Station . He would have realised that a repetition was always possible . From the fact that he wen t to action stations and approached Kormoran with his main armament and torpedo tubes bearing, it would seem that he had suspicions of he r bona fides. If it were just a routine measure, other routine measures o f greater importance in such a situation were neglected . Why Burnett did not use his aircraft, did not keep his distance and us e his superior speed and armament, did not confirm his suspicions by askin g Navy Office by wireless if Straat Malakka was in the area, are questions that can never be answered . Three days after Sydney was lost, but before her loss became known, HMS Devonshire met the raider Atlantis in the South Atlantic . Atlantis, whose actions caused the deepest suspicions, claimed to be the Dutch Polyphemus, "and the possibility", said the repor t of the encounter, "of the suspicious movements and incoherent signal s being due to our language and procedure had to be taken into account . From what little was known of the movements of Polyphemus it was no t impossible for her to be in the area ." In this doubt, Devonshire kept he r distance at high speed and wirelessed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, asking if Polyphemus could be genuine . She had to wait fo r nearly an hour for a reply which came with dramatic suddenness : " No. Repetition No . " Devonshire at once opened fire at 15,000 yards, and Atlantis was destroyed "helpless, outranged and outgunned so far a s Devonshire was concerned " . The action of Devonshire 's captain on this occasion was similar to that of Farncomb when Canberra met Coburg and Ketty Brovig the previous March ; and were anything needed to emphasise the correctness o f Farncomb's action then, the Devonshire incident provided the illustration .3 Yet Farncomb ' s report of his encounter, received in Navy Office in Apri l 1941, was the subject of some comment and implied criticism by th e Naval Staff . His report took the usual form of a narrative covering lette r accompanying the detailed technical reports, and in itself made no mention of the expenditure of 215 rounds of 8-inch ammunition, though thi s was detailed in the attached gunnery report . Durnford, the Second Nava l Member, who was Acting Chief of the Naval Staff in the absence i n Singapore of Admiral Colvin, noted on Farncomb's letter on the 26t h April : " This report discreetly makes no reference to ammunition expended . Is any further action suggested?" Four days later the letter wa s initialled by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Burnett, indicating tha t he had read the file, including Durnford's comment . e The distances kept by the two cruisers were not dissimilar-19,000 yards by Canberra, yards by Devonshire.
15,000
458
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
July-Nov
Some weeks later a letter dated 2nd July 1941, commenting on th e encounter, was received at Navy Office from Admiral Leatham, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies . Referring to the expenditure of ammunition , Leatham wrote : It was correct that Canberra should have taken precautions against the possibility of the supposed raider firing torpedoes, but I think it was being over cautiou s to avoid approaching nearer than 19,000 yards on this account . Had a more effective range been attained quickly the enemy might have been identified soone r and much ammunition saved . By the time this letter reached Navy Office, Burnett was away in command of Sydney, having been succeeded as Deputy Chief of th e Naval Staff by Captain Getting . It is probable, however, that he knew of Leatham's comments, as a copy of Leatham's letter was sent, in Augus t 1941, to the Rear-Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron . If, a s is possible, Burnett's action in closing Kormoran was influenced by the implied criticism of Farncomb's standing off from Ketty Brovig and Coburg, one can but conjecture what he would have done had he know n of Devonshire's experience . On the other hand, both Farncomb and Devonshire's captain had more positive reason for suspicion in their encounter s than had Burnett in his ; and it may well be that, influenced by the near approach of darkness, he was moved to determine the question quickly ; and thus was swayed to over confidence ; first in the genuineness of Straa t Malakka ; second in Sydney's ability, with all armament bearing and manned, to overwhelm before the trap, if such existed, were sprung. Yet to act as Burnett did was to court disaster should a trap exist, disaster a t the worst total, as it was ; at the best professional for Burnett ; for eve n had Sydney triumphed in an action it is improbable that it would hav e been without damage and casualties, and Burnett would have been unabl e to explain the risks he ran . In such an encounter, with the raider an apparently innocent merchan t vessel, the other an undisguised warship known to the raider as an enemy , the element of surprise must have remained with Detmers until Burnett' s suspicions deepened into absolute certainty . In the circumstances Burnett created, he could not have reached such certainty until Detmers abandone d all disguise and struck—a matter of almost simultaneous decision by hi m and action by his guns, giving him the tremendous advantage of that vita l second or two in the first blow at such close quarters . In the event, Sydney must have been crippled from the outset by those devastating initial salvo s at point blank range, the torpedo hit, and the fire from her aircraft' s petrol . That she managed to inflict fatal wounds on her adversary afte r such staggering blows is evidence of the undefeated spirit of those wh o survived them, and who fought on in "X" and "Y" turrets, with th e secondary armament, and at the torpedo tubes . It is probable that Sydney sank during the night of the 19th-20th November 1941 . Not only did she suffer the torpedo blow below water, but German survivors estimated that she received up to fifty shell hits on the
23Nov-6Feb
RUMOURS CIRCULATE
45 9
water line. She was not observed to blow up . The "occasional flickerings " just died to nothingness in the night . It is not surprising that there were no survivors, for after the punishment she received from shells and bullets , and the ravages of the fires on board, it is unlikely that much that could float remained . It is therefore probable that the delays in receiving information from the wireless stations of the receipt of Kormoran's mutilate d "suspicious ship" message, and from Aquitania of the earlier rescue of survivors from Kormoran, unfortunate though they were, had no bearin g on the ultimate fate of such of Sydney's complement as survived the actual fighting . News of the action, and of the presumed loss of Sydney, was publicly released in an official statement by the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, o n the 30th November 1941 . The next of kin had been informed by persona l telegram three days earlier. Unfortunately, however, through failure t o observe correct censorship procedure in which both the Naval Board i n Melbourne and the Government in Canberra were equally culpable, leak age of information occurred on the 25th November and gave rise t o rumours which circulated throughout Australia and caused deep distress to next of kin . The Naval Board were responsible in the failure to infor m the Chief Publicity Censor and to request an adequately worded censor ship instruction as soon as doubt arose regarding Sydney on the 23r d November . The Government at Canberra were responsible in that on th e 25th November, without informing or consulting the Naval Board, the y instructed the Chief Publicity Censor (Mr E . G. Bonney, who had succeeded Mr Jenkin in that appointment earlier in the year) to issue a censorship instruction " No reference press or radio to H .M .A .S . Sydney" . Circulated to all newspapers and broadcasting stations through Australia , this implied that some misfortune had befallen Sydney, and started the rumours, which spread rapidly and which, in addition to the distress the y caused, threw suspicion on the official statement when it was issued five days later . Nor did rumour end with the issue of that statement . For many months thereafter stories, either malicious or merely mischievous, of new s received from survivors of Sydney in Japan, continued to emerge and circulate, causing pain and distress in a number of Australian homes . Apparently the only material evidence of the loss of Sydney is an Australian naval type Carley life-float which, damaged by gun fire an d containing two Australian naval life-belts, was recovered by H .M .A .S . Heros on the 27th November 1941 (eight days after the action) in a position approximately 160 miles north-west of Carnarvon . This lifefloat is preserved in the Australian War Memorial at Canberra . On or about the 6th February 1942 a Carley float bearing the remain s of a corpse was sighted off Christmas Island, where it was towed ashore and the body buried "with full military honours" . It was at first though t that this might be from Sydney, but in the early post-war years, and afte r detailed investigation of all reports and descriptions of the float and its
460
THE AUSTRALIA STATION—1941
Nov-Dec
occupant, the Director of Naval Intelligence at Navy Office (then Captai n Oldham, R .A .N .) concluded that this could not be so .4 One of Kormoran's crew was a film photographer who took movin g picture films, for records purposes, of actions in which the raider too k part, and who filmed the action with Sydney. These films were, through his neglect, left on board the raider and went down with her . 5 One o f the raider's officers, Sub-Lieutenant List, also photographed the actio n with a "still" camera . He was in one of the boats which landed near Carnarvon, and hid his camera and films in a cave on the beach. Both during and after the war (in 1945), searches were made for this, bu t without success . The survivors from Kormoran were held prisoners of war in Australia until the war ended. They were repatriated in January 1947, and saile d from Port Melbourne in the steamer Orontes on the 21st of that month . Across the pier from the ship in which they embarked lay the Dutc h merchant vessel Straat Malakka . VI I During the closing weeks of 1941 the moves to create an Eastern Flee t led to discussions and decisions as to the part to be played by Australia n naval forces in the event of war with Japan . Formation of a balanced fleet was, as the Admiralty had stated, dependent on the availability of cruisers and destroyers, and these were numerically far short of over-all requirements . On the 12th November the War Cabinet (which the da y previously had cabled to the British Government its assurances of full cooperation with Admiral Phillips in his responsible task) approved a recommendation by Admiral Royle that Stuart, Voyager, Vendetta and Vampire should be employed on the China Station to act as anti-submarin e screen for Prince of Wales and Repulse . At the same time they expresse d the opinion that, in the event of war, the destroyers should return t o Australian waters in conformity with the previous decision as to the minimum forces it was considered would then be necessary for loca l defence . Only one of the four destroyers, Vampire, was immediately ready for service . The other three were refitting, Stuart and Voyager in Australia, and Vendetta in Singapore . Meanwhile negotiations were proceeding between the United States an d British naval authorities regarding naval cooperation in the event of war , and a naval conference at Singapore was arranged to be held as soo n as Admiral Phillips arrived there . United States views, as expressed by Admiral Stark, the U .S . Chief of Naval Operations, were that all Britis h ' Australian naval Intelligence continued for some years a search for any information whic h
would throw light on the fate of Sydney 's company . The flimsiest stories were followed up, and the search ranged from Central Africa to Kerguelen, but without success . , On 8 Jan 1942 Capt Detmers visited the survivors of his ship 's company in their prisoner o f war camp in Victoria . The report of his guard was : "To one of the cooks he said : 'What happened to the film you took of the engagement? ' Reply : 'It was left on board ."But you were one of the first men ordered to the boats and should have taken the film with you! ' Then turning to me, the Commander said : 'This man filmed the whole engagement, but unfortunately left the film behind . It is a great pity, as the film would have explained the whol e action and showed what happened, to the satisfaction of the Australian authorities and to ours .'"
Nov-Dec
ROYLE TO SINGAPORE
46 1
forces in "the Indian waters, East Indies, Far East, Australian and Ne w Zealand areas", except local defence forces, should be made integra l parts of the Eastern Fleet, "the Commander-in-Chief thereof being responsible for reassigning parts of his forces to the regular forces under commanders of subordinate stations after the needs of the Far East are a had been satisfied" . This disregarded the Australian view, which had been made clear and reiterated at the Singapore conferences, regarding the minimum force s considered necessary for local defence . The Australian Government thereupon produced a formula (which was endorsed by the Advisory Wa r Council on the 26th November) setting out the minimum it could accep t in agreeing to transfer the strategic control of H .M .A . Ships, other tha n local defence vessels, to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet . It was that the following necessary protection should be given to vital commitments on the Australia Station : (1) Escort of Australian and New Zealand reinforcements (every 60 days) ; (2) Escort of air trainees (every 28 days) ; (3) Food and supplies to the Middle East and Malaya (every 36 days) ; (4) Seaborne trade in Australian waters, as this was vital to Australia's war effort (including Tasman convoys every 20 days) ; (5) Any other special commitment . The Government stipulated that the protection afforded should be no t less than that which would be given by Australian naval forces if contro l of these had been retained by the Commonwealth . It was also decided that Admiral Royle, while at Singapore, should enter into no commitmen t until he had submitted a report on his discussions to the Commonwealth Government. Royle, with his staff for the conference, sailed from Darwi n on the 29th November in H .M .A .S . Manoora, and reached Singapore via Batavia on the 6th December . Meanwhile conversations continued between Japan and the Unite d States, but with diminishing hopes of success . On the 5th November the Japanese Prime Minister, Tojo, sent the diplomatist Saburo Kurusu to Washington to help Nomura in the negotiations . Proposals and counter proposals were made, but neither side would give ground . The danger of an explosion was recognised by responsible persons, both American an d Japanese . Early in November Mr Grew, the American Ambassador a t Tokyo, told his Government that Japan's resort to measures which woul d make war inevitable might come with dramatic suddenness . Later in th e month Tojo's envoys in Washington warned him that American tempe r was rising ; but he refused their request for some measure of concession . Instead, on the 20th November, Nomura was given a note for th e American Government which embodied Japan's "absolutely final proposal" . It relinquished nothing of previous demands, and was unacceptable t o America . The American Chiefs of Staff, however, needed and asked thei r Government for time (convoys of troops to reinforce the Philippines wer e at sea in the Pacific) and an attempt to reach a "temporary arrangement
462
THE AUSTRALIA
STATION—1941
Nov-De c
or modus vivendi to tide over the immediate crisis" was proposed withi n the American Government. The idea was dropped after it had been submitted to the British, Australian, Chinese and Netherlands Government s through their representatives in Washington, and had received only lukewarm support. The American Government then made a counter proposal , dated the 26th November, to the Japanese note . There was little hop e that Tojo would consider it, and the following day Admiral Stark sen t a "war warning" to Admirals Hart at Manila and Kimmel at Pearl Harbour, telling them that negotiations between the two countries had ceased , and an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days . Prince of Wales and Repulse, with their four destroyers, reached Singapore on the 2nd December . Admiral Phillips, on Admiralty instructions, flew from Colombo to Singapore in advance of the force, and afte r conferring with Admiral Layton flew on to Manila, where he arrive d on the 5th December for discussions with Admiral Hart and Genera l Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General United States Army Forces i n the Far East . By this time the Admiralty, aware of the deterioratin g situation vis-a-vis Japan, were concerned about the exposed position o f the two capital ships . On the 1st December (on which day, as was learned after the war, the final decision to go to war with the United States , Britain, and the Netherlands, was taken at an Imperial Conference a t Tokyo) they cabled to Phillips suggesting that the ships might be sen t away from Singapore . Prince of Wales, however, required a few days t o make good defects, but on the 5th December Repulse, screened by the destroyers Tenedos and Vampire, sailed for Darwin . On this day Britain received from the United States the long-awaite d assurance of armed support—in certain contingencies—in the event o f war in the Far East . One of the conditions was British intervention i n Thailand, either to forestall a Japanese landing on the Kra Isthmus (th e narrow neck connecting Malaya with mainland Asia) or as a reply to a violation of any other part of Thai territory . Such intervention had alread y been planned . In December 1940, shortly after assuming his appointmen t as Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had given consideration to a plan to occupy the southern part of the Kra Isthmu s should the Japanese make an ostensibly peaceful penetration into Thailand . The matter was further advanced at a conference called by Brooke Popham in August 1941, and a plan—with the code-name MATADOR— for the occupation of the Singora-Patani area to forestall the Japanese , was adopted . The British Chiefs of Staff, however, while agreeing that a n advance into the Kra Isthmus would be the best counter to a Japanese overland threat to Malaya, pointed out that there could be no question o f Allied forces operating in Thailand before that country had been invaded by the Japanese . There could be no sanction beforehand to an advanc e to Singora from Malaya, and MATADOR could not be implemented withou t reference to Whitehall. When, however, on the 5th December, th e American assurance of armed support was at last received, the Chiefs of Staff authorised Brooke-Popham to order MATADOR without further refer-
German Raider
(R .A .N . Historical Section ) Kormoron .
Historical Srrrinn j
Dutch Merchant Ship
Straat Malakka .
(U .S . Na
Japanese Battleship Yamato—Flagship of Admiral Yamamoto, C-in-C Combined Fleet .
(U .S. Nary ) Wounded from U .S .S . Marblehead being placed on Hospital Train at Tjilatjap 6th February 1942 .
6-8 Dec
MALAYA INVADED
46 3
ence to them should the Japanese violate any part of Thailand, or if ther e were good information that a Japanese expedition was advancing with th e apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus . The next day, at about 11 .30 a .m., air reconnaissance from Malay a reported having sighted Japanese convoys of warships and transports sout h and south-east of Point Camo, south Indo-China . The report was later amplified as three convoys, one of three merchant vessels with a cruiser as escort, in position about eighty miles south of Point Camo and headin g north-west into the Gulf of Siam; one of twenty-two merchant ship s escorted by one battle cruiser, five cruisers and seven destroyers ; and one of twenty-one merchant ships, escorted by two cruisers and te n destroyers . These two large convoys (in reality only one, twice sighted ) were some 100 miles south-east of Point Camo, steering west . Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, in consultation with Admiral Layton, concluded that the west-bound convoys would probably, on rounding Point Camo, follow the leading four ships north-west into the Gulf of Siam, there to demonstrat e against and bring pressure to bear on Thailand, and would not continu e on their present course to the Kra Isthmus . As Brooke-Popham late r wrote : Bearing in mind the policy of avoiding war with Japan if possible—a polic y which had been reaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff as recently as the 29th Novembe r —and the situation in the United States with the Kurusu talks still going on i n Washington, I decided that I would not be justified in ordering MATADOR on this information . 6 However, all forces were brought to first degree readiness, and continued attempts, frustrated by bad weather, were made to re-establish visual aerial contact with the Japanese convoys . One Catalina flying-boat, sent to shadow the convoys during the night, did possibly sight one on th e 7th December, but, from subsequent Japanese accounts, was shot down before it could report its discovery . On hearing of the sighting of the convoys on the 6th December, Admira l Phillips at once left Manila for Singapore, and Repulse and her destroyers were ordered to return there with all dispatch . Ships and admiral reache d there on the 7th December . At about midnight that night, without formal declaration of war , Japanese forces invaded northern Malaya from the sea, and Thailan d from the sea and from Indo-China . Almost simultaneously they struck the American Pacific Fleet a devastating blow in Pearl Harbour with bomb s and torpedoes from carrier-borne aircraft ; and a few hours later made ai r attacks on the Philippine Islands . Full scale war, with its direct threa t to Australia, had come to the Far East .
"Brooke-Popham, Despatch on Operations in the Far East, from 17th October 1940 to 27th
December 1941 .
CHAPTER
13
WAR IN THE FAR EAS T HE High Command of the Japanese Navy did not lightly enter upo n
T the Pacific war, nor were they unduly confident of the outcome . It
was subsequently learned that they knew they were entering a battle fo r sea communications ; and appreciated the extent of the sea powe r wielded by their prospective adversaries . They considered, however, that the great distances of the Pacific Ocean would be a factor in their favour , and pinned their hopes of success on the assumption that they could at the outset secure command of the Western Pacific and, with interior lines of communication and the establishment of boundary defences, isolate an d hold it so as to ensure, at the least, a negotiated peace favourable to Japan . In effect, the Japanese aspired to do with an ocean area what the German s aspired to do with a continental land mass ; to make of it a secure, self contained fortress within geographical limits of their own determination and then, if unable to achieve outright victory by the complete military defeat of their enemies, to so sap their strength and endurance as to force them to come to terms . This, however, was to start from a false premise ; for in a world war it is impossible for any but the dominant sea power to "take as much and as little of the war as he will" ;1 and Japan, who was not in that position, sought to limit her activities to a very small proportion of tha t three-fifths of the earth's surface which the seas occupy. The deciding voice in the shaping of Japan's naval strategy wa s Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet . Born in 1883, Yamamoto was a graduate of the Naval Academy an d Naval Staff College . A midshipman at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, he reached flag rank in 1929 . A specialist in naval aviation, he wa s Chief of the Technical Division, Department of Naval Aeronautics, i n 1930, and became Commanding Admiral, 1st Air Squadron, in 1933 . During the next six years he was, as Vice-Admiral, Chief of the Department of Naval Aeronautics and, from 1936 to 1939 was also Vice-Ministe r of the Navy. Appointed Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, in August 1939, he was promoted admiral the following year . His preoccupatio n with naval aviation was to have far-reaching results. In the successful British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto he had tangible evidence of its potency and ability to alter the balance of naval power at a singl e stroke . Described as a radical nationalist, he was very active politically , and was regarded in 1939 as a candidate for the Premiership. He is sai d to have been shrewd but of a generous nature, and pro-British in outlook . There is no doubt that Yamamoto was fully seized with the dangers his '
Francis Bacon, Essays—Of Expense : " Thus much is certain : that be that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will ."
1940-41
JAPANESE
PLANS
46 5
country faced in resorting to war ; and from the outset he was oppose d to it as being suicidal for Japan . He resisted Japan's entry into the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, by which she formally joined in a treat y of alliance with Germany and Italy . Soon after the pact was concluded h e told the Premier, Prince Konoye, that he hoped he would try to avoi d war, and that if Japan went to war her navy would "carry through for on e year, some way ; but after that I don't know" . 2 He knew that once war began there could be no half measures, and is reported to have said : "I hope that the Japanese Army realises that if this war is to be won it wil l be necessary to carry the fight into the heart of the United States an d to dictate peace terms in the White House . " Yamamoto held that in the event of war Japan's only hope lay in an early victory, and that the destruction of the United States Pacific Flee t was a prerequisite thereto . Accordingly, with the threat of war increasin g after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, he, in January 1941, ordered "his own staff and Rear-Admiral Onishi, Chief of Staff of the XI Air Fleet",3 to study his concept of a surprise carrier-borne air attack on Pearl Harbour. No one else was taken into the secret until the table top exercises at the Naval College, Tokyo, in September 1941, when Admira l Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the members of that staf f first learned of the project. Until then the Japanese plan in the event of war was to proceed wit h the conquest of the rich southern regions . If the United States attempted to intervene, the Pacific Fleet would be harried on its passage west b y all possible means, and would be met in a weakened condition, far fro m its bases, by a superior Japanese main fleet, and destroyed in waters near Japan. Nagano and several members of the General Staff wished t o adhere to this plan, and opposed the Pearl Harbour attack in that it would bring America into the war, and was in any case too risky a n operation . However they were overruled by Yamamoto and his supporters , who argued that the United States would enter the war in any case, an d that as Japan had the ships and aircraft to carry out both the Pear l Harbour and southward attacks simultaneously, it would be foolish to le t the opportunity pass . Accordingly the Pearl Harbour attack became part of the Combine d Fleet Secret Operation Order No . 1 of the 1st November 1941 . Thi s order detailed the navy's part in a far-reaching plan which was, as a preliminary and without a declaration of war, to invade Thailand, destro y the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour, and attack Malaya and the Philippine s by air. The Japanese forces would then proceed with the conquest of Malaya and Singapore, the Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, and the whol e of the Netherlands East Indies . These conquests would be secured by a "ribbon defence" running from the Kurile Islands in the north, through ' According to Admiral Toyoda (Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, July-October 1941) in post war interrogation . 8 S . E . Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol III p . 83 .
(1948) ,
466
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
Nov 194 1
Wake Island, the Marshall Islands, and around the southern and wester n edges of the Malay Barrier, to the Burmese-Indian border . The basic plan was the conquest and securing of the southern regions . The Pearl Harbour attack was complementary but subordinate to it , designed to hasten the destruction of the Pacific Fleet and thus giv e a freer hand in the southern advance . The conquest of Hawaii was neve r considered . Should the Pearl Harbour attack fail to destroy or seriousl y injure the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese naval plan was to prosecute operations in the southern regions with minimum strength, and revert to th e original plan of harrying the Pacific Fleet in any attempt to interven e and then fight a decisive fleet action with superior force . It was appreciated that it would probably be necessary rapidly to concentrate decisiv e battle strength which might be dispersed supporting invasions or takin g part in combined operations but there was no detailed provision for thi s in the plans . However, to provide for possible American attacks on th e southern area task forces, some twenty large Japanese submarines operating in the Hawaii area were placed under the command of the task forces commander (Vice-Admiral Kondo, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet) , and the main battle force under the direct control of Yamamoto in it s Inland Sea bases was made responsible for providing cover as necessary . To carry their plans into operation the Japanese possessed a powerful , balanced fleet, with a large and efficient air arm . Its main units were six fleet and four light fleet aircraft carriers ; eleven battleships ; eighteen 8-inch gun cruisers ; twenty-one cruisers with 6-inch or smaller guns (includin g three modern vessels of the Kashii class rated as sea-going training ships) ; about 100 fleet destroyers ; and 63 submarines, of which 42 were larg e operational type, ranging between 1,600 and 2,400 tons, 17 were coasta l type, and four were minelayers . Of the six fleet carriers, Akagi and Kaga, 36,000 tons, were converted battle cruisers built in the 1920's, with speeds around 28 knots ; Sory u and Hiryu, of 17,500 tons and 30 knots, were completed in the late 1930' s ; Zuikaku and Shokaku, laid down in 1938 and completed just before Japan entered the war, were of 30,000 tons and 30 knots . The large fleet carriers normally carried about 60 aircraft, of which 27 wer e fighters and the remainder torpedo bombers or bombers . Of the four light fleet carriers, Ryujo and Hosho were of 8,500 tons, and Zuiho and Shoho of 12,000 tons . Their normal complement was 20 to 24 aircraft, about hal f of which were fighters . In addition to the aircraft carriers there were two squadrons of seaplane carriers totalling nine (possibly more) ships, o f which four were converted merchant vessels . In all they could carry som e 120 seaplanes ; while approximately 80 were carried in the battleships and cruisers of the Combined Fleet. Land-based aircraft formed an integral part of Japan's naval establishment, and cooperated closely with carrier borne aircraft where circumstances permitted . The bulk of the combat strength of the shore-based naval air force was contained in the XI Ai r Fleet . Two of the battleships, Nagato and Mutsu, were built in the early 1920's .
Dec1941
JAPANESE FLEET
46 7
Of 37,500 tons, they mounted eight 16-inch guns and had a speed o f 25 knots . With the same speed but slightly smaller (34,500 tons) and mounting twelve 14-inch guns, Fuso, Ise, Hyuga and Yamashiro, were built during the 1914-18 war. The remaining four, of the older ships , Kongo, Kirishima, Haruna and Hiyei, built just before and during tha t war, were of 31,000 tons, and were the most lightly armed, with eigh t 14-inch guns (though, having been built as battle cruisers, they had a speed of 30 knots) . All ten ships were completely modernised durin g the 1930's . Just before the outbreak of war the battle fleet was joine d by the largest and most powerful battleship in existence, the newly commissioned Yamato of 63,000 tons, with a main armament of nin e 18 .1-inch guns . 4 Laid down in 1937, she was the first of three simila r vessels . Her sister ship Musashi commissioned a year later . Constructio n of the third, Shinano, began in 1940, but her design was altered and sh e was completed in November 1944 as an aircraft carrier (and in that sam e month was sunk in the Inland Sea by the American submarine Archerfish) . The eighteen 8-inch gun cruisers were built between 1922 and 1939 . The earliest four, Kako, Furutaka, Aoba and Kinugasa, were of 8,80 0 tons and mounted six guns in their main armament . Eight later ships , Nachi, Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara, Takao, Atago, Maya and Chokai, wer e completed in the late 1920's or early 1930's, were of between 12,00 0 and 13,000 tons, and mounted ten 8-inch guns . Also mounting ten 8-inch guns were six more modern ships, Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano , Tone and Chikuma . Built during the 1930's, they too were ships of betwee n 12,000 and 13,000 tons . Fifteen smaller ships of around 6,000 ton s (except Yubari, which was of 3,500 tons) and mounting seven 5 .5-inch guns, were built during the 1920 ' s : Kuma, Kitagami, Kiso, Oi, Tama , Nagara, Natori, Kinu, Isuzu, Yura, Yubari, Sendai, Naka, Jintsu, an d Abukuma . Of these the five first-named had their guns reduced to fou r 5 .5-inch just before the war in order to make room for forty 24-inc h torpedo tubes in each ship . Speeds of all these cruisers, 8-inch and 5 .5 inch, ranged between 32 and 36 knots according to their various classes . There were two smaller ships, Tenryu and Tatsuta, of 3,300 tons, which , completed in 1919, mounted four 5 .5-inch guns and had a speed of 32 knots . Also used for certain light cruiser duties were the "sea-goin g training ships" Kashii, Katori, and Kashima . Built between 1938 and 1941 , they were of 6,000 tons, mounted four 5 .5-inch guns, and had eight 21 inch torpedo tubes, but were of only 18 knots . Latest and largest of the light cruisers was the Noshiro which, built 1939-41, was of 7,000 tons, 35 knots, and mounted six 6 .1-inch guns . Compared with British standard s the Japanese tended to over-gun their cruisers at the expense of armoure d protection (but it turned out that their ships took comparable punish 4
Yamato, Jap battleship ; 63,000/72,200 tons ; length 863 ft ; beam at wI, 121 ft ; nine 18.1-inch 162-ton guns firing a 3,220 lb shell at a maximum elevation of 40 degrees ranging 45,960 yds ; average rate of fire three rounds in two minutes . Sunk off Kyushu, 7 Apr 1945 .
468
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
Dec1941
ment, probably due to greater subdivision) . Squadrons were usually of two to four ships commanded by a rear-admiral .5 There were approximately 100 fleet destroyers, about half of whic h were ships of from 1,300 to 2,000 tons, armed with five or six 5-inc h guns and eight 24-inch torpedo tubes, and built during the 1930's . Slightly earlier than these were the 23 ships of the Fubuki class, of 1,950 tons , mounting six 5-inch guns and nine 24-inch tubes . Thirty-three older vessels of the Kamikaze, Minekaze, and Mutsuki classes were of from 1,200 to 1,500 tons and mounted four 4 .7-inch guns and six 21-inch tubes . All fleet destroyers were of from 34 to 35 knots . There were also ten second-class destroyers of around 800 tons, armed with three 4 .7-inch guns and with a speed of 31 .5 knots . The normal strength of destroyer flotillas was two or four divisions of four ships each, with a light cruise r as flotilla leader. There were 63 submarines, 22 of which were cruising boats of aroun d 2,000 tons mounting one or two 5 .5-inch guns and six 21-inch torpedo tubes ; while 20 were fleet submarines mounting one 4.7-inch gun and six (eight in the 8 boats of the 1153 class) 21-inch torpedo tubes . Speed s of these I class cruising and fleet boats were from 8 knots submerged t o around 20 on the surface . A number of the larger boats were equipped to carry a small float plane or a midget two-man submarine . In 1941 the Japanese merchant fleet totalled 5,916,000 tons of stee l vessels of 500 gross tons and over, and about 1,197,000 tons of woode n junks called kihansen . During the 1930's Japan largely replaced old an d slow merchant ships with new and fast ones,° and in 1940 she had ove r 700 ocean-going cargo ships, 132 combination passenger-cargo ships, and 49 large ocean-going tankers . Nearly 300 of her cargo ships were of 1 2 knots or over, and of the 132 combination passenger-cargo vessels, 49 had speeds of 15 knots or more and included some of the fastest merchan t ships afloat . Among them were sixteen vessels quickly convertible t o armed merchant cruisers . A comparatively low proportion of the merchan t fleet was, however, of individually big ships . Excepting aircraft carriers, Japan's potential enemies could, in December 1941, muster in the Pacific and Indian Oceans naval strength comparable to her own in numbers and types, but generally less powerfu l ship for ship. There were in the Pacific three American aircraft carriers of as great a carrying capacity, and faster than the best Japanese flee t types . Of these, Enterprise and Lexington were based on Pearl Harbour, 6 In the post-war Japanese publication " Japanese Naval Vessels At the End of the War", tonnages are largely given as those of "trial displacement"—this displacement covering "condition of vessel fully equipped and ready for sea with two-thirds stowage of stores and fuel, and ful l stowage of ammunition" . This tonnage is approximately, in each instance, one-seventh greate r than the tonnages here shown, i .e. battleship Nagato, tonnage here shown 37,500 tons ; "tria l tonnage " as shown in the Japanese publication, 43,000 tons . 6 Japan 's building of new merchant ships of over 100 gross tons was : 1937 . . 442,382 tons 1940 . . 279,816 tons . 410,644 tons 1941 . . 237,617 tons 1938 . 1939 . . 343,526 ton s The gradual fall off was due to diversion of steel and shipyards to the construction of naval vessels.
Dec1941
ALLIED
WARSHIPS
46 9
and Saratoga7 was on the West Coast of America. Eight American battleships—Nevada, Arizona, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, Oklahoma , California, and Pennsylvania—were based on Pearl Harbour, and one , Colorado, was on the West Coast . Of these, Colorado, Maryland and Wes t Virginia each mounted eight 16-inch guns and the remainder twelve (te n in Nevada and Oklahoma) 14-inch guns . In classes and in age they about matched their Japanese opposite numbers, but were of only 21 knot s speed . There was also the British battleship Prince of Wales, mountin g ten 14-inch guns and with a speed of 28 .5 knots, at Singapore, togethe r with the battle-cruiser Repulse, with six 15-inch guns and a speed of 2 9 knots . America had thirteen 8-inch gun cruisers in the Pacific, twelve— Indianapolis, Chicago, Portland, Astoria, Northampton, Salt Lake City , Chester, Pensacola, Minneapolis, Louisville, New Orleans, and San Francisco—based on Pearl Harbour, and Houston in the Philippines . Each mounted nine or ten guns in the main armament, and had a speed of about 32 .5 knots . There were also in the Pacific three British, four Dutch , and nine American 6-inch gun cruisers . The British ships, Danae, Durban and Dragon, built in 1918, were of 4,850 tons, mounted six 6-inch guns , but were of only 29 knots . Of the Dutch ships, which were based on th e Netherlands East Indies, Java and Sumatra were 6,670 tons, mounted ten 5 .9-inch guns, and had a speed of 31 knots . The other two, built durin g the 1930' s, were De Ruyter, of 7,548 tons with seven 5 .9-inch guns and a speed of 32 knots ; and Tromp, of 3,350 tons, with six 5 .9-inch guns and of 33 knots speed. Ship for ship, the Americans had the lead over th e Japanese in light cruisers . Four of them—Helena, St Louis, Phoenix and Honolulu—were of 9,700 tons, mounted fifteen 6-inch guns and had a speed of 32 .5 knots, while Detroit and Raleigh were of 7,050 tons, with ten 6-inch guns and 34 knots . These six were based on Pearl Harbour . Two others, Boise and Marblehead, representatives respectively of the tw o classes mentioned above, were in the Philippines . Another three, includin g Trenton and Richmond of the 7,050 tons ten-gun class, were on the Wes t Coast . In all, the British, Dutch and Americans could muster upwards o f ninety destroyers in the Pacific. The British had eleven, of which five were local defence vessels and three were under repair . The Dutch ha d six based on the Netherlands East Indies . Also in the Western Pacific wer e thirteen American destroyers with the United States Asiatic Fleet ; these were all over-age destroyers of the first world war . In mid-Pacific were forty-eight destroyers with the Pacific Fleet, and a further nine were o n the West Coast . Most modern of these destroyers were the American, the majority of those with the Pacific Fleet being of the Farragut, Mahan an d Gridley classes, built during the 1930's, of around 1,400-1,500 tons , armed with four or five 5-inch guns and eight, twelve, or sixteen 21-inc h torpedo tubes, and with speeds of 36.5 knots . The British and Dutch ''Enterprise (1938), 19,800 tons and 34 kts, carried 81-85 aircraft ; Lexington and Saratoga (1937) , 33,000 tons, 33 .25 kts, 81 aircraft .
470
WAR
IN
THE
FAR
EAST
Dec1941
vessels were older and less heavily armed, comparable with the olde r Japanese destroyers . There were about 64 Dutch and American submarines in the Pacific ; 15 based on the Netherlands East Indies, and 49 American—29 wit h the Asiatic Fleet and 11 based on Pearl Harbour, and nine on the Wes t Coast . In addition to the forces in the Pacific ; there were one British 8-inch gun cruiser, Exeter;8 and three 6-inch gun cruisers on the east side of th e East Indies Station, mainly employed in escorting Indian Ocean convoys ; one 8-in gun cruiser, Canberra, and two 6-inch gun cruisers, Perth an d Adelaide ; and two destroyers, Stuart and Voyager; on the Australia Station ; and a further two 6-inch gun cruisers, Achilles and Leander, on the Ne w Zealand . Also on the Australia Station was the Free French "contre torpilleur" Le Triomphant (2,569 tons) which had reached Sydney fro m America in November . In the balance of forces the Japanese were well placed to seize th e initiative . They were more than twice as strong as their prospective opponents in aircraft carriers . Their battle line was greatly strengthened by Yamato, superior in range, strength, and armament to any battleship tha t could be opposed to her . Their forces were concentrated, under unifie d command, using a common code of signals and communications, welltrained and exercised in fleet tactics, close to their home bases, and wit h strong advance bases strategically placed in forward operational areas . Moreover, they had the support of powerful land-based naval air force s which could at once strike a number of prospective enemy bases in th e Western Pacific, and give effective cover to their own surface fleets . In contrast the British-American-Dutch naval forces were widely dispersed, lacked unified command, and used different codes of signals and communications (with the additional handicap of the language difficulty as between English and Dutch speaking), had no joint tactical training , operated from widely separated and, in most instances, highly vulnerabl e bases, and were numerically weakest in the area where strength was mos t needed—the Western Pacific. Little land-based air support was availabl e to them there, and no carrier-borne . II The Japanese were well situated geographically to carry out their pla n of attack and pursue it to its dangerously circumscribed limits . The conclusion of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union freed Japan' s north-western flank . The whole of Indo-China was now under her domination. She had defence in considerable depth to her east in the island strin g of naval and air bases reaching from the Kuriles southward to the Marshall Islands. With her centralised naval and air superiority she could quickly establish command of the whole sea area enclosed between these wester n and eastern limits down to the Malay Barrier . If she could captur e 8 HMS Exeter,
cruiser (1931), 8,390 tons, six 8-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 32 kts; sunk in Battle of Java Sea, 1 Mar 1942 .
Dec1941
JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS
47 1
Singapore she could seal off entry from the Indian Ocean . If she could shatter American naval power in the Pacific in an initial blow she could make herself secure from the east also, at any rate for a considerable time . The fatal weakness of the plan was that she confined herself within a limited area with limited and diminishing means of replenishing a wastin g war economy ; while perforce leaving to her enemies the control of th e main ocean communications along which to mobilise their world-wide resources against her . On the eve of her entry into the war, Japan ' s naval forces were strategically disposed to strike the initial blows . Under the direct control of Yamamoto, the main covering force was in home waters at Hiroshim a Bay ; the 1st Battle Squadron, Yamato (Flag), Mutsu and Nagato; 2nd Battle Squadron, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso and Yamashiro ; light fleet carriers Hosho and Zuiho ; light cruisers Kitagami and Oi ; and destroyers . At se a in the northern Pacific, on its way to the aircraft launching positio n about 200 miles north of Hawaii, was the Pearl Harbour striking forc e and its support group, under the command of Vice-Admiral Nagumo , Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet . This force left Hitokappu Bay , Etorofu (largest of the Kurile Islands) on the 26th November, and consisted of the 1st Carrier Squadron, Akagi (Flag), Kaga ; 2nd Carrier Squadron, Soryu, Hiryu ; 5th Carrier Squadron, Zuikaku, Shokaku ; 1st Division 3rd Battle Squadron, Hiyei, Kirishima ; 8th Cruiser Squadron , Tone, Chikuma ; and nine destroyers with their light cruiser leade r Abukuma . Also at sea on their way to Midway were the destroyer s Akebono and Ushio of the Midway Demolition Unit ; while bound from Kwajalein in the Marshalls were about twenty submarines of the Advanc e Expeditionary Force . Eleven carried small float planes, and five bor e midget submarines of the Special Naval Attack Unit, whose mission was to raid Pearl Harbour . The duties of the large boats were patrolling an d scouting off Hawaii, Samoa, and Fiji . In command of the Southern Area Fleet which was to carry out the widely flung operations in the South Western Pacific was Vice-Admira l Kondo, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, whose forces were disposed in advanced bases ready for the assault on Malaya and the Philippines . At Mako in the Pescadores, some 350 miles north of Luzon, was Kond o himself with the main covering force, 2nd Division 3rd Battle Squadron , Kongo, Haruna ; 1st Division 4th Cruiser Squadron, Ataga (Flag), Takao ; and 12 destroyers, under his direct command . The Malaya Invasion Forc e was concentrated at Samah, Hainan Island (some 1,000 miles from it s objective) and was under the command of Vice-Admiral Ozawa in th e heavy cruiser Chokai. It consisted of a close covering force of the 7th Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Kurita in Kumano, with Mhkuma , Mogami, and Suzuya ; light cruisers Sendai and Kashii ; 13 destroyers ; th e seaplane tenders Kamikawa Maru and Sanyo Maru ; two submarines of the 6th Flotilla (which left Samah on the 1st December to patrol off Palembang Strait and the entrance to Manila Harbour) ; and 19 transports . In waters to the east of Malaya, eight submarines of the 4th Flotilla (light
472
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
Dec 194 1
cruiser Kinu, flag) and four of the 5th Flotilla (light cruiser Yura, flag ) were disposed with the mission of "warning towards Singapore" . The Philippine Invasion Forces, under the command of Vice-Admira l Takahashi, Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet, were concentrated at Mak o in the Pescadores and at Palau in the Carolines . Takahashi was at Mako with a covering force Ashigara (Flag), Maya, Kuma, and two destroyers . Also at Mako were the invasion forces for northern Luzon . The Aparri force, of six transports with an escorting force of six destroyers, was commanded by Rear-Admiral Hara in the light cruiser Natori; and the Vigan force of six transports, with an escorting force of seven destroyers , was under Rear-Admiral Nishimura in Naka . There was also a numbe r of submarine chasers and minesweepers to operate with each invasion force . The Palau group was intended for Legaspi, Southern Luzon, an d was of seven transports with escort of six destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Kubo in light cruiser Nagara ; the seaplane carriers Chitose (Flag ) and Mizuho of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division under Rear-Admira l Fujita, with two minesweepers and other small craft ; three minelayers , Itsukushima (Flag), Yaeyama, and Tatsumiya Maru under Rear-Admira l Kobayashi . The Palau covering force, commanded by Rear-Admira l Takagi, was made up of the heavy cruisers Myoko (Flag), Nachi and Haguro, of the 5th Cruiser Squadron; the light fleet carrier Ryujo of the 4th Air Flotilla, with one destroyer ; and six destroyers led by light cruiser Jintsu . Some 300 miles north of Luzon, at Takao and Horyo in Formosa , was the Batan Island Surprise Attack Force under Rear-Admiral Hiros e flying his flag in the destroyer Yamagumo, with four motor torpedo boats , submarine chasers, minesweepers and patrol craft . Far away to the eastward of these Southern Area forces, at Hahajim a in the Bonin Islands ; at Kwajalein in the Marshalls ; and at Truk in th e Carolines ; the Japanese Fourth Fleet (Mandates) was disposed to attac k the American islands of Wake and Guam . The Commander-in-Chief , Vice-Admiral Inouye, was at Truk, flying his flag in the light cruise r Kashima. At Hahajima was the Guam "attack and cooperation force" o f the 6th Cruiser Squadron, Rear-Admiral Goto in the heavy ships Aoba (Flag) Kako, Furutaka and Kinugasa, the minelayer Tsugaru, and thre e destroyers . At Kwajalein the Wake force, under Rear-Admiral Kajioka , consisted of the light cruisers Tatsuta and Tenryu, and six destroyers with their light cruiser Yubari. At Jaluit were the 19th Minelayer Squadron , Okinoshima and Tenyo Maru, and two destroyers . At Ominato, away to the north on the farthest tip of the Japanese home island of Honshu , were the units of the Fifth Fleet, light cruisers Tama and Kiso, an d the 22nd Picket Boat Squadron, and the Seventh Base Force . The Japanese Navy had powerful land-based air forces disposed in th e Southern Area. The 11th Air Fleet at Takao, Formosa—which controlled also the naval air forces in Indo-China—consisted of about 300 aircraft , of which 150 were fighters, 120 bombers, and the remainder miscellaneou s types . In Indo-China were part of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd Air Flotillas . The three units—Genzan, Mihoro, and Kanoya—forming the 22nd
Nov-Dec
TIMING THE BLOWS
47 3
Flotilla, were in south Indo-China based on the Saigon area, and totalle d about 110 torpedo-bomber aircraft, and a number of fighter and reconnaissance planes . In addition, around 70 seaplanes were carried in sea plane tenders, and approximately 80 seaplanes were in battleships an d cruisers of the Combined Fleet . The Japanese naval forces were thus poised for simultaneous attac k on objectives widely separated over the whole of the western half of th e Pacific Ocean north of the equator . They were to play their part in a vas t and bold conception of conquest demanding skill and efficiency in planning in all its aspects—in administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and timing . It was a conception that demanded for its success initial secrecy, and a large measure of good fortune . In the event, these factor s were present in large measure, though one piece of ill fortune was suffered . II I As stated in the preceding chapter, the final decision to resort to wa r was taken by the Japanese Government on the 1st December . Next day the various commanding officers were told that the day of attack was fixed as the 8th of the month, Japanese time ; but as negotiations were still in progress between Japan and the United States, orders for th e various offensives were qualified with the proviso that operational actio n would be stopped if the negotiations should reach a successful conclusio n before the actual blows were struck . Such diplomatic success was not achieved. Timing of the blows demanded that the Pearl Harbour striking forc e should be the first to set out for its objective, and on the day the fina l decision to resort to war was made it was already well on its way in th e North Pacific . No hint of its existence, mission or progress, leaked out , and on the 4th December it was about 900 miles north of Midway Island , and turning south-eastward towards its flying-off position . It was more difficult for the Japanese to conceal their preparations i n the Southern Area, and some knowledge of these, coupled with the genera l deterioration of the political situation in the Far East, led to some deployment of American and Dutch naval forces in the Western Pacific durin g the last week in November . On the 24th of that month the Commanderin-Chief, U .S . Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, sent two divisions of destroyer s south from the Philippines to Dutch Borneo—the four ships of the 57t h Division to Balikpapan, and the light cruiser Marblehead with the destroye r Paul Jones9 and the four ships of the 58th Division, to Tarakan . A week later the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Helfrich, dispose d his forces in accordance with "Plenaps"—"Plans for the employment o f naval and air forces of the associated powers in the eastern theatre in th e event of war with Japan"—as had been decided at the Singapore Con 'Paul Jones, US destroyer (1921), 1,190 tons, six 3-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 35 kts .
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WAR IN THE FAR EAST
3-7 Dec
ferences earlier in the year . The cruiser Java, destroyers Evertsenl and Van Nes, 2 and submarines K 11, K 12, K 13,3 0 16 4 and K 17,5 were placed under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Easter n Fleet, in the Singapore area ; and the rest of the Dutch force was concentrated in the Java Sea . Early in December the Dutch asked for the despatch of Australia n troops to Koepang and Ambon as a " Plenaps" commitment. In a reply shortly after midnight on the 6th December, the Naval Board told Helfric h that it was proposed for the time being to send troops to Koepang only , and to transport them in Zealandia escorted by Westralia (both ship s being then in Darwin) and requesting concurrence . Helfrich agreed, and late in the afternoon of the 7th, instructions were issued for the embarkation of the Koepang force ("Sparrow") at Darwin . Meanwhile intelligence of Japanese ship concentrations reached Mel bourne . On the 4th December, the day the Japanese Pearl Harbour forc e reached its south-eastward turning point, Long, the Director of Nava l Intelligence, signalled to the Captain on the Intelligence Staff (C .O .I.S . ) Singapore : " Information received 1800 GMT 3rd December [4 a .m. 4t h December Melbourne time] from reliable Dutch source Menado that eigh t transports twenty warships left Palau proceeding towards N.E .I ." 6 Singapore replied soon after noon, Melbourne time, on the 5th : "No information here . " Within little more than 24 hours, however, at 5 .4 5 p .m . on the 6th, Melbourne time, Singapore informed Melbourne of th e sighting by Malayan air reconnaissance four hours earlier of the Japanes e convoys of transports and warships south-east of Indo-China . The Hainan Island convoy of nineteen transports (carrying approximately 26,640 troops), escorted by Sendai and the 3rd Destroyer Squadron, sailed from Samah at 5 a .m . 7 on the 4th December under the clos e cover of Rear-Admiral Kurita ' s 7th Cruiser Squadron, Kumano, Mikuma , Suzuya and Mogami. Its orders were to proceed southwards, skirting th e Indo-Chinese coast and rounding Point Camo at an offing of 100 to 15 0 miles, to a position (point " G " ) in the Gulf of Siam approximately 16 0 miles W.N .W. of Point Camo . Here it would rendezvous with a convo y of seven transports escorted by one light cruiser (Kashii) which left Saigon on the 5th December . If sighted in the Gulf of Siam before reachin g ' Evertsen,
Dutch destroyer (1927), 1,310 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; beached in Sunda Strait, 28 Feb 1942 . Van Nes, Dutch destroyer (1930), 1,316 tons, four 4.7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk off Banka I, 17 Feb 1942 . 6 K I1, K12 and K13, Dutch submarines (1925), 611 tons, one 3 .5-in gun, two 21-in and four 17.7-in torp tubes, 15 kts ; K I3 damaged at Singapore end Dec 1941 and scuttled at Surabaya, 2 Mar 1942. 6 016, Dutch submarine (1936), 896 tons, one 3 .5-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 18 kts ; mined off east coast of Malaya, 13 Dec 1941 . 6 K 17, Dutch submarine (1932), 782 tons, one 3 .5-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; sunk near Singora, 21 Dec 1941 . 6 Actually this force did not leave Palau until 6-8 December, and then for the Philippines . But its presence at Palau was correct, and its constitution was approximately as reported . ', This is from Japanese source material in which Tokyo times were presumably kept ; but in discussing these convoy movements here, Singapore time (1 hour 30 mins behind Tokyo time ) is used .
6-8 Dec
LANDINGS IN MALAYA
47 5
point "G" the course north of west would give the impression that th e destination was Bangkok . From point "G", the convoys would dispers e to their several destinations, sixteen ships of the main convoy to the Singora-Patani area in Thailand and the remaining three to Kota Bhar u in Malaya ; and the seven ships of the Saigon convoy to the Kra Isthmus . The first sighting of the convoy on the morning of the 6th Decembe r gave no indication of its precise destination, but, as stated earlier, Ai r Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham decided that it would probably turn north west in the Gulf of Siam to demonstrate against and bring pressure t o bear on Thailand . This influenced him in not ordering MATADOR, but to seek further intelligence of the convoys' movements . Air reconnaissance during the night of the 6th-7th December failed, however, to re-establish contact with the Japanese force owing to unfavourable weather . The convoy (in which the aircraft sighting on the 6th was suspected ) was therefore able to reach point "G " at 9 a .m . on the 7th, and the main group altered course to the south without that fact being known a t Singapore. The weather, which was cloudy and at times rainy, assisted i n its concealment, and it steamed southwards at some 16 knots . Meanwhile more air searches from Malaya were organised, and early on the 7th a Catalina flying-boat took off on this mission . It presumably sighted th e convoy, now on its southern course, during the afternoon ; but if so it failed to report its discovery before, at 2 .30 p .m ., it was shot down by the Japanese—their first act of war in the conflict of 1939-45 . Other air searches throughout the day failed to find the convoy, whic h continued its southern course and dispersed its ships to their various destinations unopposed . The intention had been that simultaneous landing s should be made at Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu . In this, the navy's contention that a landing at Kota Bharu should be deferred8 until succes s at Singora and Patani was assured, was overruled by the army . Anchorage s were selected one-and-a-half to two miles off shore at each point, and tim e of arrival was fixed at 0.30 a.m . on the 8th December. The convoy , however, arrived ahead of time . The nine ships of the Singora detachmen t arrived there at 10 .10 p .m . on the 7th ; the five Patani transports reache d their destination a little later ; and at 10 .30 p .m . the Kota Bharu ships — Sakura Maru (7,170 tons), Awagisan Maru (9,794 tons), and Ayato Maru (9,788 tons)—dropped anchor at "the expected anchorage bed" . At Singora, where the town was brilliantly lighted and surprise complete , landing was delayed by the sea, the height of waves being about si x feet . In the first landing attempt half of the landing craft sank or wen t aground, and landing was not effected until 2 .40 a .m . on the 8th . Conditions at Patani (though there was no opposition) also delayed landing , and it was 3 a .m . on the 8th before the first troops got on shore . At Kota Bharu, however, despite opposition, and sea conditions with hig h waves which damaged and capsized boats, the first landing was effecte d at 12 .45 a.m . Meanwhile aircraft of the R .A .A .F. made persistent low-level 8 The navy believed that, in addition to strong ground defences at Kota Bharu, there were som e 40 or 50 torpedo aircraft there also.
476
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
7-8 De c
bombing and machine-gun attacks on the ships, and at 2 .30 a.m . Awagisan sank, after sustaining ten direct bomb hits and being on fire . Both other transports were damaged. Thus Malaya was the first territory—British , Dutch, or American—to suffer assault ; and its defenders were the first to sink a Japanese ship in the Pacific war . At Singora the Thai arm y and police force offered token resistance, but by early afternoon of th e 8th this ended, and Thailand was in Japanese hands . While the first of the invaders' landing craft were making for the shor e at Kota Bharu, Nagumo's carriers of the Pearl Harbour striking force , pitching in a moderate head sea some 7,000 miles to the eastward and northward, were launching their aircraft north of Hawaii for the assaul t with bombs and torpedoes on ships in Pearl Harbour, and on the adjacen t airfields . In Hawaii (whose time lags ten hours behind that of Greenwich , which in turn is seven-and-a-half hours behind Malaya 's) it was 6 .30 in the morning of Sunday, 7th December, with the sun rising to usher in a bright and—at the moment—peaceful sabbath. Ninety-four ships of the Pacific Fleet were in harbour, 70 of them combat vessels including the eight battleships, eight cruisers, 29 destroyers , five submarines, and a number of minelayers, minesweepers, auxiliarie s and other craft . The two carriers, fortunately for the Americans an d their soon-to-be allies in the Pacific, were at sea (it was the only ill fortune suffered by the Japanese in those early days of the war, but its effects were far reaching), as were ten heavy and three light cruisers, 1 5 destroyers and seven submarines . Around 7 .30 a .m ., local time, the first of the Japanese aircraft wer e nearing Pearl Harbour . They were probably the dive bombers, whic h circled awaiting the arrival of the slower torpedo aircraft . At 7 .55 a .m . the first bomb fell on the naval base from which, three minutes later , a broadcast awoke America to a state of war : "Air raid Pearl Harbour— this is no drill ." Within the next few hours further Japanese air attack s were in progress—on Guam, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Wake Island . The operations in Japan's far-flung plan were under way . IV Admiral Phillips, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet, reached Singapore from his conference with Admiral Hart in Manila, on the evening of the 7th December . No further sighting of the main Japanese convoy (the first report of which had hastened his return from Manila ) had been made, and its destination and mission were still not clear to th e Singapore authorities . It was calculated, however, that if Singora were it s destination, it could reach it about midnight that night . At a conferenc e at the naval base at about 10 .30 p .m . on the 7th, attended by Phillip s and Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, the earlier decision not to order MATADOR was reaffirmed . They considered that even if it met no obstacle or opposition on the way into Thailand, only a small British force, lackin g reserves, could reach Singora, and that not earlier than 2 a .m. on the 8th . Before 1 a .m . on that date, however, any doubts as to Japanese
8Dec
JUSTIFIED RISK
47 7
intentions were resolved, because news reached Singapore of the Japanes e landing at Kota Bharu . 9 Two or three hours later Singapore was bombe d by eighteen Japanese aircraft.' During the day strategic aerodromes throughout Malaya were attacked by Japanese bombers whose "performance and the accuracy of their high-level bombing had come as an unpleasant surprise" . 2 News reaching Singapore from northern Malaya showed that the principal enemy landings were at Singora ; and after discussion with BrookePopham in the morning, and with his own staff and senior officers in th e early afternoon, Admiral Phillips announced his intention of taking the fleet to sea to attack the Japanese transports .3 From the information available to him, it appeared to Phillips that he might have to contend wit h a Japanese surface force of one battleship (believed to be Kongo), seven cruisers, and twenty destroyers . There was also the danger of air attac k from bases in Indo-China ; and of torpedo attack by submarines . Thi s was formidable opposition ; but a successful attack on the Japanese landing forces at this stage could well be decisive in the fate of Malaya . That the risk was justified was concurred in by all the officers at the naval conference . By direct sea route Singora lies some 450 miles to the N .N.W . o f Singapore . Admiral Phillips, however, proposed to steer courses adding some 250 miles to that distance . By sailing that night (the 8th), makin g well to the eastward and keeping the Anambas Islands (200 miles or s o N .E . of Singapore) to port, he would reduce the risk of submarine attac k or possible damage by mines ; and would also increase the possibility o f escaping detection on his passage northwards during daylight on the 9th December, especially if anticipated overcast weather with poor visibilit y prevailed . His approach to the coast at Singora would be under cover of darkness on the night of the 9th-10th, and a surprise arrival there a t dawn on the 10th by no means impossible . He anticipated that, if so fa r successful, he would certainly have to deal with long-range bomber attack s during retirement . He therefore requested three measures of air support from Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, 4 Air Officer Commanding, Malaya : air reconnaissance 100 miles ahead of the fleet throughout daylight on the 9th ; air tt .,eonnaissance along the coast from Kota Bharu to beyon d Singora from dawn on the 10th ; and fighter cover over the fleet of f Singora from daylight on the 10th . In reply he was told that reconnaissanc e • C-in-C China's report to the Admiralty that the Japanese were landing at Kota Bharu wa s timed 5.46 p .m. GMT, 7 Dec (1 .16 a .m . 8 Dec Singapore time) . 'Both Vampire and Manoora, in Singapore at the time, recorded the air raid as at 3 a .m . Other reports place the time as between 4 a.m . and 4.30 a .m . ' Lt-Gen A . E . Percival, GOC Malaya, Despatch on Operations of Malaya Command from 8th
December 1941 to 15th February 1942.
* The flag of Vice-Adm Sir Geoffrey Layton, as Commander-in-Chief, China Station, was haule d down at sunset on the 8th, and the appointment of C-in-C, China, lapsed . Phillips did no t officially take over the command until 8 a .m . local time on 10 December. 'AVM C. W. H. Pulford, CB, OBE, AFC . (HMS Ark Royal, Gallipoli, 1915 ; comd 1 Sqn 1917-18, 201 Sqn 1918.) Dir of Volunteer Reserve expansion 1938-41 ; AOC 20 Gp 1940-41 , Far East, 1941-42. Regular airman ; of London ; b. Agra, India, 26 Jan 1892. Died in Juju Islands, Mar 1942, while evading capture.
478
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
8-10 De c
on the 9th would be provided, but that there was doubt as to the abilit y to supply it on the 10th, and greater doubt that fighter cover could be made available off Singora . It was with this knowledge that he took th e fleet—Prince of Wales, Repulse, and destroyers Tenedos, Electra, Express and Vampire—to sea soon after 5 p.m . on the 8th . By earlier arrangement, Phillips' Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Palliser, 5 did not sail with the fleet, but remained in Singapore in charge of th e Commander-in-Chief's Office . Before sailing, Phillips sent, by hand, a letter to Pulford, stressing the importance he attached to fighter cove r off Singora, and asking him to let him know as soon as possible what h e could do for certain . As the ships passed Changi signal station at th e entrance to the fleet anchorage, a signal in reply told him : "Regret fighter protection impossible ." He shrugged his shoulders and said : "Well, w e must get on without it."6 Throughout the night of the 8th the fleet, steaming at 172 knots, steered north-easterly and rounded the Anambas Islands at daybreak on the 9th . During the forenoon, over a grey sea and under low overcast with frequent rainstorms, it proceeded N .N .W .2W ., altering to north soon after 1 p .m . and continuing at 171 knots through similar weather . Crews were at modified action stations . During the day Phillips signalled to his forc e that little was known of enemy naval forces in the vicinity . It is believed that Kongo is the only capital ship likely to be met . Three Atago type, one Kako type and two Jintsu type cruisers have been reported . A number of destroyers possibly of fleet type are likely to be met . My object is to surprise an d sink transports and enemy warships before air attack can develop . Objective chose n will depend on air reconnaissance . Intend to arrive objective after sunrise tomorrow 10th . If an opportunity to bring Kongo to action occurs this is to take precedence over all other action . During the afternoon the presence and northward course of the fleet became known to the Japanese . At 2 p .m . it was sighted by one of th e submarines which had been disposed to "warn towards Singapore " . Thi s boat reported the fleet as then in position approximately 7 degrees north , 105 degrees east, steering north . Either this position was wrongly transmitted or the submarine's navigation was at fault, for at that time th e fleet was some 140 miles S .S .E . of this point . There was some . delay in the delivery of this sighting report to the Japanese 22nd Air flotilla at Saigon, which did not receive it until 4 p .m . Aircraft were at that time loading bombs for a raid on Singapore . They were re-armed with torpedoe s as quickly as possible, and at 6 p .m ., when it was getting dark, a strikin g force took the air to try to find and attack the fleet . Kongo and Haruna, and two heavy cruisers, of Vice-Admiral Kondo's covering force, rendezvoused with Kurita's 7th Cruiser Squadron at 2 .30 a .m . on the 10th fift y miles south of Pulau Condore, and also tried to intercept . Owing t o unfavourable weather and the error in position, the fleet was not found b y ' Admiral Sir Arthur Palliser, KCB, DSC ; RN. Comd HMS ' s
Excellent 1938-40, Malaya 194041 ; C of S to C-in-C Eastern Fleet 1941-42 ; comd 1 Cruiser Sqn 1943-44 ; Chief of Supplies an d Transport, Admiralty, 1944-46 ; C-in-C East Indies Stn 1946-48 . B . 1891 . Died 22 Feb 1956 . °Russell Grenfell, Main Fleet to Singapore (1951), p . 114 .
9-10 Dec
OPERATION ABANDONED
47 9
either force, and the Japanese aircraft arrived back at Saigon abou t midnight . Meanwhile the fleet, at about 7 p .m ., reached a position approximatel y 120 miles S .S .E . of Point Camo and 300 miles to the eastward of Singora , and Phillips altered course for the Thailand port and increased spee d to 26 knots, informing the force that he intended to attack enemy surface vessels off Singora just after daylight with the two big ships only . ? Destroyers would be detached to a rendezvous off the Anambas Islands at 10 p .m . Two hours before the change of course, Vampire had reported sighting one possible enemy aircraft . This was unconfirmed, but at 6 .45 p.m . th e sky cleared and the fleet was shadowed by at least three aircraft . At about this time Palliser, in Singapore, sent Phillips a signal t o say that air reconnaissance reported one Japanese battleship, one heav y cruiser, eleven destroyers, and a number of transports close inshore off Kota Bharu . Phillips had decided that, in the absence of fighter cover th e following morning, surprise was essential . The shadowing of the flee t indicated that surprise was lost and, after a discussion with his staff, h e decided to abandon the operation . Speed was reduced to 20 knots ; Tenedo s was detached to return to Singapore independently, with instructions to send a signal to Singapore at 8 a .m. the following morning (when sh e would be well away from the fleet) as from Phillips, saying that the forc e would be off the Anambas Islands on its return passage not earlier tha n 6 a .m . on the 11th . At 8 .40 p.m . course was altered to S .S .E . and the remaining destroyers were told to stay with the fleet . Soon after this a second signal from Palliser told Phillips that the Kota Bharu aerodrome was in enemy hands ; that all northern Malayan aerodromes were becomin g untenable due to bombing; that Brooke-Popham "hints he is considerin g concentrating all air efforts on the defence of the Singapore area" ; and tha t "enemy bombers on South Indo-China aerodromes are in force and undisturbed . They could attack you in five hours after sighting and muc h depends on whether you have been seen today . Two carriers may be i n Saigon area . " For the remainder of the night of the 9th the fleet retired S .S .E . at 2 0 knots towards the Anambas Islands . Shortly before midnight Phillips received a signal from Palliser : "Enemy reported landing Kuantan, latitud e 3°50N.",$ and at a quarter to one in the morning of the 10th he altere d course towards, increased speed to 25 knots, and told the fleet that he wa s going in to attack this new landing force . Some two hours later, as the fleet was about crossing the 105th meridia n on its way to the coast, it was sighted, unsuccessfully attacked with fiv e torpedoes, and then reported by a second Japanese submarine—I 58. 9 The report was received by the 22nd Air Flotilla at Saigon at 3 .15 a .m . , and ten aircraft were dispatched on a sector search for the ships . An Phillips was concerned at the fuel position in the destroyers, anticipating a prolonged period o f 7 high speed steaming during the operation . ', This was a false alarm . 0 158, Japanese submarine (1929), 1,635 tons, one 4 .7-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 19 kts .
480
WAR IN THE FAR EAST
10 Dec
hour after them a striking force of 88 aircraft (27 bombers and 61 torpedo bombers) took off, and after concentrating sped south along the 105t h meridian towards "the best estimated position of the enemy ships" . Of this, Admiral Phillips was unaware . As the fleet approached the coast at dawn on the 10th a small tu g with four barges was sighted and passed. Between 6 .30 and 7 a .m. an enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared). At 8 a .m. the fleet reached the expected invasion force position, but sighted nothing unusual . The two big ships catapulted reconnaissance aircraft, and Express, sent inshore to make a close investigation, returned to report everything quiet . At 9 .30 a .m . course was altered to E . by N., and the fleet proceeded at 20 knots to investigate the tug and barges sighted earlier . About 10 a.m . came a report from Tenedos, about 140 miles to the southward, that sh e was being bombed . Meanwhile the ten original Japanese search aircraft from Saigon ha d reached as far south as Singapore without sighting anything, and ha d turned north again . It was on this return leg that they sighted the fleet 2 and broadcast an alarm to Saigon and to the nearby striking force. Shortly after 10 a.m ., aircraft were detected by the fleet and Phillips ordere d 1st degree of anti-aircraft readiness . The enemy striking force was first sighted at 11 a .m ., the initial attack being by nine bombers which Vampire watched come in from ahead "a t an estimated height of 15,000 feet" in close formation which they hel d for the whole attack "with complete disregard for anti-aircraft fire" . All ships opened fire except the Australian destroyer, of which the aircraf t did not come within range . The attack was concentrated on Repulse, who suffered one direct hit and straddling near misses, but sustained n o major damage. There followed five more main attacks, concentrated o n the two big ships . The first of these, delivered about twenty minutes after the initial bombing attack, was by torpedo aircraft . Repulse successfully evaded the torpedoes (Captain Tennant 3 estimated that she combed as many as twelve tracks), but Prince of Wales was hit on the port side right aft . Thereafter she was never under complete control . Both port propeller shafts were stopped, reducing her speed considerably ; the steerin g gear was affected ; some machinery rooms were flooded ; and she took a list to port, with increased trim aft so that the port side of her quarter deck was soon awash. The third attack was by high-level bombers, and was survived b y both ships with apparently no direct hits . At this time Captain Tennant, unaware if the Commander-in-Chief had reported the attack (he had no t i Account by Capt W . G . Tennant of Repulse . Japanese accounts make no mention of thi s aircraft reporting the sighting. Times vary regarding this sighting. A Japanese account says " at 1100 the contact was broadcast to the striking group and headquarters" . Capt Tennant said the order to assume 1st degre e anti-aircraft readiness was signalled by the flagship "at about 10 .15 ". Vampire recorded " at 10.30" . British accounts agree that the first attack developed at or shortly after 11 a .m. • Admiral Sir William Tennant, KCB, CBE, MVO; RN. Comd HMS Repulse 1940-42 ; FO Levant and Eastern Mediterranean 1944-46 ; C-in-C America and West Indies Stn 1946-49 . B . 2 Jan 1890 .
10 Dec
BIG SHIPS SUNK
48 1
done so, though the reason is not known') made the emergency repor t "Enemy aircraft bombing" to Singapore, and closed Prince of Wales to see if he could help in any way . Shortly after this the fourth attac k developed, by torpedo bombers, and Repulse was hit amidships but continued to manoeuvre and steam at about 25 knots . Her end, however, came quickly. At about 12.20 "torpedo bomber aircraft seemed to appear from several directions" and attacked both big ships . In quick succession Repulse was hit aft and put out of control with a jammed rudder, though steaming at over 20 knots ; and then struck by at least three torpedoes, two on the port side, and one on the starboard . She listed heavily to port, and at 12 .33 rolled over and sank . Meanwhile Prince of Wales, some five miles distant, was also hit by three torpedoes , one at the stem, one aft, and one amidships on the starboard side . She righted from her port list, but settled appreciably . When Repulse capsized, Phillips ordered Vampire and Electra to pick up survivors . Moran, Vampire's commanding officer, recorded that : As Vampire was approaching the survivors a high-level bombing formation wa s observed coming over Prince of Wales towards us . It appeared from their angle o f sight that they intended attacking Electra and Vampire . Consequently I went astern to avoid giving them a sitting shot at two destroyers close together . Just as I did this I saw them drop and went in again . The pattern dropped round Prince of Wales and it is estimated two hits at least were scored on her . Prince of Wales fought back with her remaining anti-aircraft batteries . According to her senior surviving officer she was straddled by this salvo of bombs and sustained one hit on the catapult deck while "near misse s may have caused further damage" . She sank shortly afterwards, "at 1 .1 5 p .m ., in position 3°38'N, 104°281'E . The bombers made off and mad e no attempt to attack us ."5 The first and only indication to those at Singapore that the fleet wa s under air attack was Captain Tennant's emergency signal, received a t 12 .4 p .m . A fighter squadron of six Brewster Buffaloes (American-buil t aircraft of comparatively slow speed and poor manoeuvrability) took off at 12 .15 and reached the scene of attack just as Prince of Wales wa s sinking, and when all enemy aircraft had departed . Vampire rescued nine officers (including Captain Tennant), 213 ratings , and one war correspondent from Repulse, and two ratings from Prince of Wales . Four of those picked up died on board. "The predominan t casualties amongst survivors in H.M.A .S . Vampire," wrote that ship' s medical officer, Surgeon-Lieutenant John Russell , e "fell into two categories : immersion and shock ; extensive burns . I should like to draw attention to the lack of resuscitation equipment aboard destroyers . This fortunately Tenedos ' The only signal addressed to Singapore by Admiral Phillips was one which he directed . It stated that to send at 8 a .m . on the 1Qth December when she was well clear of the fleet 6 a .m. on the 11th was the earliest time the force was likely to be off the Anambas Island s on its return passage, and asked that all available destroyers might be sent to meet it .
a Vampire 's report. Surg-Lt J. Russell, RANR . HMAS's Australia 1941, Vampire Sydney and Brisbane; b . Warwick, Qld, 15 Jun 1915 .
1941-42 . Medical practitioner ; of
482
WAR
IN
THE
FAR
EAST
10 Dec
was offset by a remarkable and practical knowledge of resuscitation possessed by several members of the ship's company, who are well verse d in methods of surf life saving. " In all, 796 officers and men from Repulse were picked up by Vampire and Electra. Twenty-seven officers and 486 ratings lost their lives . Mos t of the flagship's survivors were rescued by Express, who went alongside the stricken ship and remained there until the last possible moment . Of the 1,612 officers and men comprising the complement of the Prince of Wales, 90 officers and 1,195 men were saved. Admiral Phillips, and hi s Flag Captain, Captain Leach,' went down with the ship . At 11 .25 p .m . on the 10th, little more than forty-eight hours after the fleet had saile d from Singapore, Vampire secured alongside Express at the naval bas e and disembarked her quota of survivors . Admiral Phillips' venture was thus a failure, and one suffered at heavy cost . But with the information at his disposal it seemed to hold possibilitie s of success whose result could have been far-reaching ; or of failure in it s immediate objective but without detriment to the fleet . The stakes wer e high, the odds heavy. Phillips accepted those odds, but it seems that h e did not foresee the weight of the air attack he might meet ; nor was he , apparently, alone in this . The general tendency in British intelligence a t the time was to underrate Japanese capabilities in the air . Probably h e discounted the likelihood of attack by shore-based torpedo bombers . H e knew that the Japanese had strong air forces in Indo-China around Saigon , but the distance to either Singora or Kuantan was some 400 miles, and a t that date experience suggested this was beyond the range of torped o bombers . Enough is known now of the Japanese dispositions to realis e that even had Phillips reached Singora unlocated according to plan, h e would have been disappointed in his object, for he would have found th e anchorage empty of transports . There remained the possibility that h e might then have encountered Kondo's superior surface force, as well a s the air striking force which subsequently attacked him . After the Japanese attacks on the ships, naval opinion in Singapor e apparently was that the torpedo bombers had been carrier-borne . Admiral Royle, who was in Singapore at the time and was himself a Fleet Ai r Arm specialist of wide experience, told the Advisory War Council on hi s return to Australia a few days later, tha t when Admiral Phillips decided to undertake the operation he had no knowledg e that Japanese aircraft carriers were present. A mass torpedo attack is the most dangerous form of attack against a fleet . This was well known in the Royal Nav y and had Admiral Phillips been aware of the presence of Japanese aircraft carrier s he would not have proceeded with the operation . Air reconnaissance, however, ha d failed to locate the carrier . Japanese shore-based aircraft had to operate from a base 300 [sic] miles away and the risk that Admiral Phillips took was slightly less than that which was taken by the fleet in the Mediterranean . 7
Capt J . C. Leach, DSO, MVO ; RN . (HMS Erin 1914-18 .) Dir of Naval Ordnance, Admiralty , 1941 ; comd HMS Prince of Wales and CSO to C-in-C Eastern Fleet 1941 . B . 1 Sep 1894. Lost in sinking of Prince of Wales, 10 Dec 1941 .
9-10 Dec
MUTUAL LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
48 3
Air reconnaissance could not locate the carrier because there was no carrier nearer than Ryujo, some 2,000 miles away, to the east of th e Philippines with the Legaspi invasion force . Actually, the naval mediu m bombers based on Saigon had an operational radius of about 700 miles . It will never be known why Admiral Phillips did not signal for fighte r support off Kuantan as soon as he knew that air attack was imminent o n the morning of the 10th . It may be that he thought that any such reques t could not be met in any circumstances . He had been told that fighte r cover could not be provided off Singora, and had since learned fro m Palliser that "all northern aerodromes are becoming untenable due t o enemy air action . C .-in-C ., Far East, hints he is considering concentratin g all air efforts on defence of Singapore. " It could have thus appeared t o him that the situation on land was far worse than it actually was at th e time . Unfortunately, if Phillips were unaware of the true position on land , the authorities at Singapore were equally in the dark about his positio n at sea. Only one signal from him reached them—that despatched fro m Tenedos which, timed by the admiral 2 .55 p .m . on the 9th, was transmitted by the destroyer, on his instructions, at 8 a .m . on the 10th . From it, it was inferred in Singapore during the forenoon of the 10th, that Phillips could not have proceeded as far north as Singora . 8 Apparently it was not also inferred that he might have acted on Palliser' s signal of the evening of the 9th, and hastened to Kuantan to investigate th e situation there ; which, indeed, might have been considered possible, i f not probable, when that signal was sent . Had it been so considered, on e would imagine that the question would have arisen of sending fighters t o Kuantan airfield to provide cover if necessary . Sea communications were the vital factor . The fleet, unbalanced though it was, was the one weapon with which so damaging a blow could at tha t time have been dealt the Japanese as to have affected their plans and , possibly, the fate of Malaya . As such it should have been given the highes t priority in air defence, to the exclusion of all other considerations . As i t was, in a period of confusion made worse confounded by mutual lack o f knowledge as to the respective situations on land and sea, Admiral Phillip s did the best he could with the inadequate means at his disposal. According to Japanese accounts, 18 bombers and 24 torpedo aircraft attacked Prince of Wales, nine bombers and 32 torpedo aircraft attacke d Repulse; a total of 56 torpedoes of which apparently nine found thei r mark, though the Japanese estimated that 12 hit Repulse and 10 the Prince of Wales. Four Japanese aircraft were lost .
8 There appear to have been no grounds in the signal for such an inference . From Admirasl
Phillips' intended position off Singora at 6 a .m . on the 10th, to the point off the Anambas, wa 380 miles : i .e., he could have spent 51 hours off Singora if he withdrew at 20 knots and 8 ; hours if he withdrew at 25 knots, and reached the Anambas at 6.30 a .m . on the 11th . Moreover the signal expressly stated that he would probably approach the Anambas on a course whic h led directly from Singora . Actually the plan to attack Singora was not dropped till some two or three hours after the signal was written out .
CHAPTER
14
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC ARE A HEN, "In Sixteen Hundred and Forty-One", the folks of Mexico' s
W Acapulco Bay waited in vain for the return from the Philippine s of Bret Harte's legendary "Lost Galleon", while that ship searched fruitlessly in mid-Pacific for the day she had missed on the 180th meridian , they were puzzled by a problem which plagued the historian recordin g events in that ocean in Nineteen Hundred and Forty-One . Pearl Harbou r lies 1,300 miles east of the 180th meridian . Wake Island, an isolated atoll over which the American flag waved in December 1941, lies som e 800 miles west of the meridian. Yet, though only some 2,100 mile s distant from one another they are, in the local time each keeps, separate d by 22 hours . On the line (running approximately E . by N .-W . by S . between Kota Bharu and Pearl Harbour for a distance of some 6,00 0 miles) along which the Japanese struck on the 7th-8th December 1941, i t would seem, if local times only are considered, that initial blows fel l over a period of 28 hours ; from the air attack on Pearl Harbour at 7 .5 5 a .m . on the 7th December to that on Wake Island at noon on the 8th . Actually, the Japanese struck initially at six points (including Hon g Kong, well to the north of the line mentioned above) within a space of seven hours, in the chronological order Malaya, Pearl Harbour, th e Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island . Reduced to the common denominator of Eastern Australian Time, here used while describin g events against the Melbourne background, the initial Japanese attack s were : Kota Bharu 3 .5 a .m., 8th December Pearl Harbour ▪ 4 .25 a .m., 8th December Philippine s 8 a .m., 8th Decembe r • Gua m 8 .27 a .m., 8th December • 10 Hong Kong a .m ., 8th Decembe r Wake Island . 10 a.m., 8th Decembe r With the exception of that on Kota Bharu, all of these were air attacks . The first news of the Japanese attacks—a signal from the Commanderin-Chief, China, stating that the enemy were attempting to land at Kota Bharu—reached Navy Office, Melbourne, soon after 4 .30 a .m . on the 8th December, a Monday . Soon after 6 a .m . a signal from the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, addressed to the Australian and Ne w Zealand Naval Boards, and to the Dutch Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Netherlands East Indies, Vice-Admiral Helfrich, requested implementation of that section of "Plenaps" calling for air and naval reinforcement s of Singapore to meet an attack on Malaya . In view of the Commonwealth Government's stipulation on the 26th November regarding the minimum it could accept as protection on the Australia Station before agreeing t o the transfer of strategic control of Australian ships, and of its instruction s
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486
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
8Dec1941
to Admiral Royle to enter into no commitments at Singapore withou t prior submission to the Government, no action was called for by th e Australian Navy. The New Zealand Government, however, ordere d H .M .N .Z .S . Achilles, then patrolling north of New Zealand, to fuel a t Suva and proceed swiftly via Port Moresby to join the Eastern Flee t at Singapore). At 7 .43 a .m . the Admiralty war signal, " Commence hostilities against Japan at once" reached Navy Office, and was immediatel y passed to H .M .A . Ships2 and to the four Area Combined Headquarters . During the forenoon Ocean Island reported that a Japanese aircraft dropped bombs on the island at 11 a .m . Meanwhile short wave broadcast reports of Japanese attacks reache d Melbourne, and these continued to arrive throughout the day, and to give some indications of the scope of the enemy's plan . They included reports that an air attack on Pearl Harbour began at 4 a .m . ; that a n announcement from Tokyo declared that Japan had entered a state o f war with Britain and the United States in the Western Pacific ; and that Shanghai had been attacked by Japanese aircraft and marines . A broadcast from Wake Island reported the aerodrome there bombed out by twent y Japanese aircraft and appealed for immediate assistance ; and an intercepted message from some unknown station stated that Guam had bee n bombed . Singapore also reported an air attack ; and a report was receive d that Bangkok had been bombed by aircraft and bombarded from the sea . From Nauru came information that a Japanese aircraft had flown ove r the island without attacking . 3 These reports were considered by the War Cabinet at a meeting hel d in Melbourne that day, and it was agreed that the situation should b e accepted as involving a state of war with Japan . 4 In the absence at th e conference in Singapore of Admiral Royle, the Acting Chief of the Nava l Staff, Commodore Durnford, told the meeting what naval measures ha d been instituted . The departure of merchant ships for overseas was suspended ; merchant vessels in northern waters were instructed to fall bac k on Rabaul and Port Moresby ; a convoy consisting of the coastal line r Katoomba carrying troops for Rabaul and escorted by Adelaide, was hel d at Port Moresby ; instructions were issued for the extinction of coasta l navigation lights excepting those at Rabaul and Port Moresby, which wer e controlled by the Naval Officers-in-charge ; and coastwatchers were warne d Achilles reached Port Moresby at 4 .30 p .m. on 11 Dec, the day after the loss of Prince of Wale s and Repulse. She was ordered back to the New Zealand Station, and reached Auckland on th e 16th . HMAS Adelaide was in Port Moresby on the morning of 8 Dec, and one of her officers late r recalled : "In the wardroom, the officers had just finished their breakfast when the signal office r pinned a pink signal on the notice board, from the Naval Board, which read : ` Commence hostilities with Japan .' One by one the officers read it and walked quietly away . There wa s 9othing to be said . They all realised the implications of such a decision—prolonging of the wa r and much bloodshed—yet of what avail were mere words . An impetuous sub . said, 'Now the fun starts', and a lieutenant who had traded to Japan for many years in the Merchant Nav y remarked I've been waiting for this day for a long time ' ; but otherwise a pregnant silenc e prevailed ." Lt W. N . Swan, RANR(S), "Another Job Done" , HMAS (1942), p . 198 . a Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, "Situation Report No . 1". Information received u p to 4 p.m., 8 Dec . * The formal decision to declare war on Japan was made on 9 Dec . (Advisory War Counci l Minute 586 .)
4-12 Dec
TROOPS TO KOEPANG
48 7
to extra vigilance . Durnford told the War Cabinet that no immediat e decisions as to naval measures were required of it . He outlined the dispositions of the larger units of the R .A .N . : Adelaide at Moresby, Westralia at Darwin ; Kanimbla and Manoora at Singapore ; Australia on passage from Simonstown to Fremantle ; Canberra and Perth in the Tasman Se a area ; Hobart in the Mediterranean ; and Yarra in the Persian Gulf .6 Discussing the possibility of Japanese attack on Australia, Durnford tol d the War Cabinet that an air attack from an enemy aircraft carrier wa s unlikely in the early stages because of the cruiser escort that the carrie r would need . Attacks on trade by armed merchant cruisers could b e expected ; but though Australian escort facilities were limited he considere d they were adequate to deal with armed merchant cruiser or limited cruiser attack. He thought an attack on Rabaul was possible . Regarding the dispatch of A .I.F . troops to Koepang, the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, told the War Cabinet that he had approved of this the previou s day . Durnford told the meeting that, there being no cruiser at Darwin , Westralia had been ordered to escort Zealandia to Koepang . There was no immediate enemy threat in the area, and air cover would be availabl e over most of the route . The War Cabinet confirmed both actions . ("Sparrow" Force sailed from Darwin in the early morning of the 10th December with a total of 1,402 troops, 957 in Zealandia and 445 in Westralia . Koepang was reached, without incident, on the morning of the 12th . Th e two ships arrived back in Darwin four days later . ) One other matter called for discussion by the War Cabinet in vie w of the urgency of the military situation—that of shipping delays resultin g from holdups and industrial disputes . The question had arisen earlier at a meeting of the War Cabinet on the 4th December, when Durnfor d pointed out that in the event of war it would be necessary to convo y shipping, which would necessitate regularity in sailings . The delays that frequently occurred were causing the naval authorities concern, 6 and h e asked if steps could be taken to obviate them . The Prime Minister under took himself to see into the matter . At the War Cabinet meeting on th e 8th December the Chiefs of Staff referred to delays in unloading war materials at Darwin, and expressed their view that urgent action shoul d be taken to prevent delays which seriously prejudiced Darwin's defenc e measures . The War Cabinet decided that the Minister for Labour an d National Service, Mr Ward, accompanied by the Conciliation Commissioner, Mr Blakeley, should be asked to go to Darwin immediately, Ward c The Naval Board was sometimes behindhand in its knowledge of the movements of HMA Ship s on overseas stations . Yarra left the Persian Gulf in November, and by the middle of tha t month had joined the Mediterranean station . She was in the Mediterranean on 8 Dec 1941 . " Holdups in the shipping industry were increasing . In some instances complaints by the seame n regarding living conditions in individual ships were justified, but many holdups were completel y irresponsible and frivolous . A large number resulted from men going ashore for drink immediately prior to sailing time, their absence causing the remainder to refuse to sail "shorthanded" . Ofte n the absentees returned drunk, and refused to board their ship . The action of even one or two men in this way could delay the sailing of a ship . In December 1941, after the Japanese entere d the war, fourteen ships were held up simultaneously in Australian ports because they could no t get crews. Excuses given were that the men wished to spend Christmas at home, or to hav e the weekend in port. (The Telegraph, Brisbane, 13 Dec 1941 .) Shipping holdups, arising both from seamen's and waterside workers' disputes continued to be a source of worry to th e Government and the Naval Board throughout the war .
488
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
8-16 Dec
being fully authorised to take all necessary steps to ensure expeditious handling of materials for defence purposes . The trouble at Darwin wa s not alleviated, however, until the first air raid, in February 1942, drove the disturbing elements out of town, and cargo was worked by Servic e labour. The importance of Darwin was at this stage emphasised by the par t proposed for it in the naval plans being formulated at the Singapor e Conference . On the 8th December Admiral Royle signalled to the Nava l Board saying that discussions there had stressed the necessity of strengthen ing the lines of the Malay Barrier between Singapore and Darwin . Admira l Hart, the Commander-in-Chief of the U .S . Asiatic Fleet, had (Royle said ) agreed to operate the cruisers Houston, Marblehead and Boise in the triangle East Borneo, Surabaya and Darwin ; and Helfrich was being asked to station one, and later two, Dutch cruisers in the same area . Admiral Phillips had suggested that the 6-inch gun cruisers, detailed i n the Australian-British-Dutch conversations of April 1941 to operate i n northern Australian waters, should be based on Darwin . Disposition of these cruisers along this line should give added security to shipping i n the Indian Ocean . Their main task would be : (1) to provide occasiona l escort for supply and troop convoys from Fremantle to Singapore ; (2) to provide escort for supply and troops convoys to Ambon and Koepang ; (3) to act as a striking force under American command should air o r submarine reconnaissance denote the presence of enemy surface ships attempting to break through . The proposition is attractive [continued Royle] in that it makes use of the strategical possibilities of Darwin which will undoubtedly be used at times by combined striking forces. Also it enables an Australian cruiser when not employe d on escort duty to make a valuable contribution to strategic offensive while operatin g from an Australian base. I am in agreement with these proposals and request yo u to put forward to the War Cabinet a signal to the United Kingdom Government requesting the return of HMAS Hobart to Darwin for this purpose . This proposal (together with a recommendation by Durnford tha t Yarra should also be returned for anti-submarine work in the Darwi n area) was endorsed by the Advisory War Council on the 9th Decembe r and approved by the War Cabinet on the 11th ; and the United Kingdom Government was asked to arrange for the return of the tw o ships . As stated above (Chapter 11) this request had apparently bee n anticipated by the Admiralty, and Hobart was already on her way to Australia, having left the Mediterranean on the 9th December . Yarra followed her a week later . The question of strategic control of naval forces did not arise durin g the Singapore discussions, but on his return to Australia Royle told th e Advisory War Council at a meeting on the 16th December that Admira l Hart might at a later date ask for Hobart to be placed under his command, and that he (Royle) thought that the Government should agre e to this . Actually there was, throughout the month of December, lack of cohesion between the Allied naval forces in the Western Pacific . Five
8Dec
ALLIED DISPOSITIONS
48 9
different authorities—Australian, New Zealand, British, American an d Dutch—controlled strategical naval dispositions, often without precis e knowledge of what each other was doing . ? The Australian and New Zealand naval commands were in Melbourne and Wellington respectively . The British command was in Singapore where, in addition to the Princ e of Wales and Repulse there were, on the 8th December, the light cruiser s Danae, Dragon and Durban ; and the destroyers Jupiter, Electra, Encounter, Express, Tenedos, Stronghold, Isis and Vampire. Stronghold and Isis were refitting, the last-named, a unit of the Mediterranean Fleet, in Singapore for that purpose . (Also in Singapore at the time were the Australia n ships Manoora, Vendetta, and the corvettes Burnie, Goulburn, Bendigo and Maryborough . 8 Vendetta was undergoing major refit. The arme d merchant cruiser Kanimbla was on passage from Penang to Singapore . ) The Dutch naval command was at Batavia, in the west of Java, an d the Dutch naval forces, with the exception of those ships already place d under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, China, wer e disposed to protect the Netherlands East Indies . On the 8th December De Ruyter and four destroyers covered the Lesser Sunda Islands to th e east of Java ; Tromp, which had been in the Indian Ocean searching fo r Sydney, was in the western Java Sea ; the submarines K 14, K 15 an d K 169 of the Third Flotilla were in the Celebes Sea off the east coast o f Borneo ; and submarines 0 19 and 0201 of the Fourth Flotilla patrolle d the Karimata Strait. The obsolete coastal defence ship Soerabaja2 was in the Timor Sea. The Dutch Commander-in-Chief, as he later stated, considered himself "under the strategical direction of Vice-Admiral Si r Geoffrey Layton, Commander-in-Chief, China" . 3 The American naval command was in the Philippines where were, o n the 8th December at Manila, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Hart ; his Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Purnell ; the flag officer in command of th e squadron (Task Force 5), Rear-Admiral Glassford ; and the local flag officer in command, Rear-Admiral Rockwell . Ships of the Asiatic Fleet were disposed throughout the Indonesian-Philippines area . The light cruise r Marblehead, with destroyers Paul Jones, and Stewart, Bulmer, Barker and Parrott of the 58th Division were at Tarakan ; the destroyers Whipple , T For example when, on 31 Dec 1941, Ambon reported that six warships were sighted 20 miles NE of Timor, and three were sighted about 120 miles north of Melville Island, the Centra l War Room COIC at Melbourne commented : "The American cruiser Houston and three destroyer s departed Darwin at 0402/30 (GMT) and were routed to go to approximately the first of th e above positions, and then after turning east, to pass the second position before reaching thei r rendezvous off Wednesday Island . There are several American destroyers in positions not precisely known in these waters, therefore it appears probable that the six ships sighted off Timor, and possible that the other three ships sighted, were all US warships." 6 RAN corvettes, 733 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts, commnd Feb-Jun 1941 . 9 Dutch submarines (1932-33), 771 tons, one 3 .5-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts ; K 16 sank Jap destroyer Sagirl 24 Dec 1941, before herself being sunk, off Kuching, on same day . 1 Dutch submarines (1938-39), 967 tons, one 3 .5-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 40 mines, 20 kts ; 0 20 sunk near Kota Bharu, 19 Dec 1941 ; 0 19 wrecked in Jap waters, May 1945 . ~Soerabaja (1910), 5,644 tons, two 11-in guns, 16 kts ; destroyed 2 Mar 1942 . 3 Vice-Admiral Helfrich, in unpublished notes : "Important events before appointment of Genera l Wavell as Supreme Commander ABDA Area."
490
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
6-10 De c
Alden, John D . Edwards and Edsall4 of the 57th Division were at Balikpapan ; the heavy cruiser Houston, light cruiser Boise, seaplane tender Langley,5 destroyers Pope, Peary, Pillsbury and John D . Fords of the 59th Division and auxiliaries, were in the Philippines . During the discussions at Manila on the 6th December, Admiral Hart told Phillips that he was sending him the four destroyers of the 57th Division to reinforc e his screen, and on that day they were ordered from Balikpapan to Singapore. They arrived there, however, too late to join Phillips . On th e evening of the 8th December Houston (flag), Boise, Langley, Pope , John D. Ford and attendant auxiliaries sailed from the Philippines fo r Java . Only the twenty-nine submarines of the Asiatic Fleet, the destroyer s Peary and Pillsbury (which had been in collision and were under repair ) and the inshore patrol, were left as naval defence of the Philippines , where remained Admirals Hart and Rockwell . Arriving in Java the Americans established their operational base at Surabaya, in the east of the island, where Purnell exercised a de facto fleet command in the absence of Hart . Glassford flew his flag in Houston in command of Task Force 5 . On the 10th December (the day Princ e of Wales and Repulse were lost) Purnell conferred with Helfrich at Batavia, and was urged by the Dutch Commander-in-Chief to establish his base there . Purnell told him, however, that the Asiatic Fleet woul d remain under the strategic direction of Washington, and that Task Force 5 would operate east of a line running through Lombok Strait north along the east coast of Borneo . A major employment of the task force woul d be the escort of American army transports through Torres Strait . Darwin had been selected as the main base, so that, with the American area o f operations in the east, Surabaya was the natural choice as an advanc e base . The Americans, who had earlier criticised the "over-emphasis o n escort-of-convoy" in the British-Dutch concept of operations, which "woul d deprive naval striking forces of their necessary punch to break up Japanes e amphibious and fleet attacks" 7 thus now contributed towards this deprivation . Now it was Helfrich who objected to the American dispositions and concept of operations, on the grounds that they would prevent necessary concentration of strength and the establishment of a striking force . This was the first of a series of "painful and lamentable controversies" 8 betwee n the Dutch and Americans which punctuated this period . The earlier divergence of British-American views persisted regarding the importance an d '
US destroyers (1919-21), 1,190 tons, six 3-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 35 kts ; Stewar t wrecked at Surabaya to avoid falling into enemy hands, 2 Mar 1942 ; Edsall sunk S of Java, 1 Mar 1942 . Langley, US seaplane tender (1913, converted 1920-21 and further modified 1937), 10,050 tons , four 5-in guns, 15 kts ; sunk S of Java, 27 Feb 1942 . "US destroyers (1920), 1,190 tons, six 3-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 35 kts ; Pope sunk in Java Sea, 1 Mar 1942, Peary at Darwin, 19 Feb, and Pillsbury in Bali Strait, 1 Mar . ', Purnell, at the ADB Conference at Singapore in Apr 1941, "pointed out that over-emphasis on escort-of-convoy would deprive naval striking forces of their necessary punch to break u p Japanese amphibious and fleet attacks ; the British-Dutch concept of operations emphasising local defence and escort, seemed to him defensive almost to the point of defeatism " . (Morison, United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p . 55. ) 'Helfrich, unpublished notes .
10-12 Dec
LACK OF COMMON PLAN
49 1
value of Singapore ("it was agreed that for Great Britain it was fundamental that Singapore be held ; for the United States it was fundamenta l that the Pacific Fleet be held intact" —from Minutes of the Washingto n staff conversations, 10 February 1941) and the Americans were naturally to an extent preoccupied with the blow suffered by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour, and their immediate attempts in the South-West Pacifi c to succour the Philippines, in the same way as the main concern of th e British and Dutch in the area was the reinforcement and defence o f Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies . In the lack of a commo n plan, a unified command, and adequate forces trained and exercise d together, the situation did not lend itself to smooth relationships . When, on the 10th December, news of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse reached Singapore, Admiral Layton (who had that day officiall y handed over to Admiral Phillips the British naval command in the Fa r East) was on board a ship in Singapore for passage to England . He returned to the shore, and was directed by the Admiralty to carry ou t the duties of Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, until the fate of Phillip s was known . Exeter, too late to join Phillips ' force, reached Singapore that day . The next day Layton told the Admiralty that his broad policy would be " to hold as much of Malaya as possible, to secure Singapor e as a base for the Eastern Fleet, to keep trade moving, to effect the maximum damage by air and submarine on the enemy " . He asked for al l possible reinforcement of submarines, minesweepers, destroyers and air craft to carry this policy into effect, but added : " battleships should not come further than Colombo until accompanied by cruisers, destroyers and aircraft. " In the meantime the Dutch "faithfully executed their share of th e agreements and, indeed, went beyond them" . 9 As soon as it was eviden t that the main enemy thrust was west of Borneo, Helfrich put the thre e submarines of the 3rd Flotilla at Layton's disposal, and on the 12th December sent him the two boats of the 4th Flotilla also. A day or s o later De Ruyter and the destroyers Piet Heinl and Banckert2 were transferred from the eastern part of the archipelago to the west . Within th e week after the Japanese attack the Allied naval forces in the East Indie s area were thus disposed with the British and Dutch in the western par t and the Americans in the east of the archipelago . Surface forces wer e engaged mainly on escort-of-convoy, and covering merchant ship movements . There were, for example, some 200,000 tons of Allied merchan t ships in Manila Bay on the 10th December . The majority of these ships got safely away, via the Sulu Sea and Macassar Strait . Offensive operations against the Japanese were confined to those carried out by the Allie d e Brooke-Popham, Despatch on Operations in the Far East from 17th October 1940 to 27t h December 1941, p. 567 . 1 Plet Hein, Dutch destroyer (1927), 1,310 tons, four 4.7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; torpedoed off Bali, 19 Feb 1942. 9 Banckert, Dutch destroyer (1929), 1,316 tons, four 4.7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 36 kts ; sunk at Surabaya, 2 Mar 1942.
492
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
Dec1941
submarines and aircraft ; and though they inflicted some losses they were powerless even seriously to hamper the Japanese advance . II Throughout December reports of this spreading advance reached Nav y Office, Melbourne . It was a period of some confusion reflected (in the ligh t of later knowledge) in the various official and unofficial reports whic h were received . These varied from erroneous accounts of the bombin g of San Francisco and of the presence of Japanese aircraft carriers off th e west coast of America, to equally erroneous reports (originating in th e belief at the time of the crews of American attacking aircraft) that a Japanese aircraft carrier had been sunk off Honolulu, and that the battle ship Haruna had been sunk, and that Kongo and another unnamed battleship had been badly damaged, at the Philippines . Nearer home, gun fire was reported off Jervis Bay on the 8th December, and a submarine wa s "sighted" in Port Phillip Bay on the 13th . Meanwhile, on the 9th December, Commander Long, as Director of C.O .I.C . Melbourne, produced a prescient "appreciation of Japanes e situation" . Recording the then known Japanese attacks on Malaya, Pear l Harbour, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Ocean, and possibly Midwa y Islands, he outlined possible forms of future Japanese attack : (1) From Thailand on Malaya, possibly pushing through to Burma to cut the Burm a Road . (2) On the Philippines, " endeavouring to suppress American naval and air strength in the area" . (3) On the Netherlands East Indies an d North Borneo in view of the vital oil supplies in North Borneo . Th e attack "may be from either Indo-China and Hainan or from Palau in th e Carolines or from both simultaneously" . (4) On the New Ireland-Ne w Britain area from the Carolines and Marshall Islands . "In view of the strategic value of Rabaul to Japan both from a defensive and offensiv e point of view it is possible that an attack on this area may be launche d from Truk ." (5) New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji-Samoa . There had been for months unidentified ship and aircraft sightings suggesting Japanes e reconnaissance of this area as far south as Fiji-Samoa . "In view of th e strategic value of these areas to Japan vis-a-vis American-British trans Pacific communications it is possible that an attack may be made against one or all of these places (either invasion or a series of raids) with a view to seriously hindering our use of this area ." The appreciation di d not consider a direct attack against Australia and New Zealand likely a t that stage . "However, coastal raids by Japanese naval units from bases i n the southern Mandates are considered likely" by submarines, and "it i s also likely in view of Japan's present attack against Hawaii that raid s will be made by heavier units against strategic coastal areas such a s Newcastle . These attacks may take the form of shelling by a squadro n of naval units or air attack from aircraft carriers in view of Japan's know n liking for this form of attack ." The probability that Japan would sen d out armed merchant cruisers to operate as commerce raiders in th e Pacific and Indian Oceans was also taken into account.
10 Dec
PRINCE OF WALES AND REPULSE
49 3
At this time there was in Melbourne no knowledge of the exten t of the damage done to the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour . It could only be assumed that, for the time being at any rate, ther e could be no help from that quarter . 3 During the evening of Wednesday , the 10th December, news of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse reached Navy Office, first in a Tokyo broadcast, quickly followed by a n announcement in the British broadcast news . Following so rapidly on th e publicity fanfare which had announced the arrival of the two ships at Singapore only a week earlier, it came as a shock. Mr Macandie, th e Secretary of the Naval Board, who was working back as usual that night , dined at the Naval and Military Club and returned to Navy Office unawar e of the loss of the two ships . "Passing the open door of the Third Nava l Member's room on my way to my own," he later recalled, "I saw [Engineer Rear-Admiral] McNeil sitting at his desk, and stepped in for a few words . He seemed gloomy, and I commented on this . ` Things look very bad in Malaya,' he said . I answered, `Cheer up! The Prince of Wales and Repulse are there, and they're only the beginning of what we'll soon have .' H e looked up at me . `Haven't you heard?' he asked . `They've both gone .' It took me some time to grasp it ." Many others found the news equall y hard to believe at first . The situation facing the Australian Chiefs of Staff, as advisers to th e Government, was thus anything but reassuring . News from both east and west suggested that such protection and support as might have been anticipated from the United States on the one hand and Britain on the othe r in the event of a Japanese attack would now, at the best, be considerabl y delayed . It was realised that, with its heavy commitments in the Middle East and the Atlantic, the Royal Navy would have grave difficulty in making good in the Far East the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse . This loss brought those of British capital ships known to the Australia n 8
It was not until 15 Dec that the U .S . Secretary for the Navy announced the American losse s as : One battleship as a result of a direct bomb hit ; three modern 1,500-ton destroyers ; two auxiliaries; 2,729 officers and men killed ; 656 officers and men wounded ; naval aircraft losses severe ; army aircraft losses severe and some hangars lost ; several other naval vessels damaged , some of which have been repaired and are ready for sea, while others are already at sea . A few will require some time to repair. Battleship Oklahoma was capsized but can be righte d and repaired. The entire balance of the Pacific Fleet is unimpaired, and is at sea seeking contac t with the enemy. Honolulu harbour facilities undamaged . Oil tanks and oil depots safe . Japanese losses—three submarines, 41 aircraft . As was subsequently made public, of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbour when the Japanes e attacked, four were sunk, Arizona (total loss) ; Oklahoma (salvaged but never returned t o service) ; West Virginia and California . One, Nevada, was run aground to prevent her sinking . Three, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee were damaged but remained afloat. Three of th e damaged battleships were at sea in less than two weeks after the attack . All of the Pear l Harbour battleships excepting Arizona and Oklahoma subsequently took an active part in the war. The destroyers Cassin and Downes were so badly damaged as to demand complete rebuilding which was not completed until 1943 ; and destroyer Shaw had her bow blown off bu t was repaired by mid-1942. Three light cruisers, Helena, Honolulu and Raleigh, were damaged , but left Pearl Harbour by the end of January 1942 . The seaplane tender Curtiss and repai r ship Vestal were damaged. In all 19 ships were hit . Casualties were : Killed, missing, died of wounds Wounded Navy 2,008 71 0 Marine Corps . 109 69 Army 218 364 Civilians 68 35 2,403
1,178
494
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
Dec194 1
authorities, since war broke out in 1939, to four (Royal Oak,4 Hood, Prince of Wales, Repulse) . Against this over-all loss it was believed in Australia that three new battleships (King George V, Prince of Wales, an d Duke of York s ) had been added to the effective strength of the Royal Navy, thus making a net reduction of one in the pre-war total of capital ships . Actually the reduction was greater . In November, Barham had bee n sunk in the Mediterranean, a fact not known to the Australian authorities ; and a week after the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse the Royal Navy's total of effective battleships was to be further reduced by the disablemen t in Alexandria Harbour of Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, both put out of action for several months . Thus at the end of December 1941 the tota l of the Royal Navy's effective capital ships, fifteen at the outbreak of wa r in 1939, had been reduced to eleven . The United States Navy had a similar profit and loss account in capita l ships . On the debit side two were a total loss at Pearl Harbour. Three of those there damaged took several months to repair. On the credit side two new battleships, North Carolina and Washington, 6 had joined the Atlantic Fleet by the end of 1941 but, newly commissioned, were still in the "working up " stage . The net reduction in effective capital shi p strength of the United States Navy was thus from a total of fifteen a t the outbreak of war in 1939 to twelve at the end of December 1941 . This made the combined British-American total of effective capital ship s at that date twenty-three . Of these, the newer and faster British ships were needed in Home waters to contain the German Tirpitz and other heavy units, while the older ships of both the British and United States navies were unsuitable for use against the Japanese in the existing lack o f air cover. It was apparent that, for the time being and the immediat e future, Australia must look to her own resources . This was the situation visualised in the Australian Chiefs of Staff appreciation of February 1941, when it had been agreed that if neither a British nor American fleet was available for operations in the East Indie s area in the event of a Japanese attack, the defence of territory mus t depend primarily on the local forces in each area . The policy in such circumstances should be to use naval and air forces to forestall the establishment of enemy naval and air bases within striking distance of vita l points, while adequate forces were retained for local defence and th e security of sea communications . The main army forces in each allotted area should provide final opposition against invasion, and garrison outlyin g bases to ensure the continued operation of naval and air forces . Acceptance of this policy had led to reinforcement of Rabaul, and the agreement t o send Australian troops to Koepang and Ambon . ' HMS
Royal Oak, battleship (1916), 29,150 tons, eight 15-in and twelve 6-in guns, two 21-in torp tubes . 21 kts; sunk by German submarine in Scapa Flow . 14 Oct 1939. °HMS Duke of York, battleship (1941), 35,000 tons, ten 14-in and sixteen 5 .5-in guns, 28 .5 kts . In his weekly progress report to the War Cabinet for the week ended 18 Oct 1941, Royle, i n reporting the British decision to send Prince of Wales to the Far East, added : "It appeare d from this information that Duke of York was now in commission . " "North Carolina and Washington, US battleships (1941), 35,000 tons, nine 16-inch and twenty 5-in guns, A/A batteries, 28 knots.
Motor Schooner Lakatoi .
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
(R .A .N . Historical Section )
Norah Moller
on fire in Banka Strait, 3rd February 1942 .
(U .S . Nary ) Admiral
Thomas C . Hart, U .S . Navy, C-in- C Allied Naval Forces in the Far East, January February 1942 .
(F. F . Daniell ) Vice-Admiral Conrad Helfrich . C-in-C Allie d Naval Forces in the Netherlands East Indie s 1942 .
R4V.
Historical Section )
Japanese Bombing in Gaspar Strait, 15th February 1942 "close enough to see the ugly re d flash of their burst and to feel the heat of their explosions . . . ."
9-12 Dec
A PAINFUL DECISION
49 5
As stated above, the Koepang force, 1,400 . strong, sailed from Darwi n on the 10th December . Two days later a painful decision regarding Rabau l was reached by the Chiefs of Staff, and approved by the War Cabinet . Only 700 miles from Truk, the powerful Japanese base in the Carolin e Islands, Rabaul occupied a position of strategic importance to both Japa n and Australia, both from a defensive and offensive point of view . In October 1941 the War Cabinet considered an offer by the United State s to supply equipment and technical assistance for its installation (mad e available under Lend-Lease arrangements), to improve the defences o f Rabaul so that if necessary Rabaul could be used as a naval base fo r operations against the Carolines and Japanese lines of communicatio n passing to the eastward of the Philippines . The equipment was to includ e six 7-inch guns for coast defence, twenty anti-aircraft guns, ammunition , and other items . Australia was to provide the men to instal the equipmen t and man the defences . In May 1937 Rabaul was badly damaged by volcanic eruption . During 1941 the volcano showed renewed activity, but after inspections by th e Chiefs of the Naval and Air Staffs, and consultation with the geologica l advisers, Dr W. G . Woolnough and Dr N . H . Fisher, the Defence Committee concluded that Rabaul could still be used as a fleet base . The War Cabinet decided to accept the American offer, and to invite the Unite d States Government to send a mission to Australia to make the necessary arrangements . ? Before anything could be done to further the arrangements , however, Japan attacked . On the 9th December an unidentified twin-engine monoplane, considered to be a Japanese naval heavy bomber, was reported as makin g three runs over Rabaul between 10 a .m . and 10 .10 a .m ., strongly suggesting that the flight was photographic reconnaissance, and pointing to th e possibility of early attack . (At the same time another aircraft, considered to be a Japanese reconnaissance plane, circled over Kavieng, 182 mile s from Rabaul on the north-west tip of New Ireland .) In the circumstance s the Chiefs of Staff considered three courses of action : (a) to reinforc e the existing Rabaul garrison up to the strength of a brigade group ; (b) to withdraw the existing garrison and abandon Rabaul ; (c) to retain th e existing garrison . They recommended adoption of the third course . Th e recommendation was approved by the War Cabinet at its meeting of th e 12th December 1941, it being noted that "the situation is to be kep t under observation and if U .S . cruisers and destroyers fall back on Darwin , sufficient naval forces may become available to reinforce and suppl y Rabaul " . This, however, was an optimistic assembly of "ifs" and " mays". It was clear that, even had Rabaul's existing garrison been reinforced u p to the strength of a brigade group, it could not, lacking control of th e 7
Australian naval commitments would have been the provision of base staff ; port war signal station ; examination service ; anti-submarine patrol and hunting vessels ; harbour defence asdic installations ; boom depot ; boom working vessel ; stores ; and fleet tankers, as there was no oil storage at Rabaul . The army would have been responsible for manning fixed defences an d anti-aircraft defences and garrisoning the base. Total additional manning would have been approximately 1,500.
496
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
Dec194 1
sea approaches, heavy coast defence artillery and air defences (Rabau l then had two 6-inch guns and two anti-aircraft guns), have withstood, in the face of Japan's complete local sea and air control, a determined seaborne assault . Yet the existing garrison, at a time when any delay, howeve r small, that could be imposed upon the Japanese, was of great value t o Australia, could impose such a delay, though it were sacrificed in s o doing . For that reason the hard decision was taken to retain it instead of withdrawing it and abandoning Rabaul . In the meantime, plans alread y made to withdraw women and children from New Guinea, Papua, an d Darwin were accelerated, and during December numbers were landed i n Australia from the merchant ships Katoomba, Neptuna, Zealandia, and Macdhui . 8 On the 14th December the Australian force for Ambon ("Gull Force" ) sailed from Darwin, a total of 1,090 troops, in the Dutch merchant ship s Both, Valentijn, and Patras,9 escorted by Adelaide and the corvette Ballarat (Lieut-Commander Barling) .1 The voyage was made without incident, and "Gull Force" disembarked at Ambon on the 17th December. That day Australian and Dutch troops landed on Portuguese territory , at Dili in Timor . For some time Japanese interest in Portuguese Timo r had been a matter of concern to the British, Australian, and Netherland s Indies governments . In December 1940 the Japanese, with Portuguese permission, carried out " test " flights for an air service between Palau and Dili ; and a Japanese consul was appointed to Dili . Towards the end of 1941 there were indications that Japan was pressing the Portuguese Government to accept Japanese "protection" for Timor . Portuguese Timor in Japanese hands would mean an enemy base on the Australia-Malay a lines of communication ; a threat to Darwin ; and a hostile base in th e Dutch rear . The British Government, suspicious of Japanese intentions , made the Portuguese an offer of assistance in the event of a Japanes e attack . The Portuguese Government accepted this offer on the 12t h December 1941, and agreed that there should be staff conversations at Singapore to work out details . Meanwhile the Japanese had attacked, and the Dutch at Koepan g produced a plan to dispatch Dutch troops thence to Dili . "Sparrow Force " was authorised to cooperate, and on the 16th December the Dutch coasta l defence ship Soerabaja and the auxiliary vessel Canopus left Koepang fo r Dili with 400 Dutch and 250 Australian troops . These landed west of Dili on the 17th . No resistance was met, but the Portuguese Governor made strong protests . The Australians and Dutch therefore deferred ful l military control pending a reply from Lisbon to a message from th e Governor . In Lisbon the Portuguese Government protested violently t o Of 9,424, 5,952, 6,683 and 4,561 tons respectively ; Neptuna and Zealandia were sunk at Darwin, 19 Feb 1942, and Macdhui at Port Moresby, 18 Jun 1942. Of 2,601, 2,071 and 2,065 tons respectively . r HMAS Ballarat, corvette, 733 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts. (One of the ships built on Admiralty account, but Australian manned.) Commissioned 30 Aug 1941 . Lt-Cdr A. D. Barling, DSO, DSC ; RANR(S) . HMAS Bingera 1940-41 ; comd HMAS Ballara t 1941-43 ; Principal Beachmaster, Cairns 1944 ; HMAS Westralta 1944-45 . Of Sydney ; b. London, 26 Sep 1899 . 6
b
Dec 1941-Feb 1942
TAKING
STOCK
49 7
the British and Dutch Governments . It was eventually agreed that th e Allied garrison would be withdrawn from Portuguese Timor when an adequate garrison of Portuguese troops from East Africa arrived . Thes e troops, in the troopship Joao Belo (6,365 tons), escorted by the sloo p Gongalo Velho, 2 left Lorenco Marques for Timor on the 28th Januar y 1942 . Speed of advance was only eight knots, and the ships were stil l on passage (and returned to East Africa) when the Japanese capture d Timor in February . While the Australians were thus taking steps to safeguard their norther n approaches within their limited means, the Americans in the Pacific an d the British at Singapore took hasty stock of the situation, and measure s to meet it . Within a few hours of the attack on Pearl Harbour, Washingto n ordered the return to the Pacific of the aircraft carrier Yorktown (transferred thence to the Atlantic in April 1941) together with a destroye r squadron and three squadrons of patrol bombers . On the 10th December, three days after the attack, Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacifi c Fleet, was still unaware of the composition of the Japanese attacking forc e and whither it had retired . But he stated, in an estimate of the situation made that day, "we do know that Guam has fallen, Wake is under attack, some of the Gilbert Islands have been occupied, and enemy sub marines are operating eastward from Oahu" . 3 Kimmel visualised that probable enemy action in the Pacific would be raids by fast striking force s on Oahu and Midway in the Hawaii Islands and on the Aleutians ; raids on Wake Island "with possible landing attempts" ; and raids on commerce by submarines and cruisers or armed merchant cruisers . The losses inflicted on the Pacific Fleet had caused the Navy Department, Washington, th e day following the attack at Pearl Harbour, to amend the naval pla n (WPL 46 of "Rainbow 5") it had intended to implement if war brok e out with Japan, and to adopt temporarily a defensive role in which th e immediate and broad mission of the Pacific Fleet would be to retain wha t America held in the Pacific as a base for future offensives while securin g communications along the lines Panama-Samoa-Fiji-New Zealand ; an d West Coast-Pearl Harbour-Fiji-New Caledonia-Australia . There was no question of using the depleted Pacific Fleet to defend Guam or the Philip pines, but plans (based on Admiral Kimmel's appreciation) were at onc e drawn up for the employment of three carrier groups operating fro m Pearl Harbour to intercept enemy raids and support other menace d bases ; for the formation of battleship-destroyer escort groups to be base d on San Francisco and escort convoys from the West Coast to Hawaii ; and for the use of submarines offensively in Japanese waters and off Wake and Midway Islands . 4 2 Gonsalo
Velho, Portuguese sloop (1933), 950 tons, three 4.7-in guns, 16 .5 kts . During December three merchant ships were sunk by Japanese submarines near or east of Hawaii ; and two were sunk and one damaged by submarines off the Californian coast . a The above brief survey of American reactions and decisions condensed from Morison, Vol III, pp. 218-22 . 8
498
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
6-13 Dec
On the day that Kimmel produced his appreciation, Layton in Malaya outlined his broad policy to meet Japanese intentions considered to be : to capture first Luzon in the Philippines and then Singapore ; to blockade Hong Kong ; and to leave the Netherlands East Indies to the last. "An essential part of this strategy must be to increase attacks on sea communications so that raider activity is to be expected on a large scale ." Layton's broad policy had close points of similarity with Kimmel's ; but, in narrow waters under increasingly effective enemy control his chances of implementing it were far flimsier than the American's . He lacked any carrier striking force, and the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse meant tha t Japanese sea communications in the Gulf of Siam were secure excep t against submarine attack . On the 13th December he told the Admiralty that the Japanese plan appeared to be infiltration of Malaya from the north, and that if it succeeded the island of Singapore would becom e virtually a beleaguered fortress, and the naval base untenable for ships . He proposed that before this happened he should embark and take al l available surface vessels either to Colombo or Batavia—preferably the former as being the probable assembly port of the main British Fa r Eastern Fleet . The Admiralty (who for the time being were unable t o send him any reinforcements) agreed that, when he considered it necessary , he should proceed to Colombo and fly his flag on shore there . By this time the Japanese attack was developing and yielding swif t results . In the afternoon of 6th December Rear-Admiral Takagi, flyin g his flag in Myoko, with Nachi and Haguro of the 5th Cruiser Squadron ; Ryujo of the 4th Air Flotilla ; Jintsu and destroyers, left Palau to cove r the Philippines landings at Legaspi, southern Luzon . From a positio n approximately 100 miles east of Davao on the southern island of Mindanao, Ryujo's aircraft were launched and bombed the Davao area in th e early morning of the 8th . Simultaneously the first of a series of land-base d attacks by Japanese aircraft was launched from Formosa on airfields in northern Luzon . They were eminently successful, and by the evening o f the 8th December half the bomber strength and one-third of the fighte r strength of the United States air forces in the Philippines had bee n destroyed . Thus, in one day, the invading surface forces were given nea r immunity from air attack . At about the time that Ryujo was launching her aircraft, the Legaspi invasion force in seven transports escorted by Rear-Admiral Kubo in Nagara, with Chitose and Mizuho of the 11th Air Flotilla, and destroyers, sailed from Palau . They joined up with Takagi's force in the early morning of the 9th and reached Legasp i (where they protected the Japanese rear from possible air strikes fro m the Visaya islands to the south, and controlled San Bernadino Strait) i n the early morning of the 12th . Meanwhile landings had been made in northern Luzon . On the evening of the 7th December three invasion forces set out . Rear-Admiral Hirose , with his Batan Island Surprise Attack Force of a destroyer and smal l craft, sailed from Takao and Horyo in Formosa, and reached his objectiv e (some 130 miles north of Luzon) at dawn on the 8th . Rear-Admiral
8-11 Dec
GUAM
LOST
49 9
Hara in Natori, with destroyers and ancillaries, and escorting six troo p transports, left Mako in the Pescadores and anchored off Aparri, on the north-eastern tip of Luzon, at daybreak on the 10th . Also from Mak o sailed the six transports of the Vigan invasion force, escorted by RearAdmiral Nishimura in Naka with destroyers, anti-submarine vessels an d minesweepers . They reached Vigan, on the north-west coast of Luzon , soon after noon on the 10th . The Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, ViceAdmiral Takahashi, in overall command of the operation, left Mako in Ashigara on the 8th, with Maya, Kuma, and destroyers, to give genera l cover . Suffering only minor losses inflicted by the dwindling America n air forces, these preliminary Japanese landings were successful, and pave d the way for the main invasion . Away to the eastward, easy conquests fell to Vice-Admiral Inouye's Fourth Fleet, detachments from which made landings on Tarawa and Butaritari islands in the British Gilbert group on the 9th-10th December , and on the 10th (but not without losses) overwhelmed the small America n garrison on Guam, and captured that island after having bombed it fo r two days . They were less immediately successful at Wake Island . Tha t American outpost, garrisoned by 450 Marines and 68 naval officers an d men, and harbouring about 1,200 civilians (air line officials and con tractor's employees) was defended by a Marine fighter squadron o f twelve aircraft, and three batteries of 3-inch and 5-inch guns . The islan d suffered heavy air raids on the 8th, 9th and 10th December which inflicte d casualties, destroyed seven of the aircraft, and damaged some of th e guns . Shortly after midnight on the 10th, Rear-Admiral Kajioka's invasio n force of Yubari (flag) and six destroyers escorting four transports, wit h Tenryu and Tatsuta in support, arrived off the island . Landings, precede d by a ship-to-shore bombardment, were attempted soon after dawn on th e 11th, but ended in complete failure . The Japanese lost two destroyers — Hayate and Kisaragi 5 blown up by shore battery gun fire . At 7 a .m . Kajioka broke off the action and retired to Kwajalein, to "make another attempt when conditions were more favourable" . 6 IV Within three weeks of their opening strokes the Japanese had neutralise d the Malay and Philippine areas, had temporarily secured themselves in th e east, and had begun their swift deployment over the whole of the South West Pacific archipelago region down to the Malay Barrier, an area o f some two million square miles . With them, as with their enemies, it wa s a race against time . Their urgent need was to secure and utilise the ric h oil resources before installations could be destroyed, and to forestall reinforcements, particularly air reinforcements . It was necessary for them to act quickly, and as near as could be simultaneously, in all areas . Th e Hayate and Kisaragt, Japanese destroyers (1925), 1,270 and 1,500 tons, four 4 .7-in guns, six 21-in torp tubes, 34 kts . ° Captain Koyama, who was in Yubart. Morison, Vol III, p . 234. According to Morison, Yubart, Tenryu, Tatsuta, and destroyers Otte and Yayoi were damaged .
500
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
12-19 Dec
Allies, on the other hand, were pitted against time in their endeavou r to rush in reinforcements, and meanwhile to hold the invaders whereve r and whenever possible . On both sides naval emphasis was on escort o f convoy. The Japanese knew that an Allied naval force existed in th e Java Sea area, and believed that it included "several" cruisers . Becaus e of their own problems of surface cover and close escort for landin g forces in simultaneous operations over wide areas the Japanese, however , felt compelled to utilise every ship on these duties . They had neither the time nor the vessels to consider active operations against the Allie d fleet . That fleet, had it been under unified command, and had the pre determined (February 1941) policy " to use naval and air forces to forestall the establishment of enemy naval and air bases within strikin g distance of vital points " been adhered to, could possibly have impose d some delay on the enemy at this stage . But Allied concern with reinforcement and the protection of the convoys militated against the formatio n of a striking force, and the Americans and British, apparently convince d that an immediate and essential part of Japanese strategy would b e attacks on sea communications, with raider activity on a large scale, ' employed all their surface forces on escort-of-convoy duties, with seemingly little or no reference to each other, evidenced by the fact that o n the 14th December Admiral Layton told the Admiralty that he was unabl e to obtain any communication from Admiral Hart . Attempts to achieve some cohesion were, however, now being made , both locally and on the highest British-American government levels . On the 12th December Mr Churchill, with a staff of eighty, headed by th e naval and air chiefs of staff, General Dill, l and Lord Beaverbrook, 2 the Minister of Supply, sailed from Glasgow in the new battleship Duke of York for the United States and discussions with President Roosevelt an d the American Chiefs of Staff . They reached Washington on the 22nd . Before sailing, Mr Churchill appointed Mr Duff Cooper 3 (who had been Minister of State in the Far East since July 1941) Resident Cabine t Minister at Singapore for Far Eastern Affairs . Duff Cooper, on th e 19th December, formed at Singapore a War Council over which he pre sided and on which Mr V . G . Bowden, 4 Australia ' s Official Representativ e at Singapore, represented the Australian Government. On the 18th December, consequent on a proposal by President Roosevelt that inter-allie d 7 Actually the Japanese, right throughout the war, made no consistent attempt to disrupt Allie d lines of communication . They made little use of their regular surface forces in such warfar e (practically none after November 1942, from when on they were too much concerned wit h protecting their own communications) and even their submarine campaign was sporadic an d inconsistent. Only two Japanese armed merchant cruisers, Aikoku Maru (10,437 tons) and Hokoku Maru (10,439 tons) operated during the war, and their period of operation was exceptionally short and not very successful . 1 Field Marshal Sir John Dill, GCB, CMG, DSO . GOC I Corps in France 1939-40 ; CIGS War Office 1940-41 . B. Belfast, Ireland, 25 Dec 1881 . Died 4 Nov 1944. s Rt Hon Lord Beaverbrook. Minister of Information 1918, for Aircraft Production 1940-41 , of Supply 1941-42 ; Lord Privy Seal 1943-45 . B . Maple, Ontario, Canada, 25 May 1879 . s Rt Hon Viscount Norwich, GCMG, DSO . Minister of Information 1940-41 ; Ambassador to France 1944-47 . B . 1890 . Died 1 Jan 1954 . A V . G . Bowden, CBE . (With BEF in France 1915-19, Major RE.) Aust Govt Commissioner i n China 1935-41 . Official Representative in Singapore 1941-42 . B . Sydney, 28 May 1884. Executed by Japanese, 17 Feb 1942 .
17-18 Dec
NEED FOR AIRCRAFT
50 1
military conferences be arranged at Chungking, Singapore, and Moscow , to agree on preliminary recommendations "to prepare the way for common action against common enemies", such a conference was held at Singapore . Australian representatives were Major-General Gordon Bennett,5 commanding the A .I .F. in Malaya ; Captain Collins, R .A .N ., then in Singapore as Assistant Chief of Staff to Layton ; and Group Captain McCauley, 6 R .A .A .F . The conference, among other recommendations, re affirmed the policy formulated in February 1941—to keep the enem y as far north as possible, and to prevent him acquiring territory an d particularly aerodromes which would threaten the arrival of reinforcements . A sub-committee of the conference recommended as the naval contribution towards these ends, the maintenance of the strongest possible strikin g force in the South China and West Java seas, built up on British and Dutch naval forces then available, and the reinforcement of the submarine force based on Singapore ; 7 and the maintenance of the strongest possible striking force in the Celebes Sea and Macassar Strait area, built up o n the American Task Force 5 and the local Dutch forces . The conferenc e also detailed the minimum air and army reinforcements considered immediately necessary in Malaya "to stabilise the situation" ; and suggeste d that aircraft in an American convoy destined for the Philippines an d then making through the South Pacific for Brisbane, should be sent to Surabaya . A similar suggestion : "the despatch to Singapore and adjacent area s through Australia of U .S .A . air reinforcements hitherto intended for th e Philippines", was made to the United Kingdom Government by th e Australian Government on the 17th December . It was one of a numbe r recommended by the Advisory War Council after hearing Admiral Royle' s report on his return from Singapore . The council reached the conclusion that certain earlier expressed opinions of the British Chiefs of Staff required revision in the light of Royle's report, these including the view that "th e majority of the 450 shore-based aircraft which the Japanese can marsha l against us are of obsolete types and, as we have said, we have no reaso n to believe that Japanese standards are even comparable with those of th e Italians . We have already drawn attention to our experience when heavil y outnumbered during the Libyan campaign as well as at Malta and in th e air defence of Great Britain ."8 The Australian Government also stresse d the need of aircraft carriers "in the area east of Suez" and emphasised that if Britain could not provide one the United States should be aske d to do so . In addition, the Australian Government suggested that, "in view of the geographical position of Malaya and adjacent islands, a n Lt-Gen H . Gordon Bennett, CB, CMG, DSO, VD . (1st AIF : Comd 6 Bn 1915-16, 3 Inf Bde 1916-19 .) GOC 8 Div 1940-42, III Corps 1942-44. Public accountant and company director ; o f Sydney ; b . Balwyn, Vic, 16 Apr 1887 . ° Air Marshal Sir John McCauley, KBE, CB . Dep Chief of Air Staff RAAF 1942-44, 1946-47 ; Air Cmdre Ops 2 TAF, European Theatre, 1944-45 ; Chief of Staff BCOF, Japan, 1947-49 ; Chief of Air Staff RAAF 1954-57 . B . Sydney, 18 Mar 1899. ', These were Dutch vessels . There were then no British submarines in Far Eastern waters. Trusty and Truant were ordered there from the Mediterranean on 22 Dec 1941 . °C .O .S . Paper (41) 230.
502
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
12-21 Dec
essential corollary of the operation of a British fleet in these waters i s naval control of all land-based aircraft except those allotted for arm y cooperation" . This arose from Royle telling the Advisory War Counci l that he thought that better results would be achieved in air cooperatio n with the navy if that service had control of the Air Coastal Comman d in Malaya, as in the United Kingdom . There was (said Royle) evidence that our air organisation in Malaya was not effective . At noon on Monday , 8th December, the Japanese transports were not being attacked at al l from the air . There were 29 torpedo-carrying aircraft in Malaya, whic h could have done great damage to the Japanese warships and transports , but they had not been employed . He was not aware of the reason for this . ° In the meantime, offensive operations against the Japanese were con fined to those carried out by Dutch submarines, and by aircraft . The Dutc h submarines, based on Singapore and operating under the strategic control of Admiral Layton, did particularly gallant and useful work in thes e early days of the Japanese advance . They inflicted most of the damag e and losses suffered by the enemy's seaborne forces, and themselves suffere d heavily in so doing . They were first in action in the defence of Malaya , attacking the Japanese landing forces at Kota Bharu, Patani, and Singora . On the 12th December K 12 sank the transport Toro Maru (1,939 tons ) off Kota Bharu ; and the same day 0 16 attacked and severely damage d the transports Tosan Maru (8,666 tons), Sakina Maru (7,170 tons) , Ayato Maru (9,788 tons), and Asosan Maru (8,812 tons) at Patani . On the 13th December K 12 sank a naval tanker, Taisan Maru (3,52 5 tons) near Kota Bharu . 10 0 16 did not long survive her success . On he r return passage to Singapore she ran into the British East Johore minefield , and was lost with only one survivor . Within a few days the Dutch submarine force was further depleted . 0 20 was sunk by gun fire from a Japanese destroyer near Kota Bharu on the 19th December ; and on th e 21st K 17 was destroyed in a depth charge attack near Singora . The Dutch, however, achieved more successes when, in the middl e of the month, the Japanese made their first move against Borneo, an d found "air and submarine attacks more tenacious than in other areas" . 1 The Japanese overall plan for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indie s (to be carried out concurrently with the operations in Malaya and the Philippines) envisaged two main southwards advances ; one from the wes t and one from the east, with subsidiary enveloping branches springing ou t on either hand as the advance progressed . That in the west, spreadin g southwards from Camranh Bay in Indo-China, would secure Britis h 9
As stated in Chapter 13, during the night of the 7-8 December, aircraft of the RAF an d RAAF made persistent attacks on the ships, and sank Awagisan Maru . Later attempts to attack the transports by air failed because they had withdrawn behind the Perhentian Islands . 1, It is possible that the ship believed to be Taisan Maru was in reality the burnt-out Awagisan Maru (9,794 tons), which was bombed during the first assault landing on 8 Dec . Admiral Helfrich in his "Notes" recorded the damage to the four transports at Patani (previousl y considered by the Dutch authorities to have been sunk) as confirmed by Japanese reports received by the Dutch Historical Section, Naval Staff, the Hague, in Apr 1952 . A Japanes e document of 17 Jan 1946, File No. M277—Malaya Landing Operation, states that on th e 14 Dec at Patani "three vessels were damaged with no casualties of military personnel o n board" . 1 " Invasion of the Dutch East Indies" ; an ATIS translation of a Japanese account . (AL .1096.)
13-22 Dec
BORNEO INVADED
50 3
Borneo and Sumatra ; that in the east, stemming from Davao in th e Philippines, would overwhelm Dutch Borneo, Celebes, Ambon, and th e Lesser Sunda Islands, including Timor . The spearhead of the advanc e would be the air weapon, the scope of which would be progressively widened as air bases were secured . Both navy (land and ship-based), an d army aircraft would be used . It was anticipated that by the end of Februar y 1942, air supremacy would be attained over the entire Dutch East Indie s area from bases on Celebes, Borneo, and Sumatra . The main body o f Japanese invasion forces in the Dutch East Indies would then attac k Java from the east and west simultaneously . The first objective in this plan was, for two reasons, the island of Borneo . Lying as it does athwart the main sea route from the north t o Malaya and Sumatra on the west and to Celebes, Moluccas, and Ne w Guinea on the east, it occupies a position of great strategic importance ; and one which it was as needful for the Japanese to deny to their enemies as to secure for themselves . In addition, it held one of Japan's main an d urgent requirements—oil . Because the Philippine Islands launching plac e at Davao was not at that time available to the Japanese, while Camranh Bay was, and, additionally, to secure the southern flank of their advanc e on Malaya, the initial Japanese stroke was made by the western forc e against British Borneo, along a stretch of some sixty miles from Seri a in Brunei to Miri and Lutong in adjoining Sarawak . The two groups of oil fields were at the first mentioned places, and the refinery to which their crude oil was pumped was at Lutong . The Japanese invasion force (the 124th Regiment augmented by the 2nd Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force) in ten transports escorted by three destroyers and smaller craft, with the seaplane tenders Yura and Kamikawa Maru attached for reconnaissance duties, sailed from Camran h Bay in the afternoon of the 13th December . The heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya of the 7th Cruiser Squadron and (after the 18th December ) the light cruiser Kinu and destroyer Fubuki, were in support. Passage of the South China Sea was made without incident, and the convoy arrive d off Miri, Seria and Lutong, and made pre-dawn landings on the 16t h of the month . Neither the British nor the Dutch had the forces or facilitie s to defend Borneo and, before the Japanese invasion, the oil fields, an d the refinery at Lutong, were severely damaged . There was therefore no opposition to the Japanese who, though hampered by heavy weather, wer e ashore by daylight . The ships were, however, attacked next day, the 17th, by Dutch aircraft, and flying-boat X 32 sank the destroyer Shinonome , at Miri, where, also, flying-boat X 33 damaged a small transport. On the 22nd December the main body of the Japanese force (two battalions) left Miri in six transports to assault Kuching, some 370 mile s along the coast just within the south-western tip of Sarawak . One battalion 2
Shinonome, Japanese destroyer (1928), 1,700 tons, six 5-in guns, nine 24-in torp tubes, 34 kts . Admiral Helfrich records the loss of Shinonome by air attack ("initially this ship was considered as having struck a mine " ) as confirmed in "most recent Japanese data received Ap r 1952" . An earlier Japanese document, " Occupation of British Borneo, AL.1096, Dec 1941 " records "Enemy air attacks 17-18 Dec . Destroyer Shinonome sunk by bomb ."
504
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
Dec-Jan
of Japanese remained to secure British North Borneo . Kuching, which had an airfield and was only sixty miles north-east of the important Dutc h airfield at Sinkawang (which in turn was only 350 miles due east o f Singapore) was, for these reasons, defended by a small military force . The Japanese convoy, guarded by the naval force (less Shinonome) whic h had been the escort from Camranh Bay, was sighted and reported by Dutch reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 23rd December, whe n about 150 miles from Kuching. An air striking force at Sinkawang II airfield was unable to take off because of damage to the runways by a Japanese bombing attack that morning . 3 That evening, however, the Dutch submarine K 14 successfully attacked the convoy as it arrived at Kuching . Two transports, Hie Maru (4,943 tons) and Katori Maru (9,849 tons ) were sunk, and one, Hokkai Maru (8,416 tons) was badly damaged, a s was also the naval tanker Tonan Maru No . 2 (19,262 tons) . The nex t night another Dutch submarine, K 16, torpedoed and sank the destroyer Sagiri 4 off Kuching. K 16, on her return passage to Singapore, was surprised and sunk by the Japanese submarine 166 5 The Japanese force had further losses on the 26th December, when a Dutch Glenn Martin bomber sank Minesweeper No. 6 (615 tons) and Unyo Maru No. 2 (2,827 tons) . These efforts, however, gallant though they were, scarcely hampere d the enemy. The detached Japanese left in North Borneo occupied Labua n on the 3rd January 1942, and Jesselton five days later . On the 19th of the month they entered Sandakan, the seat of Government of Britis h North Borneo, and there the Governor surrendered the State and wa s interned with his staff after all had refused to carry on the administration under Japanese control . In Sarawak the defenders (a battalion of Indian troops—2/15th Punjab—the native Volunteer Corps and Coastal Marin e Service, the armed police, and the Sarawak Rangers, a body of nativ e troops) retired to Dutch West Borneo under frequent Japanese attack . At the border, which was reached on the 27th December, the Sarawa k State forces were released to return to their homes, and the much-reduce d 2/15th Punjab continued alone and cooperated with the Dutch defenders . (Their remnants, a formed and disciplined body to the end, surrendere d on the 9th March 1942, after the fall of Java . ) Although the Allied naval forces in the area did not retard the Japanes e advance, enemy apprehensions of naval attack did, at this time (early December 1941), impose some delay upon it . The Japanese conclude d that the United States Asiatic Fleet had withdrawn to the Netherland s East Indies "to combine with the Dutch" . They also believed that a powerful "British Asiatic Fleet" (with two aircraft carriers, three battleships , and seven "first class" cruisers as nucleus) was operating in the India n Ocean . This belief caused them to divert ships from the Philippines t o S The
airfield was so badly damaged that, with the concurrence of Air Headquarters, Far East , the aircraft were flown to Palembang, Sumatra, on 24 Dec . ~Sagtri, Japanese destroyer (1931), 1,700 tons, six 5-in guns, nine 24-in torp tubes, 34 kts . 5 I66, Japanese submarine (1932), 1,638 tons, one 4-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 19 kts .
Dec-Ian
ASSAULT
AGAINST
LUZON
505
the Malay area, resulting in a shortage of escort vessels which delaye d the offensive against Mindanao and Jolo, and in turn delayed the star t of the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by about ten days . The Japanese were in error in their estimate of British naval strengt h in the Indian Ocean . The formation of an Eastern Fleet remained—as it had been in August 1941—the long-term policy of the Admiralty . The n it had been hoped to have a considerable and balanced fleet in the India n Ocean by the end of January 1942 . Intervening events, involving the los s of ships in the Far East and the Mediterranean, now set back this dat e to April 1942, when it was hoped to have a fleet built on five moder n capital ships, four "R" class battleships, and three or four carriers, avail able . In the meantime there were in the Indian Ocean only one smal l carrier, Hermes, with a capacity of fifteen aircraft ; the battleship Revenge ; and a few old cruisers engaged on convoy work . The new aircraft carrier Indomitable, having refitted in the United States after her grounding in the West Indies, was on passage to Capetown, where she was due on th e 1st January 1942 . On the 23rd December the Admiralty informe d interested authorities that the following would form part of the Easter n Fleet : Revenge, Royal Sovereign, Danae, Durban, Dragon, Jupiter, En counter, Electra, Express, and H .M .A .S . Vampire . ° By the middle of December the main invasion of the Philippines wa s under way . On the 17th of the month the Mindanao force of fourteen transports escorted by Jintsu (Rear-Admiral Tanaka), and destroyers an d smaller craft, left Palau . They arrived off Davao during the night 19th-20th December, and landed with little opposition . Support was provided b y Rear-Admiral Takagi in Myoko, with Nachi and Haguro, Ryujo of the 4th Air Flotilla, and Chifose of the 11th . The object of the operation was to enable deployment of naval land-based air units in the area, and to secure advanced bases for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies . On the evening of the 20th the Japanese set up a seaplane base just south of Davao, and the security of the invasion was assured . On the 22nd December nine transports of this Mindanao force, escorted by Jintsu and destroyers, left Davao for Jolo Island, midway between Mindanao and Borneo . Landings began before dawn on the 25th and the island wa s secured by noon . The next day a naval air station was established there . The main assault against Luzon coincided with that on Mindanao . In the afternoon of the 18th December twenty-seven transports, escorted by Rear-Admiral Hara in Natori, with six destroyers and smaller craft, left Takao, Formosa, for Lingayen, where they arrived at 1 .10 a .m . on th e 22nd . The second echelon of twenty-eight transports, escorted by Nishimura in Naka with seven destroyers and smaller ships, sailed from Mako in the Pescadores and reached Lingayen at midnight on the 22nd . On the 17th December the third echelon of twenty-one transports escorted by Rear-Admiral Hirose ' s 2nd Base Unit departed from Keelung, on the 6
With the substitution of Danae, Durban and Dragon, for Prince of Wales and Repulse, an d with the addition of Royal Sovereign, this was the composition of "part of the Eastern Fleet " announced by the Admiralty on 24 Nov 1941 .
506
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
11 Dec-3 Ja n
northern tip of Formosa, and anchored at Lingayen in the early mornin g of the 23rd December . Cover was provided by Vice-Admiral Takahashi in Ashigara, with Maya, Kuma, and the seaplane tenders Sanyo Mart i (8,360 tons) and Sanuki Maru (7,158 tons) . Takahashi left Mako on th e 19th December and supported the operation from an area about 25 0 miles west of Luzon, where he was joined by Vice-Admiral Kondo' s distant cover force of Kongo, Haruna, and three heavy cruisers . Th e Japanese were apprehensive of surface attack from the south—but non e was forthcoming . Coincidental with the Lingayen assault was that on Lamon Bay, across the narrowing neck of Luzon from Manila . The twenty four transports carrying this landing force sailed from Amami 0 Shima , away north in the Ryukyu Islands, on the 17th December, and were escorted by Rear-Admiral Kubo in Nagara, with destroyers and smaller vessels of the 1st Base Unit . This escort force had gone north for the task after supporting the earlier Legaspi landings . The convoy entered Lamon Bay before dawn on the 24th December. The invading forces were attacked by submarines of the U .S . Asiatic Fleet, and by aircraft, but the casualties they inflicted "disturbed th e enemy less than did the weather " . 7 The converted minelayer Hayo Maru (5,446 tons) was sunk by submarine S38 8 at Lingayen on the 22nd December, and the small freighter Hayataka Maru (836 tons) was sunk by Seal' the next day . But the few ships and aircraft of the U.S . Asiati c Fleet were unable to prevent, or even delay, the Japanese from landin g wherever they chose . On the 3rd January 1942, they occupied Manil a and, so far as they were concerned, " this ended the naval phase of operations in the Philippines invasion" . 1 IV In the meantime, the situation in Malaya was moving towards that envisaged by Admiral Layton on the 13th December, with Singapor e becoming "virtually a beleaguered fortress" . On the 11th December th e Japanese, having captured the airfields in Northern Malaya, switched thei r major air attack to Penang . Ships were withdrawn thence to Indian ports the next day . On the 15th Lieut-General Percival 2 reported the situation at Penang as serious, and it was decided to abandon the port , which was occupied by Japanese troops on the 19th December . Th e enemy's southward advance continued, and by the 23rd December al l British aircraft in Malaya had been withdrawn to Singapore . On the 27th of the month Lieut-General Sir Henry Pownall, 3 who had arrived in Singapore on the 23rd, succeeded Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham a s 4
Morison, Vol III, p . 179 . 3 538, US submarine (1924), 800 tons, one 3-in gun, four 21-in torp tubes, 14 .5 kts. • Seal, US submarine (1938), 1,450 tons, one 4-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 17 kts . 1 "Japanese Naval Operations in the Invasion of the Philippines ." ATIS translation of Japanese documents . (AL.1311 . ) s Lt-Gen A. E . Percival, CB, DSO, OBE, MC . BGS I Corps BEF 1939-40 ; Asst CIGS Wa r Office 1940 ; GOC Malaya Command 1941-42 . B . Aspenden, Herts, Eng, 26 Dec 1887 . a Lt-Gen Sir Henry Pownall, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC . Dir of Mil Ops and Intell, War Office, 1938 39 ; CGS BEF 1939-40; Vice-CIGS War Office 1941 ; C-in-C Far East Dec 1941-Jan 1942; C of S to Supreme Allied Cdr, S-E Asia 1943-44. B . 19 Nov 1887 .
29-31 Dec
NEED FOR CRUISERS
50 7
Commander-in-Chief, Far East . The Japanese were now extending their fight for strategic airfields from Malaya to Borneo . The Philippines were a wasting asset, and if Malaya were not to follow them, quick action i n the provision of troops to hold ground and aircraft to attack enem y airfields was necessary . The matter of lack of cohesion between the Allies in meeting the situation was stressed by Australia's Official Representative at Singapore, Mr. Bowden, in a message to the Australian Government on the 29th December : The Chief of Staff of Admiral Helfrich [he said] visited Singapore yesterday t o express to Layton his Admiral's concern at "lack of cooperative spirit" shown by the Supreme War Council, Washington . Helfrich and Layton would like U.S . Asiatic Fleet to be based at Batavia or Surabaya but Washington has instructed Admiral Glass ford to base the fleet on Darwin . Layton yesterday cabled strong personal representations on this matter to the member of the Admiralty now in Washington. Layton did not repeat this cable to Australia, reason he gave being that it was "purel y a personal message", adding that Canberra would be automatically informed if an y official action arose therefrom. Pownall said he intended to cable War Office representing that at present Britain and America are conducting two entirely separate wars in Malaya and the Philippines, where Japan had the advantage of centralise d command. Intends to urge the importance of setting up supreme inter-allied command to direct all phases of Pacific war including disposal of forces available . Admiral Royle took note of the weak Singapore convoy escort situation , and suggested to the Advisory War Council that Australian naval hel p might be offered . In a report considered by the council on the 31s t December, Royle said that nine important convoys would arrive a t Singapore between the 3rd and 29th January 1942, the one conveyin g fifty-one Hurricanes 4 (fighter aircraft) being due on the 8th January . The Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, had sent a message to the Admiralty which showed that there was a shortage of cruisers for escort duty in th e West Java Sea . In view of the vital importance of Singapore in late r stages of the war when a fleet was established there, and also as it wa s evident that the Japanese were not operating off the east coast of Australia, he recommended that the Australian Government should offe r Australia and Perth as a covering force for the area. They would be away about a month, and he considered that the risk could be accepted as ther e was a regular flow of shipping to Australia from the United States som e of which was escorted by United States cruisers . The Advisory Wa r Council did not, however, agree ; and that day the War Cabinet approve d the Council's recommendation that the proposed offer should not be made, but that the matter should be further considered in the event o f a request for assistance being made to the Government . By this time the Government were aware that an agreement had bee n reached between Churchill and Roosevelt regarding unity of comman d 4
This convoy reached Singapore on 13 Jan . The next day Mr Churchill cabled to the Australia n Prime Minister, Mr Curtin : "The vital convoy, including the American transport Mount Vernon [24,300 tons], carrying fifty Hurricanes, one anti-tank regiment, fifty guns ; one heavy anti aircraft regiment, fifty guns ; one light anti-aircraft regiment, fifty guns ; and the 54th British Infantry Brigade Group, total about 9,000, reached Singapore safely and punctually yesterday . " Churchill, The Second World War, Vol IV (1951), p . 11 .
508
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
29-31 Dec
in the South-West Pacific, and this possibly influenced their decision regarding Royle's suggestion. On the 29th December Churchill outline d this agreement in a cable to the Australian Government . The salient points were : (a)That unity of command should be established in the South-West Pacific ; (b) that General Wavell should be appointed Commander-in-Chief or "Supreme Commander" of all U .S ., British Empire, and Dutch forces of land, sea and air , assigned by the Governments concerned to that theatre ; (c) that General Wavel l should have an American officer as Deputy Commander-in-Chief ; (d) that the American, British, Australian and Dutch naval forces in the theatre should b e placed under command of the American admiral in accordance with the genera l principle set forth in (a) and (b) ; (e) that Wavell should have a staff in th e South-West Pacific "accessible as Foch's High Control Staff was to the Great Staff s of the British and French armies in France", and that he would receive his order s from an appropriate joint body who would be responsible to Churchill as Ministe r for Defence and to Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief of all United States forces ; (f) that the principal commanders comprised in Wavell's sphere would be C .-in-C . Burma, C.-in-C. Singapore and Malaya, C .-in-C. Netherlands East Indies, C .-in-C . Philippines, and C.-in-C. Southern Communications via South Pacific and Nort h Australia ; (g) that India and Australia, who would have their own C .-in-C. , would be outside Wavell's sphere except as above mentioned, and are the tw o great nations through which men and material from Great Britain and the Middl e East on the one hand and the United States on the other could be moved into the fighting zone ; (h) that the United States navy would remain responsible for the whole of the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines and Australasia, including the U .S . approaches to Australasia . The War Cabinet considered the cable at its meeting on the 30t h December, and decided to assent to the text of the agreement, and to inform Churchill that it was expected that Australia would be include d in the composition of the "appropriate joint body" referred to in sub paragraph (e) ; and also to seek information as to the strength of force s it was intended to make available . It was a pity that knowledge of this agreement had not reached th e Australian Prime Minister a few days earlier . It might then have spared the publication of a signed article by him in The Herald, Melbourne, in which he made a plea for American aid . The appeal to America wa s unnecessary, since, strategically, Australia was every bit as important to America as America was to Australia, as was shown in the terms o f the agreement reached between Churchill and Roosevelt regarding unit y of command in the South-West Pacific . 5 V By the end of December 1941, the Japanese front line ran roughl y from the mouth of the Perak River on the west coast of Malaya acros s This point was seized upon by the Australian Chiefs of Staff in a cablegram they prepared on 20 Jan 1942 for transmission to Churchill in reply to one from him outlining the proposa l to establish the naval area "Anzac". The final paragraph read : "The importance of Australia as a base for American operations has been indicated by the conclusions reached by th e President and yourself, and it is also apparent from information of their plans conveyed to u s by General Brett and his staff . We hope however that the Americans have a full realisatio n of the fact that their capacity to launch a counter-offensive might be frustrated by inadequat e naval strength in this region." This draft was approved and adopted by the War Cabinet .
8-23 Dec
WAKE ISLAND
509
to Kuantan on the east coast ; continued E .S .E . over the South China Se a to the southern border of Sarawak which it followed to that of Nort h Borneo and on to that island's east coast ; thence via the Sulu Archipelago to Mindanao ; then, swinging southwards to the equator and eastwards t o the Gilbert Islands ; whence it ran northwards to Wake Island and onward s to the Kuriles . Far to the north of this line on its west-east section , Hong Kong, which the Japanese initially attacked with powerful force s on the Chinese mainland on the 8th December, was finally overwhelme d after stiff resistance, and formally and unconditionally surrendered by th e Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Sir Mark Young,° on Christmas Day . Of Hong Kong ' s small naval force of three destroyers and some torped o boats, two destroyers, Thanet and Scout, 7 were ordered to Singapore o n the 8th December. They reached Tarakan on the 12th, and proceeded o n to Singapore where they joined the Malaya command . The Australian corvettes, Burnie, Goulburn, Bendigo and Maryborough, of the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla under Commander Cant in Maryborough, spent the month of December minesweeping, patrolling and escorting i n the Singapore vicinity . The two Australian armed merchant cruisers , Manoora and Kanimbla, which were in Singapore on the 8th December, did not remain there . Manoora sailed at 6 .30 that morning for Calcutta, and spent December escorting convoys in the Bay of Bengal . Kanimbla formed part of an escort group of which Java was senior officer and which included Stronghold, Encounter, Tenedos and Evertsen, which sailed fro m Singapore on the 12th December escorting a convoy of four British an d three American ships . The convoy dispersed just south of Sunda Strai t on the 16th. The rest of the escort returned to Singapore but Kanimbla proceeded on to Australia, and berthed at Port Melbourne on Christma s Day . She had been continuously overseas for just over two years, having sailed from Sydney for Singapore on the 13th December 1939 . Away at the north-east corner of the Japanese front line Wake Island , like Hong Kong, had been forced to surrender to overwhelming force , two days before the British island capitulated . Twelve days after it s failure to take Wake on the 11th December, Admiral Inouye 's Fourth Fleet mounted a second and more formidable attack . The actual invasion force—Rear-Admiral Kajioka in Yubari, with Tenryu, Tatsuta, six destroyers, a transport, minelayer, and a seaplane tender loaded with som e 2,000 "Special Naval Landing Force troops" (Marines)—was supporte d by Rear-Admiral Goto ' s 6th Cruiser Squadron, A oba, Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kako and destroyers, which had supported the invasion of Guam ; and by a carrier striking force—Soryu and Hiryu, with heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma—detached from the Pearl Harbour striking force o n its way home to Japan . Preceded by eight days of intensive bombing b y land-based and carrier-borne aircraft, the assault landings were launche d in the early hours of the 23rd December . Before dawn the Japanese ha d ' Sir Mark Young, GCMG (served European war 1915-18), Governor of Tanganyika 1938-41 , of Hong Kong 1941, 1946 . Of Winchester, Eng ; b . 30 Jun 1886 . 7 HMS's Thanet and Scout, destroyers (1919), 905 tons, two 4-in guns, two 21-in torp tubes. 31 kts ; Thanet sunk off Malaya, 27 Jan 1942.
510
SOUTH-WEST
PACIFIC
AREA
Dec194 1
secured a firm beach-head and were ashore in strength capable of crushin g the defenders at any point. The island was surrendered to the victor s soon after 7 a .m . At that time an American relief force commanded by Rear-Admira l Fletcher—the aircraft carrier Saratoga, with heavy cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, and San Francisco and destroyers—was on its way to Wake Islan d from Pearl Harbour . Two other similarly constituted striking forces , Admiral Brown's Lexington force and Admiral Halsey ' s Enterprise group, were in distant support. But on the morning of the 23rd December Fletche r was 425 miles from the island, and, on orders from Pearl Harbour, th e relief attempt was abandoned and the three forces were recalled . Apart from this one abortive advance against the Japanese, Allied nava l activity in the Pacific and to the north and north-east of Australia was , during December 1941, confined to the protection of communications , and the covering and escorting of convoys carrying reinforcements to operational areas and advance bases . Immediately Japan attacked, transPacific merchant ship sailings were suspended by the British and America n Governments, which latter also suspended sailings on the American Pacific coast . All eastbound ships in the Western Pacific were ordere d to make for the nearest British port ; and all ships bound from Australi a for the United Kingdom were instructed to proceed via the Cape . With th e situation stabilised, the United States ordered resumption of coastal sailing s north of Panama, and trans-Pacific sailings by unescorted ships were resumed in widely dispersed routes south of Panama . It will be recalled that, towards the end of November, the America n Chiefs of Staff asked their Government for time in the negotiations the n proceeding with Japan because, among other reasons, convoys of troop s to reinforce the Philippines were at sea in the Pacific . One of these, o f eight ships8 escorted by the cruiser U .S .S. Pensacola, and carrying som e hundreds of troops and airmen, and many aircraft, left San Francisco o n the 21st November, and was passing through the Phoenix Islands whe n the Japanese struck Pearl Harbour . It was thereupon diverted to Suva , where it arrived safely on the 12th December, being then under order s to proceed thence to Brisbane . That day Canberra (Captain Farncomb ) and Perth (Captain H . M . L. Waller9 ) sailed from Sydney to cover th e convoy on this final stage of its journey . The two cruisers reached Brisbane, where Rear-Admiral Crace hoisted his flag in Canberra on the 15th , and that day sailed for the vicinity of New Caledonia . Here they wer e joined by H .M .N .Z .S . Achilles, which (having returned to New Zealand from Port Moresby) sailed from Wellington on the 17th . The three ship s duly met Pensacola and her convoy and all reached Brisbane on the 22nd . 8 Bloemfontein, Coast Farmer, Meigs, Holbrook, Republic, Admiral Halstead, Chaumont, and tender Niagara . 9 0n Perth 's return to Australia in Aug 1941, she went into dockyard hands for repairs an d refit, and was under the command of Cdr Reid, RAN, from 1 Sep 1941 to 24 Oct 1941, o n which date Capt Waller assumed command . Cdr C. R. Reid, RAN . HMAS Sydney 1922 ; HMAS Perth 1939-42 ; CSO Darwin 1942-44; LO US Service Force, Seventh Fleet, 1944-45 ; SO to NOIC New Guinea 1945 . Of Sydney ; b. Hinnomunjie, Vic, 3 Sep 1904 .
1941
AUSTRALIA RETURNS
51 1
Later that day Canberra, Perth and Achilles sailed thence for Sydney . Other Allied ships were operating in the South Pacific at this time . H .M .N .Z .S . Leander spent most of December escorting New Zealand troop reinforcements to Suva . The Free French Le Triomphant, durin g the second half of the month, escorted the Australian coastal line r Ormiston (5,832 tons) to New Caledonia, carrying some 350 men o f the 3rd Independent Company, A .I .F., 70 civilian road workers, and service cargo . The two ships left Brisbane on the 20th and reached Noume a on the 23rd . Le Triomphant was back in Brisbane on the 27th . It wa s intended that she should proceed to Singapore to join the Eastern Fleet , but at Layton's request was retained in the Eastern Australian area . On the 24th December Canberra, Perth and Achilles entered Sydney Harbour. Three days earlier, H .M .A .S . Australia had reached the New South Wales base from the South Atlantic Station . Australia had spent 1941 mainly on patrol and convoy escort work, in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans . She left Liverpool early in January 1941, as ocean escort of convoy WS .5B, for the Middle East via the Cape ; entered the Indian Ocean in February ; and on the 22nd of that month turned the convo y (then off Mombasa and bound north for the Gulf of Aden) over to H .M .S . Hawkins, while she herself joined in the hunt for the German raide r Scheer which was in the area . After this fruitless search, Australia escorte d Mauretania and Nieuw Amsterdam from Colombo towards Australia t o form part of convoy US .10, and arrived in Sydney on the 24th March . April was spent escorting US .10, and at the end of the month she carrie d Admiral Colvin and staff from Singapore to Sydney after the Singapor e Conference . June was spent escorting Tasman Sea convoys, and in mid July she reached Trincomalee with convoy US .11A . For the rest of the year she was on escort and patrol duties on the South Atlantic Station , this period including a brief visit to Kerguelen to seek for possible Germa n raiders . On the 14th August Captain Stewart, who had been in comman d since she was commissioned on the 28th August 1939, was succeeded b y Captain Moore .' In December 1941, Australia was escorting convoy WS .12X between St Helena and Capetown when, on the 3rd of th e month, she was ordered by the Admiralty to hand over to Dorsetshire and proceed towards Fremantle with dispatch . This was consequent upo n the loss of Sydney and the threatening situation in the Far East . On th e 24th December, in Sydney, Rear-Admiral Crace transferred his flag fro m Canberra to Australia, and also on that day Farncomb assumed comman d of the ship vice Moore, who went to Canberra in command . At the end of the year 1941 Australian coastal waters were the scen e of important convoy movements . On the 28th December U .S .S . Houston , flagship of the American Task Force 5, with destroyers Whipple, Alde n and Edsall escorting the transport Gold Star (4,860 tons), the submarin e tender Otus (6,750 tons), and the oiler Pecos (5,400 tons), reached 1 Rear-Adm G . D . Moore, CBE ; RAN . Joined RAN from Conway 1913 . (HMS Defence 1914-16 , HMAS Melbourne 1916-19 .) Comd HMS Dauntless 1939-41, HMAS's Australia 1941, Canberr a 1941-42 ; Second Naval Member 1942-44 ; FOIC NSW 1944-50 ; Aust Minister to Philippines , 1950-55 . B . Springsure, Qld, 10 Oct 1893 .
512
28 De c
SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
Darwin from Surabaya . That same morning convoy ZK .5 transports Aquitania (44,786 tons), Sarpedon (11,321 tons) and Herstein (5,100 tons ) —carrying 4,250 Australian troops and 10,000 tons of equipment to reinforce Port Moresby—sailed from Sydney for the Papuan port escorte d 0 120°
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by Australia, Canberra, Perth, and Achilles. Moving northwards up th e coast some 300 miles ahead of them, U .S .S . Pensacola, with her convoy of seven ships, sailed from Brisbane at 8 p .m . on the 28th on their way to Torres Strait and Darwin . The activity foreshadowed the part the islan d continent was to play as one of the "two great nations through whic h men and material . . . could be moved into the fighting zone" .
CHAPTER 1 5 ABDA AND ANZA C N the second world war the democracies fought at an initial disadvan-
I tage, though possessing much greater resources than their enemies t.
Britain and the United States had embarked on accelerated rearmamen programs in 1938, the naval projects including battleships and aircraf t carriers ; but this was a delayed start compared with that of Germany an d Japan . Preparing for munitions production for total war, finding out wha t weapons to make, and their perfection into prototypes for mass production, takes in time upwards of two decades . After this preparation period , a mass production on a nation-wide scale is at least a four-years' task i n which "the first year yields nothing ; the second very little ; the third a lot and the fourth a flood" .' When Japan struck in December 1941, Britai n and the British Commonwealth had been at war for more than two years . During that time they had to a large extent changed over to a war econom y and increasingly brought reserve strength into play . Indeed, in 1940, 194 1 and 1942, British production of aircraft, tanks, trucks, self-propelled gun s and other materials of war, exceeded Germany 's . This was partly due t o Britain's wartime economic mobilisation, and partly to the fact that Germany had not planned for a long war . Having achieved easy victories b y overwhelming unmobilised enemies with well-organised forces and accumu lated stocks of munitions and materials, the Germans allowed over confidence to prevent them from broadening the base of their econom y to match the mounting economic mobilisation of Britain . Even so, owing to the initial handicap with which she had started, and such subsequen t adversities as the fall of France, Britain had been able to do little more than stem the tide . Japan's entry into the war found Britain weak in the South-West Pacifi c because of the effects and demands of war elsewhere . It found the Unite d States weak in the South-West Pacific also because, as a democracy, the nation was not in peace as well prepared for war as was Japan, the militar y dictatorship .2 The United States gained something in the two years afte r Britain and Germany went to war in 1939, largely because of apprehensions, shared by the President and some of his advisers, that American r Churchill, The Second World War, Vol . I (1948), p . 263, wherein Churchill stated : "In 1938-3 9 British military expenditure of all kinds reached £304 millions [1937-38 £234 millions ; 1938-3 9 £304 millions ; 1939-40 £367 millions], and German at least £1,500 millions ." Japan's military budgets for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 were : 6,097, 6,417, and 7,266 millions of yen respectively, exceeding Britain's military expenditures by some 70 per cent in the earliest instance and some 33 per cent in the two subsequent periods . 2 For the eleven years 1929 to 1939 inclusive, the indices of industrial production for Japan an d the United States (1929 equals 100) were : Year Japan United State s Year Japan United States 140 .6 79 . 1 100 .0 100 .0 1935 1929 150 .2 93 . 6 94.8 82 .7 1936 1930 102 .7 .1 68 .2 1937 168 .9 1931 92 1938 174 .7 80 . 0 1932 97 .8 52 .7 1939 182 .5 98 .2 1933 113 .0 62 .7 1934 127 .4 68 . 2 (1949), p . 3. J . B. Cohen, Japan's Economy In War and Reconstruction
514
ABDA
AND
ANZAC
1940-42
security would be threatened by a German victory . These apprehensions , which increasingly influenced also American public opinion and Congress , enabled the Administration to go some way towards putting the countr y on a war footing, notably in the passing of the "two-ocean navy" Act i n July 1940, and the Selective Training and Service Act in September — the first occasion that the United States adopted compulsory military training in time of peace . In addition, President Roosevelt adopted the politica l strategy of helping Britain in the struggle against Germany in every wa y possible "short of war" , on the basis that for two years at least th e Americas would be exceedingly vulnerable in the event of a German victory in Europe. For at least that period the United States would b e vulnerable also in the Western Pacific if she was at war with Japan, an d when Japan struck that period had not expired . Consequently Japan, like Germany, was able to gain easy initial victories . But, also like the Germans , the Japanese had not planned for a long war ; and they looked to the forcible acquisition of raw materials as a substitute for broadening th e base of their economy . They, too, were the victims of over-confidenc e induced by their early success, and allowed their wartime production t o mark time while that of the United States shot ahead . 3 Nevertheless , during the opening months of 1942 the Japanese continued to sweep ahea d in the South-West Pacific . The energies of the Allies were bent toward s stopping the flood . II Concurrent with the dispatch of Allied reinforcements to the Far Eas t was a general reorganisation of command . On the American naval side , Pearl Harbour resulted in the replacement of Admiral Stark as Chief o f Naval Operations, and Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacifi c Fleet, by Admiral Ernest J . King4 and Admiral Chester Nimitz 5 respectively . Nimitz assumed his command on 31st December 1941, on whic h date King became Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet . In Marc h 1942 King assumed also the duties of Chief of Naval Operations . Stark then became Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe . 6 O n the British side Vice-Admiral Somerville was, on 1st January 1942 , appointed Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, to succeed Vice-Admira l Layton ; and on the 3rd he left Gibraltar (where he had commande d From 1939 to 1941 the total gross national product of Germany rose less than 4 per cent . From 1940 to 1942 that of Japan rose by little more than 2 per cent . (Cohen, p . 57 . ) As an indication of America's effort under the stimulus of war, naval shipyard workers increase d from 443,500 in Jan 1942 to 911,900 in Jan 1943 ; the average monthly production of destroyer s rose from 1 .33 in 1941 to 6 .75 in 1942; navy enlisted men rose from 144,824 in 1940 to 556,47 7 in 1942; and pre-Pearl Harbour construction times were cut in the order of battleships fro m 39 to 32 months; aircraft carriers from 32 to 16 months; submarines from 14 to 7 months ; an d destroyers from 14 to just over 5 months . Admiral E . J. King, Official Report, Our Navy at War , 1944 . Fleet Admiral Ernest J . King, US Navy . C-in-C Atlantic Fleet 1941, US Fleet 1941-42 ; Chie f of Naval Operations 1942-45 . B . Lorain, Ohio, USA, 23 Nov 1878 . Died 25 Jun 1956 . ° Fleet Admiral Chester W . Nimitz, US Navy. Chief, Bureau of Navigation, 1939-41 ; C-in-C Pacific Fleet 1941-45; Chief of Naval Operations 1945-47 . B. Fredericksburg, Texas, USA, 2 4 Feb 1885. ° Admiral Kimmel was relieved of his command on the 17th December 1941 . Vice-Admiral W. S . Pye, Commander, Battle Force, was appointed C-in-C, Pacific Fleet, pending the arrival o f Nimitz at Pearl Harbour . 8
Jan-Feb 1942
FAR EASTERN COUNCIL
51 5
Force "H") for England to join the aircraft carrier Formidable. In Australia, after the arrival from the United States of the Pensacola convoy, and groups of ships at the end of 1941, 7 an American military headquarters was set up in the Repatriation Building, St Kilda Road, Mel bourne . General Brett was appointed in command of all United State s Forces in Australia, with General Barnes and General Brereton (the firs t named as Chief of Staff) on his staff . On 3rd January 1942, at a conference between the United States generals and the Australian Chiefs of Staff, machinery to ensure close cooperation was worked out . Next day, however, it was announced in Washington that General Wavell had bee n appointed Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific, with Genera l Brett as Deputy Supreme Commander, and Admiral Hart in charge o f Allied Naval Forces ; and the Australian Government was told by cabl e of the detailed arrangements . The Government had previously assented to Wavell's appointment, wit h the expressed expectation that Australia would be included in the composition of the "appropriate joint body" from which Wavell would receiv e his orders . The details now communicated, however, disclosed that arrangements for higher direction were that proposals from Wavell or any of th e governments concerned in his command area would be submitted to a Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and London. The Londo n committee would telegraph its opinions to the Washington committee, 8 which would develop and submit recommendations to the President and , by telegraph, to the British Prime Minister . The Prime Minister woul d then tell the President if he agreed with the recommendations . Agreement being reached, orders to Wavell would be sent from Washington in th e names of President and Prime Minister . The British Government undertook to obtain the views and agreement of Dominion and Dutch Governments , and send them to Washington . This arrangement did not provide for any direct consultation wit h Australia, whose Government therefore said it was unable to accept it . Early in December the Government had represented unsuccessfully to th e United Kingdom Government its strong views that an inter-allied bod y should be established, preferably in the Pacific area . It now tried to secure the establishment in Washington of an inter-allied body for the highe r direction of the war, again without success . Eventually, on 6th February 1942, the Government accepted a proposition made by Churchill on 19t h January for the formation of a Far Eastern Council on the ministeria l plane in London . The first meeting of this council, comprising two Britis h groups of ships, carrying aircraft, aviation spirit, and vehicles, consisted of Hawaiia n Planter (7,798 tons), President Polk (10,508), James Lykes (6,760), Paul M . Gregg (8,187) , Mormacsun (4,996), and Portmar (5,551) . They had originally included Malama (3,275 tons), but this vessel was sunk en route by the Japanese surface raiders Aikoku Maru and Hokoku Mar u
7 These
in mid-Pacific in the vicinity of the Tuamotu Archipelago . s The Washington committee was the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, and consisted of th e Chief of Staff to the President ; the Chief of the US Staff ; the Chief of US Naval Operations; the Commanding General of the US Army Air Forces ; and high representatives of each of th e British fighting services . The purpose of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was to ensur e complete coordination of the war effort of Great Britain and the United States and to provid e for full British and American collaboration with all the United Nations .
516
ABDA AND ANZAC
6 Jan-10 Fe b
ministers, two Dutch, Sir Earle Page (Australia), Mr Jordan (New Zealand), Mr Amery (India and Burma), and the British Chiefs of Staff , was held on the 10th February under Mr Churchill's chairmanship . Its main function was "to review the broad fundamental policies to be followe d in the war against Japan throughout the Pacific area " . A similar council was set up in Washington under President Roosevelt, and the two bodie s kept in close touch with each other. The Australian Government disagreed also with the strategical approac h as outlined in the directive to General Wavell . Therein the general strategic policy was given as : (a) to hold Malaya barrier defined as the line Malaya Peninsula, Sumatra, Java , North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area and t o operate sea, land and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of thi s barrier in order to oppose a Japanese southward advance ; (b) to hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area an d Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defence of India ; (c) to re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon t o support the Philippines garrison ; (d) to maintain essential communications within the area . In regard to (b), the Advisory War Council, at a meeting on 6th January, expressed the view that the strategical and supply aspects were intermingled . The Australian Government, as the result of recommendations by its Chiefs of Staff and General Brett, had approved a joint American-Australian organisation to enable the use of Australia as a bas e for American operations along the Malay Barrier and to maintain contact with the Philippines . Vital Australian centres would become obvious target s for Japanese attacks . But the definition of the ABDA (American-British Dutch-Australian) Area excluded the whole of Australia . Australian water s were also excluded from the American naval zone in the Pacific . (Churchill's cable of 29th December 1941 outlining the agreement on unit y of command stated that the U .S . navy would remain responsible for th e whole of the Pacific east of the Philippines and Australia . ) Without adequate naval protection the line of communication to Australia for American supply ships cannot be maintained . The Japanese have only to wal k into New Caledonia where they would be astride this line and in a position t o launch air attacks on the most northern ports being used by the Americans fo r unloading aircraft and other supplies for transit to Darwin and the Netherland s East Indies . Australian protests were met on both these points . On 7th January General Wavell reached Singapore from India, where he had been Commander-in-Chief since July 1941 . He made such redispositions in Malay a as he considered most likely to solve the "time problem between rate o f Japanese advance and the arrival of reinforcements", and to enable him to take steps to halt the Japanese southward advance by securing th e line of naval and air bases from Darwin, through Timor, Java, an d southern Sumatra to Singapore . On 10th January the appointment of Commander-in-Chief, Far East, was abolished, and General Pownall's
1-24 Jan
GENERAL WAVELL
51 7
headquarters at Singapore were closed down ; and that day, Wavell, takin g Pownall with him as Chief of Staff, flew to Java and set up his head quarters at Lembang, ten miles north of Bandung and some sixty-fiv e miles south-east of Batavia . Also on the 10th Wavell, in a telegram to the Australian Government, asked whether he was responsible for th e defence of Darwin, a point not made clear in his directive . "Since this defence must depend on control of the Timor Sea which is in my area , it appears that Port Darwin is my responsibility, but should like confirmation ." A recommendation by the Australian Chiefs of Staff that i t should be his responsibility, and that the portion of Australia lying to th e north of a line running from Onslow, Western Australia, to the south east corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria, should be included in the ABD A Area was adopted by the War Cabinet ; and on 24th January the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, ordered the extension of the souther n limit of the area to include Darwin and such portion of the north-wes t coast of Australia "as was necessary for successful defence against enem y landings, and for air operations from a base in that area" . 9 Wavell formally took over as Supreme Commander of ABDA (with th e title Abdacom) on 15th January, on which date the naval branch of th e command was constituted, its duties being to advise Wavell on all nava l questions, and to exercise operational control over the Allied naval force s in the area . Its formation entailed some changes in naval command . On 1st January Admiral Hart arrived at Surabaya from the Philippines i n the submarine Shark .' By then the first of a series of important reinforcement convoys was approaching Singapore . The British naval forces engage d on escort duty had been based on Singapore, but Vice-Admiral Layto n now decided to shift their base and his headquarters to Java, the bette r to organise convoy escort . On 5th January he hoisted his flag in Dragon , and with Durban in company sailed with his staff to Batavia, where he arrived on the 6th . He took with him Rear-Admiral Palliser, whom h e appointed Senior Naval Officer, Batavia, for convoy direction . Thereafte r the convoy cruisers and destroyers were based on Tanjong Priok, the por t of Batavia . On 15th January Admiral Hart took charge of the naval branch of th e ABDA organisation, with the title Abdafloat . He appointed Palliser his chief of staff and deputy commander . This new appointment necessitate d a successor to Palliser in command of the convoy escort vessels, an d Captain Collins, R.A .N ., was appointed Commodore-in-Charge . Collins assumed his appointment on the 16th, and hoisted his broad pendant e As from 24 Jan 1942 the boundaries of ABDA were : On the north the boundary betwee n India and Burma, thence east along Chinese boundary and coast to 30°N ; along 30°N to 140° E (note Indo-China and Thailand excluded) . On east by 140°E from 30°N to equator, then eas t to 141°E, then south to boundary between Dutch and British New Guinea ; east along coast to 143°E, then south to coast of Australia . On the south by the north coast of Australia to th e south-east corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria, thence by a line running direct across the continen t to Onslow on the west coast ; thence north-west to 15°S 92°E; on the west by 92°E. Shark, US submarine (1936), 1,315 tons, one 3-in gun, six 21-in torp tubes, 20 kts ; sunk in Molucca Sea Feb 1942 .
518
ABDA AND ANZAC
13-20 Ia n
in the depot ship Anking2 at Tanjong Priok . With the appointment of Hart as Abdafloat, the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, Easter n Fleet, for the conduct of naval operations and strategy in the ABD A Area ceased ; and on 16th January Vice-Admiral Layton (who remaine d Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, pending the arrival in the India n Ocean of Vice-Admiral Somerville) transferred his flag from Dragon to Emerald (which had reached Singapore on the 13th escorting Convoy "DM .l") and sailed for Colombo . On the 16th the Admiralty defined the Eastern Fleet, then being formed, as comprising " all British battle ships, aircraft carriers, minelayers, destroyers and submarines within th e limits of the British East Indies and China Stations " . This included th e ships in the ABDA Area now under Collins . They were regarded as a detachment of the Eastern Fleet . First known as the "Far Eastern Squadron", this detachment's title was changed from 20th January to "Chin a Force" . Collins then assumed the title of Commodore Commanding Chin a Force . On the 20th the force consisted of H .M . cruisers Dragon, Durban, and Danae ; H .M . destroyers Jupiter, Encounter, Express, Electra, Strong hold, and H .M .A .S . Vampire; and the sloops H .M .I .S . Jumna3 and H .M .A.S . Yarra . The ships of China Force met and took over incoming convoys fro m their ocean escorts just outside Sunda Strait, and escorted outgoing convoy s to the open ocean, and there either dispersed them or handed them over to an ocean escort . The road from the Sunda Strait rendezvous to Singapor e was of some 600 miles through the narrow waters of Sunda and Bank a Straits, whence a choice of passages leads from the south-westwards through Berhala and Durian Straits into Singapore Strait via Selat Sinki (the dee p channel approach to Singapore from Malacca Strait) ; or, eastward of th e Lingga Archipelago to the north of Banka, through Rhio Strait int o Singapore Strait from the south-eastward . It is a road with its own distinctive signposts, where "pulau" is an island ; "selat" a channel or strait ; "sungei" a river and "kuala" its mouth ; and "tanjong" a cape or poin t of land . It is a road fringed with islands and beset by many reefs an d shallows . In early 1942 hazards were increasing as the Japanese pressed southwards, and air attack (and the threat of surface attack) were adde d to the existing danger of submarine attack and the mine menace . Anti-submarine and minesweeping duties employed the Australian corvettes of the 21st Auxiliary Minesweeping Group, whose numbers wer e added to in January with the arrival at Batavia on the 18th of Ballara t (Lieut-Commander Barling) ; Wollongong (Lieutenant Keith) ; and Toowoomba (Lieut-Commander Hirst) ; 4 and during the last days of Januar y they carried out extensive sweeping operations in Banka, Berhala, an d 2 Anking (1925), 3,472 tons, requisitioned from China Nav Co Ltd ; sunk by Jap surface craft , S of Java, 4 Mar 1942. $ HMIS Jumna, sloop (1941), 1,300 tons, six 4-in guns, 18 kts . HMAS ' s Wollongong and Toowoomba, corvettes (1941), 733 tons, one 4-in gun, 16 kts. Lt-Cdr G . A. Keith, RANVR. HMAS Perth 1940 ; comd HMAS ' s Tambar 1940-41, Wollongong 1941-43, Reserve 1943-44, Ballarat 1944, Orara 1945. Of Camberwell, Vic ; b. Sydney, 20 Aug 1900. Lt-Cdr P. H . Hirst, RAN . (HMS' s Royal Sovereign 1917, Dauntless 1918 .) Comd HMAS Toowoomba 1941-42 ; Capt Transportation Corps (Water Transport) AIF 1945-46 . Of Carrick, Tas ; b. Hobart, 27 Apr 1899.
3-27Jan
ANZAC AREA
51 9
Durian Straits . By this time Japanese aircraft were ranging well south, and the corvettes were under air attack on occasion, though without sufferin g damage or casualties . In the exercise of the naval command of ABDA it was decided tha t normally naval forces in the area would operate under their own nationa l commanders, effort being coordinated by directives issued by Abdafloat . When forces of mixed nationality were formed for any particular operation, Abdafloat would designate a commander . Thus Hart, while holdin g the Abdafloat appointment, continued in command of the U .S . Asiati c Fleet, with Purnell as his deputy at Surabaya and Glassford in comman d of Task Force 5 ; Helfrich continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Dutc h forces, with Rear-Admiral Karel Doorman commanding afloat with hi s flag in De Ruyter ; and Collins commanded China Force . General Wavell instructed that British and Dutch surface vessels were to be mainly employed in escorting convoys into Singapore ; United States surface craf t were to operate east of Borneo as a striking force if a suitable target coul d be found ; and submarines were to be used for attack on the most likel y enemy shipping routes in the area . Except that nominally there was now unity of command there was, in fact, little change from the previous situation . As to Australian protests regarding the exclusion of Australian water s from the American naval zone in the Pacific, Mr Churchill had earlie r (3rd January) told Mr Curtin that the British view was that America n naval responsibility should extend right up to the Australian coast . Admiral King (he wrote) has only just been given full powers over the whol e of the American Navy, and he has not yet accepted our views . Obviously, if I cannot persuade the Americans to take over we shall have to fill the gap as best we can, but I still hope our views will be accepted, in which case of course an y vessels we or you will have in that area will come under United States directio n while operating there .
The problem was finally resolved by acceptance of a proposal by King that a new area, to be known as "Anzac Area", should be set up, comprising approximately the north-eastern portion of the Australia Station . In this area an Allied naval force, "Anzac Force " , would operate unde r the strategical direction of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Navy , exercised through one or more American flag officers assisted by one o r more flag officers appointed by Australia and/or New Zealand . Accepted by the Australian Government on 27th January, this proposal was finalise d in an agreement defining boundaries, 5 forces and tasks . The initial assignment of ships to the area was : British, one aircraft carrier ; United States , one heavy or one new light cruiser and two destroyers ; New Zealand, two light cruisers and one armed merchant cruiser ; Australia, two heavy cruisers (Australia, Canberra), one light cruiser (Adelaide), three arme d 6
The original Anzac area boundaries were : beginning at longitude 141 degrees east at th e equator, eastwards along the equator to longitude 170° east, thence south-east to a point i n latitude 20° south, longitude 175° west, thence due south : from point of beginning south alon g meridian 141° east to south coast of New Guinea, thence eastwards along said coast t o meridian 143° east, thence due south in sea areas only .
520
ABDA AND ANZAC
27 Jan-11 Fe b
merchant cruisers (Kanimbla, Westralia, Manoora), two destroyers (Stuart, Voyager), two anti-submarine patrol vessels, and six 600-ton anti-submarine vessels—corvettes . The remainder of the Australian seagoing force s (Hobart, Perth, Vampire, Vendetta, Yarra, Swan, Warrego) were assigne d to the ABDA command . Tasks assigned to the Anzac Force, in cooperation with air forces available in the area, were : to cover the eastern an d 100°
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north-eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand ; protect shipping, including coastal ; support the defence of islands in the area, and attac k enemy island keypoints ; and cooperate with forces in the ABDA Are a and with the United States Pacific Fleet. Rear-Admiral H . F. Leary, U .S .N . (who, immediately prior to this had for a short while commanded th e Saratoga carrier group in succession to Rear-Admiral Fletcher, appointe d to command a new group formed on Yorktown), was appointed to command Anzac Force ; and Rear-Admiral Crace, Rear-Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron, to command the Anzac Squadron afloat . Leary, who took up his appointment with the rank of vice-admiral o n 7th February at Wellington, New Zealand, established his headquarters a t Navy Office, Melbourne, on the 11th . The original assignment of ships to the Anzac Area was not completel y realised. The British aircraft carrier Hermes was allotted, but never served
Feb-Mar
ANZAC
SQUADRON
52 1
there. A unit of the Eastern Fleet, she sailed from Colombo for Fremantl e on 19th February to join Anzac Force, escorted by Vampire ; but two days later both ships were recalled to Trincomalee . On 25th March th e Admiralty regretted a further delay in sending her "as she has to tak e part in a special operation ". Subsequently, after discussions between th e Admiralty and Admirals Leary and Royle, it was agreed that she coul d be better employed with the Eastern Fleet, and should remain in th e Indian Ocean .° Only one Australian ship, the cruiser Australia, was in th e Anzac Squadron at its formation. Canberra was undergoing an extensive refit . Adelaide was engaged on escort duties . The three armed merchan t cruisers were also engaged on convoy escort work, but Kanimbla spent the last two weeks of February and the first week of March refitting i n Sydney and Manoora operated in the ABDA Area and the Indian Ocean . The two destroyers would not be operational before the end of April . Available anti-submarine forces on the Australian coast amounted to only six corvettes ? and six converted merchant ships, "essential for protectio n of coastal shipping and keeping focal areas round important ports clear of submarines" . The Anzac Squadron, as originally formed on 12t h February 1942, at Suva, consisted of the heavy cruisers H .M .A .S . Australia (Flag) and U .S .S . Chicago ; two light cruisers H .M .N .Z . Ships Achilles and Leander ; and two destroyers, U.S . Ships Perkins° and Lamson . 9 During February and March Admiral Leary's command was strengthened by the addition of an American task force consisting of the aircraf t carrier Lexington, the cruisers Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Pensacola an d San Francisco, and ten destroyers, under Vice-Admiral Wilson Brown , U .S .N . II I In the ABDA Area the Allies' immediate and vital problem was that already tackled locally by General Wavell in Malaya : to solve "the tim e problem between the rate of Japanese advance and the arrival of reinforcements" . It was one which heightened the similarity between the situatio n in the South-West Pacific in early 1942 and that some twelve month s earlier in the Eastern Mediterranean . In that earlier period the Mediterranean Fleet controlled the main sea, and also the Aegean until the overwhelming German air power made the waters north of Crete untenable and brought about the loss of that island . The main sea (and the Aegean unti l The Australian Prime Minister was not told of this decision until after Hermes was lost t o Japanese air attack in the Bay of Bengal on 9 Apr 1942 . At a meeting of the Advisory Wa r Council on 16 Apr he asked Royle why she had not gone to the Anzac area and, on being told , commented : "that as the Australian Government had allotted units to Anzac Force on the basi s of joint contribution, this change should have been reported. " T At 1 Feb 1942 there were in commission 20 Australian-built corvettes classified as HMA Ships , Australian manned . Of these, nine were manned on Admiralty account . Two of them, Bathurst and Lismore, were with the Eastern Fleet ; and seven, Maryborough, Goulburn, Burnie, Bendigo, Ballarat, Wollongong and Toowoomba, were in the ABDA area. Of the balance of the 20, four , Delorafne, Lithgow, Katoomba and Warrnambool, were in the Darwin area; two Townsville an d Mildura, were on escort duties on the east coast of Australia ; and five, Colac, Whyalla, Geelong , Rockhampton and Cessnock, did not commission until during January 1942, and were working up . °Perkins, US destroyer (1936), 1,465 tons, four 5-in guns, twelve 21-in torp tubes, 36 .5 kts ; sunk by collision off N coast of New Guinea 29 Nov 1943 . Lamson, US destroyer (1937), 1,480 tons, four 5-in guns, twelve 21-in torp tubes, 36 .5 kts . 6
522
ABDA AND ANZAC
Dec-Ma r
the closing stages) was a busy communications area, with east-west convoys to and from Malta, and the north-south convoys hastening reinforcements to Greece and Crete in an endeavour to solve the time proble m between their arrival and the rate of German advance ; with the Mediterranean Fleet affording escort and both close and distant cover . In the opening months of 1942 the Indian Ocean, and the Sunda Strait an d Java Sea, with the approaches to Singapore, were similarly highways fo r the passage of convoys, until the overwhelming Japanese sea power, bot h on the surface and in the air, made the waters north of Java untenable for the Allies . The similarity extended to the heavy calls made on available Allie d naval strength for the provision of cover and escort for the convoys, but the situation in the Indian Ocean and South-West Pacific in 1942 was mor e acute because of the lack (until March) of a British battle squadron i n the Indian Ocean, and, when it did arrive, because of its inferiority i n size, speed and strength, to the powerful Japanese battle fleet which, sup ported by mounting preponderance in the air, increasingly dominated th e seas north of Java, and extended its influence southwards . Throughou t January, February, and March, the continuous stream of large and important British military convoys—the "WS" convoys round the Cape t o the Middle East ; the "BM" convoys from Bombay and "DM" fro m Durban to Malaya ; the "MS" convoys from Melbourne to the ABD A Area ; the "SR" and "MR" convoys from Calcutta and Madras to Ran goon ; and the "JS" and " SU "t convoys carrying the A .I .F . from the Middle East to Australia—employed almost the entire British nava l strength in the Indian Ocean, and the British and Dutch in the ABDA Area, in the provision of escorts . Until shortly before Singapore fell (recorded the East Indies Station war diar y for February 1942) the main task of HM Ships on this station was the escortin g of the convoys taking reinforcements of men and materials there . Subsequently more convoys continued to be escorted through the station, with troops and war material s destined for Java, Rangoon and Australia . The demand for ocean escorts was there fore very heavy throughout the month and it was only possible to give ships th e minimum time in harbour between one convoy and the next .
Battleships, when they became available, were also used for escor t work, and the same diary for March recorded that when the 3rd Battl e Squadron arrived on the station that month, the ships "carried out individual practice periods between their utilisation as ocean escorts " . Manoora was the first Australian ship to take part as ocean escort i n this convoy period, sailing from Calcutta on 14th December 1941 wit h a convoy for Rangoon. Thereafter, during January and early February she escorted four SR convoys from Calcutta to Rangoon, and two MR convoy s from Madras to the Burmese port . By the end of the month Japanes e 1 These were merely code initials to distinguish convoys, and did not always carry a definit e reference to terminal ports, though sometimes they did . In the above, "BM" and "DM" clearly indicated departure and arrival points, as did "MS" and "SR" (Sandheads-Calcutta to Rangoon) and "MR" . "JS " was apparently an arbitrary choice, and "SU" was "US " (Australia to Middle East) in reverse .
10 Dec-31 Jan
ESCORT DUTIES
52 3
submarines were active both in the Bay of Bengal and south of the Mala y barrier . Manoora listed seven ships as attacked between the 21st and 31st January . Four ships, Nord, Chak Sang, Jalatarang and Jalapalaka, 2 were sunk . The enemy did not have it all his own way, and on 17th January submarine 1160, 3 first Japanese submarine to be sunk by a British war ship, was sunk off the western entrance to Sunda Strait by the destroyer Jupiter . Jupiter was detached from the screen of the American transpor t Mount Vernon (which had arrived at Singapore with reinforcements on 13th January in convoy "DM .1 " ) in response to a distress message from a merchant ship, and sank the submarine after a two-hour asdic hunt followed by a surface duel with guns and torpedoes . Vampire was next in the escort field . Back at Singapore on 10th December after the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, she covered a minelaying operation off Kuantan, and on 19th December, in company wit h Dragon and Durban, left Singapore escorting S .S . Erinpura (5,143 tons ) with survivors from the two capital ships, towards Colombo . The three escort vessels returned to Padang, Sumatra, on the 25th December, lef t there three days later, and on the 29th met Hobart, escorting convoy "BM .9A" to Singapore, and augmented the escort through Sunda Strait . Vampire remained on escort duties in the ABDA Area until her final departure therefrom early in February . Hobart, returning to Australia from the Mediterranean, had taken ove r the ocean escort of convoy "BM.9A " from H .M .S . Glasgow off Colombo on 24th December . It was intended that she should turn over to Dragon , Durban, and Vampire off Sumatra, and herself continue on to Australia ; but she was instructed to continue on to Singapore . The convoy entered Sunda Strait at dawn on the 1st January 1942, and reached Singapore on the 3rd, where Hobart had her first taste of Japanese air attack in a rai d on the naval base . She gave a hand in escorting the next incoming convo y ("BM .9B") into Singapore, and on the 7th called at Tanjong Priok fo r fuel and provisions on her way to Fremantle, where she arrived on the 11th. On 10th January the first MS convoy-"MS .1"-sailed from Melbourne. It carried motor transport and other equipment for Australian troops wh o themselves travelled to Malaya in convoy "MS .2 " . In December the Australian Government had offered to send a machine-gun battalion ; 40 0 tank troops ; and 1,800 reinforcements for the 8th Division, to Malaya . This offer (with the exception of that of the armoured troops) was " grate fully accepted" by the British Government, and on 10th January convoy s "MS .1" and "MS.2" sailed from Melbourne and Sydney respectively . Convoy "MS .1" was of three ships for Singapore and four for th e Netherlands East Indies ports . The escort to Fremantle was Kanimbla , which had been in Melbourne since her arrival there from Singapore o n 25th December. She left Melbourne at 1 p .m . on Saturday, 10th January . 2 0f 3,193, 2,358, 2,498 and 4,215 tons respectively . 6
1160,
Japanese submarine (1929), 1,635 tons, one 4 .7-in gun, eight 21-in torp tubes, 19 kts .
524
ABDA AND ANZAC
Nov-Feb
It is considered to be worthy of remark (wrote her commanding officer, Captai n Adams) that when Kanimbla sailed at 1300 on a Saturday in Melbourne, one hou r after interrupted foreign service leave in one watch expired, only four ratings wer e absent over leave out of a ship's company of over 300 officers and men . At Fremantle, "MS .1" was enlarged by three more ships (and a coupl e of days later by a fourth from Geraldton) and Hobart strengthened the escort . The convoy arrived off the entrance to Sunda Strait on 28t h January . There Tenedos and Stronghold joined the escort, and Kanimbla detached and returned to Fremantle . The Singapore portion of the convo y (now of five ships) reached there safely on the 1st February . 4 Kanimbla arrived at Fremantle on the 3rd, and on the 14th reached Sydney, wher e she underwent refit . She took no further part in the ABDA Area operations . There was only one ship—Aquitania--in convoy " MS .2", escorted by H .M .A .S . Canberra . Japan's entry into the war interrupted the series o f " US "—A .I .F .—convoys to the Middle East and Malaya . "US .13" was th e last "US" convoy to leave Australia in 1941, but transports were returning to Australia for inclusion in 1942 " US" convoys . Aquitania, whic h had been one of "US .12B" to the Middle East, arrived back in Sydne y on 28th November, and was there when the Far Eastern war broke out . Queen Elizabeth, returning from the Middle East, where she had gone i n "US .13" in November, reached Sydney on 15th December . It will be recalled that at the end of December Aquitania formed part of convoy "ZK .5", carrying reinforcements from Sydney to Port Moresby . She wa s back in Sydney on 8th January, by which time arrangements had bee n made for her to carry troops to Malaya . The original proposal, put forward by the Naval Board, was that she should go to Singapore, bu t Admiral Layton, concerned at putting her within striking distance of Japanese aircraft, suggested the use of smaller ships . Aquitania was, however, the only suitable ship available in Australia . It was eventually decided to use her, but to trans-ship her troops at Ratai Bay, Sunda Strait , into smaller vessels which the Dutch provided, thus keeping her outsid e the range of Japanese aircraft . Escorted by Canberra, and carrying 3,456 , including 78 navy, 105 air force and 76 civilians, she left Sydney on 10t h January and reached Ratai Bay on the 20th . There, under cover of a n Allied naval force, her troops were trans-shipped to seven small vessels5 and carried on to Singapore (reached on 24th January) in convoy "MS .2A" , escorted by Canberra ; Vampire ; H .M .S . Thanet ; H .M .I .S . Jumna ; and the Dutch cruiser Java . Aquitania was back in Sydney on 31st January. Canberra, which had detached from "MS .2A" north of Banka Strait on the 23rd, returned via Tanjong Priok to Fremantle, where sh e & Ships in " MS .1 " were : for Singapore—City of Manchester (8,917 tons) ; Phrontis (6,181) ; Pan Europe (9,468) ; Derrymore (4,799) ; Gorgon (3,533) . For NEI ports—Tjikarang (9,505) ; Peisander (6,225) ; Enggano (5,412) ; Java (7,500) ; Tjikandi (7,970) ; and War Sirdar (5,542) . s The naval covering force at Ratai Bay comprised the Australian ships Canberra and Vampire ; the British Dragon and Express; the American Stewart, Barker and Isabel ; the Indian Jumna; and the Dutch Van Nes and Soemba. Transports in convoy MS .2A were the Dutch KPM vessels Both (2,601 tons) ; Reijnst (2,462) ; Van der Lijn (2,464) ; Sloet van de Beele (2,977) ; Van Swoll (2,147) ; and Reael (2,561) ; and the British Taishan (3,174) .
3Jan-l7 Feb
AIRCRAFT
REINFORCEMENTS
52 5
arrived on 29th January . It was undesirable to retain the big transport s in an area where they could not be used to advantage, and on 7th Februar y Queen Elizabeth sailed from Sydney for Canada via New Zealand, an d reached Esquimault on the 24th of the month . A quitania departed Sydney for Honolulu on 10th February . Three more "MS " convoys sailed from Australia, but hurrying event s dictated that only one should reach the ABDA Area . With the Japanes e rapidly pushing down to the remaining oil ports in the Netherlands Eas t Indies, endeavours were made to get as many oil cargoes out as possible , and on the 30th January convoy "MS .3 " , of seven tankers for Palemban g and four cargo ships for Batavia, sailed from Fremantle escorted b y Canberra. In the vicinity of Christmas Island, on 6th February, the convoy met Dragon, Durban, and two destroyers escorting Warwick Castle (20,107 tons) from Singapore, and escorts changed over . Canberra returned to Fremantle where she arrived on 10th February with Warwick Castle , while Dragon and her consorts escorted "MS .3 " through Sunda Strait, north of which the convoy split into two sections each of which safel y reached its destination . 6 From Fremantle Canberra proceeded to Sydney, where she arrived on 17th February for refit, thus ending her activities i n the ABDA Area . Meanwhile aircraft reinforcements, of which the most urgent need wa s fighters, were hurried to the ABDA Area . Some few aircraft were flow n in December from Australia and the Middle East to Malaya ; but earl y in that month the Japanese occupied the airfield at Victoria Point, southern Burma (on the Kra Isthmus) and thus denied to the British the air reinforcement route along the west coast of Malaya . The stages on the alternative route, via Sabang off northern Sumatra, were too long fo r fighters, which henceforward had to be sent by sea . Fifty-one Hurricanes were carried from Durban in convoy "DM.1 " ; forty more were embarke d at the western terminus of the air reinforcement route, Takoradi, i n H .M .S . Athene (4,681 tons), which reached Batavia via the Cape o n 6th February ; and another forty-eight were embarked, with their pilots , in H .M .S . Indomitable at Port Sudan for transportation to ABDA . Indomitable was escorted by the three Australian destroyers of the 7t h Flotilla—Napier, Nizam, and Nestor. In December the aircraft carrier was en route to the Indian Ocean, and reached Durban (whence she was ordered to Port Sudan) on the 31st . The three destroyers left Alexandria on 3rd January, on the 9th met Indomitable off Guardafui and, on th e 14th, the four ships reached Port Sudan whence they sailed, with th e aircraft embarked in Indomitable, next day . On the 21st they reache d Addu Atoll ;' four days later, in the vicinity of Cocos Island, the destroyers Ships in "MS .3" were : tankers for Palembang—Marpessa (7,408 tons) ; Erling BrSvig (9,970) ; (9,916) ; Manvantara (8,237) ; Merula (8,228) ; Elsa (5,381) ; and Herborg (7,892) . Cargo vessels for Tanjong Priok—Marella (7,475) ; Mangola (3,352) ; Antilochus (9,082) ; and Charon (3,703) . 7 Addu Atoll, a ring of coral islands surrounding a deepwater lagoon at the southern end of the Maldive Islands, supplied a secret and secluded fleet anchorage in the Indian Ocean as an alternative to Colombo, from which it lay south-west some 600 miles. With tankers, store ships, hospital ships, an airfield and flying-boat base, it had considerable value in Indian Ocean strateg y in the period of British weakness there. 9
Seirstad
526
5Jan-2 Fe b
ABDA AND ANZAC
fuelled from the carrier . On 27th and 28th January, from a position south of Java, Indomitable flew off the aircraft . The force reached Trincomale e on 2nd February . 75°
195
90°
Calcutta r,„, y>• Bom bay
P,
150°
'Burma Rangoon
Marian
INDIA
Inlippine
PACIFI C C . :olinc .
lsl;ud s
OCEA N
AUSTRALIA Brisban e
'Perth Adelaide Sydne
—
B. M. Convoys D. M . Convoys from Durban 7ndomttable' C Destroyers ferrying aircraf t —i— J. S. Convoys mlth A .h.F . from M.E. American Convoys for Jav a M.S . Convoys
y
Melbourn e
H,uart .
05
Reinforcement of ABD A
Meanwhile the possibility of withdrawal of British forces from Singapor e in favour of the reinforcement of Burma had been considered by th e British Government . It will be recalled that the general strategic polic y as given in the directive to General Wavell as Abdacom included : "to hol d Malaya Barrier defined as the line Malaya Peninsula, Sumatra, Java , North Australia as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area", an d "to hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defence o f India" . But at this stage the Japanese had secured much of the Malay a Peninsula, while the rest of it, with Sumatra and Burma, faced dire threats . As with Malaya, the threat to Burma had developed with unexpected speed . From 5th January Rangoon was under air attack, an d on the 16th January the invasion of Lower Burma from Siam began wit h an attack on Tavoy, which the Japanese entered on the 19th . On the 22nd the General Officer Commanding, Burma, reported that he coul d not guarantee the safety of the country with the forces available . This gloomy picture coincided with one of Malaya and Singapore in whic h
16Dec-5Feb
AUSTRALIAN
PROTEST
52 7
Wavell hinted at the possibility of the loss of Malaya, and told Churchill : "I doubt whether island [Singapore] can be held for long once Johore i s lost. " Reinforcements, including part of the 18th British Division (par t had already landed) and an Indian brigade, were in the Indian Ocean o n the way to Singapore, but it was beyond British resources to reinforc e both threatened areas ; and it was on this day, the 22nd January, tha t Sir Earle Page, who was in London as Special Representative of th e Australian Government, cabled to that Government that the Britis h Defence Committee had been considering the abandonment of Malaya an d Singapore, and concentration on the defence of Burma and keeping ope n the Burma Road to China . For nearly twenty years, as a result of acceptance of British views an d assurances regarding the vital role of Singapore in a Far Eastern War , the naval base there and the fleet to be based thereon had been th e keystone of Australian defence plans . And when, from time to time, as a result of disquieting suggestions, Australian doubts had been expresse d as to the security of Singapore, these had been soothed by British reassurance both as to Singapore ' s ability to resist attack, and British abilit y to send there a fleet capable of securing control of the adjacent seas . It was on the acceptance of these assurances and reassurances that Australia had a division of troops in Malaya . An immediate and strong pro test by the Australian Government against any proposed withdrawal wa s therefore not unnatural, and this was sent by Mr Curtin to Mr Churchil l on 23rd January, and was concurred in by the Australian Chiefs of Staff . Australian views on the question had not been sought . In London Si r Earle Page had not been consulted, but "by some means or other "8 had been shown a copy of a minute on the subject sent by Churchill to th e British Chiefs of Staff . Subsequently Mr Churchill wrote : "It is not true to say that Mr Curtin 's message decided the issue " ; but that there wa s "a hardening of opinion against the abandonment of this renowned ke y point in the Far East" . As in Greece, and as was to happen again in th e Netherlands East Indies, considerations other than military influenced the decision . But Mr Churchill was beyond question right when he said : "There is no doubt what a purely military decision should have been . " As it was, the convoys carrying the reinforcements were not diverted t o Rangoon (as had been envisaged as a possibility by Mr Churchill) bu t continued on to Singapore, where the last, "BM .12", arrived on 5th February . This convoy, "BM .12 " , brought another Australian ship well into th e ABDA picture . She was H .M .A .S . Yarra, which spent much of Januar y and February escorting in the area and its approaches . She sailed from Alexandria on 16th December 1941, was at Colombo on the 30th, an d on 11th January reached Tanjong Priok . On the 15th she was allotted to the Far Eastern Squadron (shortly to become China Force) and at onc e entered on escort work . On 3rd February Convoy "BM .12" : Devonshire 8 Churchill,
The Second World War, Vol . IV (1951), p. 50 .
528
ABDA
AND
ANZAC
1-6Fe b
(11,100 tons) ; Empress of Asia (16,909) ; Felix Roussel (17,083) ; City of Canterbury (8,331) ; and Plancius (5,955) for Singapore; and Convoy " DM .2 " : Warwick Castle ; City of Pretoria (8,049) ; Malancha (8,124) ; and Dunera for Batavia ; all ships loaded with troops and military equipment, were negotiating Sunda Strait escorted by Exeter ; Danae ; Sutlej;9 Jupiter ; Java; Vampire and Yarra . The convoys parted for their respective destinations after clearing Sunda Strait . During the forenoon of the 4th the Singapore portion, escorted by Danae, Sutlej and Yarra, was bombe d in Banka Strait, but suffered only minor damage from near-misses . "This attack, " wrote Harrington, Yarra' s commanding officer, "was not in my opinion pressed home with determination equal to that shown by Germa n or even Italian aircraft, and bombs were jettisoned clear of any target . " Next day, however, the Japanese were more successful . On 5th February only two of the corvettes of the 21st Minesweeping Group, Bendigo and Wollongong, were at Singapore . The rest had left for operations in Java and southern Sumatra . Bendigo had been for six days at anchor in Singapore Roads . It was a trying time in which "the inactivity on board coupled with the monotonous regularity of enem y bombers had a most depressing effect on morale . From 1st to 6th Februar y there were 25 alerts, and the enemy were over two or three times daily ."1 Hitherto, since Japan entered the war, no convoy had entered Singapore during daylight hours ; but "BM .12", in two groups, arrived in the fore noon of 5th February . Sutlej, with the leading group, Devonshire an d Plancius, was at the eastern end of Selat Sinki when, looking westwards at 11 .15 a .m ., a large column of smoke was seen behind the western en d of Pulau Bukum (the southern side of the eastern entrance to Selat Sinki) . A few minutes later anti-aircraft smoke bursts were seen south of Sulta n Shoal lighthouse on the northern edge of Selat Sink i' s western entrance, and Empress of Asia came into sight closing Sultan Shoal . She was (Sutlej recorded) on fire from bridge to mainmast and steaming at slo w speed, sheering first to port and then to starboard . . . and Yarra was sighted in the direction of Sultan Shoal engaging enemy aircraft . . . . At 11 .35 City of Canterbury was sighted . Both she and Felix Roussel were being attacked by enemy dive bombers . . I am of the opinion that Felix Roussel and City of Canterbury were only save d from the fate of Empress of Asia by the skilful handling and determined defenc e of their ships coupled with the effective gun fire of HMAS Yarra . It is possible that the fire of HMIS Sutlej did have a deterrent effect on the enemy dive bombers whic h were attacking these ships. 2 The three transports of the second group, escorted by Yarra and Danae , were turning in to the western end of Selat Sinki when Japanese aircraf t struck in a series of dive-bombing and machine-gunning attacks . Felix Roussel and Empress of Asia were both hit and set on fire . The firstnamed extinguished her fire promptly, but Empress of Asia was soon blazing fiercely amidships, and anchored off Sultan Shoal with her peopl e crowded at either end of the ship . Yarra, only superficially damaged though ~HMIS Sutlef, sloop (1941), 1,300 tons, six 4-in guns, 18 kts . Bendigo "Letter of Proceedings" . Report of HMIS Sutlef .
2
Dec-Feb
ENEMY FORGING AHEAD
52 9
dive-bombed and machine-gunned, shot down one aircraft for certain wit h two probables ; and while the attack was still in progress, Harrington lai d her bow alongside Empress of Asia's stern (being determined to keep his propellers clear) and, lowering floats and boats and rafts, did a fine rescue job . In all, Yarra lifted 1,804 from the doomed transport, embarking 1,334 directly from the liner, and picking up 470 in boats and floats . Not until no one remained in the after part of Empress of Asia (which was completely isolated from the fore part by the midships fire) di d Harrington cast off, and by then, though as many as possible of those rescued had been sent below and all stores, cabins, and lower deck compartments were filled to capacity, "I was becoming a little dubious of th e stability of H .M .A .S . Yarra, and on getting clear gave orders for all hands to sit " . Meanwhile Bendigo and Wollongong also took a hand . Bendig o rescued seventy-eight, while Wollongong "went alongside Empress of Asia and took off the last survivors, the Master and Chief Engineer, fro m the bow" . 3 Harrington, while observing in his report that "my officers and me n performed their various tasks with that coordination and cooperation whic h they are accustomed to show in unforeseen circumstances", singled ou t Acting Leading Seaman Taylor, 4 who, "the captain of No . 2 gun, deserves commendation in that, on this occasion, as on many others, he controlle d his gun with judgment and determination . This rating's keenness and courage are a good example to all those in his vicinity . " Convoy "BM .12" was the last into Singapore . During the night of th e 30th-31st January the British withdrew from Malaya on to Singapor e Island in the face of the advancing Japanese, and breached the causeway . By that date the line of Japanese advance ran from the southern tip of Malaya across to Borneo where the enemy had reached as far sout h as Balikpapan on the east coast ; thence to Kendari at the south-eas t corner of Celebes ; across the Banda Sea to Ambon ; whence it arched eastwards, embracing the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, to a ne w anchorage at Rabaul . In the race between the arrival of reinforcement s and the Japanese advance, the enemy was forging ahead . IV The initial Japanese assault on Borneo was by Vice-Admiral Ozawa' s western naval force from Camranh Bay in mid-December 1941 . Early in January Vice-Admiral Takahashi ' s eastern force, having completed nava l operations in the Philippines, moved against the Netherlands East Indie s in simultaneous operations through the Macassar Strait and Molucca Sea , for which purpose ships and aircraft assigned to the Third Fleet were divided into a western and eastern invasion force, supported respectively by the 23rd and 21st Air Flotillas which moved into position during th e first week in January, the first-named at Jolo, and the second at Davao . 8 Report of HMIS
Sutlef. Ldg-Seaman R . Taylor, 20863, RAN. HMAS Yarra 1939-41 . B . Carlton, Vic, 29 Apr 1918 . Lost in sinking of Yarra, 4 Mar 1942 .
530
ABDA AND ANZAC
4-25 Ja n
Surface forces assembled in Davao Bay where, on 4th January, the heav y cruiser Myoko was damaged in an Allied air attack and had to go t o Sasebo for repairs . Distant cover for the entire operation was provide d by Vice-Admiral Kondo's main force of Atago, Takao, Kongo and destroyers under his direct command, and the East Support Unit, Haruna, Maya , and destroyers, which two groups operated east of Palau and east of Mindanao respectively ; and overall support was given by Rear-Admira l Takagi in Nachi, with Haguro, Myoko, 5 and two destroyers operating nort h of Menado . In conjunction with these operations the submarines of the 28th, 29th and 30th Divisions were deployed in northern Australian waters on reconnaissance, to attack lines of communication, and to mine Dunda s and Torres Straits . The first surface group to move was that of the western invasion forc e for Tarakan in Borneo . Of sixteen transports carrying the 56th Regimental Group and the 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, it left Davao o n 7th January . Naval escort was by Rear-Admiral Nishimura in Naka wit h eleven destroyers, and small vessels ; with the seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru to provide anti-submarine defence . Air cover was give n by the 23rd Air Flotilla . Rear-Admiral Hirose ' s 2nd Base Force cooperate d at the landings, screening the landing forces and clearing the approaches . The convoy suffered only one attack en route—by three American heav y bombers—and sustained no damage . On the evening of 10th January th e convoy anchored some ten miles east of Tarakan Island, the heavy smok e from which indicated that the Dutch defenders had fired the oil fields . Landing craft set off about midnight, and by dawn on the 11th landing s had been made on the north and south coasts . The next morning the overwhelmed, small Dutch garrison surrendered . On the 16th aircraft of the 23rd Air Flotilla were able to use the airfield, and by 25th January the flotilla's headquarters were established on the island . Simultaneously the eastern invasion force launched an assault o n Menado, on the northern tip of Celebes . It included, for the first time by the Japanese, an attack by naval paratroops . The surface force of si x transports carrying the Sasebo Combined Special Naval Landing Forc e left Davao on 9th January escorted by Rear-Admiral Tanaka in Jintsu with ten destroyers, and smaller vessels ; and with Chitose and Mizuh o of Rear-Admiral Fujita's 11th Seaplane Tender Division to provide antisubmarine defence . These two ships left Davao with the convoy and wen t to Bangka Island harbour (one of the Sangi Islands, just to the north o f Menado) on the 11th . The 21st Air Flotilla gave air cover . Nagara, an d other units of Rear-Admiral Kubo's 1st Base Force cooperated in the actual landing operations . The convoy was sighted by an American Catalina flying-boat in the afternoon of the 10th when about 180 miles nort h of Menado, 6 and Allied aircraft from Ambon and Bum attacked it afte r 6 Japanese accounts, though including Myoko in Takagi's force at this time as part of the 5th Cruiser Squadron, also state that she had to go to Sasebo for repairs after being damage d on 4 Jan . 6 The Catalina 's report gave the convoy as consisting of "one heavy cruiser, eight light cruisers , 15 destroyers, 12 transports, and three submarines" .
11-24 Jan
MENADO OCCUPIED
53 1
it anchored, but without success . Before dawn on the 11th, landings wer e made successfully at the Menado beaches, and also at those at Kema o n the opposite side of the peninsula . Meanwhile, early in the morning of th e 11th, 334 men of the First Paratroop Force of 1st Yokosuka Specia l Landing Force left Davao in twenty-eight transport aircraft and began dropping on Langoan airfield, just south of Menado, shortly before 1 0 a .m . As an essay in this form of warfare the operation left much to b e desired from the Japanese viewpoint . The aircraft were too high whe n the drops were made, and a strong wind scattered the parachutists an d separated them from their equipment . However the attack caused confusion among the defenders, and the Japanese secured the airfield before noon . Next day another 185 paratroops landed on Langoan airfield, occupie d the town of Langoan, and linked up with the seaborne invaders durin g the afternoon of the 12th, by which day the whole of the Menado are a was occupied . The Japanese thus gained control of the northern approaches to the Strait of Macassar and the Molucca Passage, and extended thei r own aircraft range southward while preventing air reinforcement of th e Philippines with other than long-range bombers . By 24th January Langoa n airfield was fully operative, and occupied by the 21st Air Flotilla, an d the Japanese had "succeeded in driving a wedge deep into the eastern par t of the Dutch East Indies " . 7 That the Japanese progress was able to proceed so smoothly was in par t due to the failure of the Allies to implement the policy decided upon at the Singapore conference in February 1941, and confirmed at subsequen t conferences, including that in December 1941, that naval and air force s should be used to forestall the establishment of enemy naval and air base s within striking distance of vital points . 8 At this stage there was still n o central Allied naval command . Emphasis in the use of naval forces continued to be on escort of convoy, contrary to the general agreement at th e December conference that the strongest possible striking forces should b e maintained—of British and Dutch in the west, and of Task Force 5 an d local Dutch forces in the Celebes Sea and Macassar Strait area . At th e time of the Tarakan and Menado invasions the British and Dutch surfac e forces were mainly employed in the escort of Singapore convoys ; an d Task Force 5 was in northern Australian waters . Houston, with Alden , Edsall and Whipple, was in Darwin ; and on 9th January the two other cruisers of the Task Force, Boise (flag of Rear-Admiral Glassford) an d Marblehead, with the five destroyers Stewart, Bulmer, Pope, Parrott, and Barker, left Darwin escorting the transport Bloemfontein (10,081 tons ) to Surabaya . 7 Japanese document, ATIS translation "AL .1096 " , 1948, "Invasion of the Dutch East Indies " . 8 In an "Appreciation on Japanese Strategy" issued on 8 Feb 1942, the Director of COIC remarked : "The Japanese advance has been maintained and their success in all these operations has bee n due in the main to numerical superiority but their careful and successfully planned operations have never been seriously interrupted . Their advanced positions now extend in a semicircle from Thailand to New Britain behind which is a network of major, secondary and advanced operational bases—military, naval, and air . In the case of aerial operations this extensive network permits of a rapid transfer of aircraft from one sphere of activity to another . Further, they have achieved a position which is the inner arc of a circle of attack, while our weaker defendin g forces now hold only the longer and more difficult system of aerial communications . "
532
ABDA AND ANZAC
12-21 Ja n
On hearing of the Japanese assaults, however, Admiral Hart (who ha d taken responsibility for the flank east of Bali, while the British were respon sible for the western flank and the Dutch for the centre) planned a strik e by Task Force 5 on the Japanese convoy at Kema, and on 12th January Houston, Alden, Edsall and Whipple sailed from Darwin to rendezvou s with Glassford in the Banda Sea . But on the 17th, when it was learne d that the Japanese ships were no longer at Kema, the operation was can celled .